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Issues: Whether regular bail should be granted in proceedings concerning alleged offences under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
Analysis: The grant of bail was warranted in view of the co-accused having been enlarged on bail, the period of incarceration already undergone, and the stage of the trial.
Conclusion: Regular bail was granted in favour of the assessee, subject to terms and conditions to be fixed by the concerned Trial Court.
Regular bail - parity with co-accused and period of incarceration
Entitlement to regular bail in proceedings for alleged offences under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - HELD THAT: - The Court took into account that a co-accused had been enlarged on bail, the period of incarceration already undergone by the appellant, and the stage of trial. [Paras 4]
The impugned order was set aside and regular bail was granted on such terms and conditions as the concerned Trial Court may impose.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed and the appellant was granted regular bail, subject to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court.
Issues: Whether anticipatory bail should be granted where the investigation is complete, charge-sheet has been filed, charges have been framed, and the trial is in progress.
Analysis: The investigation had concluded, and the matter had progressed to trial after filing of the charge-sheet and framing of charges. Custodial interrogation was therefore no longer required.
Conclusion: Anticipatory bail was granted, subject to conditions imposed by the investigating officer, continued cooperation, and appearance before the jurisdictional court.
Anticipatory bail - Custodial interrogation after completion of investigation and filing of charge-sheet
Entitlement to anticipatory bail where investigation was complete, charge-sheet had been filed, charges had been framed and trial was in progress - HELD THAT: - As the investigation had concluded and the matter had proceeded to trial after framing of charges, the Court found that custodial interrogation of the appellant was no longer required. [Paras 4]
Anticipatory bail was granted, subject to conditions imposed by the Investigating Officer, continued cooperation in the investigation, and furnishing of bail bonds before the jurisdictional court.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed and the denial of anticipatory bail was set aside.
Issues: Whether the petitioner should be released on bail after filing of the charge-sheet.
Analysis: The charge-sheet had been filed, and no further custodial interrogation was required. The petitioner had remained in custody for nearly three months and had no stated criminal antecedents.
Outcome: The petitioner was directed to be released on bail, and the Special Leave Petition was disposed of.
Bail after filing of charge-sheet - Further custodial interrogation - Entitlement to bail in prosecution for alleged unrecorded dry-fruit transactions and issuance of tax invoices
HELD THAT: - On a prima facie consideration of the material, the Court found that the charge-sheet had been filed and that no further custodial interrogation of the petitioner was required. [Paras 5, 6]
The petitioner was directed to be released on bail, subject to conditions imposed by the jurisdictional court, and to appear before that court within two weeks.
Final Conclusion: The Special Leave Petition was disposed of by directing release of the petitioner on bail subject to appropriate conditions.
Issues: Whether the challenge to cancellation of registration and rejection of its revocation should be entertained in writ jurisdiction despite an available statutory appeal, where disputed questions of fact arise.
Analysis: A statutory appellate remedy was available against both the cancellation order and the order rejecting revocation. The impugned order was defectively drafted and undated, but the date of its service was directed to be treated as its date for purposes of appeal. The disputed factual question concerning production of electronic devices was left open for determination by the appellate authority.
Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to pursue the statutory appellate remedy.
Alternative statutory remedy against cancellation of GST registration - Maintainability of the writ petition against cancellation of GST registration and rejection of the application for revocation in the presence of a statutory appellate remedy
HELD THAT: - Since an appeal lay against both the cancellation order and the order rejecting revocation, the Court declined to adjudicate the factual dispute. As the rejection order was undated and was stated to have been served on the petitioner on 22.08.2026, that date was directed to be treated as the date of the order for pursuing the appellate remedy. [Paras 11, 12]
The petitioner was permitted to file appeals against both orders within two weeks, to be decided expeditiously; all factual contentions were left open before the appellate authority.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of on account of the available statutory appellate remedy, with a direction permitting the petitioner to pursue appeals against the cancellation and revocation-rejection orders.
Issues: Whether the GST liability order, allegedly passed without granting a personal hearing, complied with Section 75(4) of the Uttarakhand Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
Analysis: The facts were not shown to be distinguishable from an earlier decision concerning the same requirement of personal hearing.
Outcome: The writ petition was decided in terms of the earlier decision.
GST liability order passed without granting a personal hearing
HELD THAT:- The writ petition was decided in terms of the earlier judgment M/s Warmmax India [2026 (9) TMI 815 - UTTARAKHAND HIGH COURT] concerning the requirement of personal hearing before an adverse order under the Uttarakhand Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
Issues: (i) Whether entitlement to refund of accumulated input tax credit under the inverted duty structure depends on whether the registered person is a manufacturer or trader; (ii) Whether Circular No. 135/05/2020-GST bars refund where input and output goods have an overlapping classification without any GST-rate reduction; (iii) Whether the refund was required to be computed period-wise under Rule 89(5); (iv) Whether the documentary verification relating to capital goods, input invoices, GSTR-2B matching and zero-rated supplies justified interference with the refund orders.
Issue (i): Whether entitlement to refund of accumulated input tax credit under the inverted duty structure depends on whether the registered person is a manufacturer or trader.
Analysis: GST is levied on supplies under Section 9(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The statutory refund entitlement is not conditional upon the claimant being a manufacturer, and the distinction between trading and manufacturing is immaterial for this purpose.
Conclusion: Refund eligibility does not depend on whether the assessee is a manufacturer or trader. The issue is in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether Circular No. 135/05/2020-GST bars refund where input and output goods have an overlapping classification without any GST-rate reduction.
Analysis: Paragraph 3 of the Circular concerns accumulation caused by reduction of GST rate on the same goods at different points of time. In the present circumstances, there was no reduction in the GST rate. Accumulation attributable to higher-taxed inputs used for outward supplies is governed by Section 54(3)(ii) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the formula under Rule 89(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017.
Conclusion: The Circular does not bar the refund claim merely because the input and output have an overlapping classification. The issue is in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether the refund was required to be computed period-wise under Rule 89(5).
Analysis: The records showed that net input tax credit and refund were computed on the basis of period-specific data by applying the prescribed formula. The reference to annual figures was only corroborative and was not the basis for quantification.
Conclusion: The refund computation complied with the period-wise requirement under Rule 89(5). The issue is in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iv): Whether the documentary verification relating to capital goods, input invoices, GSTR-2B matching and zero-rated supplies justified interference with the refund orders.
Analysis: The original and first appellate authorities had undertaken detailed verification of the refund documents, including exclusion of ineligible credit and matching of relevant invoices. No evidence was produced to displace those findings.
Conclusion: No infirmity was established in the verification of the refund claims. The issue is in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The orders granting the assessee's accumulated input tax credit refunds under the inverted duty structure remain legally sustainable.
Ratio Decidendi: Refund under the inverted duty structure is determined by the statutory conditions and the prescribed period-wise formula, and cannot be denied on the basis of manufacturing status or a circular confined to GST-rate reductions on the same goods.
Refund of accumulated ITC under the inverted tax structure - Inapplicability of rate-reduction circular to unchanged-rate supplies - Tax-period-wise computation of inverted-duty-structure refund - Verification of input tax credit refund claims
Inverted-duty-structure refund irrespective of manufacturing status - Eligibility for accumulated input tax credit refund under an inverted duty structure on supplies of finished apparel - relevance of the claimant's status as manufacturer or trader - HELD THAT: - GST is levied on the supply of goods or services and not on manufacture. Therefore, eligibility for the claimed refund could not be made dependent on whether the registered person was engaged in trading or manufacturing. [Paras 10]
The Revenue's objection founded on the claimant's manufacturing status was rejected.
Inapplicability of rate-reduction circular to unchanged-rate supplies - Accumulated input tax credit refund - Applicability of the circular excluding refund where input and output are the same goods to supplies of apparel where there was no reduction in the GST rate - HELD THAT: - The circular concerns accumulation arising from a reduction in the GST rate on the same goods at different points of time. As the final products were supplied at the same GST rate and no rate reduction was involved, the circular did not govern the refund claim. Accumulation attributable to other inputs taxed at higher rates remained computable under the prescribed refund formula. [Paras 10]
The circular did not disentitle the respondent to refund of accumulated input tax credit.
Tax-period-wise computation of inverted-duty-structure refund - Period-wise computation of refund of accumulated input tax credit under the inverted-duty-structure formula - HELD THAT: - The original authority had computed net input tax credit and the refund on the basis of period-specific data by applying the prescribed formula. The record therefore disclosed no violation of the requirement that refund be determined for each tax period rather than cumulatively for the year. [Paras 10]
The Revenue's challenge to the computation of the refund was rejected.
Verification of input tax credit refund claims - Adequacy of verification of the refund claims, including exclusion of ineligible credit, invoice reconciliation and treatment of input tax credit relating to zero-rated supplies - HELD THAT: - The appellate authority had examined the documents relevant to the refund claims, and the original authority had also considered their verification. The Revenue produced no evidence beyond oral submissions to displace the findings regarding such verification. [Paras 10]
No infirmity was found in the verification of the refund claims or in the orders allowing them.
Final Conclusion: The Revenue appeals were dismissed and the appellate orders allowing refund of accumulated input tax credit were sustained.
Deduction u/s 80IB(10) - calculating the eligible limit of 1000 sq. ft for the purpose of allowing the deduction - Calculation of “built up area” - habitable area - common areas exclusion - projections and balconies - inner measurements at the floor level
HELD THAT:- We find no good ground and reason to interfere with the impugned judgment/order passed by the High Court. [2025 (7) TMI 1060 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT]
The special leave petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
Issues: Whether the order giving effect to the appellate order could stand despite denial of the expressly contemplated opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
Analysis: The operative portion of the order dated 29.03.2025 contemplated a reasonable opportunity of hearing. It was conceded that no such hearing had been afforded. The earlier High Court orders had also specifically required an opportunity of hearing. Denial of that opportunity warranted reconsideration by the Assessing Officer, with all contentions kept open.
Conclusion: The order dated 29.03.2025 and the impugned High Court judgment were set aside, and the matter was directed to be reconsidered after hearing the assessee. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Opportunity of hearing before giving effect to appellate order - Validity of the order giving effect to the appellate order without affording the assessee the hearing expressly contemplated therein -
HELD THAT: - The operative portion of the order required that the assessee be afforded a reasonable opportunity of hearing. As the Revenue fairly conceded that no hearing was granted, the order could not be sustained. The merits of the controversy were left open for consideration by the Assessing Officer. [Paras 3, 4, 5]
The order giving effect to the appellate order and the impugned High Court judgment were set aside, and the matter was directed to be reconsidered by the Assessing Officer after hearing the petitioner.
Final Conclusion: The Special Leave Petition was disposed of by setting aside the impugned orders for denial of the stipulated opportunity of hearing. All contentions on merits were left open.
Writ of mandamus - Judicial restraint in disputed allegations - Exercise of writ jurisdiction - writ petition invoking Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21, 261 and 265 of the Constitution seeking enforcement of statutory duties against alleged tax evasion based on judicially admitted unaccounted cash transactions of approximately ₹1.80 crores, supported by an FIR, sworn testimony before the Family Court, and affidavits reflecting disproportionate declared assets
HELD THAT:- We find no good ground and reason to interfere with the impugned judgment/order passed by the High Court.[2026 (4) TMI 1196 - CHHATTISGARH HIGH COURT]
The special leave petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
Section 10(38) exemption for long-term capital gains - computation of book profits under Section 115JB (MAT) - proviso to Section 10(38) regarding inclusion in book profits - interpretation of exclusion from total income versus inclusion for MAT
HELD THAT:- There is a delay of 469 days in filing this Special Leave Petition and we do not find any plausible and bona fide explanation to condone this inordinate delay.
The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed on the ground of delay.
Issues: Whether the Revenue established sufficient cause for condonation of the delay in filing its income-tax appeal.
Analysis: Section 260A(2)(a) prescribes a 120-day period for filing an appeal, while Section 260A(2A) permits delayed admission only upon sufficient cause. Even after excluding the pandemic-related limitation period, an unexplained delay of 1116 days remained. The asserted administrative workload, difficulty in tracing records, and departmental pressure were unsupported and did not explain the further delay after the appeal papers had been finalised. The Revenue's conduct disclosed absence of due diligence and bona fides; a liberal approach to limitation does not extend to a lethargic, tardy, or unsubstantiated explanation for inordinate delay.
Conclusion: The delay was not condoned, as sufficient cause was not established.
Condonation of inordinate delay in filing the income-tax appeal by revenue - Sufficient cause for condonation of inordinate delay - Bona fides and due diligence in pursuing appeal -
HELD THAT: - Although "sufficient cause" warrants a liberal construction where negligence, inaction or want of bona fides is absent, the explanation for delay remains decisive. Even after allowing the benefit of the Supreme Court's suo motu extension of limitation, substantial delay remained unexplained.
