Accrued statutory protection survives amendment where no clear intent shows retrospective divestment of existing rights.

Omission of the infancy-protection clause in Section 16(1)(d) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act did not extinguish protection already accrued to establishments that had commenced operations before the amendment. Applying the presumption against retrospectivity and Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the law was treated as preserving rights, privileges, and liabilities already acquired unless a contrary intention is clearly shown by express words or necessary implication. The unexpired three-year infancy period therefore continued to run from each establishment's date of setting up, and the amendment could not divest that pre-existing statutory benefit.

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Issues: Whether the deletion of the infancy-protection clause in Section 16(1)(d) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 by the amending Act took away the benefit already accrued to establishments that had commenced operations before the amendment, and whether such accrued protection could be denied by treating the amendment as immediately applicable to them.

Analysis: The statutory scheme originally granted newly set up establishments an exclusion from the Act for three years. The later omission of clause (d) did not contain any express indication that rights already accrued during the running infancy period were to be extinguished. The governing principle applied was that legislation is ordinarily prospective, and an existing right is not taken away unless the statute clearly shows such intention expressly or by necessary implication. Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 was relied upon for the rule that repeal does not affect any right, privilege, or liability already acquired or accrued unless a different intention appears. On that basis, the omission of the clause was held not to operate so as to destroy infancy protection that had already accrued to the establishments before the amendment.

Conclusion: The accrued infancy protection was preserved, and the establishments were entitled to continue to enjoy the unexpired period of three years from their respective dates of setting up notwithstanding the omission of the provision.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded because the amendment was held not to divest pre-existing statutory protection already earned under the earlier law.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory amendment or repeal does not retrospectively take away an accrued right unless the legislature has clearly manifested such intention; in the absence of express words or necessary implication, the amendment operates prospectively and preserves accrued benefits.

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