Issues: (i) Whether the admitted execution and delivery of the cheques, the subsequent monetary settlement, and the defence of Security Cheque rebutted the statutory presumptions and sustained the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; (ii) Whether cheque No. 315387 was void for Material Alteration or could not attract Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for want of proved presentment to the drawee bank; (iii) Whether refusal to admit Additional Evidence and summon further witnesses disclosed a material irregularity; (iv) Whether the compensation and substantive sentence required interference.

Issue (i): Whether the admitted execution and delivery of the cheques, the subsequent monetary settlement, and the defence of Security Cheque rebutted the statutory presumptions and sustained the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Analysis: Revisional Jurisdiction over concurrent factual findings is confined to perversity, material illegality, arbitrariness, or disregard of relevant evidence; it does not permit reappreciation merely because another view is possible. Upon admitted signatures and delivery of the cheques, the Statutory Presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 operated in favour of consideration and a legally enforceable liability. Those presumptions required rebuttal through a probable defence on a Preponderance of Probabilities. The written settlement, attesting testimony, and delivery of three cheques supported a settled monetary obligation. The unsubstantiated Security Cheque defence, allegations of incomplete construction, and proposed adjustment of contractual dues did not displace that obligation.

Conclusion: The statutory presumptions were not rebutted, and the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was rightly sustained against the Petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether cheque No. 315387 was void for Material Alteration or could not attract Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for want of proved presentment to the drawee bank.

Analysis: Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 invalidates an instrument only upon proof of an unauthorised material change to an existing entry. The Petitioner admitted signing and delivering the cheque but did not establish when or how an amount already entered was altered without consent. The corresponding numerical and written amounts, together with the absence of supporting evidence, did not prove Material Alteration. The collecting bank's endorsement referring to alteration was insufficient by itself to establish that the instrument was void. Further, the record did not prove the factual assertion that the cheque had not been presented to the drawee bank.

Conclusion: The objections based on Material Alteration and alleged non-presentment failed, and cheque No. 315387 continued to support the conviction against the Petitioner.

Issue (iii): Whether refusal to admit Additional Evidence and summon further witnesses disclosed a material irregularity.

Analysis: Additional Evidence under Section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 may be received where necessary, but the provision does not confer an unrestricted right to introduce material not relied upon at trial. The proposed affidavit had not been invoked during cross-examination or earlier stages of the defence, contained an erased paragraph, and was reasonably treated as an afterthought. The request under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to summon further witnesses at final arguments lacked sufficient justification; the construction-related evidence was already on record and did not displace the distinct liability arising from the settlement.

Conclusion: Refusal to admit the proposed evidence and summon further witnesses disclosed no material irregularity and was sustained against the Petitioner.

Issue (iv): Whether the compensation and substantive sentence required interference.

Analysis: The compensation amount, comprising the cheque amount and an additional sum reflecting prolonged deprivation of payment, was practical and reasonable. The liability remained unpaid despite deposits made during proceedings. Sentencing Proportionality nevertheless required consideration of the property-development context, family circumstances, partial deposits, and the substantial compensation continuing to be payable.

Conclusion: The compensation and default sentence were affirmed, but the substantive sentence was reduced from ten months to six months' simple imprisonment, partly in favour of the Petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The conviction, compensatory liability, and default penalty remain operative, while the custodial sentence stands recalibrated to six months' simple imprisonment.

Ratio Decidendi: An accused who admits signing and delivering a cheque must rebut the presumptions of consideration and legally enforceable liability on a preponderance of probabilities; an unsupported Security Cheque defence or bank endorsement of alteration does not establish such rebuttal.

Issues: Whether an adjudication order may confirm a GST demand exceeding the amount proposed in the show-cause notice.

Analysis: Section 75(7) of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 prohibits confirmation of a demand exceeding that proposed in the show-cause notice. The notice proposed tax, interest and penalty at specified amounts, whereas the adjudication order confirmed a substantially higher tax demand and penalty. Such confirmation exceeded the statutory authority conferred on the adjudicating authority.

