Liberal condonation of delay in property appeals may favour hearing on merits where substantive rights remain unresolved.

A delay of 444 days in filing a first appeal was discussed in the context of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, with emphasis on the liberal, justice-oriented meaning of "sufficient cause." The text states that, in a property dispute where the merits had not yet been finally tested, the court should avoid a pedantic approach and should not shut out adjudication merely because of delay. It further notes that the respondents had not acquired an indefeasible right before the final decree, that multiple preliminary decrees are permissible, and that any prejudice could be met with costs. On that basis, the delay should have been condoned and the appeal restored for decision on merits.

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Issues: Whether the delay of 444 days in filing the first appeal ought to have been condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, particularly in a civil dispute concerning property rights.

Analysis: The explanation for the delay was assessed against the settled principle that "sufficient cause" under Section 5 must receive a liberal and justice-oriented construction so that substantive rights are not defeated on the ground of delay alone. In civil litigation, especially where the underlying dispute concerns property and the merits of the challenge have not yet been finally tested, the court should avoid a pedantic approach. The fact that the respondents had not yet acquired an indefeasible right before the final decree and that multiple preliminary decrees are permissible in law reinforced the need to permit the appeal to be heard on merits. The court also noted that any prejudice could have been compensated by costs rather than by shutting out adjudication altogether.

Conclusion: The delay should have been condoned, and the appellants were entitled to have the appeal restored and decided on merits.

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