1998 (9) TMI 602 - SC - Indian Laws

Supreme Court restores trial court's discretionary decision on delay condonation after High Court wrongly overturned it

The SC allowed the appeal regarding condonation of delay. The trial court had accepted the appellant's explanation for delay in its discretion, but the HC ... Condonation of delay - delay of 883 days - Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - Held that:- Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicue up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. In this case, explanation for the delay set up by the appellant was found satisfactory to the trial court in the exercise of its discretion and the High Court went wrong in upsetting the finding, more so when the High Court was exercising revisional jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the respondent must be compensated particularly because the appellant has secured a sum of Rs. fifty thousand from the delinquent-advocate through the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum. 1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED- Whether the delay of 883 days in filing the application to set aside the ex parte decree was sufficiently explained to justify condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.- The scope and exercise of judicial discretion in condoning delay, particularly when the delay is inordinate.- The responsibility of a litigant in monitoring the progress of his case through his advocate and the extent to which negligence on the litigant's part can be excused due to the conduct of the advocate.- The appropriateness of interference by a High Court in revision jurisdiction with the trial court's order condoning delay.- The principle of balancing the interests of the party seeking condonation of delay and the opposite party who suffers prejudice due to such delay.2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSISDelay in Filing Application and Explanation ThereofThe appellant delayed 883 days in filing the application to set aside the ex parte decree. The trial court accepted the explanation offered under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, but the High Court in revision reversed this finding. The appellant's explanation centered on the failure of his advocate to inform him about the dismissal of the application for setting aside the decree and the advocate's subsequent abandonment of the case.The legal framework requires that delay must be explained with 'sufficient cause' to justify condonation under Section 5. Precedents emphasize a liberal construction of 'sufficient cause' to advance substantial justice rather than to penalize litigants for every lapse. The Court referred to authoritative rulings establishing that delay alone, even if lengthy, is not fatal if the explanation is satisfactory and not mala fide or part of a dilatory tactic.The Court noted that the appellant engaged an advocate who failed to inform him of the dismissal for default and later left the profession. The appellant only became aware of the dismissal when execution proceedings were initiated. This explanation was accepted by the trial court as satisfactory.The High Court's reasoning was that the appellant was negligent in not verifying the status of the case and that such negligence disentitles him to blame the advocate. The Court disagreed with this strict approach, observing that while litigants should exercise vigilance, ordinary litigants cannot be expected to continuously monitor their advocates' actions, especially given their own preoccupations. The Court held that such omission should not attract harsh consequences.Judicial Discretion in Condonation of DelayThe Court reiterated the principle that condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion and that there is no fixed limit to the length of delay that can be condoned. The acceptability of the explanation is the sole criterion. The Court distinguished between cases where the trial court refuses to condone delay-where the appellate or revisional court may independently consider the explanation-and cases where the trial court condones delay, which should not be lightly disturbed on revision unless the discretion is exercised on untenable, arbitrary, or perverse grounds.The Court emphasized the public policy underlying limitation laws: they are intended to prevent stale claims and dilatory tactics, ensuring finality and certainty in litigation, but not to destroy rights. The maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium was cited to underscore the balance between finality and justice.The Court further stressed that courts should not presume delay is always deliberate and that some degree of lapse is common in every case. Unless mala fide or dilatory intent is evident, courts must show utmost consideration to the suitor seeking relief.Responsibility of the Litigant and Conduct of the AdvocateThe High Court had faulted the appellant for lack of diligence and vigilance in prosecuting the matter. The Court rejected this harsh characterization, holding that the appellant's conduct was not far from what an ordinary litigant would do. While greater vigilance might have been ideal, the appellant's omission did not warrant denial of relief or characterization as irresponsible.The Court recognized the appellant's grievance against the advocate, who had failed in his duty, evidenced by the consumer forum's order directing compensation to the appellant. This fact lent credibility to the appellant's explanation and justified condonation.Balancing Interests of Parties and CompensationWhile condoning delay, the Court acknowledged the prejudice to the opposite party, who had incurred litigation expenses and was initially successful. As a salutary guideline, the Court ordered the appellant to compensate the respondent with Rs. 10,000 to balance the equities, especially since the appellant had already recovered Rs. 50,000 from the delinquent advocate through the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum.3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS'Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion.''Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse.''Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly.''In every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him.''If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor.''While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.'Final determinations:- The trial court rightly exercised its discretion in condoning the delay based on the appellant's explanation.- The High Court erred in reversing the trial court's order in revision jurisdiction.- The appellant's explanation of advocate's negligence and abandonment was satisfactory and justified condonation despite the inordinate delay.- The appellant should compensate the respondent for the prejudice caused by the delay.- The appeals were allowed, the High Court order set aside, and the trial court order restored subject to payment of Rs. 10,000 by the appellant to the respondent.