Conclusion: An adjudicating authority cannot confirm tax, interest or penalty beyond the amount proposed in the show-cause notice; an order doing so is without jurisdiction.

Issues: (i) Whether the tax demand could be sustained when the show-cause notice did not disclose the material factual and legal basis for treating the February 2020 entry as wrongful input tax credit and the orders gave no reasoned answer to the restoration explanation; (ii) Whether a payment of IGST under the wrong tax head could be corrected by unilateral recredit in GSTR-3B, and how the correct-head payments must be treated; and (iii) Whether the consequential interest and penalty were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the tax demand could be sustained when the show-cause notice did not disclose the material factual and legal basis for treating the February 2020 entry as wrongful input tax credit and the orders gave no reasoned answer to the restoration explanation.

Analysis: Section 73(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, read with Sections 75(6) and 75(7), requires the notice to disclose the factual and legal basis of the proposed demand and confines confirmation to the stated grounds. Although the notice identified the amount and month, it did not specify which condition under Section 16(2) failed or distinguish a fresh claim of credit on inward supplies from restoration of credit earlier used for output-tax payment under a wrong head. The subsequent reliance on supplier-related defaults and the refund-procedure objection did not cure this omission. The adjudication and appellate orders also did not reconcile the original IGST debit with the correct-head payments or give a reasoned answer to the explanation. This denied natural justice and resulted in non-speaking orders on material issues.

Conclusion: The demand founded on the deficient show-cause notice and unsupported by reasoned findings was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a payment of IGST under the wrong tax head could be corrected by unilateral recredit in GSTR-3B, and how the correct-head payments must be treated.

Analysis: Section 19(1) of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Rule 89(1A) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules prescribe refund as the statutory mechanism for IGST paid on a supply subsequently found to be intra-State; Section 77(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 excludes interest on the correct Central and State tax liability. Output tax paid under the wrong head does not automatically become fresh input tax credit under Section 16 merely through a GSTR-3B entry. However, the payments made under the correct Central and State tax heads through DRC-03 were established and had to be recognised. The framework required reconciliation of the original IGST payment, the correct-head payments and any benefit obtained through recredit, so as to give effect to revenue neutrality and avoid double taxation without permitting duplicate credit or refund.

Conclusion: Unilateral recredit through GSTR-3B was not automatically lawful; nevertheless, the correct-head tax payments had to be recognised and fiscally reconciled without any duplicate credit or refund, partly in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the consequential interest and penalty were sustainable.

Analysis: Interest under Section 50(3) and Rule 88B of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules requires findings on wrongful availment and utilisation of input tax credit, including the relevant ledger balance, utilisation and period of benefit. Section 77(2) also protected the correct Central and State tax payment from interest. Penalty under Section 73(11) could not independently survive once the finding of wrongful credit and the underlying demand failed.

Conclusion: The consequential interest and penalty were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: A correction involving payment of tax under a wrong head must follow the statutory refund framework, but the Department must recognise tax actually paid under the correct heads and cannot sustain recovery on an inadequately disclosed charge or an unreasoned rejection of the taxpayer's explanation.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a GST demand treats a recredit as wrongly availed input tax credit, the show-cause notice must disclose the factual and legal basis of that charge and adjudication must address the taxpayer's actual explanation; the prescribed refund process for a wrong-head payment does not permit disregard of tax already paid under the correct heads.

Issues: (i) Whether a corporate guarantor's liability is a financial debt despite the guarantee not having been invoked before commencement of CIRP; (ii) Whether an individual homebuyer may object to inclusion of creditors in the CoC without proceeding through the authorised representative; (iii) Whether the lender, debenture trustee, and a recent assignee were related parties barred from CoC participation.

Issue (i): Whether a corporate guarantor's liability is a financial debt despite the guarantee not having been invoked before commencement of CIRP.

