Liberal construction of sufficient cause under limitation law protects litigants from non-deliberate counsel lapse and ensures merits review.

A delay of 287 days in filing an appeal was condonable where the explanation showed that the appellate order had been served on counsel but was not communicated to the assessee. The court treated the lapse as an omission by counsel, not deliberate inaction or lack of diligence by the litigant, and applied a liberal, pragmatic construction of "sufficient cause" under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The refusal to condone delay was set aside, and the appeal was directed to be registered and heard on merits.

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Issues: Whether the delay of 287 days in filing the appeal before the Tribunal was liable to be condoned on the ground that the appeal was not filed due to omission on the part of counsel, and whether rejection of the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was justified.

Analysis: The delay was supported by affidavits of the authorised representative and the earlier counsel, and it was ed that the appellate order had been served on counsel but was not communicated to the assessee. The explanation showed omission by counsel rather than deliberate inaction or lack of diligence by the assessee. In such matters, the governing principle is that the expression "sufficient cause" in section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 must receive a liberal and pragmatic construction so that substantial justice is not defeated by a technical or pedantic approach.

Conclusion: The delay was liable to be condoned. The Tribunal's refusal to condone delay was set aside, and the appeal was directed to be registered and decided on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: For condonation under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, a bona fide explanation showing sufficient cause must be assessed pragmatically, and a litigant should not suffer for a non-deliberate lapse attributable to counsel when substantial justice demands adjudication on merits.

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