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Issues: (i) Whether a writ application filed after gross delay despite the statutory appellate remedy is entertainable; (ii) Whether Article 226 of the Constitution of India permits condonation of delay beyond the period prescribed by Section 107(4) of the Bihar Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
Issue (i): Whether a writ application filed after gross delay despite the statutory appellate remedy is entertainable.
Analysis: Section 107 provides a time-bound appellate remedy against an assessment order. Although writ jurisdiction may be invoked exceptionally for breach of fundamental rights, violation of natural justice, excess of jurisdiction, or challenge to vires, an unexplained delay of nearly three years after exhaustion or expiry of the statutory remedy defeats the legislative scheme of expeditious tax adjudication.
Conclusion: The delayed writ application was not entertainable; this issue was decided against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether Article 226 of the Constitution of India permits condonation of delay beyond the period prescribed by Section 107(4) of the Bihar Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
Analysis: Section 107(1) prescribes three months for filing an appeal, while Section 107(4) permits condonation only for a further period of one month. The statutory outer limit is mandatory, and writ jurisdiction cannot be exercised to override that legislative limitation.
Conclusion: Article 226 does not permit condonation of delay beyond the statutory condonable period under Section 107(4); this issue was decided against the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The statutory limitation governing the GST appellate remedy cannot be circumvented through writ jurisdiction after expiry of the prescribed period.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a fiscal statute fixes an outer limit for filing and condoning an appeal, writ jurisdiction cannot be used to extend that limitation in the absence of exceptional grounds warranting judicial review.
Writ jurisdiction after expiry of statutory appellate limitation - Condonation beyond statutorily prescribed period for GST appeal
Writ jurisdiction after expiry of statutory appellate limitation - Maintainability of a writ challenge to a GST demand order where the statutory appeal was rejected as time-barred and the writ petition was filed after unexplained delay - HELD THAT: - The statutory appellate remedy and its prescribed limitation form part of the legislative scheme for expeditious redressal. Though writ jurisdiction may be invoked in exceptional cases involving breach of fundamental rights, violation of natural justice, excess of jurisdiction or challenge to vires, it cannot be used as a matter of course to bypass an expired statutory remedy. The unexplained delay of almost three years in approaching the Court would frustrate the legislative intent and render the limitation scheme otiose. [Paras 9, 12]
The writ petition was held not entertainable and was dismissed.
Condonation beyond statutorily prescribed period for GST appeal - Power of the High Court under Article 226 to condone delay in filing a GST appeal beyond the further period permitted to the appellate authority - HELD THAT: - Provision of Section 162 bars the jurisdiction of civil Court in reference to Section 107 of the BGST Act and legislature in its wisdom has restricted a limit of 30 days to Appellate Authority under Section 107(4), three months to Appellate Tribunal for filing appeal/45 days for filing memorandum of cross-objection under Section 112(6) and the High Court in exercise of its Appellate jurisdiction under Section 117(2) proviso of this BGST Act 2017, for condonation of delay in filing of an application before respective Forum.
Therefore, the condonation of delay by this Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of Constitution of India in filing of appeal under Section 107 of BGST Act 2017 in our opinion, will be against the legislative intent manifested in the provision of BGST Act 2017. It is true that High Court has wide jurisdiction under Article 226 of constitution of India but does not mean that it can disregard the substantive provision of a Statute. Accordingly, we come to the conclusion that this Court can't entertain the present writ application filed after expiry of prescribed time limit. [Paras 10, 12]
The High Court held that it could not condone delay beyond the statutory limit for filing the appeal.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was dismissed as it sought to bypass the prescribed appellate limitation after gross and unexplained delay.
Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration, followed by dismissal of the statutory appeal on limitation, warranted reconsideration where the personal hearing fixed in the show-cause notice was not a meaningful opportunity and the assessee had subsequently filed returns and paid outstanding dues.
Analysis: Section 75(4) of the Bihar Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires an opportunity of hearing where an adverse decision is contemplated. The hearing date was fixed before expiry of the period allowed for furnishing a reply to the show-cause notice, rendering the hearing an empty formality. The assessee had subsequently filed the pending GSTR-3B and GSTR-1 returns and paid the tax, late fee and penalty. Permanent cancellation of registration could cause civil death to the business.
Conclusion: The appellate order was set aside. The assessee may apply for revocation of cancellation within three weeks, and the competent authority must decide that application on merits without rejecting it solely on limitation.
Opportunity of hearing before cancellation of GST registration - Cancellation of GST registration for non-filing of returns where the personal-hearing date preceded the expiry of the period allowed for filing the show-cause reply
HELD THAT: - Section 75(4) requires a hearing when an adverse decision is contemplated. Where the notice allowed 30 days for submission of a show-cause reply, fixing the hearing before expiry of that period was held to be an empty formality. Since the pending returns had been furnished and the tax, late fee and penalty paid, and permanent cancellation could affect the taxpayer's livelihood, the Court followed M/s Galaxy Heights [2026 (8) TMI 844 - PATNA HIGH COURT] in permitting recourse to revocation. [Paras 12, 14, 15, 16]
The appellate order was set aside; the petitioner was permitted to apply for revocation of cancellation, which the competent authority must decide on merits without rejecting it on limitation alone.
Final Conclusion: The writ application was allowed to the extent that the appellate order was set aside and the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to seek revocation of the cancelled GST registration on merits.
Issues: Whether omission of Rule 96(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 without a saving or sunset clause removes the restriction in pending proceedings concerning refund of integrated tax on exports.
Analysis: Rule 96(10) was omitted with effect from 08.10.2024 without a saving or sunset clause. The binding interpretation of the omission establishes that the rule was removed to end the complications generated by it and was not intended to remain operative for pending proceedings; a recommendation that the omission operate prospectively is advisory and does not preserve the omitted restriction.
Conclusion: The restriction under omitted Rule 96(10) cannot be applied to the pending refund proceedings, and the impugned communication has no legal basis.
Omission of export-refund restriction without saving clause - Applicability of omitted Rule 96(10) of the CGST Rules to pending proceedings concerning refund of integrated tax paid on exported goods and services
HELD THAT: - Applying the Supreme Court decision in Goodluck India Limited and Anr. vs. Union of India and Ors [2026 (8) TMI 719 - SUPREME COURT] the Court held that omission of Rule 96(10), without a saving or sunset clause, was intended to end the unnecessary complications arising from that restriction and could not keep it alive in pending proceedings. [Paras 5, 6]
The impugned communication founded on Rule 96(10) was quashed and set aside, and the writ petition was allowed.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed and the impugned communication was quashed, as omitted Rule 96(10) could not govern the pending refund proceedings in the absence of a saving or sunset clause.
Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to regular bail in proceedings alleging fraudulent issuance of invoices, wrongful availment of input tax credit, falsification of records, and operation of shell entities under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
Analysis: The allegations concerned alleged tax evasion through invoices without actual supply of goods, fraudulent input tax credit, falsified financial records, and shell entities, with a stated revenue implication of approximately Rs. 73.75 crore. The request for bail referred to completion of investigation, filing of the charge sheet, absence of a likelihood of evidence tampering, and the period of judicial custody.
Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to regular bail on furnishing the prescribed bail bond and sureties.
Entitlment to regular bail in proceedings alleging fraudulent issuance of invoices, wrongful availment of input tax credit, falsification of records, and operation of shell entities under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
HELD THAT:- From a conjoint reading of sections 69 and 132 of the CGST Act, 2017, it is clear that there must be a reason to believe of tax evasion or the conditions specified in Section 132 for the arrest of such a person under the act and such reason to believe was not mentioned in the authorization of arrest and arrest memo.
The monetary limit which is specified in section 132 regarding period of conviction as per amount of tax evasion but has not been specified in the arrest memo. It means that the arrest of petitioner is merely on the basis of suspicion and there is nothing concrete in this case.
This court is inclined to enlarge the petitioner on bail. The above named petitioner is directed to be released on bail in connection with Complaint Case on furnishing bail bond of Rs.10,000/- (ten thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of learned Special Judge, Economic Offence, Patna/ Concern Court, Patna.
Issues: Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised to challenge the adjudication order despite an efficacious statutory appellate remedy where consideration of the taxpayers' replies and their alleged role requires factual examination.
Analysis: The challenge required examination of disputed factual matters, including whether the replies to the show-cause notice were considered and the precise role of each petitioner in the alleged transactions. Such matters were suitable for adjudication by the Appellate Authority. The reliance on principles requiring consideration of a taxpayer's response to a show-cause notice was distinguishable because the impugned adjudication was a consolidated order concerning numerous firms and individuals.
Conclusion: Writ jurisdiction ought not to be exercised to bypass the efficacious statutory appellate remedy where disputed factual issues require appellate examination.
Writ jurisdiction - disputed questions of fact - Statutory appellate remedy against consolidated GST order - Exercise of writ jurisdiction against a consolidated GST adjudication order where the petitioners asserted non-consideration of their replies and absence of involvement in the alleged transactions
HELD THAT: - Petitioners, relying upon judgment in M/s. ASP Traders v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. [2025 (7) TMI 1525 - SUPREME COURT] submitted that the principles of natural justice mandate that, where a taxpayer submits a response to an SCN, the Adjudicating Authority is required to consider such response and render a reasoned and speaking order. It is contended that failure to do so renders the statutory right of appeal illusory or nugatory, but said decision is clearly distinguishable on facts, as it concerned an order passed against an individual assessee and did not deal with a common order passed against more than 600 firms and individuals.
Whether the Replies submitted by the present Petitioners were duly considered, as also the precise role attributable to them in the transactions in question, are matters which can appropriately be examined by the Appellate Authority.
In a case of the present nature, where detailed and disputed questions of fact are required to be examined and adjudicated, exercise of writ jurisdiction, thereby permitting the Petitioners to bypass the efficacious statutory remedy of appeal, would not be appropriate.
A perusal of the Impugned Order-in-Original also shows that statements of various persons were recorded and the accounts, invoices and transactions of various firms were examined. The Adjudicating Authority has recorded a finding that Sh. Vikrant Singhal and Sh. Sachin Singhal, along with others, were the masterminds behind the alleged racket involving creation of 107 fake firms for availing ineligible input tax credit.
This Court is not inclined to exercise our writ jurisdiction. The Petitioners are, accordingly, relegated to the statutory remedy of appeal.[Paras 10, 11, 12, 14]
The petitioners were relegated to the statutory remedy of appeal, and the writ petitions were disposed of.
Final Conclusion: Declining to exercise writ jurisdiction in view of the available statutory appeal and the disputed factual questions, the Court disposed of the writ petitions by relegating the petitioners to the appellate remedy.
Issues: Whether the blocking of input tax credit in the Electronic Credit Ledger without compliance with Rule 86A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 was valid, notwithstanding subsequent reactivation of the ledger.
Analysis: Rule 86A(1), including clause (d), permits restriction on use of credit only by the competent officer upon reasons to believe and reasons recorded in writing. The respondents acknowledged that no proper reasoned order was passed and that no opportunity of hearing was afforded before the credit was blocked. The Electronic Credit Ledger had, however, become operational upon expiry of the statutory period.
Conclusion: The mandatory requirements of Rule 86A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 were not complied with in blocking the input tax credit. In the exceptional circumstances, no further substantive relief was granted; future non-compliant blocking was cautioned to entail appropriate compensation to the aggrieved party.