Analysis: Section 5(8) encompasses liability under a corporate guarantee. A financial creditor under Section 5(7) is a person to whom financial debt is owed and need not establish an existing default for lodging a claim in CIRP. Default under Section 3(12) is material to commencement of CIRP under Section 7(1), not to the existence of financial debt.

Conclusion: A corporate guarantor's liability is a financial debt even where the guarantee was not invoked before CIRP commenced, and the claims could be lodged. In favour of the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether an individual homebuyer may object to inclusion of creditors in the CoC without proceeding through the authorised representative.

Analysis: The authorised representative of creditors in a class has a limited statutory role of attending CoC meetings and voting on their behalf. That role does not prevent an individual homebuyer from challenging the inclusion of a related party in the CoC. An earlier direction permitting resubmission of claims without hearing other financial creditors does not operate as res judicata against their subsequent objection.

Conclusion: An individual homebuyer had locus to raise the related-party objection; representation through the authorised representative was unnecessary for that purpose. In favour of the respondents.

Issue (iii): Whether the lender, debenture trustee, and a recent assignee were related parties barred from CoC participation.

Analysis: Section 5(24)(m)(i) requires association through participation in the corporate debtor's policy-making processes. This enquiry is less exacting than the positive and proactive control required for disqualification under Section 29A. The contractual rights to appoint a nominee director, resolve deadlocks, approve and modify construction budgets, regulate key managerial personnel, oversee project implementation, appoint sales agents, and control project revenues and escrow accounts established pervasive participation in policy-making and business supervision. The post-CIRP assignment was not a bona fide assignment and could not be used to defeat the related-party exclusion.

Conclusion: The lender was a related party; it, the debenture trustee acting for its debenture interest, and the recent assignee could not be represented, participate, or vote in the CoC. In favour of the respondents.

Final Conclusion: Although the corporate-guarantee claims constituted financial debt, the related-party exclusion precluded the lender, trustee, and assignee from CoC rights, and the individual homebuyer's objection was maintainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A financial creditor whose contractual rights enable participation in a corporate debtor's policy-making processes is a related party and cannot obtain CoC representation through a post-CIRP assignment that is not bona fide.

Issues: (i) Whether the application under Section 95(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 against the personal guarantor was filed within the applicable limitation period; and (ii) Whether admission of a creditor's claim by a resolution professional constitutes an acknowledgment extending limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Issue (i): Whether the application under Section 95(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 against the personal guarantor was filed within the applicable limitation period.

Analysis: Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribed a three-year period. The limitation period commenced upon expiry of the period specified in the demand invoking the personal guarantee. After excluding the period directed to be excluded during the COVID-19 pandemic, the limitation period expired before the application was instituted.

Conclusion: The application was barred by limitation and was not maintainable, in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether admission of a creditor's claim by a resolution professional constitutes an acknowledgment extending limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Analysis: A valid acknowledgment under Section 18 must be made by the person against whom the right is claimed, or an authorised person, before expiry of limitation, and must consciously and unequivocally admit the subsisting liability. Admission of a claim by a resolution professional is an administrative act of collating and recording claims, not an adjudicatory admission of liability by the corporate debtor.

Conclusion: Admission of the claim by the resolution professional did not amount to an acknowledgment and could not extend or renew limitation, in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The limitation objection prevailed because no valid acknowledgment existed to preserve the claim beyond the applicable limitation period for initiating the personal-guarantor insolvency process.

Ratio Decidendi: A resolution professional's administrative admission of a claim is not an acknowledgment of debt capable of extending a subsisting limitation period under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Issues: Whether the omission of Rule 96(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, without a saving clause, applies to pending claims for refund of integrated tax paid on exports.

Analysis: The Supreme Court ruling, accepted by the revenue authorities, was applied. Omission of Rule 96(10) without a saving or sunset clause extinguishes the restriction for pending proceedings; Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 does not preserve proceedings under an omitted rule. The recommendation that the omission operate prospectively was advisory and could not preserve the omitted restriction.

Conclusion: Rule 96(10) cannot be applied to pending export refund proceedings. Refund applications are to be considered afresh in accordance with law without prejudice from the earlier orders.