The departmental workload, difficulty in locating records and shifting responsibility to the office handling the matter did not establish due diligence or bona fides; moreover, no explanation was offered for the delay after the appeal papers had been finalised and forwarded to counsel. The explanation was consequently found to be a mere excuse rather than sufficient cause.
The Apex Court in Shivamma (Dead) By LRS vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors. [2025 (9) TMI 1721 - SUPREME COURT] observed that while there is no arithmetical formula, through decades of judicial application, certain yardsticks for judging the sufficiency of cause for condonation of delay have evolved. Mere good cause is not sufficient enough to turn back the clock and allow resuscitation of a claim otherwise barred by delay. The Court ought to be cautious while undertaking such an exercise, being circumspect against condoning delay which is attributable to the applicant. Although the actual period of delay might be instructive, it is the explanation for the delay which would be the decisive factor. [Paras 20, 23, 24, 25, 26]
The application for condonation of delay was dismissed, and the appeal was consequently dismissed as time-barred.
Final Conclusion: The appellant having failed to establish sufficient cause, bona fides or due diligence for the inordinate delay, the condonation application and the appeal were dismissed as time-barred.
Issues: Whether the rejection of the miscellaneous application concerning Paper Book No. II-A and the accompanying affidavit warranted interference and fresh consideration under Rule 29.
Analysis: The record, including the Tribunal's receipt endorsements on the paper books and the subsequent inspection of the Tribunal's files, prima facie established that Paper Book No. II-A and the affidavit seeking permission for additional evidence were available before the Tribunal. The absence of a separate Rule 29 application did not justify the Tribunal's doubt that these materials had ever been filed; however, whether the affidavit constituted due compliance with Rule 29, and whether the documents were relevant to the appeal, required determination by the Tribunal. The grievance regarding Paper Book No. II was not pursued.
Conclusion: The order concerning the miscellaneous application was set aside to the limited extent necessary for the Tribunal to freshly determine Rule 29 compliance in respect of Paper Book No. II-A and, if satisfied, its relevance and consequential effect.
Rectification application - non-consideration of additional evidence - Additional evidence before the Tribunal - compliance with Rule 29
Whether the rejection of the miscellaneous application concerning Paper Book No. II-A and the accompanying affidavit warranted interference and fresh consideration under Rule 29? - HELD THAT: - The affidavit accompanying Paper Book No. II-A and the paper book were prima facie filed before, and available in the records of, the Tribunal. The affidavit expressly sought permission under Rule 29. Consequently, the Tribunal's doubt whether those documents had been filed could not prima facie be sustained. Whether Paper Book No. II-A was duly filed in compliance with Rule 29, and, if so, whether its documents were relevant to the appeal, required fresh consideration. [Paras 10, 11, 12, 13]
The impugned order was partly set aside insofar as the concerned rectification application was dismissed, and that application was remitted for consideration of Rule 29 compliance and, if established, the relevance of Paper Book No. II-A and consequential relief.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by partially setting aside the impugned order and remitting the rectification application for limited fresh consideration. The findings concerning the other paper book and the remaining grounds were left undisturbed.
Issues: Whether revisionary jurisdiction could validly be exercised in respect of the assessment order for failure to verify the deductibility of expenses allegedly paid without tax deduction at source.
Analysis: Revision under Section 263 applies where the assessment order is both erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. The recorded tax-deduction-at-source liability and the claimed expenses required verification from the assessee's records. The assertion that a substantial part of the expenditure represented reimbursements, without supporting material establishing the deduction and deposit of tax, did not answer the verification deficiency. The assessment was therefore made without adequate enquiry on this issue.
Conclusion: The assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue on the tax-deduction-at-source expenditure issue, and revision under Section 263 was valid.
Revision of assessment for lack of inquiry into TDS compliance - Disallowance of production expenses for non-deduction or non-payment of TDS
Revision of the assessment for failure to verify tax deduction at source compliance in respect of remuneration and hire expenses incurred in producing motion pictures - HELD THAT: - The record did not establish either the extent of tax deducted at source on the claimed expenses or deposit of the reported TDS liability. The assessee's assertion that almost half of the expenditure represented reimbursements could not, without supporting documents and examination of evidence, substantiate the claim. An assessment made without the necessary verification on this factual issue was therefore erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, warranting revision and fresh assessment. [Paras 27, 28, 29, 30, 31]
The assumption of revisional jurisdiction was upheld; the issue was required to be examined afresh on the evidence and records after affording the assessee an opportunity of hearing.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed, the Tribunal's affirmation of revision in respect of the TDS-related expenses being held to be in accordance with law and not perverse.
Issues: Whether an order initiating reassessment could be sustained where the assessee's uploaded reply was not considered and the time to respond was curtailed.
Analysis: The statutory response period was curtailed despite time being available to complete the process. The assessee had sought further time before expiry of the curtailed deadline and uploaded its reply before the order was made. Non-consideration of that reply caused prejudice and constituted an irregularity violating principles of natural justice.
Conclusion: The order under Section 148A(d) and the consequential notice under Section 148 were set aside, with a direction to make a fresh determination after considering the reply; this is in favour of the assessee.
Reassessment proceedings - opportunity to respond and consideration of reply - Principles of natural justice
Validity of the order initiating reassessment where the assessee's statutory time to reply was curtailed and its uploaded reply was not considered - HELD THAT: - Although the statute allowed 30 days for filing a reply, the Assessing Officer restricted the effective time available to the assessee and proceeded despite having sufficient time available. The assessee had sought further time before expiry of the stipulated date and had uploaded its reply before the order was made. Failure to afford reasonable time and to consider that reply caused prejudice and violated the principles of natural justice. [Paras 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]
The order under Section 148A(d) and the consequential notice under Section 148 were set aside, with a direction to pass a fresh order after considering the assessee's reply, independently and in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed and the reassessment-initiation order and consequential notice were set aside for violation of principles of natural justice. The Assessing Officer was directed to reconsider the matter without any finding on the merits or jurisdiction to initiate proceedings.
Issues: Whether a reassessment is valid where notice under Section 143(2) is issued before, rather than after, the return furnished in response to notice under Section 148.
Analysis: A notice under Section 143(2) is mandatory for completing a reassessment after a return is furnished in response to Section 148. A notice issued before such return does not satisfy that requirement. Section 292BB cures defects in service, timing or manner of service of an issued notice, but does not cure the absence of a valid notice issued after the return. Non-issuance of the required notice is a jurisdictional defect and not a curable procedural irregularity.
Conclusion: The reassessment order was invalid for want of a valid notice under Section 143(2) issued after the return filed in response to Section 148; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Notice u/s 143(2) issued before return in reassessment - Invalid reassessment for want of valid scrutiny notice
Validity of reassessment where the notice under section 143(2) was issued before the assessee filed its return in response to notice under section 148 - HELD THAT: - A notice under section 143(2) must be issued after the return in response to the reopening notice is filed. A notice issued before such return is invalid, and the absence of a valid notice under section 143(2) renders the reassessment order invalid. [Paras 5, 6]
The reassessment orders were invalid; no question of law arose from the Tribunal's order setting them aside.
Final Conclusion: The appeals were dismissed, as the notice under section 143(2) issued before the return filed pursuant to notice under section 148 could not sustain the reassessment.
Issues: Whether an assessment made pursuant to a revision order can survive after that revision order has been quashed, merely because the Revenue's challenge to the quashing order remains pending.
Analysis: The revision order under Section 263 had been quashed and was consequently not subsisting when the consequential assessment was made under Section 143(3) read with Section 263. That quashed order was the jurisdictional foundation for the assessment. The pendency of an appeal against the quashing order did not preserve the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction or operate as a stay of the quashing order.
Conclusion: The consequential assessment had no surviving legal foundation and was invalid; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Revision u/s 263 - Consequential assessment after quashing of revision order - Pendency of appeal against quashing order
Validity of an assessment made pursuant to a revision order which had been quashed by the Tribunal, notwithstanding the pendency of the Revenue's appeal against that quashing order - HELD THAT: - Once the revision order had been quashed, it ceased to exist and could not furnish a foundation for an assessment under Section 143(3) read with Section 263. The mere pendency of the Revenue's challenge to the order quashing the revision order did not restore the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction to make the consequential assessment. [Paras 8, 9, 10, 11]
The annulment of the consequential assessment was upheld and the Revenue's appeal was dismissed; if the Revenue succeeds in the pending appeal against the quashing of the revision order, consequential action may be taken in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The Revenue's appeal was dismissed as no substantial question of law arose. The consequential assessment could not survive after the revision order on which it rested had been quashed.
Issues: (i) Whether recovery proceedings and auction sale were barred by limitation under Rule 68B for the relevant assessment years; (ii) Whether individual partners must receive notices under the Second Schedule before recovery action against partnership-firm assets or a partner's personal assets; (iii) Whether the notices in the present recovery and sale proceedings were validly served and complied with natural justice; (iv) Whether the auction sales were vitiated by improper valuation or sale below fair market value; (v) Whether payments through demand drafts funded from the successful bidder's father's bank account invalidated the auction sale.
Issue (i): Whether recovery proceedings and auction sale were barred by limitation under Rule 68B for the relevant assessment years.
Analysis: The earlier determination on Rule 68B was applied: recovery relating to assessment years 2007-08 and 2008-09 was time-barred, whereas recovery for assessment years 2009-10 to 2011-12 remained within limitation. The amendment to Rule 68B applies where the original limitation period was subsisting when the amendment came into force, but not where that period had already expired.
Conclusion: The recovery and sale proceedings for assessment years 2009-10 to 2011-12 were not barred by limitation, against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether individual partners must receive notices under the Second Schedule before recovery action against partnership-firm assets or a partner's personal assets.
Analysis: Sections 222 and 188A, read with Rule 2 and the definition of defaulter in the Second Schedule, require notice to the assessee named in the recovery certificate. A partnership firm is the defaulter where the certificate is issued in its name. The contextual qualification in the definition provisions requires an individual partner to be treated as a defaulter when recovery is pursued against that partner's personal assets because that partner is directly affected by the sale.
Conclusion: Notice to individual partners is unnecessary for sale of the defaulting firm's assets, but is necessary where recovery measures are directed against an individual partner's assets.
Issue (iii): Whether the notices in the present recovery and sale proceedings were validly served and complied with natural justice.
Analysis: Rule 2 notices and attachment orders were served on the partnership firm. The notice for settlement of sale proclamation and the sale proclamation were also copied to the partners; the relevant partner raised objections upon receipt of the former notice and refused receipt of the latter. The sale concerned assets of the partnership firm, and the factual record did not establish non-compliance with the applicable recovery rules or denial of a meaningful opportunity.
Conclusion: The recovery and sale notices were validly served and did not violate the Second Schedule or principles of natural justice, against the assessee.
Issue (iv): Whether the auction sales were vitiated by improper valuation or sale below fair market value.
Analysis: The realised auction prices substantially exceeded both the guideline value and the market value recorded in the affidavit executed by all partners. No evidence established that either property was sold below fair market value. Differences in reserve prices between sale notices, without such evidence, did not demonstrate an infirm valuation or sale process.
Conclusion: The valuation challenge did not vitiate the auction sales, against the assessee.
Issue (v): Whether payments through demand drafts funded from the successful bidder's father's bank account invalidated the auction sale.
Analysis: The earnest money and sale payments were made through bank demand drafts in accordance with the auction conditions. The source account of the successful bidder's father did not affect the validity of payments made for and on behalf of the successful bidder.
Conclusion: The demand drafts funded by the successful bidder's father did not invalidate the auction sale, against the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The objections to the recovery auction were untenable; the auction sale was confirmed and the purchaser became entitled to a sale certificate, while the objecting partner was afforded a signed copy of the order on his objection petition for any further remedy.
Ratio Decidendi: In recovery proceedings against a defaulting partnership firm, notice to the firm suffices for sale of firm assets, whereas a partner must be notified only when recovery is pursued against that partner's personal assets; an auction is not invalid absent material proof of defective service, material irregularity, or inadequate sale value.
Limitation for tax recovery under Rule 68B of the II Schedule - Notice to partners in recovery sale of partnership-firm property - Validity of auction-sale valuation in tax recovery proceedings - Third-party funding of auction payments
Limitation for tax recovery under Rule 68B of the II Schedule - Prospective application of amendment extending limitation - Limitation for enforcing recovery certificates in respect of the partnership firm's assessment years 2007-08 to 2011-12 - HELD THAT: - The amendment to Rule 68B cannot apply where the original limitation period had expired before the amendment came into force, but applies where that period was still subsisting. Applying the earlier decision on the same recovery proceedings, enforcement was barred for assessment years 2007-08 and 2008-09, but remained within limitation for assessment years 2009-10 to 2011-12.
