Liberal condonation of delay under the Limitation Act turns on sufficient cause, bona fides, and a pragmatic explanation.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 requires "sufficient cause" to be construed liberally so that substantial justice is advanced, and delay is not ative by length alone. A condonation request should be assessed on bona fide conduct, absence of deliberate inaction or gross negligence, and a pragmatic explanation, particularly in governmental matters where file movement and administrative handling may cause delay. On the facts described, the record had moved through departmental channels, was lost and later traced, and further steps were then taken to pursue the matter. The text concludes that the refusal to condone was unduly technical, and the delay should have been condoned so that leave to appeal could be granted.

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Issues: Whether the delay in filing the application for leave to appeal should have been condoned on the facts disclosed, and whether leave to appeal ought to have been granted.

Analysis: Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 requires the existence of sufficient cause, and the expression is to be construed liberally to advance substantial justice. The length of delay is not decisive by itself; what matters is whether the explanation shows bona fide conduct, absence of deliberate inaction or gross negligence, and a reasonable, pragmatic explanation in the context of governmental functioning. The material disclosed showed movement of the file through departmental channels, loss of the record, later tracing of the file, and subsequent steps taken to pursue the matter. In such circumstances, the refusal to condone delay adopted an unduly technical approach inconsistent with the settled rule that matters should ordinarily be decided on merits where no mala fides are shown.

Conclusion: The delay ought to have been condoned, and the application for leave to appeal deserved to be allowed.

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