Issues: Whether the bail condition requiring deposit of the passport and prior permission for every foreign journey should be modified.

Analysis: Bail restrictions are intended to secure the accused's participation in trial. The applicant had complied with the existing condition, obtained permission for overseas travel on previous occasions, and redeposited the passport after each visit. The recurring requirement of obtaining release of the passport was found to hinder foreign travel, while advance intimation to the trial court adequately protected the purpose of the bail condition.

Conclusion: The passport-deposit requirement was dispensed with. The applicant must notify the trial court in writing thirty days before leaving India, specifying the foreign-travel schedule, and must inform the trial court in writing upon return.

Issues: Whether the public-interest challenge to the GST rate applicable to online legal research and legal educational data services was maintainable.

Analysis: The challenge concerned a tax rate in force since 2017. The petitioner, who had been practising since 2020, gave no explanation for the delayed challenge or for the asserted sudden awareness of the rate. These circumstances did not support the maintainability of the public-interest petition. No adjudication was made on the legality or reasonableness of the GST rate.

Outcome: Petition dismissed.

Issues: Whether rejection of the statutory appeal as time-barred without considering the grounds stated for condonation of delay was sustainable.

Analysis: The appellate order rejected the appeal solely by referring to the period of delay and did not address the explanation that the appellant lacked knowledge of the notices and order because the registered portal e-mail belonged to a former accountant. The requirement of a reasoned order obliged the appellate authority to consider the grounds advanced for condonation, whether accepted or rejected, before denying consideration of the appeal on merits.

Conclusion: The rejection of the appeal was unsustainable. The appellate order was set aside, the delay was condoned, and the appeal was directed to be decided on merits within three months, subject to payment of costs.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessment order could be revised under section 263 where the Assessing Officer had examined foreign donations and their application; (ii) Whether payment to the recipient company attracted section 13(1)(c)(ii) read with section 13(3).

Issue (i): Whether the assessment order could be revised under section 263 where the Assessing Officer had examined foreign donations and their application.

Analysis: The assessment record showed that specific enquiries were made regarding the foreign contribution, its utilisation for COVID-19 relief activities, and the supporting funding and cost details. Detailed replies and documents were furnished and the returned income was accepted after such verification. The deeming conditions under Explanation 2 to section 263 were not attracted where the Assessing Officer had made the requisite enquiry and adopted a legally possible view; revision cannot rest merely on a different view of the Commissioner.

Conclusion: The jurisdiction under section 263 was invalidly invoked; this issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether payment to the recipient company attracted section 13(1)(c)(ii) read with section 13(3).

Analysis: Section 13(1)(c)(ii) applies only where the trust's income or property is applied for the benefit of persons specified under section 13(3), including a concern in which such persons hold substantial interest. The record did not establish that any specified person held the requisite substantial interest in the recipient company, or that the payment conferred any direct or indirect benefit upon such person. The payment was shown to be applied towards the charitable COVID-19 relief project.

Conclusion: The payment did not attract section 13(1)(c)(ii) or section 13(3); this issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory prerequisites for revising the completed assessment were absent, and the revisional action could not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: Revision under section 263 is impermissible where the Assessing Officer has made relevant enquiries and adopted a possible view, unless both error and prejudice to revenue are established; an alleged section 13 violation also requires proof of benefit to a specified person or a concern in which such person has substantial interest.

Outcome: Civil appeals dismissed on account of tax effect below the prescribed monetary limit; the question of law on classification was kept open.

Issues: (i) Whether the Authority may rule on the permissibility of overseas agency-commission remittances under foreign-trade and foreign-exchange law; (ii) Whether the relevant CBIC circulars impose a cap or remittance restriction on overseas agency commission, or solely govern computation of export benefits; and (iii) Whether overseas agency commission exceeding 12.5% affects the Section 14 transaction value or the FOB basis for export incentives.