Relying on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Uttam Steel Ltd, [2015 (5) TMI 214 - SUPREME COURT] it was concluded that the amendment would not apply in cases wherein the period of limitation had expired prior to the entry thereof, whereas it would apply to cases where the original limitation period was alive at the time of entry of the amendment.[Paras 7]
The limitation objection to the auction proceedings concerning assessment years 2009-10 to 2011-12 was rejected.
Notice to partners in recovery sale of partnership-firm property - Requirement of notice to individual partners before attachment and sale of immovable properties belonging to the defaulting partnership firm - HELD THAT: - Notices under the II Schedule are ordinarily required to be served on the defaulter named in the recovery certificate. While the contextual definition of defaulter includes an individual partner where recovery measures are directed against that partner's personal assets on account of joint and several liability, no such extended construction is warranted where the assets proposed for sale belong to the defaulting firm. In any event, the firm was served, copies of the relevant notices were sent to the partners, and the objecting partner had notice of and participated in the proceedings. [Paras 9, 10, 11, 13]
The Court held that the applicable rules and principles of natural justice were not violated in the sale of the firm's properties.
Validity of auction-sale valuation in tax recovery proceedings - Challenge to the valuation of the partnership firm's immovable properties in the recovery auction - HELD THAT: - The auction prices exceeded both the guideline value and the market value recorded in an affidavit executed by all the partners. In the absence of evidence that the properties were sold below fair market value, changes in the reserve prices in successive sale notices did not establish improper valuation. [Paras 14, 15]
The challenge to the valuation and auction prices was rejected.
Third-party funding of auction payments - Effect of demand drafts for the auction consideration being funded from a third-party bank account. - HELD THAT: - Where the earnest money and other payments are made in accordance with the terms and conditions of the auction by or for the successful bidder, the source bank account from which demand drafts are purchased does not vitiate the sale. [Paras 16]
The objection based on the funding of the demand drafts was rejected.
Final Conclusion: The objections to the recovery auction were rejected. The auction sale was confirmed, and the Tax Recovery Officer was directed to execute the sale certificate in favour of the auction purchaser.
Issues: Whether interest on borrowings used to acquire shares in a subsidiary for expansion of the assessee's business was deductible as business expenditure.
Analysis: The acquisition increased the assessee's shareholding in an entity engaged in the same line of business, which subsequently merged with the assessee, expanding its multiplex resources. The dominant purpose of the acquisition was business expansion and maximisation of resources, rather than earning dividend income. Investment in the subsidiary to obtain controlling interest was commercially expedient.
Conclusion: Interest on the borrowings was allowable under Section 36(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The question was answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
Deduction of interest on borrowed capital for acquisition of subsidiary shares - Commercial expediency
Whether interest on borrowings used to acquire shares in a subsidiary for expansion of the assessee's business was deductible as business expenditure? - HELD THAT: - The question raised in this appeal is no more res-integra in view of the decision of Apex Court in case of Sharp Business System [2025 (12) TMI 1235 - SUPREME COURT] held that purpose for which the advances were made to the sister concern and its directors would also be covered by the principle of commercial expediency.
The undisputed findings established that the shares were acquired in a company engaged in the same business, with the object of expanding the assessee's multiplex operations and maximising its resources, and not merely for earning dividend income. The investment was consequently made on grounds of commercial expediency, rendering the interest on the borrowed funds allowable as business expenditure. [Paras 13, 14]
The interest expenditure was held deductible and the substantial question of law was answered in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed and the deduction of interest expenditure on borrowings utilised for acquiring the subsidiary's shares was sustained.
Issues: Whether penalty for concealment could be sustained on disallowance of interest relating to secured premium notes.
Analysis: The quantum disallowance of the interest had subsequently been reversed, with the interest being found to relate to capital borrowed for business purposes. The claim had also been regarded as a debatable one, and an addition in assessment did not by itself justify penalty where the assessee had disclosed the material facts and furnished a bona fide explanation.
Conclusion: Penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was not leviable; the questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
Penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) - disallowance of business interest on secured promissory notes
HELD THAT: - The earlier quantum decisions [2017 (11) TMI 327 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] as following [2017 (11) TMI 63 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] had held that interest on the secured promissory notes was incurred for business purposes and was not required to be disallowed. Consequently, the basis for the penalty did not survive; the Tribunal had rightly deleted the penalty, initially in view of the debatable nature of the issue, which had subsequently attained finality. [Paras 3, 4]
Both questions were answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue, and the appeals were dismissed.
Final Conclusion: The quantum disallowance of interest on secured promissory notes having been reversed, the penalty founded upon it could not survive. The Revenue's appeals were dismissed.
Issues: (i) Whether interest on income-tax refund received by an Irish tax resident is taxable at the beneficial rate of 10% under Article 11 of the India-Ireland Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement; (ii) Whether credit for tax deducted at source is allowable.
Issue (i): Whether interest on income-tax refund received by an Irish tax resident is taxable at the beneficial rate of 10% under Article 11 of the India-Ireland Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
Analysis: Article 11 limits Indian taxation of interest paid to an Irish resident to 10% of the gross interest. By virtue of section 90(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, treaty provisions prevail where more beneficial. The assessee's Irish tax residency and entitlement to treaty benefits were undisputed, and the facts were identical to the earlier assessment year.
Conclusion: Interest on the income-tax refund is taxable at 10% under Article 11 of the India-Ireland Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether credit for tax deducted at source is allowable.
Analysis: The claim for tax deducted at source credit required examination as to whether the credit had already been granted and, if not, its allowability in accordance with law.
Conclusion: The tax deducted at source credit issue is restored to the Assessing Officer for re-examination and grant of eligible credit in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The beneficial treaty rate governs the taxation of the refund interest, while the tax deducted at source credit claim requires fresh verification.
Ratio Decidendi: Where an eligible non-resident is entitled to a more beneficial treaty rate, the treaty limitation on tax applies in preference to the domestic-law rate.
India-Ireland tax treaty benefit for income-tax refund interest - Credit of tax deducted at source - Beneficial treaty rate
Whether the assessee is eligible for the beneficial rate of tax @10% under Article 11 of the India-Ireland DTAA on interest on Income Tax refund received during the period relevant to the assessment year under appeal? - HELD THAT: - The facts were admittedly identical to those considered for the subsequent assessment year [2023 (10) TMI 699 - ITAT DELHI]. The earlier decision held that, where more beneficial, treaty provisions prevail over the Act and Article 11 limits Indian taxation of such interest to 10 per cent of its gross amount. That finding was held applicable mutatis mutandis. [Paras 6, 8]
The assessee was held entitled to tax the interest on income-tax refund at the beneficial rate of 10 per cent under Article 11 for both assessment years.
Credit of tax deducted at source - Allowance of credit for tax deducted at source while computing the tax payable - HELD THAT: - The claim required examination as to whether the tax deducted at source credit had already been allowed. The issue was therefore not adjudicated on merits and was restored for verification in accordance with law. [Paras 7, 8]
The Assessing Officer was directed to re-examine and allow the tax deducted at source credit, if not already allowed, in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The appeals were allowed insofar as the treaty rate on interest on income-tax refund was concerned, while the claim for tax deducted at source credit was restored to the Assessing Officer for verification.
Issues: Validity of penalty proceedings under Section 271AAB(1) where the notice did not specify the applicable clause or default.
Analysis: Section 271AAB(1) prescribes distinct factual conditions and penalty rates under clauses (a), (b) and (c). By virtue of Section 271AAB(3), the notice requirement under Section 274 applies to such penalty proceedings. A notice which merely proposes penalty under Section 271AAB, without identifying the applicable clause or precise statutory default, does not enable an effective defence. Subsequent hearing notices cannot cure this foundational defect, and participation in the proceedings cannot confer jurisdiction where valid initiation is absent.
Conclusion: The notice was defective and invalid; consequently, initiation of the penalty proceedings and the penalty imposed under Section 271AAB(1) were vitiated, in favour of the assessee.
Penalty u/s 271AAB - defective show-cause notice - Non Specification of applicable penalty clause
HELD THAT: - As the clauses of section 271AAB(1) operate in different factual circumstances and prescribe different rates of penalty, the assessee must be informed of the particular clause under which penalty is proposed. The reasonable opportunity contemplated by section 274 requires disclosure of the precise statutory basis for the proposed penalty. The notice and the subsequent notices did not specify either the applicable clause or the default alleged; participation in the proceedings could not cure this foundational jurisdictional defect. [Paras 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]
The initiation of penalty proceedings was vitiated, and the penalty imposed under section 271AAB(1) was quashed; the remaining grounds were left open.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed, the appellate order was set aside, and the penalty under section 271AAB(1) was quashed for want of a valid notice initiating the penalty proceedings.
Classification of imported PCC Lime 0/20MM (Quicklime) - to be classified under Chapter Sub-Heading 2522 1000 or under Chapter Sub-Heading 2825 9090?
HELD THAT:- We are of the view that no error not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, Kolkata [2025 (12) TMI 522 - CESTAT KOLKATA] in dismissing the appeal preferred by the appellant – Revenue wherein held that goods in question are rightly classifiable under Customs Tariff Item No. 2522 1000, as claimed by the appellant-assessee and the reclassification of the impugned goods under the Chapter Sub-Heading 2825 9090, by the Revenue rejected.
The Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.
Port services - Storage and Warehousing - storage and warehouse keeper - incidental or ancillary services - vivisection of a composite activity - taxable service
Inordinate delay of 6752 days in filing the Civil Appeal by stating that appellant had moved the High Court assailing the order of CESTAT on misconception that since the dispute pertains to classification, the jurisdictional High Court would have the jurisdiction to entertain the appeal
HELD THAT:- Civil Appeal dismissed - delay was not condoned and the appeal was not entertained on merits.[2007 (11) TMI 75 - CESTAT, AHMEDABAD]
Issues: Whether the one-year limitation for a refund of duty paid under provisional assessment begins from the date of the finalisation order or from the date on which that order is communicated to the person entitled to refund.
Analysis: Section 27(1B)(c) of the Customs Act, 1962 must be applied consistently with the principle that limitation for a remedy available to an affected person cannot commence before actual or constructive knowledge of the order giving rise to that remedy. Communication of the final assessment order is therefore necessary for computing limitation. Section 153 requires service through the prescribed modes, and mere despatch without proof of delivery does not establish communication. The burden to prove valid service lies on Revenue. The unrebutted postal evidence established receipt of the finalisation order on 10.06.2014, while Revenue produced no evidence of an earlier despatch or delivery.
Conclusion: The limitation under Section 27(1B)(c) commenced on communication of the finalisation order on 10.06.2014, and the refund claim filed within one year thereof was not barred by limitation.
Limitation for refund of provisionally assessed customs duty - Communication and proof of service of assessment order
Whether the one-year limitation for a refund of duty paid under provisional assessment begins from the date of the finalisation order or from the date on which that order is communicated to the person entitled to refund? - HELD THAT: - A limitation prescribed for a party to pursue a remedy cannot commence before the party has actual or constructive knowledge of the order giving rise to that remedy. Consequently, the one-year period for refund of duty paid provisionally runs from communication of the order finalising assessment, not from its bare date. Service under the prescribed statutory mode must be established by the Revenue; despatch without proof of delivery is insufficient. As Revenue produced no evidence of despatch or delivery, while the respondent's unrebutted postal cover established receipt of the finalisation order, the refund claim was within time. [Paras 15, 16, 17, 18, 19]
The refund claim was not barred by limitation and the order directing its consideration was upheld.
Final Conclusion: Revenue's appeal was dismissed. The order holding the refund claim to be within limitation and directing its consideration was upheld.
Issues: (i) Whether section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962, applies to the seized Indian currency; (ii) Whether the requirements of section 121 of the Customs Act, 1962, have been established; (iii) Whether the penalties under section 112(a) and 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962, are sustainable; and (iv) Whether the matters require remand.
Issue (i): Whether section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962, applies to the seized Indian currency.
Analysis: Section 123 creates an exception to the ordinary burden of proof only for specified or notified goods. Although gold is covered, Indian currency is not a specified or notified good. Since the seized property was currency and not gold, the statutory burden of proof remained upon the Revenue to establish that it represented sale proceeds of smuggled goods.
Conclusion: Section 123 does not apply to the seized Indian currency; the burden of proof rested upon the Revenue, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the requirements of section 121 of the Customs Act, 1962, have been established.
