Condonation of delay depends on sufficient cause and reasonable diligence; explained internal delay was accepted and appeal could proceed on merits.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act requires sufficient cause for delay, assessed on the facts of each case with a liberal but not uncritical approach. The text states that limitation is intended to promote finality, yet should not defeat substantive rights where the delay is explained and no avoidable default is shown. Applying that test, the explanation for a 155-day delay in filing the appeal was treated as plausible and unintentional, arising from the appellant's internal decision-making process. The delay was therefore condoned, and the appeal was directed to proceed on merits before the Tribunal.

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Issues: Whether the delay of 155 days in filing the appeal before the Tribunal was liable to be condoned.

Analysis: The governing test under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is whether sufficient cause is shown for not preferring the appeal within time. The expression is elastic and must be applied on the facts of each case, keeping in view that limitation serves public policy but does not exist to defeat substantive rights. The explanation offered for the delay was accepted as plausible, and the delay was treated as unintentional and attributable to the decision-making process within the appellant organisation.

Conclusion: The delay of 155 days was condoned and the appeal was to be heard on merits by the Tribunal.

Ratio Decidendi: For condonation of delay, the Court must assess whether sufficient cause is made out on the facts of the particular case, applying a liberal approach where the delay is short and a stricter approach where it is inordinate, while focusing on reasonable diligence and the absence of avoidable default.

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