Issue (i): Whether the Authority may rule on the permissibility of overseas agency-commission remittances under foreign-trade and foreign-exchange law.

Analysis: Section 28H(2) of the Customs Act, 1962 permits an advance ruling on customs valuation and related export-benefit questions. The permissibility of remittance under the foreign-trade, FEMA and RBI frameworks does not fall within that jurisdiction.

Conclusion: No ruling was made on the permissibility or remittance of agency commission under the foreign-trade, FEMA or RBI regimes.

Issue (ii): Whether the relevant CBIC circulars impose a cap or remittance restriction on overseas agency commission, or solely govern computation of export benefits.

Analysis: Circular No. 64/2003-Cus. dated 21.07.2003, Circular No. 33/2019-Customs dated 19.09.2019 and Circular No. 20/2026-Customs dated 10.04.2026 prescribe the treatment of agency commission and foreign bank charges for duty drawback, RoDTEP and RoSCTL benefits. They permit benefit computation without deduction up to the overall 12.5% threshold and require deduction only of the excess for those benefits. The circulars neither amend Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 or the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Export Goods) Rules, 2007 nor regulate the payment or remittance of commission.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the 12.5% threshold is not a cap or remittance restriction on agency commission; it operates only for the specified export-benefit computations.

Issue (iii): Whether overseas agency commission exceeding 12.5% affects the Section 14 transaction value or the FOB basis for export incentives.

Analysis: Under Section 14(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 and Rule 3 of the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Export Goods) Rules, 2007, export value is the transaction value unless the declared value is rejected under Rule 8 of those Rules. Commission paid by an exporter to its overseas agent from sale proceeds is a selling expense and does not reduce the price paid or payable by the overseas buyer. For the specified export incentives, agency commission and foreign bank charges exceeding the overall 12.5% threshold are deductible from the FOB basis only to the extent of the excess.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, agency commission exceeding 12.5% does not by itself reduce an otherwise acceptable transaction value; only the excess affects computation of the specified export incentives.

Final Conclusion: Under the customs valuation framework, the 12.5% threshold governs only the FOB basis for the identified export benefits and does not alter the accepted transaction value or independently create a customs consequence for higher agency commission.

Ratio Decidendi: Administrative circulars prescribing export-benefit computation cannot amend statutory transaction-value rules or regulate matters beyond their stated subject matter.

Issues: (i) Whether the relevant customs circulars prescribe a cap on overseas agency commission or regulate its payment or remittance; (ii) Whether overseas agency commission exceeding 12.5% of FOB value affects the transaction value of export goods for customs valuation; (iii) Whether commission and foreign bank charges exceeding 12.5% of FOB value must be deducted while computing specified export incentives.

Issue (i): Whether the relevant customs circulars prescribe a cap on overseas agency commission or regulate its payment or remittance.

Analysis: Section 28H(2) of the Customs Act, 1962 permits a ruling on customs valuation and export-benefit matters. Circular No. 64/2003-Customs, Circular No. 33/2019-Customs and Circular No. 20/2026-Customs govern the treatment of agency commission and foreign bank charges only for computation of the export benefits specified in those circulars. They do not amend the statutory valuation framework or address foreign-exchange remittances. Questions concerning permissibility under FEMA, RBI directions, the foreign trade law or policy fall outside advance-ruling jurisdiction in this proceeding.

Conclusion: The customs circulars do not prescribe a cap on agency commission or regulate its payment or remittance; no ruling is made on permissibility under FEMA, RBI directions, foreign trade law or policy.

Issue (ii): Whether overseas agency commission exceeding 12.5% of FOB value affects the transaction value of export goods for customs valuation.

Analysis: Under Section 14(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 and Rule 3 of the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Export Goods) Rules, 2007, export value is the transaction value, subject to rejection under Rule 8. Commission paid by an exporter to its overseas agent from export proceeds is a selling expense and does not reduce the price paid or payable by the buyer for delivery at the place of exportation. Neither the statute nor the Export Valuation Rules provide for deduction of such commission from transaction value merely because it exceeds 12.5% of FOB value.