Analysis: Confiscation under section 121 requires cumulative statutory ingredients: legally established smuggled goods, their sale by a person having knowledge or reason to believe them to be smuggled, and a direct evidentiary nexus between that sale and the currency. Suspicion arising from possession of substantial cash or doubts regarding its source cannot substitute this proof. No particular smuggled gold consignment, illegal importation, seller, buyer, sale, consideration, or identifiable part of the currency linked to such sale was established. The business records, GST returns, bill books, and customer confirmations supporting alternative sources were not displaced by contrary evidence.
Conclusion: The statutory requirements for confiscation under section 121 were not established; confiscation of the currency is unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether the penalties under section 112(a) and 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962, are sustainable.
Analysis: Penalty under section 112(a) or section 112(b) requires identified goods liable to confiscation under section 111 and an established act, omission, abetment, or knowing dealing in relation to those goods. No specific smuggled gold or conduct relating to identified confiscable goods was proved. Allegations or conduct arising from an unconnected proceeding cannot supply the missing factual foundation, and confiscation proposed under section 121 cannot replace the foundational requirements for penalty.
Conclusion: The penalties under section 112(a) and section 112(b) are unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iv): Whether the matters require remand.
Analysis: Though the appellate remand direction could not be sustained under section 128A, remand was not warranted after findings that confiscation lacked legal authority and the statutory ingredients were unproved. Remand cannot be used to permit reconstruction of a fundamentally deficient case by identifying new facts or evidentiary links absent from the show cause notice. Fresh adjudication on the same record would serve no purpose.
Conclusion: Remand was unwarranted and the remand direction is set aside, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The absence of proof linking the currency to identified sales of smuggled goods defeats both confiscation and penalty; the matter attains finality without a fresh adjudication.
Ratio Decidendi: Currency may be confiscated as sale proceeds of smuggled goods only upon the Revenue proving all statutory ingredients, including a direct and identifiable evidentiary nexus between a proven sale of smuggled goods and the currency sought to be confiscated.
Burden of proof for confiscation of Indian currency - Confiscation of sale proceeds of smuggled goods - Penalty for dealing with goods liable to confiscation - Remand after failure to establish statutory ingredients
Burden of proof for confiscation of Indian currency - Applicability of statutory presumption to notified goods - Applicability of the statutory burden of proof to seized Indian currency alleged to be sale proceeds of smuggled gold - HELD THAT: - The statutory exception concerning burden of proof applies only to specified or notified goods. In the case of Tulsi Das Agarwal [2003 (9) TMI 198 - CESTAT, NEW DELHI] the Tribunal held that section 123 does not apply to Indian currency and that the failure of a claimant to satisfactorily establish lawful acquisition of cash, does not, by itself, make the currency liable to confiscation under section 121. The Commissioner (Appeals) therefore correctly held that the burden rested upon the department.
As the seized property was Indian currency and not gold, the burden did not shift to the respondent to prove its lawful source; the department remained bound to establish the conditions for confiscation. [Paras 15, 16]
The appellate finding that the burden rested on the department was affirmed.
Confiscation of sale proceeds of smuggled goods - Identifiable nexus between sale and seized currency - Liability of Indian currency to confiscation as sale proceeds of smuggled gold - HELD THAT: - Confiscation requires cumulative proof of the smuggled character of identified goods, their sale by a person having the requisite knowledge, and a direct identifiable nexus between that sale and the currency. Suspicion arising from possession of cash or doubtful explanations cannot substitute such proof. No particular smuggled gold, sale, seller, buyer, consideration, or part of the currency relatable to an alleged sale was established; the business records and customer statements could not be discarded without contrary evidence. [Paras 17, 18, 19, 20]
The statutory requirements for confiscation were not proved, and the confiscation of the seized currency was set aside.
Penalty for dealing with goods liable to confiscation - Foundational requirements for penalty - Sustainability of penalties for alleged acts concerning smuggled gold when no particular goods liable to confiscation were identified - HELD THAT: - Penalty liability requires identification of particular goods liable to confiscation and proof of the person's relevant act, omission, or knowing dealing in relation to those goods. Confiscation of currency as alleged sale proceeds cannot replace these foundational requirements. An unconnected proceeding concerning seizure of gold could not supply proof in the present proceedings. [Paras 21, 22]
As neither identified smuggled gold nor any relevant act or knowing dealing was established, the penalties were unsustainable and were set aside.
Remand after failure to establish statutory ingredients - Adjudication confined to show-cause notice allegations - Propriety of directing de novo adjudication after categorical findings that confiscation and penalties lacked statutory foundation - HELD THAT: - Although the remand direction could not be sustained, it did not warrant revival of the original confiscation and penalties. Having found the statutory ingredients unproved, the appellate authority could not logically remit the same matter for further adjudication. Remand cannot enable the department to construct a deficient case by identifying new foundational facts absent from the show-cause notice, and the adjudicating authority remains confined to the notice allegations. [Paras 23, 24]
The remand direction was deleted; the merits findings were affirmed, the Revenue's appeal was dismissed, and the respondent's cross-objection was allowed.
Final Conclusion: The confiscation of Indian currency and the penalties were set aside for failure to establish the statutory prerequisites. The de novo remand direction was also set aside, with the Revenue's appeal dismissed and the respondent's cross-objection allowed.
Issues: (i) Whether the declared CIF transaction value was liable to be accepted; (ii) Whether freight and insurance could be added to the declared CIF value; (iii) Whether upstream FOB values in supplier invoices and Non-GMO certificates could replace the importer's transaction value; (iv) Whether the extended limitation period was validly invoked; (v) Whether confiscation, redemption fine and penalties could be sustained.
Issue (i): Whether the declared CIF transaction value was liable to be accepted.
Analysis: Section 14(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 and Rule 3(1) of the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Imported Goods) Rules, 2007 prescribe the price actually paid or payable in the sale for export to India as the primary valuation basis. Rejection under Rule 12 required cogent evidence that the declared price was not the real consideration. Banking remittances did not exceed the declared invoice value, and no extra payment, relationship affecting price, or flow-back of funds was established.
Conclusion: The declared CIF transaction value was required to be accepted. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether freight and insurance could be added to the declared CIF value.
Analysis: Rule 10(2) permits addition of transport and insurance costs only to the extent they are not included in the price actually paid or payable. The invoices were on CIF terms and identified the Indian destination; freight was prepaid abroad by the foreign supplier, and there was no evidence that the importer paid or was liable to reimburse freight or insurance. Rule 10(3) also required any addition to rest on objective and quantifiable data rather than assumption.
Conclusion: No addition towards freight or insurance was permissible. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether upstream FOB values in supplier invoices and Non-GMO certificates could replace the importer's transaction value.
Analysis: The upstream FOB figures related to a separate transaction between foreign entities and did not establish the price paid or payable in the sale for export to India. Non-GMO certificates were regulatory compliance documents, not commercial valuation documents, and did not provide comparable-import data, actual consideration, or a quantifiable omitted amount. Similarity between the upstream FOB price and the downstream CIF price created, at most, suspicion and did not prove undervaluation.
Conclusion: The upstream FOB values and Non-GMO certificates could not substitute the declared CIF transaction value. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iv): Whether the extended limitation period was validly invoked.
Analysis: Invocation of Section 28(4) required collusion, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts with intent to evade duty. The primary import documents and CIF Incoterm were disclosed at assessment, and the dispute concerned valuation methodology rather than concealment or deliberate evasion.
Conclusion: The extended limitation period was not validly invoked, and the demand beyond the normal period was time-barred. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (v): Whether confiscation, redemption fine and penalties could be sustained.
Analysis: Confiscation under Section 111(m) depended on a sustainable finding of value misdeclaration. Penalty under Section 114A was contingent upon a valid extended-period duty determination, while penalties under Sections 112(a) and 112(b) rested on the same unproved valuation allegation. With the valuation enhancement and extended-period demand failing, no foundation remained for these consequences.
Conclusion: The confiscation, redemption fine, and penalties were unsustainable. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: Customs assessment must proceed on the declared CIF consideration, with the consequential differential-duty demand and related liabilities having no legal basis.
Ratio Decidendi: A declared CIF transaction value cannot be rejected or enhanced by imputing freight and insurance from an upstream FOB transaction unless reliable, objective evidence establishes that the importer paid or was liable to pay additional consideration not included in the invoice price.
Declared CIF transaction value of imported fresh apples - Freight and insurance addition to CIF value - Extended limitation for alleged customs undervaluation - Consequential confiscation and penalties for misdeclaration of value
Declared CIF transaction value of imported fresh apples - Freight and insurance addition to CIF value - Acceptance of the declared CIF transaction value for imported fresh apples and addition of freight and insurance based on upstream FOB documents - HELD THAT: - Transaction value is the primary basis of customs valuation and can be rejected only on cogent evidence that it does not represent the price actually paid or payable.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in South India Television [2007 (7) TMI 9 - SUPREME COURT] cautions against rejecting declared transaction value without establishing the real consideration and held that although the invoice price is not sacrosanct, before rejecting the same the Department is required to give cogent reasons and bring material on record to establish that the declared price does not represent the real transaction value. The burden is thus on the Department to establish that the apparent price is not the real price.
Department neither established any excess payment, flow-back or reimbursement by the importer nor identified an objective and quantifiable freight or insurance amount omitted from the CIF price. Freight was shown to have been prepaid by the foreign seller, and the upstream FOB transaction and Non-GMO certificates did not establish the consideration payable in the importer's distinct CIF transaction. Statements raising suspicion, without independent financial or documentary corroboration, could not fill that evidentiary gap. [Paras 30, 31, 34, 36, 37]
The declared CIF transaction value was liable to be accepted; no addition of freight or insurance was warranted, and the enhancement of assessable value was set aside.
Extended limitation for alleged customs undervaluation - Validity of invoking the extended period for alleged undervaluation of CIF-imported fresh apples - HELD THAT: - All primary import documents and the CIF Incoterm had been disclosed at assessment. A dispute over whether an upstream FOB figure could displace the disclosed CIF value, absent proof of additional consideration, did not amount to a positive and deliberate act of collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression with intent to evade duty. [Paras 38]
Invocation of the extended period was invalid, and the demand beyond the normal period was held time-barred.
Consequential confiscation and penalties for misdeclaration of value - Sustainability of confiscation, redemption fine and penalties founded on the rejected valuation and extended-period demand - HELD THAT: - As the declared value was wrongly rejected and the extended-period demand could not survive, the foundation for confiscation for misdeclaration of value failed. Penalty under section 114A was contingent upon the unsustainable extended-period duty determination, while penalties under section 112 rested on the same unsubstantiated premise. [Paras 39, 40]
The confiscation, redemption fine and penalties were set aside.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeals were allowed with consequential relief in accordance with law.
Issues: (i) Whether the ex parte proceedings denied the suspended directors a fair opportunity to contest the liquidator's application and whether the forensic audit report could be relied upon; (ii) Whether the property transactions and cash-expense entries constituted fraudulent accommodation and round-tripping transactions warranting contribution to the corporate debtor.
Issue (i): Whether the ex parte proceedings denied the suspended directors a fair opportunity to contest the liquidator's application and whether the forensic audit report could be relied upon.
Analysis: The appellants had been afforded sufficient opportunities before the Adjudicating Authority and their explanation for non-participation was not accepted. They were also able to place defence material in the appeal but did not produce reliable evidence sufficient to displace the audit findings. Though a forensic report is not conclusive by itself, it acquired evidentiary significance because it was founded on sale deeds, bank records, sub-registrar records and title-verification material. The burden to explain facts especially within the erstwhile management's knowledge remained on the appellants once the liquidator had produced a reliable forensic report.
Conclusion: The proceedings did not occasion any denial of fair opportunity, and the forensic audit report was rightly relied upon. The issue is decided against the appellants.
Issue (ii): Whether the property transactions and cash-expense entries constituted fraudulent accommodation and round-tripping transactions warranting contribution to the corporate debtor.
Analysis: The documentary material showed substantial overvaluation of properties, absence of proof for alleged cash payments, continued possession and rental collection by vendors, and rapid transfer of loan disbursements back to the corporate debtor and related entities. Certain properties remained encumbered and title-related steps were not completed. The unexplained and unsupported cash-expense entries further supported the finding that funds had been improperly withdrawn. These circumstances established that the stated property purchases were used as accommodation transactions to obtain loans and channel the proceeds back to the corporate debtor or connected entities.
Conclusion: The transactions were fraudulent round-tripping arrangements intended to defraud creditors, and the contribution liability imposed on the appellants was sustained. The issue is decided against the appellants.
Final Conclusion: The findings of fraudulent transactions and the consequent monetary contribution obligation under the insolvency framework remain enforceable.
Ratio Decidendi: A forensic audit supported by reliable documentary material may sustain a finding of fraudulent transactions where persons having special knowledge of the relevant affairs fail to produce cogent evidence rebutting it.
