2025 (12) TMI 1608 - HC - Central Excise

Delay in filing penalty appeal during COVID-19 portal disruptions held 'sufficient cause' u/s5; condonation allowed.

The dominant issue was whether 'sufficient cause' existed under s.5 Limitation Act to condone a 2262-day delay in filing a statutory appeal against a ... Refusal to condone a delay of 2262 days in filing the statutory appeal - summary dismissal of the Assessee’s plea upon the characterization of their inaction as “total negligence” - extinguishment of Appellant’s right to challenge a significant financial penalty on merits - HELD THAT:- It is a well-settled principle of law that the expression “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, must receive a liberal construction to advance the cause of justice. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji [1987 (2) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT] when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred. The global disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic cannot be ignored. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in its Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2020 [2022 (1) TMI 385 - SC ORDER], took cognizance of the hardships faced by litigants and directed the exclusion of the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 for the purposes of limitation. The Tribunal’s expectation that the Appellant should have monitored the digital portal daily during this period is, in our considered view, divorced from the ground realities of the time - The Order-in-Original imposes a penalty of Rs. 10,23,864/-. To deny a citizen the right to test the legality of such a penalty on the grounds of a non-deliberate delay would be unconscionable. Law is not meant to be an extinguish any substantive rights. The Substantial Question of Law is therefore, answered in favour of the Appellant - appeal disposed off. 1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED 1) Whether refusal to condone a 2262-day delay in filing a statutory appeal was justified, when the delay was attributed to a bona fide attempt to resolve the dispute through the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019, and when the Tribunal treated the conduct as 'total negligence.' 2) Whether, in assessing 'sufficient cause,' the Tribunal adopted an impermissibly hyper-technical approach by (i) insisting on a strict explanation for the pre-scheme period and (ii) rejecting the plea of ignorance of the scheme-application rejection despite pandemic-era realities, thereby defeating adjudication on merits of a significant penalty. 2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue 1: Justification for refusing condonation of delay as 'total negligence' despite pursuit of a settlement scheme Legal framework: The Court examined the standard of 'sufficient cause' under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, emphasizing that it must be construed liberally to advance substantial justice rather than defeat substantive rights on procedural rigidity. Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that the Tribunal's characterization of the appellant's conduct as 'total negligence' was unsustainable because the appellant's conduct showed an intent to resolve liability through a beneficial, State-sponsored dispute resolution mechanism. Even if the appellant's scheme application ultimately failed (including on eligibility), the act of applying reflected bona fide pursuit of settlement and could not be treated as a dilatory or mala fide tactic warranting denial of adjudication on merits. Conclusions: The Tribunal was not justified in refusing condonation on the ground of 'total negligence.' The Court set aside the impugned refusal and held that the delay deserved to be condoned, subject to balancing equities through costs. Issue 2: Whether the Tribunal's approach to the 'unexplained' periods and portal-based 'ignorance' was hyper-technical, including the effect of pandemic disruption Legal framework: The Court applied the principle that limitation law should not operate as an 'extinguishing engine' for substantive rights, and considered the judicially recognized exclusion of limitation during the COVID-19 disruption period (as referenced by the Court) as relevant to evaluating diligence expectations. Interpretation and reasoning: (i) On the Tribunal's insistence that the period between expiry of limitation and the scheme application was unaccounted for, the Court reasoned that once the later delay was shown to be rooted in bona fide pursuit of settlement, a broader and justice-oriented view could be taken of the preceding period rather than treating it as fatal. (ii) On the Tribunal's view that rejection status being available on a public portal defeated the plea of ignorance, the Court found the expectation of constant monitoring-particularly during the pandemic-era disruption-unrealistic and divorced from ground realities. The Court also stressed that denying a hearing on merits in a matter involving a significant penalty merely due to non-deliberate delay would be unconscionable and contrary to substantial justice. Conclusions: The Tribunal adopted a hyper-technical approach by treating the portal availability and the earlier period as determinative against condonation, without giving due weight to bona fide pursuit of settlement and pandemic realities. The Court answered the substantial question of law in favour of the appellant, condoned the 2262-day delay, and directed restoration of the appeal for decision on merits, subject to payment of costs to the Revenue within a fixed time.