Conclusion: Agency commission exceeding 12.5% does not reduce the otherwise acceptable transaction value or FOB value for customs valuation, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether commission and foreign bank charges exceeding 12.5% of FOB value must be deducted while computing specified export incentives.

Analysis: The circulars permit export benefits on FOB value without deduction where agency commission and foreign bank charges, separately or jointly, are within the overall 12.5% threshold. They require only the excess over that threshold to be deducted from FOB value for Duty Drawback and extend the same treatment to RoDTEP and RoSCTL benefits.

Conclusion: For Duty Drawback, RoDTEP and RoSCTL, agency commission and foreign bank charges exceeding the aggregate 12.5% threshold must be deducted from FOB value to the extent of the excess, against the assessee to that extent.

Final Conclusion: A commission above 12.5% neither alters the statutory customs valuation of accepted export goods nor independently attracts a consequence under the Customs Act, 1962, but the excess correspondingly reduces the FOB base eligible for the specified export incentives.

Ratio Decidendi: CBIC circulars governing export-incentive computation cannot amend the statutory transaction-value rules or impose an independent cap on an exporter's overseas agency commission.

Issues: Whether the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was barred by limitation, having regard to service of the order-in-original by affixture and the restricted power to condone delay.

Analysis: The order-in-original was sent to the registered address and, after postal return, was served by chaspa on that premises under a panchnama. The same registered address continued to be used in subsequent proceedings, while postal communications were repeatedly returned because no person was available. The recorded service by affixture was accepted as reliable evidence of service. Section 85(3A) of the Finance Act, 1994 prescribes two months for filing an appeal and permits condonation only for a further one month on sufficient cause. The statutory maximum period cannot be extended beyond that limit.

Conclusion: The first appeal, filed beyond the maximum statutory period after valid service by affixture, was time-barred and could not be entertained; the finding is against the assessee.

Issues: Whether proceedings to reopen deemed assessments under Section 27 of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006 were barred by limitation, and whether the dealer's request for copies of assessment records could extend the statutory period.

Analysis: The returns having been filed with the prescribed documents and proof of tax payment, the assessments stood deemed completed under Section 22(2) of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006. The power to reopen such assessments for escaped turnover or wrong availment of input tax credit under Section 27 was subject to the six-year statutory limitation. The dealer's subsequent communication seeking copies of assessment records could neither extend, enlarge nor revive that limitation; statutory jurisdiction cannot be enlarged by correspondence or conduct.

Conclusion: The reopening proceedings and consequential assessment orders, having been initiated beyond the prescribed six-year period, were barred by limitation and without jurisdiction, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the enhanced additional court fee at 1% under the notification effective from 01.04.2016 applies to tax appeals and revisions in which the taxing lis commenced before that date.

Analysis: Section 76(1) authorises levy of additional court fee, while the notification enhancing its rate took effect from 01.04.2016 and contains no express or necessarily implied retrospective operation. The obligation to pay court fee as a condition of appeal forms part of the vested right of appeal and cannot be made more onerous after commencement of the lis. In tax proceedings, the lis commences when, upon dissatisfaction with the return, the assessing authority calls for material or evidence, including through a pre-assessment notice; it does not depend merely on the assessment year, the date of assessment order, or the date of filing the appeal.

Conclusion: The enhanced 1% additional court fee is payable only where the taxing lis commenced on or after 01.04.2016; appeals or revisions arising from a lis commenced before that date remain governed by the earlier rate. Where the commencement date is not established, the concerned appellate or revisional authority must determine it.

Ratio Decidendi: An enhanced court-fee condition affecting a vested right of appeal operates prospectively, absent express or necessarily implied retrospectivity, and its applicability in tax matters is determined by the date on which the lis commenced.

Issues: Whether the Committee of Creditors may withdraw an approved resolution plan before its approval by the Adjudicating Authority on the ground that the corporate debtor's financial position has subsequently improved.