Forensic audit report - evidentiary value in insolvency proceedings - Fraudulent accommodation transactions and round-tripping of loan funds - Adequate opportunity of hearing
Adequate opportunity of hearing - Ex parte proceedings - Validity of the ex parte determination of the liquidator's application on the ground of alleged denial of opportunity to the suspended directors - HELD THAT: - The suspended directors had been afforded fullest possible opportunity before the Adjudicating Authority, but failed to contest the proceedings for reasons not found acceptable. They were also entitled to place material in support of their defence in appeal, but failed to produce reliable material sufficient to discredit the forensic audit report. [Paras 63, 64]
The ex parte determination was not vitiated for want of opportunity.
Forensic audit report - evidentiary value - Fraudulent accommodation transactions - Round-tripping of loan funds - Reliance on the forensic audit report to sustain contribution liability for fraudulent property transactions and unsupported cash expenses of the corporate debtor - HELD THAT: - A forensic audit report is not conclusive proof of fraud; however, it cannot be disregarded where its conclusions are supported by reliable documentary material. The report was founded on sale deeds, bank records, sub-registrar records and title-verification material, and the former management failed to rebut its factual foundation despite the burden resting on it as to matters within its special knowledge. The transactions involving the properties were rightly found to be accommodation arrangements for raising loans, with substantial loan proceeds returning through the sellers to the corporate debtor and related entities, thereby constituting round-tripping intended to defraud creditors. [Paras 62, 64, 65, 66, 68]
The forensic audit report was accepted as reliable, and the finding of fraudulent transactions and the consequential contribution direction were sustained.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed. The finding that the transactions were fraudulent accommodation arrangements involving round-tripping of loan funds, and the consequential contribution direction, were upheld.
Issues: Whether the IBBI (Liquidation Process) (Second Amendment) Regulations, 2025 applied to a liquidation by sale of the corporate debtor as a going concern where the liquidation order, recording the Committee of Creditors' decision for such sale, had been passed before the amendment came into force.
Analysis: The liquidation order under Section 33(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 had made liquidation effective from its date and had expressly recorded the recommendation under Regulation 39C of the IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016 that the liquidator first explore a going-concern sale under Regulation 32(e) of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016. The auction was an implementation step in the liquidation already commenced, not a fresh liquidation process. Rights and obligations in liquidation are governed by the regulations prevailing on the liquidation commencement date; a later amendment without retrospective operation cannot alter the legal foundation of the pre-existing process.
Conclusion: The amendment notified on 14.10.2025 did not govern or invalidate the going-concern sale process that commenced with the liquidation order dated 10.10.2025. The impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remitted for consideration of reliefs and concessions in accordance with law.
Prospective application of liquidation-process amendments - Liquidation commencement date for sale as a going concern
Applicability of the subsequent liquidation-process amendment to a sale of the corporate debtor as a going concern initiated under an earlier liquidation order - HELD THAT: - The liquidation order was a substantive order which made liquidation effective from its date and recorded the Committee of Creditors' decision that the liquidator should first explore sale of the corporate debtor as a going concern. The subsequent auction and sale steps were implementation of that existing liquidation process, and not commencement of a fresh process.
In the absence of express retrospective operation, the amendment notified after the liquidation order could not alter the rights and obligations arising under the regulatory regime prevailing on the liquidation commencement date. [Paras 14, 16, 19, 20, 21]
The impugned order was set aside insofar as it treated the subsequent amendment as governing the already commenced liquidation by sale as a going concern; the matter was remanded for consideration of the reliefs and concessions sought in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The appeals were disposed of by setting aside the impugned order to the extent it retrospectively applied the subsequent amendment and by remanding the request for consequential reliefs and concessions for fresh consideration in accordance with law.
Issues: (i) Whether the liquidation order under Section 33(1) was sustainable when the resolution professional's application was not founded on an independent and objective assessment and liquidation had not been considered by the Committee of Creditors; (ii) Whether the CIRP could be restored to enable consideration of withdrawal under Section 12A where settlement of financial debts was being pursued.
Issue (i): Whether the liquidation order under Section 33(1) was sustainable when the resolution professional's application was not founded on an independent and objective assessment and liquidation had not been considered by the Committee of Creditors.
Analysis: Section 33(1) permits liquidation upon failure of the resolution process, but the resolution professional must act independently, objectively, and consistently with the statutory scheme. The application was filed after the resolution professional abandoned the proposed request for general directions under Section 60(5), allegedly on the Registry's insistence, and acted upon an informal communication from one financial creditor outside a Committee of Creditors meeting. Neither financial creditor had voted for liquidation. These circumstances showed that the decision to invoke liquidation was not an independent, objective decision and was taken without placing the matter before the Committee of Creditors for deliberation.
Conclusion: The liquidation order under Section 33(1) was legally unsustainable and was set aside in favour of the appellant.
Issue (ii): Whether the CIRP could be restored to enable consideration of withdrawal under Section 12A where settlement of financial debts was being pursued.
Analysis: Withdrawal under Section 12A is an integral route for resolving an insolvency condition through settlement, alongside resolution through a plan and liquidation. The CIRP timeline is directory where a viable resolution remains in sight. The extension mechanism under Section 12(3), including the period up to the outer limit of 330 days, can be used to facilitate a probable Section 12A exit route as well as a resolution plan. Since repayment under the one-time settlement was continuing and the financial debts had been substantially addressed, fairness and the objective of preserving the corporate debtor as a going concern required an opportunity to pursue withdrawal rather than liquidation.
Conclusion: The CIRP was restored and the resolution professional was required to explore withdrawal under Section 12A, in favour of the appellant.
Final Conclusion: Insolvency resolution must favour a fair and purposive choice among available mechanisms, and liquidation cannot be pursued where a viable settlement-based exit may preserve the corporate debtor as a going concern.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a resolution professional invokes liquidation without an independent and objective assessment, despite a viable settlement process capable of supporting withdrawal under Section 12A, the liquidation order may be reversed and the CIRP restored to pursue that statutory exit route.
Liquidation of corporate debtor - independent decision of resolution professional - Withdrawal of corporate insolvency resolution process by settlement under Section 12A - Extension of corporate insolvency resolution process for settlement
Liquidation application u/s 33(1) - Independent and objective decision of resolution professional - Validity of liquidation ordered on an application u/s 33(1) where the resolution professional acted on the Registry's advice and private communication from an individual Committee of Creditors member - HELD THAT: - A resolution professional must exercise an independent and objective judgment, consistently with the instructions of the Committee of Creditors or directions of the Adjudicating Authority, and cannot be guided by the Registry on the nature of relief to be sought. Once the decision to invoke Section 33(1) ceased to be independent, the resolution professional ought to have convened the Committee of Creditors rather than consult a member privately outside the Committee. The circumstances in which liquidation was sought, which were not before the Adjudicating Authority, rendered the liquidation order legally unsustainable. [Paras 10, 24, 25]
The order directing liquidation was set aside.
Section 12A settlement as insolvency resolution - Extension of CIRP for settlement - Availability of extension of the corporate insolvency resolution process for pursuing withdrawal by settlement u/s 12A while repayment under the one-time settlement was in progress - HELD THAT: - Withdrawal through settlement under Section 12A ends the insolvency condition and constitutes an exit route integral to insolvency resolution, alongside resolution through a plan or liquidation. The additional period up to the outer limit of 330 days remains capable of being utilised, in an appropriate case, through the inherent powers of the Adjudicating Authority notwithstanding the stipulation of a single application for extension. A resolution professional must objectively consider extension where a successful resolution through either the plan route or the Section 12A exit route is probable; failure to do so by disregarding material settlement circumstances taints the decision to invoke Section 33(1) with arbitrariness. [Paras 11, 19, 21, 22, 23]
The CIRP was restored and the resolution professional was directed to explore the Section 12A route.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed, the liquidation order was set aside, and the CIRP was restored for exploration of withdrawal through settlement under Section 12A.
Issues: (i) Whether the ex parte adjudication suffered from denial of notice and opportunity of hearing; (ii) Whether a director remained liable for non-realisation of export proceeds despite the company subsequently entering liquidation; (iii) Whether the penalty imposed required reduction.
Issue (i): Whether the ex parte adjudication suffered from denial of notice and opportunity of hearing.
Analysis: The appellant had acknowledged the investigation directive and sought time to respond, but furnished no reply. Notices and hearing communications were sent to the available addresses, attempts at personal service and affixture were made, and the appellant did not notify any changed address despite awareness of the investigation. The failure to participate after such awareness and service attempts could not be invoked as denial of a fair hearing.
Conclusion: The plea of violation of principles of natural justice was rejected, against the appellant.
Issue (ii): Whether a director remained liable for non-realisation of export proceeds despite the company subsequently entering liquidation.
Analysis: The export proceeds remained unrealised and the appellant did not dispute that fact. During the period of contravention, he was a director in charge of the company's affairs. The statutory presumption that reasonable steps to recover export proceeds had not been taken was unrebutted. Subsequent liquidation neither displaced liability arising during the relevant period nor established that the appellant was unable to seek the company records from the Official Liquidator.
Conclusion: The appellant's liability for contravention was sustained, against the appellant.
Issue (iii): Whether the penalty imposed required reduction.
Analysis: Although the penalty was substantially below the statutory maximum and proportionate to the magnitude of the contravention, the relevant period, delay in adjudication, and the company's liquidation warranted confining the penalty to the amount already deposited.
Conclusion: The penalty was reduced to Rs. 30,00,000, in favour of the appellant.
Final Conclusion: The contravention and personal liability were maintained, while monetary relief was granted by limiting the penalty to the pre-deposit amount.
Ratio Decidendi: A director responsible for a company during the period of export-default remains liable where the statutory presumption of failure to take reasonable recovery steps is unrebutted, and cannot claim denial of hearing after having knowledge of the investigation and failing to respond to reasonable service efforts.
Ex parte adjudication suffered from denial of notice and opportunity of hearing - Natural justice in foreign-exchange adjudication - Director's liability for unrealised export proceeds - Penalty for unrealised export proceeds
Service of notice in foreign-exchange adjudication - Opportunity of hearing - Adequacy of opportunity afforded to the director in adjudication for non-realisation of export proceeds - HELD THAT: - The appellant was aware of the investigation, had sought time to respond to the directive, and thereafter neither responded nor notified any change of address. Repeated attempts to serve notices were made, and the appellant could not rely upon his own non-cooperation to plead denial of hearing. The Tribunal therefore found no breach of natural justice. [Paras 26]
The challenge to the ex parte adjudication on the ground of denial of opportunity was rejected.
Director's liability for unrealised export proceeds - Statutory presumption of failure to take reasonable steps - Liability of the director for non-realisation of the company's export proceeds despite the company's liquidation - HELD THAT: - Non-realisation of the export proceeds was not disputed. The appellant was in charge of the company throughout the period of contravention, and neither established realisation of the proceeds nor produced material showing efforts to obtain relevant information from the Official Liquidator. The statutory presumption of failure to take reasonable steps to recover the payments remained unrebutted; liquidation did not absolve the appellant of liability for the contravention committed while he was in charge. [Paras 21, 29]
The imposition of penalty for the contravention was upheld.
Quantum of penalty for unrealised export proceeds - Appropriate quantum of penalty imposed on the director for non-realisation of export proceeds - HELD THAT: - Though the penalty was not found excessive in relation to the contravention, the Tribunal considered the period of contravention, the time-frame of the adjudication proceedings, and the company's liquidation. In the interests of justice, the penalty was confined to the amount already deposited by the appellant. [Paras 27, 32, 33]
The penalty was sustained but reduced to the amount paid towards pre-deposit.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was disposed of by sustaining the penalty for contravention relating to unrealised export proceeds, while reducing its quantum to the amount already paid towards pre-deposit.
Issues: Whether non-supply of relied-upon documents denied the appellant a fair opportunity of hearing and vitiated the attachment-confirmation proceedings.
Analysis: The record established service of the envelope containing the notice and relied-upon documents while the appellant was in custody, acknowledged by the appellant's endorsement. The subsequent denial, raised after a substantial delay without any complaint against the serving official, was not accepted. Inspection of documents was also permitted, and adequate time was available to file a reply; the later request for further copies and time was treated as an attempt to delay completion of the proceedings.
Conclusion: No breach of principles of natural justice or denial of a fair hearing was established; the confirmation of the provisional attachment was not liable to interference.