Blocking of electronic credit ledger under Rule 86A - Mandatory preconditions for restriction of input tax credit - Reasons recorded in writing for restriction of input tax credit
Blocking of input tax credit in the electronic credit ledger without compliance with the mandatory requirements of Rule 86A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 - HELD THAT: - Rule 86A permits restriction on debit of input tax credit only upon fulfilment of its prescribed conditions, including reasons to believe and reasons recorded in writing. The respondents were unable to establish compliance with those mandatory requirements before blocking the credit ledger. [Paras 8]
Since the ledger had become operational upon expiry of the statutory period, the writ petition was disposed of as an exceptional case on acceptance of the unconditional apology, with a categorical warning that future non-compliant blocking would entail liability to pay appropriate compensation to the aggrieved party.
Final Conclusion: The Court found the impugned blocking to have been effected without compliance with Rule 86A, but disposed of the petition because the electronic credit ledger stood reactivated, while warning of compensation for any future breach.
Issues: Whether the delay in filing the statutory appeal should be condoned.
Analysis: Section 107 of the Karnataka Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 provides the appellate remedy. The medical circumstances affecting the petitioner's accountant, supported by medical records, together with the peculiar facts of the case, constituted sufficient cause to permit pursuit of the appellate remedy. The merits of the input tax credit dispute were left for adjudication by the Appellate Authority.
Conclusion: The delay in filing the appeal was condoned and the limitation-based dismissal of the appeal was set aside, in favour of the assessee.
Condonation of delay in GST appeal due to accountant's medical incapacity - HELD THAT: - Having regard to the medical records concerning the accountant's serious ailment and surgery, the factual assertions raised against the original order, and the decisions noted by the Court, it was expedient in the peculiar facts to permit the petitioner to pursue the statutory appeal. The merits of the input tax credit dispute were not adjudicated. [Paras 5]
The appellate order dismissing the appeal as time-barred was set aside, the delay was condoned, and the appeal was restored for adjudication in accordance with law, with all merits contentions kept open.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was partly allowed by setting aside the dismissal of the statutory appeal on limitation and condoning the delay. The appellate authority was directed to decide the appeal on merits in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration and dismissal of the statutory appeal on limitation warranted interference and restoration of registration.
Analysis: The statutory appellate authority could not condone delay beyond the period prescribed under Section 107 of the Maharashtra Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. However, the limitation provisions were not to be applied so as to deprive a taxpayer of the constitutional right to carry on trade and commerce under Articles 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India. Cancellation of registration neither conferred a corresponding right on the State nor advanced the GST regime; restoration would enable legitimate business operations and revenue collection. The earlier view permitting such relief in writ jurisdiction was followed.
Conclusion: The cancellation of registration and the appellate order rejecting the appeal as time-barred were set aside, and the registration was held valid from 29.02.2024 upon compliance with filing of pending returns and payment of outstanding dues, interest, penalty and late fees under Rule 23(1) of the Maharashtra Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017.
Cancellation of GST registration - delayed appeal - Restoration of GST registration - Cancellation of GST registration and rejection of the statutory appeal as time-barred, where revival of registration was sought through writ jurisdiction - HELD THAT: - Following the view in a decision on similar facts in Rohit Enterprises [2023 (2) TMI 759 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT], subsequently followed in Shri Ganesh Majoor Sahkari Sanstha Limited [2024 (12) TMI 579 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] the Court held that the writ petition deserved to be allowed notwithstanding the delay in the statutory appeal. The registration was restored subject to filing up-to-date GST returns and payment of pending dues with applicable interest, penalty and late fees. [Paras 6, 8, 9]
The cancellation order and the appellate order were quashed, and the GST registration was restored subject to the stipulated compliance.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed, the cancellation and appellate orders were quashed, and the registration was restored subject to statutory compliance.
Issues: Whether GST can be levied on a penalty recovered from an employee for shortage of stock.
Analysis: Section 7 read with paragraph 5(e) of Schedule II applies where there is a supply of services, including an agreement to refrain from an act, tolerate an act or situation, or do an act. A penalty imposed for stock shortage in the course of employment arises from the employer-employee relationship and does not constitute a supply of goods or services between a supplier and recipient.
Conclusion: GST is not leviable on the penalty imposed upon the employee for stock shortage; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
GST on penalty recovered from employee for stock shortage - Employer-employee relationship constituting supply of service or not?
Whether the provisions of the GST Act authorise the appellants to collect GST on the penalty imposed upon the employee for the shortage of stock? - HELD THAT: - The obligation contemplated by paragraph 5(e) of Schedule II to the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 concerns an agreement in the context of a supply of services. A penalty imposed upon an employee for alleged stock shortage arises from the employer-employee relationship and cannot, merely on that basis, be treated as consideration for a supply of service. [Paras 7, 8, 9]
The provision could not be invoked to collect GST on the penalty; the order directing a de novo enquiry on such collection was sustained and the intra-court appeal was dismissed.
Final Conclusion: The intra-court appeal was dismissed, the Court holding that GST could not be collected merely because a penalty had been imposed on an employee for stock shortage.
Issues: (i) Whether a common or consolidated show-cause notice may cover multiple financial years; (ii) Whether the appellate order was invalid for denial of an opportunity of hearing on the merits of the appeal.
Issue (i): Whether a common or consolidated show-cause notice may cover multiple financial years.
Analysis: Sections 73 and 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 do not prohibit a show-cause notice from covering multiple financial years. The contrary basis on which the writ petition had been allowed could not be sustained.
Conclusion: A common or consolidated show-cause notice covering multiple financial years is maintainable, in favour of the Revenue.
Issue (ii): Whether the appellate order was invalid for denial of an opportunity of hearing on the merits of the appeal.
Analysis: The record of personal hearing showed that the hearing was confined to condonation of delay and included a request for admission of the appeal and a merits hearing. The appeal was decided without affording a hearing on merits, contrary to principles of natural justice.
Conclusion: The appellate order is invalid for breach of principles of natural justice and the assessee must be afforded a merits hearing, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The legal validity of consolidated notices for multiple financial years is affirmed, while the appellate adjudication requires reconsideration after a proper merits hearing.
Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of a statutory prohibition, a GST show-cause notice may validly consolidate multiple financial years; however, an appellate decision rendered without a hearing on merits violates principles of natural justice.
Consolidated show-cause notice covering multiple financial years - Appellate hearing on merits - Principles of natural justice
Maintainability of a common show-cause notice covering multiple financial years under the CGST and SGST enactments - HELD THAT: - The Court held that proceedings under Sections 73 and 74 do not prohibit a common or consolidated show-cause notice covering multiple financial years. The quashing of the notice and consequential orders solely on the ground that tax periods could not be clubbed was therefore unsustainable. [Paras 9]
The common show-cause notice was held maintainable in respect of multiple financial years.
Appellate hearing on merits - Violation of principles of natural justice - Validity of the appellate order where the hearing was confined to condonation of delay and no opportunity was afforded on the merits of the appeal - HELD THAT: - The record of personal hearing established that the respondents sought condonation of delay and admission of the appeal for a hearing on merits, but the appellate authority heard only the delay question and passed the appellate order without hearing the appeal on merits. The order was consequently held to violate the principles of natural justice. [Paras 8, 9]
The appellate order was set aside and the appellate authority was directed to afford a hearing on merits and pass an appropriate order.
Final Conclusion: The revenue appeal was allowed to the extent of holding the consolidated show-cause notice maintainable. The appellate order was set aside for breach of natural justice and the appeal was remitted for a hearing on merits.
Issues: Whether writ jurisdiction could be invoked to challenge cancellation of GST registration after expiry of the statutory appeal period without exceptional circumstances.
Analysis: A statutory appeal under Section 107 was available but was not availed within the prescribed period. The writ application was instituted after expiry of that period, and no exceptional circumstance warranting departure from the alternate-remedy rule was shown.
Conclusion: Interference under writ jurisdiction was declined in view of the unavailed statutory appellate remedy and delay beyond the prescribed appeal period.
Writ jurisdiction where statutory appellate remedy is not availed - Delay beyond statutory period of appeal - Maintainability of a writ petition challenging cancellation of GST registration after expiry of the statutory period for appeal without exceptional circumstances - HELD THAT: - The petitioner had not availed the statutory remedy of appeal and approached the Court after expiry of the prescribed appellate limitation.
Following M K Traders Vrs. State of Bihar & Ors [2026 (9) TMI 78 - PATNA HIGH COURT] the Court held that a writ petition filed beyond the statutory period for appeal, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, ought not to be entertained. [Paras 8]
The Court declined to exercise writ jurisdiction and dismissed the writ petition, while leaving the petitioner at liberty to file the final return and seek fresh registration in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition challenging cancellation of GST registration was dismissed for non-availment of the statutory appeal within time and absence of exceptional circumstances. Liberty was reserved to file the final return and apply for fresh registration in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether the service-tax demand order could stand when the relevant work contracts and agreements were subsequently placed on record for consideration.
Analysis: The relevant contractual materials were available for examination, and the Department agreed that the matter required fresh consideration on the basis of the complete record. A fresh decision was also required after permitting production of any further relevant documents and affording an opportunity of hearing.
Conclusion: The impugned demand order was set aside and the matter was directed to be decided afresh by the competent Commissioner on the available and further relevant materials.
Service-tax demand order - Fresh adjudication on relevant contractual material - Reconsideration of the service-tax demand after production of the relevant work contracts and agreements - HELD THAT: - As the relevant contracts and agreements had been brought on record and the Department agreed to fresh consideration on the entire material, the impugned adjudication could not stand without reconsideration of those materials. The merits of the claimed exemption were not adjudicated. [Paras 16]
The demand order and consequential penalties were set aside and the matter was remitted for fresh adjudication on the materials on record, with liberty to call for further relevant documents and after affording an opportunity of hearing.
Final Conclusion: The writ application was allowed to the extent of setting aside the impugned service-tax adjudication and remitting the matter for fresh consideration on the relevant materials after hearing the petitioner.
Issues: Whether an adjudicating authority may confirm tax and penalty beyond the amounts proposed in the show cause notice.
Analysis: Section 75(7) prohibits confirmation of a demand exceeding that specified in the show cause notice. The notice proposed tax of Rs. 96,000 and penalty of Rs. 20,000, whereas the adjudication order confirmed tax of Rs. 96,000 and penalty of Rs. 96,000. The excess confirmation violated the mandatory statutory limitation and was without jurisdiction.
Conclusion: The adjudication order confirming penalty beyond the show cause notice was invalid and was set aside in favour of the assessee.
Adjudication beyond show-cause notice - Mandatory limitation on confirmation of demand
Validity of confirmation of tax demand and penalty exceeding those proposed in the show-cause notice - HELD THAT: - Section 75(7) mandatorily prohibits the adjudicating authority from confirming a demand exceeding that proposed in the show-cause notice. The adjudication order, having confirmed penalty far in excess of the proposed penalty, was consequently without jurisdiction. [Paras 2, 3, 4]
The adjudication order was set aside and the matter was remitted for fresh adjudication after affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by setting aside the adjudication order and remitting the matter for a fresh order in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether State GST assessment and rectification proceedings could be sustained when the Central GST authorities had earlier adjudicated the same issues for the same assessment period and that adjudication was pending in appeal.
