Restoration after dismissal for default requires strict compliance with the special time limit and sufficient cause in insolvency proceedings.

Where a special restoration rule expressly requires an application within 30 days and proof of sufficient cause after dismissal for default, inherent powers and general enlargement of time cannot be used to bypass that scheme. The absence of a separate condonation application is not conclusive, but the Tribunal must still be satisfied that sufficient cause exists within the prescribed framework. Repeated non-appearance, a five-month delay, and a largely unexplained counsel lapse were treated as insufficient in insolvency proceedings, where expedition and finality are central. Restoration was therefore refused and the dismissal of the restoration request was sustained.

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Issues: (i) Whether a restoration application filed beyond the 30-day period prescribed for revival of a petition dismissed for default could be entertained without a formal condonation application; (ii) Whether the explanation offered for the delay and non-appearance constituted sufficient cause for restoration in insolvency proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether a restoration application filed beyond the 30-day period prescribed for revival of a petition dismissed for default could be entertained without a formal condonation application.

Analysis: Rule 48(2) of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 specifically governs restoration of a petition dismissed for default and requires the applicant to move within thirty days and satisfy the Tribunal as to sufficient cause for non-appearance. The general powers under Rule 11 and the power to enlarge time under Rule 15 cannot be invoked to override an express procedural prescription. Rule 153 also does not displace the specific restoration framework where the rules expressly regulate the situation. The absence of a separate written condonation application is not decisive by itself, but the Tribunal must still find sufficient cause within the statutory framework.

Conclusion: The delayed restoration application was not maintainable merely by reliance on inherent powers or enlargement of time.

Issue (ii): Whether the explanation offered for the delay and non-appearance constituted sufficient cause for restoration in insolvency proceedings.

Analysis: The petition had been repeatedly unattended, the restoration request came after about five months, and the explanation was founded mainly on counsel's lapse and lack of communication. In insolvency matters, expedition and finality are central, and the standard of sufficient cause cannot be diluted so as to excuse repeated default and unexplained inaction. The Tribunal found that the explanation was not bona fide enough to justify condonation of the delay or to warrant restoration of the main petition.

Conclusion: No sufficient cause was made out, and restoration was rightly refused.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the refusal of restoration failed, and the dismissal of the restoration application was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special procedural rule expressly prescribes the time and conditions for restoration after dismissal for default, inherent or general enlargement powers cannot be used to bypass that express scheme absent sufficient cause.

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