Inordinate delay and sufficient cause: strict limitation rules barred condonation where prolonged inaction remained unexplained.

Inordinate delay in filing an appeal under the Land Acquisition Act can be condoned only on a satisfactory showing of sufficient cause and bona fide conduct. The Court reiterated that limitation provisions must be applied strictly, and sympathetic or equitable considerations cannot replace a convincing explanation for prolonged inaction and laches. Because the petitioners failed to justify a delay of more than 10 years, and earlier appeals by similarly placed litigants did not excuse their own delay, the refusal to condone the delay was upheld.

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Issues: Whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the High Court's refusal to condone an inordinate delay of more than 10 years in filing the appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Analysis: The petitioners sought condonation of a delay of 10 years, 2 months and 29 days in filing the appeal against the land acquisition compensation award. The High Court had declined to condone the delay after considering the governing principles on limitation and delay, including the need for sufficient cause, the relevance of bona fides, and the distinction between ordinary delay and inordinate delay. The settled law applied was that limitation provisions must be enforced with rigour, and courts cannot condone delay on sympathetic or equitable grounds when the explanation is neither satisfactory nor convincing. The fact that similarly placed persons had pursued appeals earlier and obtained higher compensation did not furnish a valid explanation for the petitioners' long inaction or laches.

Conclusion: The refusal to condone the delay was upheld and no interference was called for.

Ratio Decidendi: Inordinate delay can be condoned only on a satisfactory showing of sufficient cause and bona fide conduct, and belated reliance on relief obtained by diligent litigants does not justify ignoring delay and laches.

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