Analysis: The Central GST order preceded the State GST orders, and comparison established that both sets of proceedings concerned identical issues and the same assessment period. The pendency of an appeal against the earlier Central GST adjudication did not permit parallel State GST adjudication on those matters.
Conclusion: The State GST assessment and rectification orders could not be sustained because they duplicated the prior Central GST adjudication.
Parallel GST proceedings on the same issues - Validity of State GST assessment and rectification orders concerning issues already adjudicated by the Central GST authorities for the same assessment period - HELD THAT: - On comparison, the Court found that both sets of orders concerned the same issues and the same assessment period. Since the Central GST authorities had issued the earlier order and the appeal therefrom was pending before the appellate authority, the subsequent State GST proceedings could not be sustained. [Paras 4]
The State GST assessment and rectification orders were quashed.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed and the impugned assessment and rectification orders were quashed.
Issues: Whether tax liability could be assessed under Section 73(9) before expiry of the due date for filing the annual return for financial year 2022-2023.
Analysis: The annual-return due date was 31.12.2023, whereas the assessment order was made on 25.11.2023. The Proper Officer lacked authority to assess tax liability under Section 73(9) before expiry of the return-filing due date.
Conclusion: Assessment under Section 73(9) before expiry of the annual-return due date was without authority and was set aside for fresh assessment after notice and opportunity of hearing.
Premature assessment before expiry of annual-return due date - Authority of the Proper Officer to determine tax liability before expiry of the due date for filing the annual return for the financial year concerned
HELD THAT: - As the statutory due date for filing the annual return had not expired when the tax-liability order was made, the Proper Officer lacked authority to assess the petitioner under Section 73(9) at that stage. [Paras 5, 6]
The assessment order was set aside and the matter remanded for fresh assessment proceedings after proper notice and opportunity of hearing, to be completed in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The writ application was allowed to the extent that the premature assessment order was set aside and fresh assessment proceedings were directed.
Issues: Whether the demand arising from denial of exemption for non-filing of Form 10-B should be adjudicated in the writ petition while the assessee's rectification application remains pending.
Analysis: The rectification application acknowledged by the Income Tax Department had not been considered because it was not reflected on the electronic system. Since no order on rectification had been passed on merits, adjudication of the challenge to the demand was considered premature. The competent authority was directed to take the application on record, consider it on its own merits in accordance with law, and communicate its order; the demand was directed to abide by that decision.
Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with directions for consideration and disposal of the pending rectification application.
Demand arising from denial of exemption for non-filing of Form 10-B - Pending rectification application - Premature writ adjudication
Adjudication of the challenge to the demand founded on non-filing of Audit Report in Form 10-B while the rectification application remained undisposed of - HELD THAT: - Since the rectification application had admittedly not been disposed of on merits, adjudication of the writ petition at that stage was held to be improper. The competent authority was required to take the application on board and decide it by a written order in accordance with the rectification provisions and on its own merits. [Paras 10]
The writ petition was disposed of by directing submission and acknowledgement of hard copies of the Audit Report and rectification application, followed by their consideration on merits; the demand was made subject to the decision on rectification.
Final Conclusion: The Court left all merits open and directed disposal of the pending rectification application in accordance with law. The impugned demand was directed to abide by that decision.
Issues: Whether a charitable trust that inadvertently omitted to claim capital-gains exemption on reinvestment of sale proceeds in fixed deposits could obtain relief in revision under Section 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Analysis: Section 11(1A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 specifically governs capital gains arising on transfer of a capital asset held under trust where the net consideration is utilised to acquire another capital asset. CBDT Instruction No. 883 dated 24.09.1975 recognises investment in a bank fixed deposit for six months or more as such utilisation. The undisputed investment of the entire sale proceeds in a two-year fixed deposit therefore met the requirement for exemption. Revisional power under Section 264 extends to granting relief for an assessee's bona fide error in a return that resulted in overassessment; it is not confined to errors of subordinate authorities. Compliance questions under Section 36(1)(a) of the Gujarat Public Trust Act, 1950 and doubts concerning charitable activities could not be imported to deny the standalone benefit under Section 11(1A), particularly where the trust held valid registration and had disclosed the material facts.
Conclusion: The issue is answered in favour of the assessee. The assessee was entitled to exemption under Section 11(1A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and consequential refund of excess tax with applicable interest; rejection of the revision application was unsustainable.
Revisional jurisdiction to correct an assessee's error in return - charitable trust that inadvertently omitted to claim capital-gains exemption on reinvestment of sale proceeds in fixed deposits
Revisional jurisdiction to correct an assessee's error in return - Whether a charitable trust that inadvertently omitted to claim capital-gains exemption on reinvestment of sale proceeds in fixed deposits could obtain relief in revision u/s 264? - HELD THAT: - The revisional power extends to a claim for relief omitted in the return where the assessee discovers an error resulting in over-assessment after completion of assessment. The fact that the income was voluntarily shown as taxable does not preclude consideration of the claim; the revisional authority must apply its mind to the assessee's entitlement under law. The trust had disclosed the capital gains and supporting particulars and had not suppressed any material. [Paras 12, 13, 16]
The rejection of the revision application was unsustainable and was quashed.
Capital gains exemption on reinvestment by charitable trust - Fixed deposit as acquisition of another capital asset - Entitlement of a charitable trust to exemption of capital gains on sale of trust property where the sale proceeds were invested in a bank fixed deposit - HELD THAT: - Under Instruction No. 883, investment of the net consideration from transfer of a trust-held capital asset in a bank fixed deposit for six months or more is regarded as acquisition of another capital asset for purposes of capital-gains exemption. The statutory provision governing such exemption is standalone and alleged non-compliance with conditions imposed under the public-trust law could not be imported to deny it. Since the sale proceeds were invested in a fixed deposit for two years, the trust satisfied the requirement for exemption. [Paras 14, 16]
The trust was held entitled to the claimed exemption, with consequential refund of excess tax together with applicable interest.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed, the order rejecting revision was quashed, and the trust was held entitled to capital-gains exemption with consequential refund and applicable interest.
Issues: Whether an order determining arm's length price under Section 92CA(3) could be sustained where the statutory show cause notice required by the proviso to Section 92C(3) was not served on the assessee.
Analysis: Section 92CA(3) requires the Transfer Pricing Officer to determine arm's length price in accordance with Section 92C(3). The proviso to Section 92C(3) mandates service of a show cause notice and an opportunity of hearing before such determination. Notices issued under Section 92CA(2) merely seeking information are not a substitute for the statutory show cause notice. The admitted non-service of the notice deprived the assessee of an opportunity to respond to the proposed determination.
Conclusion: The order under Section 92CA(3), having been passed without service of the mandatory show cause notice, was invalid and was set aside for fresh determination after notice and hearing.
Validity of a transfer-pricing order determining the arm's length price without service of the statutory show-cause notice - denial of Principles of Natural Justice - no Opportunity of Hearing
HELD THAT: - A Transfer Pricing Officer determining the arm's length price under section 92CA(3) is required to follow the procedure prescribed by section 92C(3), including the proviso mandating service of a show-cause notice and an opportunity of hearing. Notices under section 92CA(2) calling for information cannot substitute the statutory show-cause notice contemplated by the proviso to section 92C(3). Since the show-cause notice was admittedly not served, the petitioner had no opportunity to respond before determination of the arm's length price. [Paras 11, 12]
The transfer-pricing order was held bad in law and set aside; the matter was remanded to the Transfer Pricing Officer from the stage of issuance of the statutory show-cause notice, with a direction to afford the petitioner a personal hearing.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed by setting aside the impugned transfer-pricing order and remanding the matter for fresh determination after service of the statutory show-cause notice and grant of hearing.
Issues: (i) Whether rejection of the revision application for want of proof of the petitioner's status as legal heir was sustainable without considering the documents furnished by her; (ii) Whether the ex parte reassessment order and consequential penalty actions should remain operative pending fresh consideration of the revision application.
Issue (i): Whether rejection of the revision application for want of proof of the petitioner's status as legal heir was sustainable without considering the documents furnished by her.
Analysis: Section 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 permits revision of an assessment. The documents supporting the petitioner's status as legal representative were supplied to the Assessing Officer shortly before the revision order was made, but were not considered while the revision application was rejected as not maintainable. Recognition of the petitioner as legal heir was necessary for effective consideration of the revision application, and a personal hearing was directed before its fresh determination.
Conclusion: The rejection of the revision application was unsustainable and was set aside in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the ex parte reassessment order and consequential penalty actions should remain operative pending fresh consideration of the revision application.
Analysis: The reassessment order under Sections 147 and 144 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was passed ex parte because notices issued to the deceased's email address remained unanswered before the petitioner became aware of the proceedings. In the bona fide circumstances, preservation of the subject matter pending revision was warranted.
Conclusion: Operation, implementation and execution of the assessment order and consequential penalty actions were stayed until disposal of the revision application and for four weeks thereafter, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The petitioner must first be brought on record as legal heir, following which the revision application must be decided afresh on merits and in accordance with law after a personal hearing.
Ratio Decidendi: A revision application cannot be rejected for want of proof of legal-heir status where material furnished for that purpose was not considered; the legal representative must be recognised and afforded an effective opportunity before a fresh merits determination.
Rejection of the revision application for want of proof of the petitioner's status as legal heir - Non considering the documents furnished by legal heir - HELD THAT: - The revision order had been passed without taking into account the documents and details furnished by the petitioner in response to the request for proof of her legal-heir status. The Revenue fairly conceded that the application required reconsideration after the petitioner was brought on record as the legal heir. The Court made no determination on the merits of the assessment or the revision application. [Paras 6, 7, 8, 10, 11]
The revision order was set aside. The Assessing Officer was directed to examine the documents for bringing the petitioner on record as legal heir, following which the revision application shall be decided afresh on merits after personal hearing. Pending that decision and for four weeks thereafter, the ex parte reassessment order and consequential penal actions were stayed.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by setting aside the rejection of the revision application and directing its de novo consideration after verification of the petitioner's legal-heir status. The merits of the reassessment were left open.
Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings under Sections 147 and 148 could be sustained when the six issues forming the basis of the alleged income escapement had subsequently been decided in favour of the assessee in later assessment years.
Analysis: The recorded reasons relied upon additions and disallowances made for subsequent assessment years. The appellate orders for those years had deleted or rejected the Revenue's position on all the relevant issues, including broken-period interest, amortisation of premium on held-to-maturity securities, interest on non-performing assets, interest on perpetual debt instruments, bad debts and wage-revision provision. Consequently, the material forming the stated basis for reopening no longer supported a reason to believe that income had escaped assessment.
Conclusion: The foundation for the reassessment had ceased to exist; the reopening notice and the order rejecting objections were without jurisdiction and were quashed, in favour of the assessee.
Ratio Decidendi: A reassessment founded solely on findings in subsequent assessment years cannot survive once those findings are overturned by binding appellate orders, as the requisite reason to believe income escaped assessment is thereby extinguished.
