Liberal construction of sufficient cause upheld for delayed appeal where bona fide conduct and counsel's default were shown.

For condonation of a 928-day delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 'sufficient cause' was construed liberally where the explanation showed bona fide conduct, due diligence, and reliance on counsel pursuing the matter. The delay was attributed to counsel's default rather than any want of diligence by the applicants, and the Court held that substantial justice should not be defeated on that basis. The respondent's plea of prejudice was rejected in light of the nature of the impugned order and the pendency of connected matters, and the delay was condoned subject to costs.

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Issues: Whether the delay of 928 days in filing the Letters Patent Appeal could be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Analysis: The explanation showed that the writ petition had been disposed of by following an earlier order, that a batch of connected appeals on the same issue was already pending, and that the applicants acted on the understanding that counsel was pursuing the matter. The Court treated the delay as sufficiently explained, accepted that the applicants had shown bona fide and due diligence on the facts, and applied a liberal approach to the expression "sufficient cause" so that substantial justice would not be defeated by counsel's omission. The respondent's plea of prejudice was rejected in view of the nature of the order sought to be appealed from and the pendency of connected matters.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned and the application was allowed, subject to payment of costs.

Ratio Decidendi: For condonation under Section 5, the expression "sufficient cause" must receive a liberal construction where the explanation shows bona fide conduct and the delay is attributable to counsel's default rather than want of diligence by the party, particularly when refusal would defeat substantial justice.

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