Supply of relied upon documents denied - no Opportunity of hearing in attachment proceedings - Alleged non-supply of relied upon documents and denial of adequate opportunity to contest the provisional attachment proceedings - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the appellant had acknowledged receipt of the envelope containing the notice and relied upon documents while in custody. His subsequent denial, made after a substantial interval and unsupported by any complaint against the official alleged to have obtained the acknowledgement without delivery, was held to be an afterthought. Inspection of documents was also permitted, and the Tribunal found that sufficient time had been available for filing a reply; the later request for further copies and time was viewed as an attempt to delay completion of the proceedings. [Paras 19, 20, 21, 22, 23]
No violation of natural justice or denial of a fair opportunity was established; the challenge to the confirmation of the provisional attachment failed.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed, the Tribunal holding that the relied upon documents had been served and that the appellant had been afforded a fair opportunity to defend the attachment proceedings.
Issues: (i) Whether transfer of development rights in land to a developer in exchange for a share of the built-up area constitutes a taxable service; (ii) Whether CENVAT credit of tax paid on works-contract and administrative services received from the developer is admissible; (iii) Whether the extended limitation period and penalties are invocable in relation to the inadmissible CENVAT credit.
Issue (i): Whether transfer of development rights in land to a developer in exchange for a share of the built-up area constitutes a taxable service.
Analysis: Development rights are benefits arising out of land and consequently constitute immovable property under Section 3(26) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. A transfer of such rights is a transaction in immovable property, not a provision of construction service or any other taxable service.
Conclusion: Transfer of development rights was not a taxable service; the service-tax demand and related penalties under Sections 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 are unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether CENVAT credit of tax paid on works-contract and administrative services received from the developer is admissible.
Analysis: Since transfer of development rights was not an output service, the works-contract and administrative services received from the developer could not qualify as input services for that transaction.
Conclusion: CENVAT credit is inadmissible and recoverable under Rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002, against the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether the extended limitation period and penalties are invocable in relation to the inadmissible CENVAT credit.
Analysis: The credit was availed because the assessee bona fide treated transfer of development rights as taxable construction service and discharged service tax on that basis. This conduct did not warrant invocation of the extended limitation period or imposition of penalty.
Conclusion: Recovery of inadmissible credit is restricted to the normal limitation period, and the penalty under Rule 15 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002 is set aside, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The transfer of development rights is treated as a transaction in immovable property; service tax paid on it may be claimed as refund subject to the statutory bar of unjust enrichment, while inadmissible credit remains recoverable only within the normal period.
Ratio Decidendi: Transfer of development rights, being a benefit arising out of land and thus immovable property, is not a taxable service; services received for such transfer cannot generate input-service credit, though a bona fide contrary tax position precludes extended limitation and penalty.
Transfer of development rights as immovable property - CENVAT credit on services received by landowner - Extended limitation and penalty for wrongly availed CENVAT credit
Transfer of development rights as immovable property - Service tax on transfer of development rights - Taxability of transfer of land development rights to a developer in consideration of a share in the built-up area - HELD THAT: - Development rights are a benefit arising out of land and consequently constitute immovable property. Their transfer is therefore a transaction in immovable property and not a taxable service, whether characterised as construction of complexes or otherwise. [Paras 9, 12]
The service-tax demand on transfer of development rights and the connected penalties were set aside.
CENVAT credit on services received by landowner - Availability of CENVAT credit of service tax paid on works-contract and administrative services received from the developer - HELD THAT: - Since transfer of development rights was not an output service of the appellant, the works-contract and administrative services received from the developer could not qualify as input services in its hands. [Paras 10, 12]
Denial and recovery of the CENVAT credit were upheld, confined to the normal period of limitation.
Extended limitation and penalty for wrongly availed CENVAT credit - Invocation of the extended limitation period and imposition of penalty for CENVAT credit availed on services received from the developer - HELD THAT: - The appellant had treated transfer of development rights as taxable construction service and availed the credit on that basis. This understanding precluded invocation of the extended period and also warranted deletion of the penalty. [Paras 10, 12]
The extended period was held inapplicable and the penalty relating to the CENVAT credit was set aside.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was partly allowed. The service-tax demand and penalties were set aside, while recovery of the inadmissible CENVAT credit was sustained only for the normal limitation period.
Issues: (i) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the alleged short reversal of CENVAT credit; (ii) Whether proportionate reversal under Rule 6(3A) was to be computed with reference to total CENVAT credit or only common CENVAT credit; and (iii) Whether trading or services in the negative list could be treated as exempted services for Rule 6.
Issue (i): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the alleged short reversal of CENVAT credit.
Analysis: The reversals were disclosed in filed returns and the Revenue could have verified the computation by scrutiny or by seeking further information. Failure to undertake such verification does not establish deliberate concealment. Invocation of the extended period requires fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade; mens rea cannot be presumed from a bona fide interpretative position or an audit detection.
Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether proportionate reversal under Rule 6(3A) was to be computed with reference to total CENVAT credit or only common CENVAT credit.
Analysis: Read harmoniously, Rule 6 permits proportionate reversal only of credit attributable to common inputs or input services used for taxable and exempted activities. Credit exclusively used for taxable output services or dutiable goods cannot be included in the reversal formula. The substitution of the Rule 6(3A) formula by Notification No. 13/2016-C.E. (N.T.) was clarificatory and consequently applied retrospectively.
Conclusion: Only common CENVAT credit was relevant for proportionate reversal; computation on total CENVAT credit was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether trading or services in the negative list could be treated as exempted services for Rule 6.
Analysis: Rule 2(e) does not classify services listed in Section 66D as exempted services. Transfer of title in goods through trading is excluded from the definition of service; it is a sale transaction subject to the distinct taxing field applicable to goods and cannot be deemed to be a service merely for the purpose of the negative list.
Conclusion: Trading is not a service and cannot be treated as an exempted service for Rule 6, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The demand founded on the alleged short reversal of credit was legally unsustainable.
Extended limitation for CENVAT credit reversal - Proportionate reversal of common CENVAT credit under Rule 6(3A) - Trading of goods as exempted service
Extended limitation for CENVAT credit reversal - Suppression of facts with intent to evade duty - Invocation of the extended period for alleged short reversal of CENVAT credit disclosed in service tax return - HELD THAT: - The extended period requires fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade duty; mens rea and positive conduct directed at evasion are essential. As the appellant had disclosed the reversals in its returns, the Department could have scrutinised the computation or sought further information. Failure to undertake such scrutiny could not establish deliberate suppression or intent to evade duty. [Paras 14, 15, 16]
The extended period was not invocable, the requisite suppression or intent to evade duty not having been established.
Proportionate reversal of common CENVAT credit under Rule 6(3A) - Clarificatory amendment to CENVAT credit reversal formula - Computation of proportionate CENVAT credit reversal where inputs and input services were used both for taxable output and exempted activities - HELD THAT: - A harmonious reading of Rule 6(1), (2) and (3) showed that total CENVAT credit in the Rule 6(3A) formula meant the total common credit and did not include credit exclusively attributable to taxable output services or dutiable goods. Otherwise, credit relatable exclusively to dutiable output would be disallowed without authority. The substituted reversal formula was held clarificatory and therefore applicable retrospectively. [Paras 17, 18]
The reversal could be computed with reference to common CENVAT credit and not the entire credit availed.
Trading of goods as exempted service - Sale of goods outside the scope of service - Treatment of trading in goods as an exempted service for CENVAT credit reversal - HELD THAT: - Services specified in the negative list were not, merely for that reason, exempted services under the definition in the CENVAT Credit Rules. Trading constituted transfer of title in goods for consideration and was a sale of goods, which lay outside the statutory definition of service. A transaction excluded from the definition of service could not be treated as a service under the negative-list provision. [Paras 19, 20, 21]
Trading in goods could not be treated as an exempted service on the basis adopted in the impugned order.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief in accordance with law.
Issues: (i) Whether construction of residential flats by a builder before 01.07.2010 was taxable in the absence of the deeming provision; (ii) Whether construction of a building or independently identifiable project having twelve or fewer residential units was taxable as a residential complex service or works contract service; (iii) Whether consideration received under separate agreements with individual purchasers for completion of residential units intended for personal use was taxable; (iv) Whether a separate levy could be sustained on flats allotted to landowners under a development agreement; (v) Whether abatement and cum-tax valuation were available for any consideration otherwise found taxable; and (vi) Whether the extended limitation period and penalties were sustainable.
Issue (i): Whether construction of residential flats by a builder before 01.07.2010 was taxable in the absence of the deeming provision.
Analysis: The explanation deeming construction by a builder to be taxable where consideration was received from a prospective buyer before completion certification came into force only from 01.07.2010. That deeming fiction could not operate retrospectively for the earlier period.
Conclusion: The demand for the period before 01.07.2010 was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether construction of a building or independently identifiable project having twelve or fewer residential units was taxable as a residential complex service or works contract service.
Analysis: Although indivisible contracts involving goods and construction services are works contracts, taxability of residential construction still depends on satisfaction of the statutory definition of a residential complex. A project or independently identifiable building having twelve or fewer residential units does not meet that definition, and the works contract entry cannot enlarge it.
Conclusion: Construction of such buildings or projects was outside the taxable scope, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether consideration received under separate agreements with individual purchasers for completion of residential units intended for personal use was taxable.
Analysis: The statutory exclusion covered construction undertaken under individual agreements for residential units intended for the purchasers' personal use, including use by another person as a residence with or without rent. Separate agreements for completion and finishing of individual flats fell within that exclusion, absent material showing commercial exploitation or non-residential use.
Conclusion: Service tax on consideration under the individual purchaser agreements was not payable, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iv): Whether a separate levy could be sustained on flats allotted to landowners under a development agreement.
Analysis: A further levy on the landowners' share would constitute double taxation where the value of land or development rights was embedded in the assessable value of the developer's share on which tax had been discharged. No evidence established that consideration received in kind from landowners had escaped tax despite such inclusion.
Conclusion: The separate demand on the landowners' share was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (v): Whether abatement and cum-tax valuation were available for any consideration otherwise found taxable.
Analysis: Any residual taxable consideration was entitled to statutory abatement on fulfilment of prescribed conditions. Where service tax had not been separately collected, the gross amount charged had to be treated as inclusive of service tax for valuation.
Conclusion: Applicable abatement and cum-tax benefit under Section 67(2) were required to be extended for any amount otherwise found taxable, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (vi): Whether the extended limitation period and penalties were sustainable.
Analysis: The dispute arose from interpretation of composite construction contracts, the subsequently introduced deeming provision, the personal-use exclusion, valuation, and taxability of the landowners' share. Divergent views and the absence of any identified fraud, collusion, or deliberate suppression with intent to evade precluded invocation of the extended period. The same interpretational circumstances did not support penalties.
Conclusion: The extended period was not invocable and all penalties were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The disputed residential-construction levy was governed by the pre-2010 non-taxability, statutory residential-complex and personal-use exclusions, protection against double taxation, applicable valuation relief, and the normal limitation period.
Works Contract Service and statutory definition of residential complex - Prospective operation of builder-construction deeming provision - Personal-use exclusion for residential units under individual construction agreements - Landowner's share in joint-development projects and double taxation - Extended limitation in interpretational Service Tax disputes - Penalty in absence of fraud or deliberate evasion
Works Contract Service and residential complex threshold - Taxability under Works Contract Service of composite construction contracts relating to a building or independently identifiable project having twelve or fewer residential units - HELD THAT: - The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs, Kerala Vs Larsen and Toubro Ltd. [2015 (8) TMI 749 - SUPREME COURT] held that and indivisible composite works contract could not be subjected to Service Tax under the categories of Commercial or Industrial Construction Service or Construction of Complex Service prior to 01.06.2007. After 01.06.2007, such contracts could be taxed only under the specific taxable category of Works Contract Service, subject to satisfaction of its statutory requirements. However, mere existence of a composite contract does not conclude the question of taxability. To fall within Works Contract Service in relation to residential construction, the subject construction must satisfy the statutory description of a “Residential Complex”.
Although indivisible contracts involving supply of goods and construction services are works contracts and could, after the introduction of the specific taxable entry, be taxed only as Works Contract Service, that entry could not enlarge the statutory meaning of a residential complex. A building or independently identifiable project having twelve or fewer residential units, and not otherwise satisfying the statutory description of a residential complex, could not be subjected to Service Tax merely by characterising the activity as a works contract. [Paras 11, 12]
Construction of such buildings or projects was held outside the scope of taxable construction of residential complex service.
Prospective operation of builder-construction deeming provision - Service Tax liability on construction of residential flats by a builder for prospective purchasers before 01.07.2010 - HELD THAT: - The deeming provision treating construction by a builder as a taxable service upon receipt of consideration from a prospective buyer before grant of completion certificate came into force only from 01.07.2010. Being a statutory deeming fiction, it could not be retrospectively applied to the earlier period. [Paras 13, 14]
The demand relating to construction of residential flats before 01.07.2010 was set aside.