Validity of Reassessment - subsistence of reasons to believe - Reassessment founded on subsequent assessment orders
Validity of reassessment initiated on the basis of additions and disallowances made in subsequent assessment years, where the appellate orders for those years had deleted or decided in favour of the assessee the very issues forming the basis of reopening - HELD THAT: - The proposed reassessment rested upon six issues examined in the assessments for subsequent years. The appellate orders for those years had resulted in none of those issues surviving against the assessee. Consequently, even if the subsequent assessment orders initially constituted material for reopening, the foundation of the belief that income had escaped assessment had ceased to exist. The Revenue's non-acceptance of the Tribunal's orders was immaterial while those orders continued to operate. [Paras 16, 17, 18]
The notice for reassessment and the order rejecting objections were quashed; however, the petition would stand revived if the Revenue succeeds in its appeals on any issue forming the basis of the reassessment.
Final Conclusion: The reassessment notice and the order rejecting objections were quashed because the appellate orders for the subsequent years had removed the foundation for reopening. The other challenges to reassessment were left open, subject to revival of the petition if the Revenue succeeds in its pending appeals.
Issues: (i) Whether reassessment based on the alleged non-genuine share capital and share premium received from a foreign investor was valid; (ii) Whether reassessment was valid on account of delayed deposit of employees' PF and ESIC contributions.
Issue (i): Whether reassessment based on the alleged non-genuine share capital and share premium received from a foreign investor was valid.
Analysis: The statements relied upon alleged non-genuine practices by a person connected with the investor but did not refer, directly or indirectly, to the assessee or to the investment transaction. The survey report and statements therefore lacked a direct nexus or live link with the belief that the share capital represented escaped income. An inference that the assessee's own funds were routed through an unrelated foreign investor, which thereby obtained a substantial equity stake, was also unsustainable on the test of human probabilities. Material that is remote, conjectural or founded merely on suspicion cannot support the statutory reason to believe.
Conclusion: The reassessment ground concerning share capital and premium was invalid, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether reassessment was valid on account of delayed deposit of employees' PF and ESIC contributions.
Analysis: On the date of the reassessment notice, the prevailing law permitted deduction where employees' contributions were deposited by the due date for filing the return. Since the deposits satisfied that requirement, the later contrary Supreme Court ruling could not retrospectively furnish a reason to believe that income had escaped assessment when the notice was issued.
Conclusion: The reassessment ground concerning employees' PF and ESIC contributions was invalid, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: Neither recorded ground lawfully conferred jurisdiction to reopen the completed assessment, and the reassessment notice was liable to be annulled.
Ratio Decidendi: A reassessment notice requires material having a direct and live nexus with the alleged escapement of income, and the existence of reason to believe must be tested against the law prevailing when the notice is issued.
Validity of Reassessment - reason to believe - live nexus with material - Reassessment on account of delayed deposit of employees' PF and ESIC contributions - law prevailing on notice date
Reassessment - reason to believe - live nexus with material - Validity of reassessment founded on the alleged non-genuineness of foreign investment in the assessee's share capital and share premium. - HELD THAT: - Material relied upon for reopening must have a rational connection and live link with the belief of escapement of income; a reason to suspect is insufficient. The statements relied upon did not refer, directly or indirectly, to the assessee or to the investment transaction. The survey report and statements, founded on allegations concerning the investor's representative and unsupported assumptions about the transaction, did not establish any nexus with escapement of the assessee's income. [Paras 21, 26, 27, 28, 32]
The first ground for reopening was held wholly unsustainable.
Validity of reassessment for alleged delayed deposit of employees' contributions to provident fund and employee state insurance fund - HELD THAT: - When the reassessment notice was issued, the prevailing law permitted deduction where the employees' contributions were deposited by the due date for filing the return of income. As the deposits were made within that time, the Assessing Officer could not have formed a reason to believe that income had escaped assessment. A later Supreme Court ruling in Checkmate Services P. Ltd. [2022 (10) TMI 617 - SUPREME COURT (LB)] taking a contrary view could not validate the reason recorded under the law then in force. [Paras 33, 34]
The second ground for reopening was also held unsustainable.
Final Conclusion: The reassessment notice for A. Y. 2016-17 was quashed, as neither recorded ground disclosed a legally sustainable reason to believe that income had escaped assessment.
Issues: (i) Whether a demand and penalty proceedings could be founded on a draft assessment order where no final assessment determining the sum payable had been made; (ii) Whether a draft assessment order under Section 144C could be issued to an assessee where the Transfer Pricing Officer had made no variation in the returned income.
Issue (i): Whether a demand and penalty proceedings could be founded on a draft assessment order where no final assessment determining the sum payable had been made.
Analysis: The assessment order expressly described itself as a draft order, treated the proposed disallowance as a proposal, withheld demand and penalty notices, and afforded the statutory option to accept the variations or file objections. A final assessment under Section 143(3) requires determination of the sum payable before demand can be raised under Section 156. The asserted error in issuing a draft order was not confined to portal uploading and was never corrected through a subsequent order; consequently, Section 292B could not convert the draft order into a final assessment.
Conclusion: The demand and consequential penalty proceedings based solely on the draft assessment order were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether a draft assessment order under Section 144C could be issued to an assessee where the Transfer Pricing Officer had made no variation in the returned income.
Analysis: The Transfer Pricing Officer made no variation to the international transactions because they were covered by the advance pricing agreement. In the absence of a variation arising from the transfer-pricing order, the assessee did not fall within the definition of an eligible assessee under Section 144C(15)(b). The statutory draft-assessment procedure under Section 144C(1) was therefore unavailable.
Conclusion: The draft assessment order was without authority under Section 144C and was invalid, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The invalid draft-assessment process could neither be retrospectively treated as a final assessment nor sustain the consequential fiscal and penalty actions.
Ratio Decidendi: A demand requires a final assessment determining the sum payable, and the draft-assessment procedure is unavailable where the assessee is not an eligible assessee because the transfer-pricing order contains no variation in returned income.
Draft assessment order - absence of final assessment - Eligible assessee under draft assessment procedure
Validity of the demand and penalty initiation founded on an assessment order expressly issued as a draft order, without final determination of the sum payable - HELD THAT: - The order repeatedly described the proposed disallowance as a proposal, expressly stated that no demand or penalty notice was being issued, and preserved the assessee's right to accept the variations or object to them before a final assessment. A demand can be raised only after a final assessment determines the sum payable. The purported error could not be treated as a mere uploading mistake or cured under Section 292B, particularly when no subsequent order acknowledging and correcting or clarifying the error was passed. [Paras 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]
The demand notice and the notice initiating penalty proceedings, founded on the draft order without a final assessment, were unsustainable and were set aside.
Eligible assessee for draft assessment procedure - No transfer-pricing variation - Competence to issue a draft assessment order where the Transfer Pricing Officer made no variation in the assessee's returned income from international transactions - HELD THAT: - As no variation was made by the Transfer Pricing Officer in respect of the international transactions, the assessee was not an eligible assessee for the draft-assessment procedure. Consequently, there was no occasion to issue a draft order under Section 144C. [Paras 19, 20, 21, 22]
The draft assessment order was independently invalid and was set aside.
Final Conclusion: The petition was allowed, and the draft assessment order together with the consequential demand notice and penalty-initiation notice was set aside.
Issues: Whether an unsigned approval under Section 151 for issuance of a reassessment notice is valid.
Analysis: Sanction by the specified authority under Section 151 is a mandatory jurisdictional safeguard before a notice under Section 148 can be issued. An approval is an "other document" under Section 282A(1) and must be signed, manually or digitally, by the approving authority. A DIN, electronic transmission, or printing of the authority's name and designation under Section 282A(2) establishes neither compliance with the mandatory signature requirement nor legality of an unsigned approval. Section 292BC was inapplicable because the approval pre-dated its effective date of 1 April 2021.
Conclusion: The unsigned approval was invalid; consequently, the reassessment notice and all consequential reassessment proceedings were without jurisdiction and were quashed.
Unsigned statutory sanction for reassessment - Jurisdictional requirement of signed approval - Authentication of electronic approval
Validity of reassessment initiated on the basis of an unsigned approval under the statutory sanction requirement - HELD THAT: - Sanction of the prescribed authority is a jurisdictional pre-condition for issuance of a reassessment notice and is a statutory safeguard against arbitrary reopening. An approval constitutes an "other document" requiring signature under the authentication provision; the approving authority must record its satisfaction after considering the recorded reasons and material under its signature. A DIN, electronic transmission, or printing of the officer's name and designation may establish authenticity but cannot dispense with the mandatory requirement of a manual or digital signature. The curative provision invoked by the Department was inapplicable, having come into force after the approval in question. [Paras 18, 19, 20, 22, 23]
The unsigned approval was invalid and did not confer jurisdiction to issue the reassessment notice; the notice, the order disposing of objections, and consequential reassessment notices were quashed.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed. The unsigned statutory approval invalidated the assumption of reassessment jurisdiction, and the impugned reassessment proceedings and consequential notices were quashed.
Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings initiated by a notice issued under Section 148 to a deceased assessee were valid where the legal representative promptly objected and did not submit to the assessing jurisdiction.
Analysis: A notice under Section 148 issued to a deceased person is invalid unless the legal representative submits to the jurisdiction without objection. The legal representative promptly informed the assessing authority of the assessee's death and reiterated the objection; such intimation did not amount to participation in the assessment proceedings. Section 159 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 did not validate proceedings commenced through a notice addressed to the deceased assessee.
Conclusion: The reassessment initiation and the consequential assessment and demand were invalid; the respondent may commence proceedings against the legal representative in accordance with Section 159 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, if otherwise permissible.
Reassessment notice issued to deceased assessee - Participation in assessment proceedings by legal representative -
HELD THAT: - A reassessment notice issued to a deceased person is invalid unless the legal representative submits to the Assessing Officer's jurisdiction without objection. The legal representative's communications informing the authority of the assessee's death and disputing the validity of the notice did not amount to participation in the assessment proceedings. The contention that proceedings could be sustained under the provisions governing assessment of a deceased person was therefore not accepted. [Paras 5, 7]
The reassessment notice, consequential order rejecting objections, assessment order and demand notice were quashed; liberty was reserved to re-initiate proceedings against the legal representative if permissible in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The petition was allowed and the reassessment proceedings initiated against the deceased assessee were quashed, subject to the respondent's liberty to proceed against the legal representative in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether compensation received pursuant to land acquisition under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 could be subjected to capital gains tax despite its disclosure in the return.
Analysis: Section 96 provides that no income tax shall be levied on an award or agreement made under that Act. Since the capital gain declared in the return arose from compensation received in acquisition proceedings under that Act, the compensation fell outside the scope of taxable income under the Income-tax Act, 1961. The failure to claim the exemption in the original return did not preclude consideration of the statutory non-liability.
Conclusion: The compensation was exempt from income tax under Section 96, in favour of the assessee, and the assessment was required to be reconsidered consistently with that exemption.
Income-tax exemption on land acquisition compensation - Capital gains erroneously disclosed in return - Income-tax liability on capital gains disclosed from compensation received under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 - HELD THAT: - Section 96 exempts from income tax an award or agreement made under the land acquisition statute, except as specified therein. As the capital gain represented compensation received pursuant to acquisition proceedings under that statute, its disclosure in the return and the finalisation of processing under the Income-tax Act did not preclude consideration of the statutory exemption. [Paras 8, 9]
The intimation was set aside, and the jurisdictional assessing authority was directed to reconsider the matter in accordance with Section 96 and the applicable principles after affording an opportunity of hearing.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by setting aside the intimation and directing fresh consideration of the claimed statutory exemption.
