1994 (5) TMI 281 - HC - Indian Laws

Condonation of Delay: Fact vs. Principle in Administrative Delays

Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad through the Municipal Commissioner Versus Voltas Limited and etc. etc.

The court concluded that 'sufficient cause' for condonation of delay is a question of fact, not principle. Administrative delays must be supported by ... - Issues Involved:1. Whether the question of condonation of delay, and in this context, 'sufficient cause', is a question of fact or a question of principle.2. Whether 'administrative delay/administrative reasons/administrative procedure' constitutes 'sufficient cause' for condonation of delay.3. Whether the merits of the substantive matter should be the predominant factor in deciding the sufficiency of the cause for delay.Detailed Analysis:1. Condonation of Delay: Question of Fact or PrincipleThe court examined whether 'sufficient cause' for condonation of delay is a question of fact or principle. It was concluded that the phrase 'sufficient cause' pertains to establishing appropriate facts before the court. Thus, it is fundamentally a question of fact, not principle. The court emphasized that the sufficiency of the cause for condonation of delay must be established through facts specific to each case, and a liberal view should be taken in interpreting these facts to advance substantial justice.2. Administrative Delay as Sufficient CauseThe court addressed whether administrative delays constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. It was held that merely stating 'administrative delay/administrative reasons/administrative procedure' does not automatically establish sufficient cause. The court must be satisfied with precise factual reasons for the delay. The court underscored that the term 'sufficient' within 'sufficient cause' necessitates a factual foundation, and each case must be evaluated on its specific facts. It was noted that the doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State, are treated equally, and no special leniency should be granted to government bodies without adequate factual justification.3. Merits of the Substantive MatterThe court considered whether the merits of the substantive matter should be the predominant factor in deciding the sufficiency of the cause for delay. It was concluded that merits cannot override the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The merits of the case cannot be regarded as the sole or predominant factor while adjudicating upon the sufficiency of the cause for condonation of delay. The court emphasized that until the delay is condoned, the court cannot take cognizance of the merits of the substantive matter. The application for condonation of delay creates a jurisdictional barrier against considering the substantive matter on merits.Additional Observations:- The court noted that each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and no rigid formula can be applied.- The court highlighted that the extent of the delay is immaterial if sufficient cause is shown. Conversely, even a short delay may not be condoned if no sufficient cause is established.- The court reiterated that while a liberal view should be taken in interpreting facts constituting sufficient cause, this does not mean that all applications for condonation must be granted. The court must exercise its discretion judicially based on well-established principles.Conclusion:The court concluded that:1. 'Sufficient cause' is a question of fact, not principle.2. Administrative delays must be factually substantiated to constitute sufficient cause.3. The merits of the substantive matter cannot override the requirement to establish sufficient cause for condonation of delay.These applications were to be placed before the Division Bench for a decision on merits in accordance with these principles.