Personal-use exclusion for individually contracted residential units - Service Tax liability on completion and finishing of residential units under separate agreements with individual purchasers - HELD THAT: - Where, after transfer of the undivided land share together with partly constructed units, separate agreements were entered into with individual purchasers for completion of their respective residences, the construction fell within the personal-use exclusion. The exclusion was not displaced merely because several units formed part of one development, and personal use included allowing another person to use the unit as a residence without consideration or on rent. [Paras 15, 16]
Service Tax on consideration received under such individual agreements for residential units intended for purchasers' personal use was held not payable.
Landowner's share in joint-development projects and double taxation - Separate Service Tax demand on flats allotted to landowners under development agreements - HELD THAT: - A separate levy on flats allotted to landowners would amount to double taxation where the value of land or development rights was embedded in the assessable value of the developer's share sold to independent purchasers and tax had been discharged on that value. As the record did not establish that consideration received in kind from landowners had escaped taxation despite such inclusion, the separate demand could not stand. [Paras 17]
The Department's challenge to the dropping of the demand on the landowners' share was rejected.
Statutory abatement and cum-tax valuation - Valuation of any consideration ultimately found taxable under the construction arrangements - HELD THAT: - For any amount found taxable upon final verification, statutory abatement was required to be granted upon fulfilment of prescribed conditions. Further, where Service Tax had not been collected separately, the gross consideration had to be treated as inclusive of tax and valued on a cum-tax basis unless the Department established separate collection of Service Tax. [Paras 18]
Applicable abatement and cum-tax benefit were directed to be extended in respect of any otherwise taxable consideration.
Extended limitation in interpretational Service Tax disputes - Invocation of the extended limitation period for the demand arising from composite residential construction contracts - HELD THAT: - The controversy involved interpretation of composite contracts, the subsequent deeming provision, the personal-use exclusion, valuation and the landowners' share, on which divergent views had prevailed. In the absence of any identified positive act of fraud, collusion or deliberate suppression with intent to evade tax, mere non-payment arising from an interpretational dispute could not justify the extended period.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Uniworth Textiles Ltd., Vs Commissioner of Central Excise[2013 (1) TMI 616 - SUPREME COURT] held that mere non-payment of duty does not amount to suppression and that something more indicating a deliberate act with intent to evade payment must be established for invoking the extended period. [Paras 19, 20]
Invocation of the extended period was set aside, and any otherwise surviving liability was confined to the normal period.
Penalty in absence of fraud or deliberate evasion - Penalty for non-payment of Service Tax in an interpretational dispute concerning residential construction - HELD THAT: - The dispute concerned complex and frequently amended statutory provisions, without fraud or deliberate evasion by the appellant. Penalty could not therefore be sustained. [Paras 21]
All penalties imposed on the appellant were set aside.
Final Conclusion: The appellant's appeal was allowed and the Department's appeal was dismissed. The impugned demand and penalties were set aside to the extent determined, subject to the direction concerning any liability otherwise surviving within the normal period.
Issues: (i) Whether construction of staff quarters for an industrial establishment falls within Commercial or Industrial Construction Service; and (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for service tax demanded from a sub-contractor where the taxability of sub-contract work was subject to divergent judicial views during the relevant period.
Issue (i): Whether construction of staff quarters for an industrial establishment falls within Commercial or Industrial Construction Service.
Analysis: Construction of a residential colony for factory employees is a welfare activity and does not acquire a commercial or industrial character merely because the employees serve an industrial undertaking. The jurisdictional High Court's ruling on this question was binding on the departmental authorities and the Tribunal.
Conclusion: Construction of the staff quarters was not taxable as Commercial or Industrial Construction Service. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for service tax demanded from a sub-contractor where the taxability of sub-contract work was subject to divergent judicial views during the relevant period.
Analysis: Although a sub-contractor remains independently liable to service tax notwithstanding tax payment by the main contractor, the proviso to Section 73(1) requires suppression or wilful misstatement with intent to evade tax for invocation of the extended period. Non-payment founded on a bona fide view amid genuinely conflicting decisions on taxability does not, without more, establish the requisite intent.
Conclusion: The extended period was unavailable, and the sub-contractor demand raised solely under that period was time-barred. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The tax demands for staff-quarter construction and sub-contract work, together with the related interest and penalties, could not be sustained.
Commercial or Industrial Construction Service - staff quarters for factory workforce - Extended limitation - sub-contractor's service-tax liability amid conflicting judicial views
Commercial or Industrial Construction Service - staff quarters for factory workforce - Binding precedent of jurisdictional High Court - Taxability of construction of residential staff quarters for the workforce of a cotton mill as Commercial or Industrial Construction Service - HELD THAT: - Construction of a residential colony for a factory workforce is a welfare activity and does not acquire a commercial or industrial character merely because the employees work in a commercial or industrial establishment. The jurisdictional High Court's decision MANIKGARH CEMENT [2010 (10) TMI 10 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] on this point was binding on the Tribunal and authorities within its jurisdiction. [Paras 8]
The service-tax demand on construction of staff quarters was set aside.
Extended limitation-sub-contractor's service-tax liability amid conflicting judicial views - Suppression with intent to evade tax - Validity of invoking the extended period for service-tax demand on construction work executed as a sub-contractor where the main contractors had discharged tax on the activity - HELD THAT: - A sub-contractor remains liable to service tax notwithstanding payment by the main contractor. However, invocation of the extended period requires a positive act of suppression or wilful misstatement with intent to evade tax; mere non-payment is insufficient. As the sub-contractor's liability was genuinely debatable amid conflicting decisions during the relevant period, the appellant's ultimately erroneous belief did not establish mala fide intent. The issue of divergent judicial opinion, being a matter of record bearing on limitation, could be raised at that stage. [Paras 9, 10]
As the demand was raised solely by invoking the extended period, it was barred by limitation and was set aside.
Final Conclusion: The service-tax demands were set aside: the staff-quarters construction was not taxable under Commercial or Industrial Construction Service, and the sub-contractor demand was time-barred. Consequential interest and penalties were also set aside, and the appeal was allowed.
Issues: (i) Whether the extended period of limitation under the proviso to Section 11A(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was invocable in the absence of established deliberate suppression, where the Department had contemporaneous knowledge of the stock position and the demand rested on statutory records; (ii) Whether penalty under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was imposable.
Issue (i): Whether the extended period of limitation under the proviso to Section 11A(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was invocable in the absence of established deliberate suppression, where the Department had contemporaneous knowledge of the stock position and the demand rested on statutory records.
Analysis: The proviso requires the Revenue to establish that the non-levy or short-levy resulted from fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade duty. This jurisdictional enquiry is distinct from computation of the limitation period from the relevant date. Departmental knowledge cannot alter the statutory relevant date after the proviso is attracted, but contemporaneous knowledge is material evidence in deciding whether suppression existed at all.
Analysis: The stock verification was conducted in the presence of departmental officers after their invitation, and the demand was founded exclusively on the Cost Audit Report, a statutory record required to be maintained and producible to the Department. The prescribed returns did not require disclosure of the shortages or excesses. The notices neither identified a suppressed fact nor pleaded a breached disclosure obligation, deliberate concealment, or intent to evade duty. In the absence of a positive and deliberate act of withholding material information, mere non-reporting or discovery of a discrepancy cannot constitute suppression. The notices issued beyond the ordinary one-year period were therefore time-barred.
Conclusion: The extended period was not available; the demand was barred by limitation in its entirety, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether penalty under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was imposable.
Analysis: Penalty under Section 11AC is conditional upon satisfaction of the ingredients that permit invocation of the proviso to Section 11A(1). Since no fraud, wilful suppression, or intent to evade duty was established, that condition failed.
Conclusion: Penalty under Section 11AC was not imposable, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The extended-period duty demand and consequential interest and penalty liabilities could not be sustained; no finding was required on the merits of the underlying demand.
Ratio Decidendi: The extended limitation period under the proviso to Section 11A(1) is available only upon proof of deliberate suppression or other specified culpable conduct with intent to evade duty; departmental possession of statutory records and contemporaneous knowledge may demonstrate the absence of such suppression.
Extended limitation for excise duty demand - suppression of facts - Penalty for duty short-levy - prerequisite of fraud, suppression or intent to evade
Extended limitation for excise duty demand - suppression of facts - Departmental knowledge of statutory records - Specific pleading of suppression in show cause notice - Invocation of the extended period for CENVAT credit demand founded on shortages reflected in the assessee's statutory Cost Audit Report - HELD THAT: - The proviso to Section 11A(1) involves a prior jurisdictional enquiry into whether the non-levy or short-levy resulted from fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade duty; only upon satisfaction of those conditions does the question of reckoning the five-year period from the relevant date arise. Departmental knowledge cannot curtail a valid statutory limitation period, but contemporaneous knowledge of the relevant facts is material in determining whether there was deliberate suppression.
The shortages and excesses were recorded during stock verification attended by departmental officers, and the demand rested wholly on a statutory Cost Audit Report which the assessee was obliged to maintain and produce when called for. As the prescribed returns required no such disclosure, the notices contained no particulars of any fact suppressed or duty to disclose that was breached, and the Department delayed issuance of notices after obtaining the records, no positive and deliberate concealment or intent to evade duty was established. [Paras 24, 26, 27, 28, 29]
The extended period was unavailable and the notices were barred by the ordinary period of limitation.
Penalty for duty short-levy - prerequisite of fraud, suppression or intent to evade - Imposition of penalty under Section 11AC where the conditions for invoking the extended period were not established - HELD THAT: - Penalty under Section 11AC is not free-standing and is attracted only where the conditions of the proviso to Section 11A(1) are satisfied. Since fraud, suppression, wilful misstatement, or intent to evade duty was not made out, the statutory basis for penalty failed. [Paras 25, 30]
The penalty under Section 11AC was set aside.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed, the Tribunal's order was set aside and the appellate orders were restored. The demand, interest and penalty were set aside as barred by limitation, without examination of the merits of the demand.
Issues: (i) Whether dolochar, fly ash, iron ore fines and other incidental waste materials arising during manufacture of sponge iron are liable to Central Excise duty merely because they are marketable and tariff-listed; (ii) Whether dolochar was alternatively covered by unconditional exemption notifications applicable to waste arising from manufacture of iron or steel; (iii) Whether the extended period of limitation, interest and penalties could be sustained.
Issue (i): Whether dolochar, fly ash, iron ore fines and other incidental waste materials arising during manufacture of sponge iron are liable to Central Excise duty merely because they are marketable and tariff-listed.
Analysis: Levy under Section 3 requires that goods be manufactured or produced. Marketability under the explanation to Section 2(d), sale value, or tariff coverage does not dispense with the independent requirement of manufacture. Dolochar and fly ash arose inevitably as residues from coal use, while iron ore fines arose from handling, screening or segregation; no independent process producing a new and distinct commodity with a separate name, character or use was established. The burden to establish manufacture remained unmet.
Conclusion: The disputed residues and waste materials were not excisable goods liable to duty; this finding is in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether dolochar was alternatively covered by unconditional exemption notifications applicable to waste arising from manufacture of iron or steel.
Analysis: The relevant notification entries unconditionally exempt slag, dross, scaling and other waste from manufacture of iron or steel falling under Chapter 26. If dolochar were classified by the Department under that chapter as waste from sponge-iron manufacture, the exemption could not be denied.
Conclusion: On the alternative assumption of excisability and classification under Chapter 26, dolochar attracted unconditional exemption and no effective duty liability arose; this finding is in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether the extended period of limitation, interest and penalties could be sustained.
Analysis: The dispute concerned the excisability of unavoidable residues and involved divergent administrative views, including a Board circular later rescinded. This demonstrated an interpretational dispute. No fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or intent to evade duty was established.
Conclusion: The extended period was unavailable, and consequential interest and penalties, including personal penalties, could not survive; this finding is in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: No Central Excise duty, consequential interest, or penalties were sustainable in respect of the disputed clearances.
Ratio Decidendi: Marketability, saleability, or tariff classification cannot render an incidental waste or residue dutiable unless it emerges through a process amounting to manufacture or production.
Excisability of incidental waste arising in sponge iron manufacture - Manufacture and marketability as distinct conditions for levy - Extended limitation - suppression with intent to evade duty
Excisability of incidental waste arising in sponge iron manufacture - Manufacture and marketability as distinct conditions for levy - Liability of dolochar, fly ash, iron ore fines and other waste materials arising incidentally during manufacture of sponge iron to Central Excise duty on the basis of marketability and tariff coverage - HELD THAT: - Manufacture or production is the foundational taxable event, and marketability under the inclusive definition of goods cannot dispense with that independent requirement. The Department did not establish any process undertaken to manufacture the disputed materials or the emergence of a new and distinct commodity. Dolochar and fly ash were unavoidable residues of the manufacturing process and combustion of coal respectively, while iron ore fines resulted from handling, screening or segregation without beneficiation or enrichment. Their saleability, commercial utility or tariff specification could not, in the absence of manufacture, sustain the levy.