Issues: Whether the transfer-pricing adjustment for payments towards intra-group management, sales and support services could be sustained by determining their arm's length price at nil.
Analysis: Documentary material established the nature and rendition of the intra-group services, including service agreements, cost-allocation workings, invoices and supporting evidence. The services facilitated the assessee's business operations and were not shown to be shareholder or stewardship activities. Further, determination of the arm's length price at nil under the Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method lacked comparable uncontrolled transactions or a cogent benchmarking basis. The assessee's entity-level operating margin, after considering the service costs, also fell within the arm's length range accepted in the transfer-pricing analysis.
Conclusion: The adjustment for intra-group services was deleted in favour of the assessee.
TP adjustment for payments towards intra-group management, sales and support services - determining their arm's length price at nil - HELD THAT: - Having regard to the material facts and the co-ordinate Bench judgment [2024 (12) TMI 1566 - ITAT DELHI] placed before it, the Tribunal held that the entire transfer-pricing adjustment made in respect of the intra-group services merited deletion. [Paras 11]
The transfer-pricing adjustment was deleted and the corresponding grounds were allowed.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed by deleting the transfer-pricing adjustment for intra-group services. The remaining grounds were left open.
Issues: Whether the transfer-pricing adjustment could be sustained without separately considering the assessee's segmental analysis for determining the arm's length price.
Analysis: The record reflected no transfer-pricing adjustment in the subsequent assessment year, whereas the impugned determination had disregarded the segmental break-up of income and expenses. The segmental analysis was material to the determination of the arm's length price, and the objections on this aspect had not been substantively addressed. A fresh opportunity of hearing was necessary.
Conclusion: The transfer-pricing determination requires fresh separate segmental analysis in accordance with law after affording the assessee an opportunity of hearing.
Transfer pricing adjustment - consideration of segmental analysis - Determination of arm's length price without separate consideration of the assessee's segmental break-up of income and expenses
HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the segmental analysis was specifically in issue and that the DRP had failed to consider the segmental break-up of income and expenses while disposing of the objections. A fresh segmental analysis was therefore required in accordance with law after granting the assessee an opportunity of hearing. [Paras 6, 7]
The final assessment order was set aside and the matter was restored to the TPO for redoing the segmental analysis separately after affording fresh opportunity of hearing.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes by setting aside the assessment and remanding the transfer-pricing issue for fresh segmental analysis.
Issues: (i) Whether the transfer-pricing adjustment for preparation of US tax returns and secondment services required reconsideration of the COVID-19 adjustment claim and consistent treatment of operating items; (ii) Whether the transfer-pricing adjustment for software support services could be sustained after rejection of the internal CUP method; (iii) Whether the final assessment order was barred by limitation.
Issue (i): Whether the transfer-pricing adjustment for preparation of US tax returns and secondment services required reconsideration of the COVID-19 adjustment claim and consistent treatment of operating items.
Analysis: A pandemic-related adjustment under Rule 10B requires identification of actual exceptional costs, contemporaneous supporting material, and demonstration that the corresponding cost or economic impact is absent from or materially different in the comparables. A reliable TNMM comparison also requires uniform classification of export incentives, foreign-exchange gain or loss, and depreciation in the tested party and comparable margins. Foreign-exchange items linked to revenue transactions ordinarily bear an operating nexus, while depreciation relating to assets deployed in the activity is an operating cost; their treatment must remain identical on both sides of the comparison.
Conclusion: The adjustment requires fresh verification and recomputation on consistent comparability principles, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the transfer-pricing adjustment for software support services could be sustained after rejection of the internal CUP method.
Analysis: Under Rule 10B(1)(a), an internal CUP is a direct benchmark where controlled and uncontrolled transactions are sufficiently comparable and material differences can be reasonably adjusted. A difference in employee cost warrants examination of contractual scope, actual functions, assets, risks, employee skill and deployment, volume, duration, market and other terms, but does not by itself establish price incomparability. If CUP is unreliable, adoption of TNMM must be supported by a reasoned selection of the most appropriate method under Section 92C and Rule 10C, using comparable profit level indicators.
Conclusion: The adjustment was set aside for fresh benchmarking after examination of the internal CUP and, if necessary, reasoned selection of another method, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether the final assessment order was barred by limitation.
Analysis: Section 144C(13A), retrospectively operative from 01.04.2009, clarifies that where the draft assessment order is forwarded within the period under Section 153, the time for the final assessment after DRP directions is governed by Sections 144C(12) and 144C(13). The draft order was forwarded before expiry of the Section 153 period, and the final order was made within one month from the end of the month in which the DRP directions were received.
Conclusion: The final assessment order was within limitation, against the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The transfer-pricing determinations require de novo verification and benchmarking in accordance with reliable comparability standards, whereas the limitation challenge fails.
COVID-19 adjustment in transfer-pricing benchmarking - Consistent treatment of operating items under TNMM - Internal CUP for software support services - Limitation for final assessment following DRP directions
COVID-19 adjustment in transfer-pricing benchmarking - Consistent treatment of operating items under TNMM - Transfer-pricing adjustment for preparation of US tax returns and secondment services based on COVID-19-related costs and inconsistent treatment of operating items - HELD THAT: - A pandemic-related adjustment cannot be allowed merely because the relevant period fell during COVID-19. The assessee must identify exceptional expenditure actually incurred on account of the pandemic, establish that it was not a normal operating cost, and show that the corresponding cost or economic impact was absent from or materially different in the comparables. Further, a reliable TNMM comparison requires uniform classification of operating and non-operating items for the tested party and comparables. Foreign-exchange fluctuation arising from revenue transactions ordinarily has nexus with operating activity, and depreciation is operating cost where related to assets used in that activity; in either event, parity of treatment is essential. [Paras 8, 9, 10, 11]
The adjustment was restored to the Assessing Officer/TPO for verification of the COVID-19 claim, foreign-exchange items and depreciation, followed by recomputation on a consistent basis or reconsideration of affected comparables where reliable data or adjustment is unavailable.
Selection of MAM - Internal CUP for software support services - Selection of the most appropriate transfer-pricing method - Transfer-pricing adjustment for software support services after rejection of the internal CUP and adoption of TNMM - HELD THAT: - An internal CUP is a direct benchmark where controlled and uncontrolled transactions are sufficiently comparable and reasonably accurate adjustments can be made for material differences. General similarity in services is insufficient: contractual scope, functions, assets, risks, employee skill and deployment, volume, duration, market and business circumstances require examination. A difference in employee cost is relevant but does not, by itself, establish price incomparability. Rejection of CUP requires examination of the agreements, invoices and actual services; if CUP is unreliable, adoption of TNMM must be supported by a reasoned determination of the most appropriate method and comparison of like profit level indicators. [Paras 12, 13, 14]
The adjustment was set aside and remanded to the Assessing Officer/TPO for transaction-wise examination and fresh benchmarking, with internal CUP to be applied if comparability and reliable adjustments are established.
Limitation for final assessment following DRP directions - Limitation for passing the final assessment order where the draft assessment order was forwarded within the general assessment period - HELD THAT: - Where a draft assessment order is forwarded within the period prescribed for assessment, the time for passing the final order upon receipt of DRP directions is governed by the time limits applicable to the DRP procedure, notwithstanding expiry of the general assessment period. Since the draft order was forwarded within the prescribed period and the final order was passed within one month from the end of the month in which the DRP directions were received, the final order was timely. [Paras 17]
The challenge to the final assessment order as barred by limitation was rejected.
Final Conclusion: The transfer-pricing adjustments were remanded for fresh examination and benchmarking. The limitation challenge failed, and the appeal was partly allowed for statistical purposes.
Issues: (i) Whether the final assessment order was barred by limitation following retrospective insertion of section 144C(13A); (ii) Whether cost-to-cost recovery of tax paid on employee stock options should be included in the assessee's operating margin; (iii) Whether the disputed ITeS comparables were functionally comparable to the assessee; (iv) Whether delayed trade receivables warranted a separate notional-interest adjustment.
Issue (i): Whether the final assessment order was barred by limitation following retrospective insertion of section 144C(13A).
Analysis: Section 144C(13A), inserted retrospectively from 01.04.2009 by the Finance Act, 2026, governed the limitation computation. Under that provision, the final assessment order fell within the prescribed period.
Conclusion: The assessment order was not barred by limitation. Against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether cost-to-cost recovery of tax paid on employee stock options should be included in the assessee's operating margin.
Analysis: The recovered amount represented withholding tax payable by the associated enterprises in relation to employee stock options, paid by the assessee and recovered on a cost-to-cost basis. It had no connection with the ITeS rendered and was therefore non-operating for computation of the operating profit-to-operating cost margin.
Conclusion: The tax recovery must be excluded from operating income while computing the operating margin. In favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether the disputed ITeS comparables were functionally comparable to the assessee.
Analysis: Functional comparability was determined from the actual service profiles. Voice-based call-centre, routine BPO, information-technology service, and intellectual-property consultancy functions were materially different from the assessee's technical documentation, statistical analysis, regulatory, analytics, and reporting services. A knowledge-processing concern engaged in patent analysis, technical editing, and indexing was, however, functionally similar to the assessee's technical ITeS functions.
Conclusion: Four functionally dissimilar comparables must be excluded, while the functionally similar knowledge-processing comparable must be retained. Partly in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iv): Whether delayed trade receivables warranted a separate notional-interest adjustment.
Analysis: Deferred payment or receivables fall within the definition of an international transaction. However, the outstanding receivables arose solely from the ITeS transaction and were closely linked to it. Rules 10B(3)(ii) and 10B(1)(e) require reasonably accurate adjustments for material differences in applying the Transactional Net Margin Method. A working capital adjustment captures the profitability impact of such receivables.
Conclusion: Delayed receivables are an international transaction, but a working capital adjustment must be granted under the combined-transaction approach and no separate notional-interest adjustment is warranted thereafter. In favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The ITeS transfer-pricing computation must be revised by excluding the non-operating tax recovery, applying the directed comparable set, and granting working capital adjustment, while the assessment remains within limitation.
Limitation for final assessment pursuant to DRP directions - Operating margin computation for ITeS services - Functional comparability of ITeS service providers - Outstanding trade receivables under TNMM benchmarking
Limitation for final assessment pursuant to DRP directions - Validity of the final assessment order on the ground of limitation. - HELD THAT: - The retrospective insertion of sub-section (13A) in section 144C by the Finance Act, 2026 rendered the final assessment order within the limitation period prescribed under the Act. [Paras 6]
The challenge to the final assessment order as time-barred was rejected.
Treatment of the cost-to-cost recovery from associated enterprises of withholding tax paid in respect of restricted stock units while computing the assessee's operating margin - HELD THAT: - The recovery represented withholding tax payable by the associated enterprises, which the assessee paid and recovered on a cost-to-cost basis. Since it had no connection with the ITeS rendered by the assessee, it was non-operating in nature and had to be excluded in computing the assessee's profit level indicator. [Paras 17]
The recovery was directed to be excluded from the computation of the assessee's operating margin.
