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Issues: (i) Whether the appellate authority was bound to insist on deposit of 50 per cent of the assessed tax as a condition for entertaining the appeal under section 20(1) of the Tripura Sales Tax Act, 1976. (ii) Whether the writ petitions could be entertained under article 226 of the Constitution of India despite the availability and invocation of the statutory appellate and revisional remedies.
Issue (i): Whether the appellate authority was bound to insist on deposit of 50 per cent of the assessed tax as a condition for entertaining the appeal under section 20(1) of the Tripura Sales Tax Act, 1976.
Analysis: The statutory scheme made deposit of at least 50 per cent of the assessed amount the normal rule for maintaining an appeal. The appellate authority had only a limited discretion to waive that requirement for recorded reasons. The challenge to the pre-deposit provision had already been rejected by the apex court, and the provision stood upheld. On that basis, the appellate authority and the revisional authority acted within the statutory mandate in insisting upon the deposit before the appeal could be entertained.
Conclusion: The pre-deposit requirement was mandatory, and the appellate and revisional orders were valid.
Issue (ii): Whether the writ petitions could be entertained under article 226 of the Constitution of India despite the availability and invocation of the statutory appellate and revisional remedies.
Analysis: The appellants had already invoked the statutory appeal and revision but declined to comply with the statutory precondition. The writ jurisdiction under article 226 is not a substitute for the statutory appellate process, and mere existence of a grievance against the assessment order did not justify bypassing the statutory scheme. No case of gross injustice or jurisdictional failure was shown that would warrant interference despite the alternative remedy. The learned single Judge's refusal to re-examine the assessment on merits was therefore justified.
Conclusion: The writ petitions were not fit for interference under article 226.
Final Conclusion: The statutory pre-deposit condition was enforceable and the writ court declined to bypass the alternative remedies, so the appellants obtained no relief.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a taxing statute makes pre-deposit a condition for entertaining an appeal, the appellate authority must enforce that condition unless the statute itself permits waiver, and the High Court should not use article 226 to bypass the statutory appellate machinery absent gross injustice or jurisdictional error.