Analysis: A resolution plan approved under Section 30(4) derives binding force from the statutory insolvency framework between the Committee of Creditors and the successful resolution applicant even before approval under Section 31(1). Section 12-A, read with Regulations 30-A and 18(2), permits withdrawal only until approval of the plan by the Committee of Creditors; the Committee's continued role pending implementation does not extend to decisions affecting a plan already placed before the Adjudicating Authority. The commercial wisdom of the Committee cannot override this binding effect. The Adjudicating Authority's review remains confined to statutory compliance under Sections 30(2) and 31(1), and improved profitability alone does not justify refusal of an otherwise compliant plan.

Conclusion: The Committee of Creditors cannot withdraw its approved resolution plan after its submission to the Adjudicating Authority merely because the corporate debtor's financial position has improved; such improvement alone cannot warrant refusal of approval where the plan satisfies Section 30(2).

Issues: (i) Whether the IBC moratorium barred the arbitral tribunal from entertaining the second application under Section 17 and modifying the status quo arrangement while the corporate debtor's counterclaim was pending. (ii) Whether the tribunal's erroneous statement of the scope of the Section 29A extension order invalidated the impugned order. (iii) Whether the Adjudicating Authority had exclusive jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) read with Section 63 of the IBC.

Issue (i): Whether the IBC moratorium barred the arbitral tribunal from entertaining the second application under Section 17 and modifying the status quo arrangement while the corporate debtor's counterclaim was pending.

Analysis: Section 14(1)(a) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 prohibits proceedings against a corporate debtor, but does not prohibit proceedings initiated by it. A counterclaim by the corporate debtor may augment its estate if successful and does not impose a pecuniary liability upon it if unsuccessful. The expression "by or against" in Section 60(6) cannot be read into Section 14(1)(a) to create a bar on the counterclaim. The termination of the development agreement preceded the CIRP; the contractual conditions for possession had not been fulfilled, and the terminated agreement was not property of the corporate debtor protected by Section 14(1)(d). The interim status quo arrangement was a voluntary pro tem measure and could be reconsidered as an arbitral interim measure in aid of the surviving counterclaim.

Conclusion: The moratorium did not deprive the arbitral tribunal of jurisdiction to entertain the second Section 17 application and modify the status quo arrangement in relation to the counterclaim. The issue is decided against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the tribunal's erroneous statement of the scope of the Section 29A extension order invalidated the impugned order.

Analysis: The Section 29A extension order had attained finality and permitted continuation of the corporate debtor's counterclaim, not the claim against it. Although the impugned order incorrectly described that order as permitting both claims to proceed, the second interim application was referable to the counterclaim. The misstatement therefore did not affect the tribunal's jurisdiction to determine the appropriate interlocutory arrangement.

Conclusion: The erroneous description of the Section 29A order did not invalidate the impugned order. The issue is decided against the petitioner.

Issue (iii): Whether the Adjudicating Authority had exclusive jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) read with Section 63 of the IBC.

Analysis: Section 60(5)(c) confers limited residuary jurisdiction over disputes arising out of or relating to insolvency resolution. That jurisdiction is unavailable for a contractual termination founded on pre-insolvency non-performance and unconnected with the CIRP. Since the termination notice preceded the CIRP and was not occasioned by insolvency, the necessary nexus for invoking the Adjudicating Authority's jurisdiction was absent. Consequently, the jurisdictional bar under Section 63 did not arise.

Conclusion: The Adjudicating Authority did not have exclusive jurisdiction, and the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction was not ousted. The issue is decided against the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The arbitral process may continue on the corporate debtor's counterclaim, with interlocutory measures remaining within the arbitral tribunal's competence; the IBC moratorium neither preserves the terminated development agreement as estate property nor transfers this contractual dispute exclusively to the Adjudicating Authority.

Ratio Decidendi: The IBC moratorium and the Adjudicating Authority's residuary jurisdiction do not displace arbitral adjudication of a corporate debtor's own counterclaim where the contractual termination preceded, and is unrelated to, the CIRP.