Functional comparability of ITeS service providers - Functional comparability of selected companies for benchmarking the assessee's technical ITeS transaction with associated enterprises - HELD THAT: - The assessee rendered diverse technical services, including documentation support, medical writing, statistical analysis, data processing, commercial analytics, regulatory support, and finance and supply-chain reporting. Companies engaged in voice-based call-centre services, information technology services, BPO services including voice support and technical helpdesk, and intellectual-property consultancy were not functionally comparable to those activities. However, a company providing knowledge-processing services such as patent analysis, technical editing and deep indexing of scientific and technical research papers performed functions similar to those of the assessee and remained comparable. [Paras 26, 29, 32, 35, 36]
Tech Mahindra Business Services Ltd., Sutherland Global Services Pvt. Ltd., TTEC India Customer Solutions Pvt. Ltd. and Sagacious Research Pvt. Ltd. were directed to be excluded, while Domex E-Data Pvt. Ltd. was retained as a comparable.
Outstanding trade receivables under TNMM benchmarking - Working capital adjustment - Whether notional interest on delayed trade receivables from associated enterprises warranted a separate transfer-pricing adjustment? - HELD THAT: - Deferred payment or receivables fall within the definition of an international transaction. However, the receivables arose only from the ITeS transaction and were closely linked to that principal transaction, requiring a combined-transaction approach. Under TNMM, the effect of receivables is reflected in working capital and profitability; therefore, after granting a working capital adjustment, no separate notional-interest adjustment on delayed receivables survives. [Paras 39, 40, 41]
The Assessing Officer and Transfer Pricing Officer were directed to grant working capital adjustment for the ITeS transaction, and the separate adjustment for notional interest on delayed receivables was held unwarranted.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was partly allowed. The limitation challenge was rejected, while relief was granted in relation to operating-margin computation, certain ITeS comparables, and the separate adjustment for delayed receivables.
Issues: Whether abnormal idle costs arising from COVID-19-induced underutilisation of a captive service provider's manpower and infrastructure required a capacity-utilisation adjustment while determining its arm's length margin under TNMM.
Analysis: Rule 10B(3) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 permits reasonably accurate adjustments to eliminate material differences affecting profits; it does not require identical capacity-utilisation or idle-cost data of comparable companies to be publicly available. Transfer-pricing analysis permits reasonable economic estimation rather than mathematical precision. Extraordinary underutilisation materially depressed the assessee's operating margin because fixed employee and infrastructure costs continued despite reduced activity. The abnormal idle costs, their business nexus, and the methodology for their computation were not found to be fictitious, non-business, unreliable, or incorrect. The absence of confidential internal data of independent comparables could not by itself justify rejecting a demonstrated and reasonably quantified adjustment.
Conclusion: The COVID-19-related abnormal idle costs had to be neutralised through an appropriate capacity-utilisation adjustment. The adjusted operating margin of 14.25% exceeded the comparable median margin of 11.84%; therefore, the international transactions were at arm's length and no transfer-pricing adjustment was warranted.
Determining the arm's length margin of the assessee under the TNMM - adjustment in respect of abnormal idle costs arising on account of COVID-19- induced underutilisation of the assessee's manpower and infrastructure - Reasonably accurate comparability adjustments under Rule 10B(3)
Whether abnormal idle costs arising from COVID-19-induced underutilisation of a captive service provider's manpower and infrastructure required a capacity-utilisation adjustment while determining its arm's length margin under TNMM? - HELD THAT: - Rule 10B(3) requires reasonably accurate adjustments to neutralise material differences affecting profitability; it does not require mathematically exact adjustment or public availability of identical capacity-utilisation data of comparable companies. Extraordinary underutilisation, causing fixed employee and infrastructure costs to be spread over reduced activity, was a material economic difference. As the abnormal idle costs and their basis were furnished and were not found to be non-genuine, non-business-related, or incorrectly computed, their adjustment could not be rejected merely because comparable-company data was unavailable. [Paras 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]
The abnormal idle costs attributable to extraordinary COVID-19-induced underutilisation were required to be neutralised; the adjusted margin exceeded the comparable median margin, the international transaction was at arm's length, and the transfer-pricing adjustment was deleted.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed. The transfer-pricing adjustment arising from denial of the capacity-utilisation adjustment was deleted.
Issues: (i) Whether penalty for improper importation was sustainable on admitted undervaluation of imported goods; (ii) Whether penalty for use of false or incorrect material applied to import transactions and, if so, its appropriate quantum.
Issue (i): Whether penalty for improper importation was sustainable on admitted undervaluation of imported goods.
Analysis: Section 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 applies where an act or omission renders goods liable to confiscation under Section 111 of the Customs Act, 1962. The declared values were substantially lower than the values redetermined on the basis of investigation documents, and the redetermined values and differential duty were admitted.
Conclusion: Penalty under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 was validly imposed and is sustained, against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether penalty for use of false or incorrect material applied to import transactions and, if so, its appropriate quantum.
Analysis: Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 covers a knowingly or intentionally false or incorrect declaration, statement, or document in a transaction of business for the purposes of the Act; it is not confined to export transactions. Filing Bills of Entry supported by undervalued invoices justified invocation of that provision. In fixing the amount, the existing penalty under Section 112(a) and the circumstances relating to the additional Bill of Entry warranted mitigation.
Conclusion: Penalty under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 applies to the import undervaluation and is sustainable, but is reduced to Rs.50,000, in favour of the assessee to that extent.
Final Conclusion: The statutory penalties for admitted import undervaluation remain enforceable, with mitigated monetary liability under Section 114AA.
Ratio Decidendi: Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 extends to materially false import declarations, and may operate alongside penalty for improper importation under Section 112(a), subject to appropriate calibration of penalty quantum.
Penalty for import undervaluation - Penalty for false import declarations
Penalty for improper importation - Undervaluation of imported goods - Penalty on the proprietor for improper importation arising from admitted undervaluation of imported goods - HELD THAT: - The admitted undervaluation rendered the imported goods liable to confiscation, thereby establishing the basis for penalty for improper importation. [Paras 4]
The penalty for improper importation was upheld.
Penalty for false import declarations - Concurrent customs penalties - Penalty for use of false or incorrect material in import transactions and its imposition in addition to penalty for improper importation - HELD THAT: - The penalty provision for knowingly or intentionally using a materially false or incorrect declaration or document applies to transactions under the Customs Act and is not confined to exports. The false invoices reflecting undervalued import declarations justified its invocation. However, the fact that the proprietor had already suffered penalty for improper importation warranted reduction of the additional penalty. [Paras 4]
The penalty for false import declarations was sustained but reduced.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was partially allowed only to the extent of reducing the penalty for false import declarations; the remaining impugned order was upheld.
Issues: (i) Whether the transaction value of parts imported for sale or distribution could be rejected and the value determined under the residual method; (ii) Whether royalty, technical know-how fees and management fees could be added to the value of imported parts and components used for manufacture in India.
Issue (i): Whether the transaction value of parts imported for sale or distribution could be rejected and the value determined under the residual method.
Analysis: Under the valuation rules, rejection of declared transaction value requires reasonable doubt founded on objective reasons concerning its truth or accuracy. Non-disclosure of the exporter's Suggested List Price, without evidence that the declared import price or the discount was abnormal, artificial, or influenced by the relationship, did not establish such doubt. Once transaction value is rejected, valuation must proceed sequentially under the prescribed rules. The residual method cannot adopt the domestic-market price in the exporting country, which is expressly prohibited. The record also showed that comparable and substantial discounts were available in the exporting country and that the discount allowed in India was commercially normal.
Conclusion: The declared transaction value could not be rejected, and reassessment by adopting the exporter's domestic Suggested List Price under the residual method was impermissible; in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether royalty, technical know-how fees and management fees could be added to the value of imported parts and components used for manufacture in India.
Analysis: Rule 9(1)(c) of the 1988 Rules and Rule 10(1)(c) of the 2007 Rules permit addition only where the royalty or licence fee relates to the imported goods and is payable, directly or indirectly, as a condition of their sale. The Master Agreement and Addendum, read together, showed that royalty and technical fees were consideration for technology and know-how used in post-import manufacture of products in India. The importer was free to procure parts locally or from third parties, subject only to prescribed quality standards; payment of these charges was therefore not a condition for sale of imported parts. No examination of the pricing arrangement established that the charges masked or adjusted the import price. Management fees had not been paid during the disputed period, and their proposed addition on a notional basis was unsupported.
Conclusion: Royalty, technical know-how fees and management fees were not includible in the transaction value of the imported goods; in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The redetermination of import value and the valuation additions underlying the duty demand were legally unsustainable.
Ratio Decidendi: Declared customs value may be displaced or loaded only upon satisfaction of the valuation rules; payments for post-import manufacturing rights or services are excluded unless they have a nexus with the imported goods and are a condition of their sale.
Transaction value of related-party imported parts for distribution - Inclusion of royalty, technical fees and management fees in customs value
Transaction value of related-party imported parts for distribution - Residual valuation and exporter's domestic-market price - Acceptance of the declared transaction value of imported parts meant for distribution and validity of reassessment based on the exporter's Suggested List Price - HELD THAT: - Rejection of declared value requires reasonable doubt, founded on objective reasons, as to its truth or accuracy. Mere non-disclosure of the Suggested List Price did not establish that the declared transaction value or the discount was abnormal, artificial or relationship-influenced; nor did the Revenue rebut the material showing that comparable discounts were allowed in the country of export and that the discount allowed in India was commercially normal. Further, upon rejection of transaction value, valuation must proceed sequentially under the prescribed methods. The residual method cannot adopt the price of goods in the domestic market of the country of exportation, which is expressly prohibited. [Paras 28, 29, 30, 31]
The rejection of the declared transaction value and its redetermination by adopting the Suggested List Price under the residual method were held unsustainable.
Inclusion of royalty, technical fees and management fees in customs value - Condition of sale of imported goods - Inclusion of royalty, technical fees and notional management fees in the value of imported parts and components used to manufacture products in India - HELD THAT: - For loading royalty or licence fees, the payment must both relate to the imported goods and be payable as a condition of their sale. The Addendum was required to be read with the Master Agreement, its existence having been reflected in earlier proceedings, and it merely clarified the earlier arrangement. The agreements permitted procurement of parts from third parties, subject to prescribed specifications and quality standards. Royalty and technical fees were paid for technology, technical know-how and manufacture of products in India, not as a condition for sale of the imported parts. The adjudicating authority had not examined the pricing arrangement to establish an adjustment of import price through such payments. Notional management fees, discontinued during the disputed period, could not be added on assumptions. [Paras 36, 37, 38, 39, 40]
Royalty, technical assistance or know-how fees and notional management fees were not includible in the transaction value of the imported goods.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed. The remaining questions concerning limitation, penalty, confiscation and interest were not examined as academic.
Issues: Whether Bulk Drugs/Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients imported for manufacture of pharmaceutical formulations or for testing, clinical research, bioavailability or bioequivalence studies qualify for the 5% IGST rate under Sl. No. 226 of Schedule I to Notification No. 9/2025-Integrated Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025.
Analysis: IGST on imported articles is governed by Section 3(7) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, read with the applicable IGST rate notification. The expression "drug" is not defined in the rate notification; its meaning was therefore determined with reference to Section 3(b) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, which inclusively covers substances intended for use as components of a drug. The definition of active pharmaceutical ingredient or bulk drug under the Drugs (Price Control) Order, 2013 also covers pharmaceutical substances used as such or as ingredients in formulations. APIs regulated and licensed as pharmaceutical substances consequently fall within the expression "drugs and medicines".
