Binding resolution plan principles bar withdrawal, belated objections, and judicial substitution of commercial judgment under insolvency law.

An approved resolution plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code remains binding once statutory requirements are met, and adjudicating or appellate forums cannot substitute their commercial assessment for that of the Committee of Creditors. Refusal to grant waivers or related reliefs concerning the Kharagpur land did not amount to impermissible modification where the plan itself contemplated that non-grant of approvals would not jeopardise implementation. A resolution applicant cannot withdraw merely by alleging post-approval unviability when the plan was already binding and implementation had stalled earlier. Objections based on Section 29A ineligibility, alleged CIRP illegality, asset inclusion disputes, rejected claims, and distribution methodology were not shown to create legal infirmity.

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Issues: (i) Whether the adjudicating authority had impermissibly modified the approved resolution plan by declining the requested waivers and related reliefs concerning the Kharagpur land and allied dues; (ii) whether the successful resolution applicant could withdraw from implementation of the approved plan on the ground that the plan had become unviable after the impugned order and subsequent events; (iii) whether the challenge to the resolution plan on the grounds of alleged ineligibility under Section 29A, alleged illegality in CIRP, and alleged incorrect inclusion of assets or claims warranted interference; (iv) whether the rejection or partial rejection of claims and the distribution methodology adopted in the plan suffered from legal infirmity.

Issue (i): Whether the adjudicating authority had impermissibly modified the approved resolution plan by declining the requested waivers and related reliefs concerning the Kharagpur land and allied dues.

Analysis: The approved plan itself contemplated that if the requested approvals, extinguishments, or waivers were not granted, implementation would not be jeopardised. The adjudicating authority did not direct payment of transfer fee, lease rent, penalty, interest, or other charges to the concerned authority. It merely left the question of exemption to be dealt with by the appropriate authorities if approached. That course did not amount to unilateral alteration of the commercial terms of the plan. The refusal to approve a waiver was therefore treated as a permissible exercise within the limited scrutiny under the Code.

Conclusion: The adjudicating authority did not impermissibly modify the resolution plan, and no interference was warranted.

Issue (ii): Whether the successful resolution applicant could withdraw from implementation of the approved plan on the ground that the plan had become unviable after the impugned order and subsequent events.

Analysis: The plan had been approved much before the pandemic-related lockdown, and the resolution applicant had already failed to implement the plan even before the alleged subsequent events. The plan was binding once approved, the monitoring mechanism had commenced, and the applicant's own conduct showed non-participation and delay. The asserted financial unviability was not established as a legal ground to undo an approved plan.

Conclusion: Withdrawal from the approved plan was not justified, and the challenge on alleged unviability failed.

Issue (iii): Whether the challenge to the resolution plan on the grounds of alleged ineligibility under Section 29A, alleged illegality in CIRP, and alleged incorrect inclusion of assets or claims warranted interference.

Analysis: The alleged disqualification under Section 29A was found unsubstantiated on the facts. The objections regarding the wind mill asset and the third-party land were rejected because the disputes were either sub judice, already disclosed in the process documents, or founded on a belated attempt to recharacterise assets after long participation in the process. The tribunal reiterated that where a resolution applicant or objector participates throughout the process and raises objections only at the final stage, such objections may be treated as afterthoughts. The approved plan could not be disturbed on these grounds.

Conclusion: No legal infirmity was made out on the grounds of ineligibility, alleged CIRP illegality, or inclusion of assets.

Issue (iv): Whether the rejection or partial rejection of claims and the distribution methodology adopted in the plan suffered from legal infirmity.

Analysis: The resolution professional's role was held to be confined to verification and best estimation of claims on the basis of supporting documents; it was not an adjudicatory function. Where the claimant failed to furnish adequate contractual and repayment material, rejection of the claim was upheld. Likewise, the distribution methodology based on security structure and the recorded pari passu positions was accepted, especially where the objectors had acquiesced during the process and raised no timely challenge to the recorded charge structure.

Conclusion: The rejection of claims and the approved distribution methodology were sustained.

Final Conclusion: The common order upholding approval of the resolution plan was sustained in all respects, and the connected appeals were dismissed with directions for immediate implementation of the approved resolution plan.

Ratio Decidendi: Once a resolution plan satisfies the statutory requirements and is approved, the adjudicating and appellate authorities cannot substitute their own commercial assessment for that of the Committee of Creditors, and a resolution applicant cannot later avoid the approved plan by relying on ungranted waivers, belated objections, or unproven claims of unviability.

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