The issue is directly covered by the decisions in M/s Alok Steel Industries Pvt Ltd. [2020 (1) TMI 581 - CESTAT KOLKATA] and M/s kaushal Ferro Metals (P) Ltd [2026 (3) TMI 904 - CESTAT KOLKATA]
The decision of this Tribunal in Principal Commissioner of Central Tax, Rangareddy – GST [2026 (8) TMI 515 - CESTAT HYDERABAD] also reiterates that fly ash emerging from the burning of coal in a captive power plant is not excisable.
In Tarini Prasad Mohaty [2026 (7) TMI 84 - CESTAT KOLKATA] it was held that crushing and screening of iron ore, resulting merely in size reduction an segregation without beneficiation or enrichment, does not amount to manufacture of iron ore concentrated. The same principle applies to the iron ore fines involved in the present proceedings. [Paras 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]
The disputed materials were held not excisable, and the demand of duty could not be sustained.
Extended limitation - suppression with intent to evade duty - Penalty for non-payment of duty on incidental waste materials - Validity of invoking the extended period and imposing penalties for non-payment of duty on incidental waste and residues arising during manufacture of sponge iron - HELD THAT: - The controversy concerning excisability of the waste materials was interpretational, as reflected by divergent administrative views, withdrawal of the earlier Board Circular and judicial debate. In the absence of evidence of fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression with intent to evade duty, mere non-payment could not justify the extended period. The failure of the demand on merits and limitation also excluded interest and penalties, including penalties on the company's officers.
There is no evidence of any positive act of fraud, collusion, wilful, mis-statement or suppression of facts with intent to evade duty. Mere non-payment of duty without proof of requisite intent, cannot justify the extended period, as held in CCE Vs Chemphar Drugs & Liniments [1989 (2) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT] and Continental Foundadtion Jt. Venture [2007 (8) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT] [Paras 20, 21]
The extended period was held unavailable, and the interest and penalties were held unsustainable.
Final Conclusion: The Department's appeal was dismissed. The order setting aside the duty demand, interest and penalties was sustained.
Issues: (i) Whether C&F services rendered at depots/warehouses qualify as input services. (ii) Whether credit for transportation, delivery and unloading at customers' premises is admissible. (iii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked. (iv) Whether equivalent penalty was sustainable.
Issue (i): Whether C&F services rendered at depots/warehouses qualify as input services.
Analysis: Section 4(3)(C) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 includes a depot or consignment agent's premises, from which goods are sold after factory clearance, within the place of removal. Receipt, unloading, storage, handling and loading at depots from which cement was sold had a direct nexus with manufacture and sale and were performed up to the place of removal.
Conclusion: Credit for C&F services performed at the depots/warehouses is admissible, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether credit for transportation, delivery and unloading at customers' premises is admissible.
Analysis: For FOR-destination sales, the place of removal cannot be inferred merely from that description. It depends on the contractual terms concerning transfer of title and risk, responsibility for freight and insurance, inclusion of freight in assessable value, and whether delivery at the customer's premises was an essential condition of sale. If ownership and risk remained with the assessee until delivery, the customer's premises would be the place of removal; otherwise, post-depot services would not qualify.
Conclusion: Eligibility of credit for post-depot transportation, delivery and unloading must be determined upon factual verification of the relevant contractual and transaction documents.
Issue (iii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked.
Analysis: The credit was disclosed in statutory records and returns and the records had been subjected to departmental audit. The dispute involved interpretation of input service and place of removal, with divergent views on FOR-destination transactions. No fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or deliberate suppression with intent to evade duty was established.
Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable, and the demand beyond the normal period is set aside, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iv): Whether equivalent penalty was sustainable.
Analysis: As the requisite deliberate suppression or intent to evade duty was not established, the ingredients for penalty under Rule 15(2) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 read with Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 were absent.
Conclusion: The equivalent penalty is set aside in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: Depot-level C&F credit stands admissible, while post-depot credit requires application of the contractual place-of-removal test; only any credit within the normal limitation period remains to be quantified.
Ratio Decidendi: In FOR-destination transactions, post-clearance service credit depends on the actual place of removal, determined from the contractual transfer of title and risk and the obligations governing delivery, freight and insurance.
Cenvat credit for depot clearing and forwarding services - Place of removal under FOR-destination contracts - Extended limitation for Cenvat credit demand - Penalty for wrongly availed Cenvat credit
Input services at depots and warehouses - Depot as place of removal - Admissibility of Cenvat credit on clearing and forwarding services used for receipt, unloading, storage, handling and loading of cement at depots or warehouses from which the cement was sold - HELD THAT: - A depot, premises of a consignment agent, or other premises from which excisable goods are sold after factory clearance falls within the place of removal. Services used at such depots for receiving, storing, handling and loading cement are not rendered beyond the place of removal and have a direct nexus with its manufacture and sale. [Paras 10, 18]
Cenvat credit on the clearing and forwarding services rendered at the depots or warehouses was held admissible.
Place of removal under FOR-destination contracts - Cenvat credit on post-depot delivery services - Admissibility of Cenvat credit on transportation, delivery and unloading services used after clearance of cement from the depot up to the customer's premises under FOR-destination sales - HELD THAT: - The expression FOR-destination in an invoice or contract is not conclusive of the place of removal. The actual terms of sale must establish where title and risk passed, who bore freight and insurance, whether freight formed part of the assessable value, and whether delivery at the customer's premises was an essential condition of sale.
The Larger Bench of the Tribunal in The Ramco Cement Ltd.[2023 (12) TMI 1332 - CESTAT CHENNAI-LB] has held that where clearances are made under FOR-destination contracts, the place of removal must be determined after examining the terms of the contracts and applying the principles laid down by in Roofit Industries Ltd. [2015 (4) TMI 857 - SUPREME COURT] and Emco Industries Ltd.[2015 (8) TMI 200 - SUPREME COURT] the judgment of Bharat Fritz Warner Ltd. [2022 (7) TMI 352 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] and CBEC Circular No. 1065/4/2018 – CX dated 08.06.2018. It follows that the mere use of expression “FOR-destination” in invoices or contract is not, by itself, conclusive.
Credit is admissible up to the customer's premises only where ownership and risk remained with the appellant until delivery and the sale was completed there; it is not admissible where title and risk passed at the factory or depot and onward transport was merely an additional facility. [Paras 12, 13, 14, 18]
The issue was remanded for limited factual verification of the relevant contracts, invoices and related records, followed by re-quantification, if any, within the normal period.
Extended limitation for Cenvat credit demand - Suppression with intent to evade duty - Invocation of the extended period for recovery of allegedly inadmissible Cenvat credit on clearing and forwarding services - HELD THAT: - The dispute arose from the interpretation of input service and place of removal. As the credit was recorded in statutory records and returns, and no positive act of fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or deliberate suppression with intent to evade duty was established, an incorrect or disputed interpretation of law could not justify the extended period. [Paras 15, 16, 18]
The demand falling beyond the normal limitation period was set aside.
Penalty for wrongly availed Cenvat credit - Intent to evade duty - Imposition of equivalent penalty for allegedly inadmissible Cenvat credit on clearing and forwarding services - HELD THAT: - The absence of fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression with intent to evade duty also meant that the statutory ingredients for imposition of penalty were not established. [Paras 17, 18]
The equivalent penalty was set aside in its entirety.
Final Conclusion: Cenvat credit for services used at depots or warehouses was allowed, while eligibility of credit for post-depot delivery services was remanded for transaction-specific verification. The extended-period demand and equivalent penalty were set aside, and the appeal was partly allowed and partly remanded.
Issues: Whether the challenge to the notification substituting Serial No. 60 of Schedule B required adjudication when the petitioner's claim that Digital Still Image Cameras were IT products remained unaffected by the substituted entry.
Analysis: The unamended and substituted entries both retained the expression "IT Products". The petitioner's claim to concessional tax treatment rested exclusively on Digital Still Image Cameras being IT products, rather than on any specifically enumerated item in either entry. The substitution therefore did not affect the basis of its claim.
Conclusion: The challenge to the notification was academic and was not adjudicated; the eligibility of Digital Still Image Cameras as IT products was not determined.
Challenge to amendment of concessional VAT entry - absence of prejudice - Alternative statutory appellate remedy against assessment orders
Challenge to the notification substituting the concessional VAT entry for Digital Still Image Cameras, asserted to be IT products, was academic in the absence of prejudice - HELD THAT: - The petitioner's claim rested solely on Digital Still Image Cameras being covered by the expression "IT Products". That expression continued in both the original and substituted entries; the enumerated goods in either entry were not the basis of the claim. The notification, therefore, did not affect the asserted claim, and its validity need not be examined. [Paras 8, 9]
The challenge to the notification was not entertained and the writ petition was consigned to the records.
Alternative statutory appellate remedy against assessment orders - connected challenges to assessment orders were to be pursued through statutory appeals - HELD THAT: - As the connected writ petitions had been filed because the lead case was pending, the petitioner was directed to avail the appellate remedy against the assessment orders. All questions concerning those orders were expressly left open for examination in appeal. [Paras 12, 13]
The connected writ petitions were disposed of, with a direction that appeals filed within 30 days be entertained without objection as to limitation.
Final Conclusion: The challenge to the notification was held academic because the substituted entry retained the expression "IT Products". The assessment-related challenges were relegated to the statutory appellate remedy, with protection against limitation objections for appeals filed within the stipulated period.
Issues: (i) Whether development of custom-made/customised software under the agreements constituted a sale of goods liable to VAT; (ii) Whether issuance of Digital Signature Certificates constituted a sale of goods liable to VAT.
Issue (i): Whether development of custom-made/customised software under the agreements constituted a sale of goods liable to VAT.
Analysis: Entry 2 of Schedule IV of the Telangana Value Added Tax Act, 2005 applies to a sale of software as goods. The agreements established end-to-end IT outsourcing, software development, maintenance, implementation and support services. The customer retained ownership and effective control over its existing hardware and software; software developed for a customer was tailor-made, customer-specific and incapable of being marketed to another person. Intellectual property either vested in the customer from inception or was licensed for use in connection with the services, without a transfer of property in goods for consideration. The activities were consequently service contracts, falling within support services of business or commerce under Section 65(104c) of the Finance Act, 1994, rather than sales of software.
Conclusion: Development of the custom-made/customised software did not constitute a sale of goods and was not liable to VAT, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether issuance of Digital Signature Certificates constituted a sale of goods liable to VAT.
Analysis: Issuance of Digital Signature Certificates by a licensed certifying authority involved rendering certification services and did not entail a transfer of goods.
Conclusion: Issuance of Digital Signature Certificates did not constitute a sale of goods and was not liable to VAT, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The service turnover could not be recharacterised as turnover from sale of software or other goods; the VAT assessments and consequential demand lacked legal and factual basis.
Ratio Decidendi: Customer-specific software development and related certification activities are not sales of goods where the arrangement does not effect a transfer of property in marketable software for consideration.
VAT on custom-made software development - Transfer of property in goods - VAT on issuance of Digital Signature Certificates
Custom-made software development as service contract - Transfer of property in goods - Levy of VAT on consideration for development, customisation, maintenance and support of customer-specific software - HELD THAT: - The agreements disclosed rendition of outsourced IT and software-development services, without transfer of title in software by the petitioner for consideration. The software was tailor-made on a work-for-hire basis for particular customers, could not be marketed or sold to others, and the intellectual property either vested in the customer from inception or was licensed to the customer solely in connection with the services.
High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case of Tata Consultancy Services vs. State of Andhra Pradesh [1996 (12) TMI 364 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT] categorically held that “unbranded software” shall not be deemed to be as goods.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tata Consultancy Services v. State of A.P. [2004 (11) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT (LB)] conclusively held that even “unbranded software” may be “goods” when marketed or sold in the market.
In the absence of transfer of property in goods, the transactions remained service contracts and could not be equated with software marketed or sold as goods. [Paras 18, 21, 22]
The service turnover could not be treated as sale of software, and the VAT levy thereon was held unsustainable and quashed.
Digital Signature Certificates as service - VAT on issuance of Digital Signature Certificates - Levy of VAT on issuance of Digital Signature Certificates by a licensed Certifying Authority - HELD THAT: - Issuance of Digital Signature Certificates was held to be a service performed in the capacity of a licensed Certifying Authority under the Information Technology Act, 2000, involving no sale of goods. [Paras 21, 22]
The issuance of Digital Signature Certificates was not exigible to VAT, and the levy was quashed.
Final Conclusion: The VAT assessments treating the petitioner's service turnover as sale of software or other goods were quashed, and the writ petitions were allowed.
TaxTMI