Analysis: Sl. No. 226 is a description-based entry applicable to goods under Chapter 30 or any Chapter. Its reference to "all drugs and medicines" and separately to "formulations manufactured from bulk drugs" cannot be confined to finished dosage forms, as that would render part of the entry redundant. The specific entry for drugs and medicines prevails over the general chemical entries for Chapters 28 and 29. The notification is a taxing rate notification, and any ambiguity in its scope is resolved in favour of the taxpayer. The nil-rate exclusion under Sl. No. 113 of Notification No. 10/2025-Integrated Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025 remains subject to verification for each individual API at import.
Conclusion: Bulk Drugs/APIs described in the application qualify as "All Drugs and medicines" under Sl. No. 226 of Schedule I to Notification No. 9/2025-Integrated Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025 and attract IGST at 5%, provided the particular API is not covered by the stated nil-rate exclusion.
Ratio Decidendi: A pharmaceutical API that is a component of a drug and satisfies the regulatory requirements for drugs falls within a description-based entry for "all drugs and medicines", notwithstanding its tariff classification under a general chemical chapter.
IGST rate on imported bulk drugs and active pharmaceutical ingredients - correct rate of IGST leviable for the import of bulk drugs falling under chapter 28 or 29 of the Schedule of Customs Tariff Act, 1975 - Specific description-based rate entry prevailing over general chemical entries
Whether Integrated Goods and Services Tax is leviable @5% for the import of bulk drugs in terms of SI. No. 226 of Schedule I of Notification No. 9/2025-Integrated Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025 (hereinafter referred to as the 'IGST Rate Notification')? - HELD THAT: - The definition of "drug" under Section 3(b) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 is wide and inclusive in nature, and expressly covers substances intended for use as components of a drug. Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs) / bulk drugs, being pharmaceutical substances used as such or as ingredients in formulations, squarely fall within the ambit of the said definition subject to. their intended use and compliance with the applicable statutory requirements.
The expression "drugs" being undefined in the rate notification, its meaning was ascertained from the regulatory framework governing the goods. The inclusive definition under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act covers substances intended for use as components of a drug, while the Drugs (Price Control) Order treats APIs/bulk drugs as pharmaceutical substances used as such or as ingredients in formulations. The intended use of APIs for testing, clinical research or bioavailability and bioequivalence studies did not exclude them from the ambit of drugs. Sl. No. 226 is description-based, applies to goods under Chapter 30 or any Chapter, and its semicolon separates drugs and medicines from formulations manufactured from bulk drugs. It therefore covers APIs notwithstanding their chemical classification under Chapters 28 or 29. The specific entry for drugs and medicines prevails over the general entries for inorganic and organic chemicals; further, as the notification is a taxing rate notification rather than an exemption notification, ambiguity is to be resolved in favour of the taxpayer. [Paras 7]
The subject bulk drugs/APIs are eligible for IGST at 5% under Sl. No. 226 of Schedule I, provided that the particular bulk drug/API is not covered by the stated exclusions, including the goods specified at Sl. No. 113 of the nil-rate notification.
Final Conclusion: The application was answered in the affirmative. Bulk drugs/APIs satisfying the stated description are chargeable to IGST at 5%, subject to the exclusions in the applicable notifications; the alternative question did not arise.
Issues: Whether bulk drugs or active pharmaceutical ingredients, classifiable under Chapters 28 or 29 and imported for pharmaceutical formulations, testing, clinical research, bioavailability or bioequivalence studies, qualify for IGST at 5% under Sl. No. 226 of Schedule I to Notification No. 9/2025-Integrated Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025.
Analysis: IGST on imports is chargeable under Section 3(7) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 at the rate applicable to like domestic supplies. The expression "drugs" in the rate notification was interpreted with reference to Section 3(b) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, which inclusively covers substances intended for use as components of a drug. The definition of active pharmaceutical ingredients or bulk drugs in the Drugs (Price Control) Order, 2013 confirms their pharmaceutical character and use as ingredients in formulations. APIs imported for testing, clinical trials, bioavailability or bioequivalence studies are not excluded merely because they are not directly used as finished therapeutic formulations.
Analysis: Sl. No. 226 is a description-based entry covering drugs and medicines falling under Chapter 30 or any Chapter. Its reference to formulations manufactured from bulk drugs does not confine "all drugs and medicines" to finished dosage forms; such a construction would render parts of the entry redundant. The specific entry for drugs and medicines prevails over the general Chapter 28 and Chapter 29 entries for inorganic and organic chemicals. As the notification is a taxing rate notification rather than an exemption notification, any ambiguity is to be resolved in favour of the taxpayer. The applicability of the nil-rate exclusion under Sl. No. 113 must be verified for the particular API at import.
Conclusion: Yes. Bulk drugs/APIs qualifying as drugs or medicines are eligible for IGST at 5% under Sl. No. 226 of Schedule I to Notification No. 9/2025-Integrated Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025, provided the particular API is not covered by the exclusion under Sl. No. 113 of Notification No. 10/2025-Integrated Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025. The ruling is in favour of the assessee.
Bulk drugs and active pharmaceutical ingredients as drugs - Specific description-based IGST rate entry prevailing over general chemical entries - IGST rate on imported bulk drugs/Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients classifiable under Chapters 28 or 29-coverage by the specific entry for "All Drugs and medicines"
Correct rate of IGST leviable for the import of bulk drugs falling under chapter 28 or 29 of the Schedule of Customs Tariff Act, 1975 - Whether Integrated Goods and Services Tax/IGST is leviable @5% for the import of bulk drugs in terms of SI. No. 226 of Schedule I of Notification No. 9/2025-Integrated Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025 (hereinafter referred to as the 'IGST Rate Notification')?
HELD THAT: - The definition of "drug" under Section 3(b) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 is wide and inclusive in nature, and expressly covers substances intended for use as components of a drug. Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs) / bulk drugs, being pharmaceutical substances used as such or as ingredients in formulations, squarely fall within the ambit of the said definition subject to their intended use and compliance with the applicable statutory requirements. Bulk Drugs/APIs having the character and intended use of drugs and medicines may accordingly fall within the scope of the said entry, notwithstanding their classification under Chapter 28 or Chapter 29 of the Customs Tariff.
As neither the rate notification nor the Customs Act defines "drugs", the expression was construed with reference to the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and the Drugs (Price Control) Order. APIs, being pharmaceutical substances used as components of drugs or formulations, fall within the inclusive meaning of drugs; their import for testing, clinical research, bioavailability or bioequivalence studies does not alter that character. The entry covering "All Drugs and medicines" under Chapter 30 or any Chapter is description-based and extends beyond finished formulations under Chapter 30. The specific entry for drugs and medicines therefore prevails over the general Chapter 28 and 29 entries for inorganic and organic chemicals. The notification being a rate notification and not an exemption notification, any ambiguity was also held to be resolvable in favour of the applicant. [Paras 7]
Bulk drugs/APIs qualify as "All Drugs and medicines" under SI. No. 226 of Schedule I to Notification No. 9/2025-Integrated Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025 and are eligible for the concessional IGST rate of 5%, provided that the particular Bulk Drug/API is not covered under the exclusion specified in the said entry, including the goods specified at SI. No. 113 of Notification No. 10/2025-Integrated Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025.
Final Conclusion: The application was allowed. The proposed imports of bulk drugs/APIs are eligible for IGST at 5% under the specified entry, subject to verification that the particular goods do not fall within the nil-rate exclusion.
Issues: Whether bulk drugs or active pharmaceutical ingredients, including those imported for manufacture, testing, clinical trials, bioavailability studies or bioequivalence studies, qualify as "All Drugs and medicines" under Sl. No. 226 of Schedule I to Notification No. 9/2025-Integrated Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025 and attract IGST at 5%.
Analysis: IGST on imports is determined by the rate applicable to like domestic supplies. The expression "drug" is undefined in the rate notification; therefore, its meaning was derived from the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, under which substances intended for use as components of a drug are included. The definition of active pharmaceutical ingredient or bulk drug in the Drugs (Price Control) Order, 2013 confirms that APIs are pharmaceutical or chemical substances used as such or as ingredients in formulations. The licensing framework under the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 and the New Drugs and Clinical Trials Rules, 2019 also treats the subject goods as drugs irrespective of whether they are imported for manufacture, testing, clinical trials, bioavailability or bioequivalence studies.
Analysis: Sl. No. 226 is a description-based entry covering all drugs and medicines under Chapter 30 or any Chapter. Its semicolon separates the independent coverage of drugs and medicines from formulations manufactured from bulk drugs. The expression "or any Chapter" extends the entry to APIs classifiable under Chapters 28 and 29. As the drugs entry is specific, it prevails over the general Chapter-based entries for inorganic and organic chemicals in Schedule II.
Conclusion: Bulk drugs/APIs qualify as drugs under Sl. No. 226 of Schedule I to Notification No. 9/2025-Integrated Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025 and are chargeable to IGST at 5%, provided the goods are not covered by the nil-rated entry under Sl. No. 113 of Notification No. 10/2025-Integrated Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025.
IGST rate on imported bulk drugs and active pharmaceutical ingredients - Specific description-based rate entry prevailing over general Chapter-based entries
Whether bulk drugs or active pharmaceutical ingredients, including those imported for manufacture, testing, clinical trials, bioavailability studies or bioequivalence studies, qualify as "All Drugs and medicines" under Sl. No. 226 of Schedule I to Notification No. 9/2025-Integrated Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025 and attract IGST at 5%? - HELD THAT: - The definition of "drug" under Section 3(b) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 is wide and inclusive in nature, and expressly covers substances intended for use as components of a drug. Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs) / bulk drugs, being pharmaceutical substances used as such or as ingredients in formulations, squarely fall within the ambit of the said definition.
The inclusive definition of "drug" under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act extends to substances intended for use as components of a drug, while the definition of bulk drug or API confirms that such substances are used as such or as ingredients in formulations. Their statutory licensing as drugs and their use for testing or clinical studies do not alter that character. The semicolon in the rate entry separates "all drugs and medicines" from formulations manufactured from bulk drugs, and the expression "Chapter 30 or any Chapter" extends coverage to APIs under Chapters 28 and 29. As the description-based entry for drugs is specific, it prevails over the general Chapter-based entries for organic and inorganic chemicals. The notification is a rate notification rather than an exemption notification. [Paras 4]
Integrated Goods and Services Tax [IGST] is leviable @5% for the import of Bulk drugs or Active Pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) in terms of SI. No. 226 of Schedule I of Notification No. 9/2025- Integrated Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025, provided they are not covered under SI. No. 113 of Notification No. I 0/2025-Integrated Tax (Rate).
Final Conclusion: The application was allowed. Bulk drugs or APIs imported as drugs, including for manufacture or specified testing and clinical purposes, attract IGST at 5% under the applicable rate entry, subject to exclusion of nil-rated goods.
Issues: Whether the appellate order setting aside the Company Court's confirmation of the auction sale could be sustained on the State's unsubstantiated assertion that the auctioned lands were assigned lands liable to resume on alleged unauthorised transfers.
Analysis: The lands had been held through registered transactions, revenue mutations and long uninterrupted possession, including industrial use by the company in liquidation. The State did not substantiate the alleged assignments, and its own assertion that substantial land had been assigned to a person who was not landless undermined its case. The Official Liquidator had taken custody, and the auction was conducted and confirmed under orders of the Company Court; the State neither timely approached that Court nor established its claim there.
Analysis: Where a bona fide title dispute exists, the State cannot determine its own title and dispossess persons in long possession through summary resumption proceedings. The question whether the lands were assigned and whether any transfer warranted resumption required adjudication in appropriate proceedings and could not justify interference with the court-supervised auction.
Conclusion: The appellate order interfering with the confirmed auction sale was unsustainable; the Company Court's order stood revived, the purchaser's possession was protected, and the connected writ matter was restored for fresh merits consideration.
Summary resumption of lands claimed as assigned lands - Bona fide dispute as to Government title - Company liquidation sale of disputed land -
Whether the appellate order setting aside the Company Court's confirmation of the auction sale could be sustained on the State's unsubstantiated assertion that the auctioned lands were assigned lands liable to resume on alleged unauthorised transfers? - HELD THAT: - Applying Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao and Another [1982 (3) TMI 285 - SUPREME COURT] the Court held that the Government cannot unilaterally determine its title and resort to summary eviction where the person in possession asserts a bona fide claim of title. The alleged assignment was not unequivocally established; the lands were claimed under registered title deeds and revenue mutations, had remained in private and thereafter company possession for a long period, and had been taken into custody and sold under orders of the Company Court. The State neither substantiated its claim before the Company Court nor could the disputed title and alleged reversion be adjudicated in proceedings concerning liquidation and auction. The appellate court, therefore, ought not to have summarily interfered with the confirmed sale. [Paras 13, 17, 18, 19, 20]
The appellate order setting aside the auction confirmation was set aside and the Company Court's order was restored; possession was directed to be delivered to, or protected with, the auction purchaser. The writ petition and pending proceedings concerning the asserted summary resumption were left for fresh consideration on merits, with all contentions open.
Final Conclusion: The civil appeals were allowed to the extent of restoring the confirmed liquidation sale and protecting the auction purchaser's possession. The parties were left to pursue their respective claims regarding the alleged assigned lands in the proceedings pending or restored before the High Court.
Issues: Whether the Official Liquidator should be exempted from filing annual or final accounts for the financial year 2024-25 where audited half-yearly accounts for both halves of that year had been filed.
Analysis: Section 551 of the Companies Act, 1956 requires annual or final accounts. Audited half-yearly accounts for the two respective periods do not replace annual accounts, as consolidation of those accounts is necessary to present the correct financial status of the companies in liquidation.
Conclusion: Exemption from filing annual or final accounts for the financial year 2024-25 was refused.
Annual accounts of companies in liquidation - Exemption from filing annual or final accounts for companies in liquidation on the ground that audited half-yearly accounts had been filed - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the annual accounts could not be dispensed with merely because the accounts for both half-years had been filed. The concerned Chartered Accountant was required to merge the half-yearly accounts, since only the annual accounts would correctly disclose the financial status of the companies in liquidation. [Paras 3]
The request for exemption from filing annual or final accounts for the financial year 2024-25 was rejected.
Final Conclusion: The half-yearly accounts were taken on record and payment of the auditors' fee from the companies' available funds, or the Estate and Establishment Fund subject to reimbursement, was permitted. The applications were partly allowed, while exemption from filing annual or final accounts was refused.
Issues: Whether a public interest litigant who suppressed a prior pending writ petition seeking substantially overlapping reliefs, and made a contrary averment on oath, was entitled to invoke writ jurisdiction.
Analysis: Rule 9(i)(h) of the Delhi High Court (Public Interest Litigation) Rules, 2010 requires disclosure of previously instituted PILs or letter petitions. The undisclosed Bombay writ was instituted before the present PIL, concerned the same NSE shareholding and beneficial-ownership disclosures, and substantially overlapped with the reliefs sought. The incorrect assertion that no prior similar proceeding existed demonstrated absence of candour, unclean hands, forum shopping and abuse of the PIL jurisdiction. Such suppression disentitles a litigant from equitable relief irrespective of the merits of the underlying allegations.
Conclusion: The petitioner was not entitled to pursue the PIL because of suppression of material facts and forum shopping, and exemplary costs were warranted.
Suppression of material facts in public interest litigation - Forum shopping in writ jurisdiction - Maintainability of a public interest litigation where the petitioner suppressed a prior pending writ petition seeking substantially overlapping reliefs concerning NSE shareholding
HELD THAT: - A litigant invoking the equitable and extraordinary PIL jurisdiction must approach the Court with clean hands and make complete disclosure of material facts. The mandatory disclosure of earlier PILs safeguards against parallel proceedings and conflicting adjudication.
The petitioner neither disclosed the prior Bombay writ petition nor made a truthful averment regarding earlier similar proceedings; the reliefs in both matters substantially concerned the same shareholding and beneficial ownership disclosures. Such suppression and pursuit of overlapping reliefs before different Courts constituted abuse of process and forum shopping, disentitling the petitioner to relief irrespective of the merits of the underlying allegations. [Paras 19, 20, 21, 25, 26]
The PIL was dismissed at the threshold without examination of the divestment allegations, with exemplary costs imposed to deter abuse of PIL jurisdiction.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was dismissed for suppression of the prior substantially overlapping proceeding and forum shopping, with exemplary costs.
Issues: Whether a homebuyers' association or its members may intervene in an ongoing corporate liquidation process to challenge the liquidator's proposed sale of assets.
Analysis: An association of homebuyers is not itself entitled to intervene at the adjudicatory stage as a creditor. However, the amended Section 21(11), made applicable to ongoing liquidation processes where no application for dissolution has been filed, enables the committee of creditors to supervise the liquidator's conduct. Members who are stakeholders may therefore independently seek intervention before the adjudicating authority on that statutory basis.
Conclusion: The association could not maintain the intervention sought in the writ petition; nevertheless, its individual member-stakeholders may file a fresh application before the NCLT under the amended insolvency framework.
Intervention by homebuyers in ongoing liquidation proceedings - Stakeholders' supervision of liquidation process
Entitlement of homebuyers, represented through their association, to intervene in an ongoing corporate liquidation concerning sale of the corporate debtor's property - HELD THAT: - An association of homebuyers is not entitled to intervene before the adjudicatory authority merely in that representative capacity. The amended insolvency provisions apply to an ongoing liquidation process and confer supervisory participation in the conduct of liquidation upon stakeholders through the committee of creditors.
The members of the association, being stakeholders, may therefore seek intervention individually by a fresh application before the adjudicatory authority. [Paras 8, 9]
The writ petition was dismissed, while leaving open the members' right to file a fresh application before the National Company Law Tribunal under the amended provisions.
Final Conclusion: The association could not maintain intervention in its representative capacity, but its stakeholder-members were left free to seek intervention afresh in the ongoing liquidation under the amended insolvency framework.
Issues: Whether the successful auction bidder was entitled to refund of the part sale consideration forfeited upon cancellation of the letter of intent before expiry of the extended payment period.
Analysis: The auction terms conferred discretion to extend the time for payment. The communication granting payment time up to sixty days after the original due date, coupled with the provision for interest on delayed payment, operated as an extension until 30.05.2023. Under Regulation 33 and Clause 1(12) of Schedule I to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, delayed payment with interest was contemplated before cancellation. Forfeiture on 10.05.2023 was therefore premature, arbitrary, and contrary to the extension granted. The subsequent sale at a higher consideration also meant that retention of the appellant's deposit would cause unjust enrichment. Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 did not justify forfeiture before expiry of the modified payment period.
Conclusion: The appellant is entitled to refund of Rs. 32,50,000 deposited towards the sale consideration, without interest.
Forfeiture of e-auction deposit before expiry of extended payment period - Extension of time for payment of auction consideration
Validity of forfeiture of the successful bidder's part payment before expiry of the extended period for payment of the balance auction consideration - HELD THAT: - The communication issued by the Resolution Professional permitted payment beyond the original deadline, with interest, up to 60 days thereafter; the expression "post which" made forfeiture operative only upon a continuing default after that extended period. Note 2 of the payment schedule also vested discretion to extend the payment timeline. The process memorandum could not be read to authorise forfeiture before expiry of the extension actually granted, and the regulatory scheme similarly contemplated delayed payment with interest before cancellation. Since the forfeiture was effected before the extended period expired, it was arbitrary. The subsequent sale having realised consideration for the asset, retention of the part payment would not be justified. [Paras 16, 22, 23, 24, 25]
The forfeiture was set aside to the extent of directing refund of the part payment to the successful bidder; the refund was directed without interest.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was partly allowed only in respect of refund of the forfeited part payment. The Resolution Professional was directed to refund the amount within the stipulated period, without interest.
Issues: Whether confirmation of the provisional attachment could be interfered with on the basis that the attached properties had been sold or partly sold before attachment, or were mortgaged to financial institutions.
Analysis: The appellants admitted receipt of funds from the accused entity but produced no invoices, GST returns, income-tax returns, or other material demonstrating genuine business activity or an independent source for acquisition of the properties. The record supported the finding that the entities were shell companies used for layering diverted loan funds and acquiring assets from proceeds of crime. A selling entity retained no interest in properties stated to have been sold, leaving purchasers to pursue any independent claim. Mortgage of properties did not displace the attachment; any claim of the mortgagee was left open.
Conclusion: The provisional attachment and its confirmation were sustained, including in respect of mortgaged and partly sold properties; the challenge was decided against the appellants.
Attachment of proceeds of crime - Effect of prior sale and mortgage on provisional attachment
Provisional attachment of properties alleged to have been acquired from proceeds of crime, notwithstanding asserted prior sales, partial sales or mortgages - HELD THAT: - The appellants admitted receipt of funds from the accused entity but produced no evidence of their business activities or of an independent source for acquisition of the attached properties. The properties were found to have been acquired out of tainted money through entities controlled by the accused. In respect of properties asserted to have been sold, the appellants had no subsisting interest and any purchaser could pursue its own remedy. The asserted mortgages did not warrant interference with attachment, while leaving any claim of the concerned financial institution open. [Paras 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]
The confirmation of the provisional attachment was sustained, including in respect of mortgaged properties, without prejudice to any subsisting right of a third party.
Final Conclusion: The appeals were disposed of without interference with the confirmed provisional attachment. Any independent right of a purchaser or financial institution, if existing, was kept open.
Issues: (i) Whether amounts written off as unclaimed vendor balances and other outstanding credits constituted consideration for a declared service of tolerating an act under Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation was validly invoked.
Issue (i): Whether amounts written off as unclaimed vendor balances and other outstanding credits constituted consideration for a declared service of tolerating an act under Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994.
Analysis: A declared service requires an activity carried out by one person for another for consideration. Toleration of an act under Section 66E(e) requires an independent express or implied contractual obligation to refrain from, tolerate, or do an act, with consideration flowing for that obligation. Accounting entries recording lapsed vendor balances or unclaimed amounts as income do not, by themselves, establish provision of a taxable service. No evidence established any such agreement, contractual obligation, activity, or flow of consideration.
Conclusion: The written-off amounts were not consideration for a declared service under Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994; the finding of taxability is in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation was validly invoked.
Analysis: Invocation of the extended period required evidence of a positive act to evade tax. No such evidence existed, and no taxable activity had been suppressed or omitted.
Conclusion: The extended period was wrongly invoked; the finding is in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The service-tax demand founded on written-off balances as consideration for tolerating an act, together with the consequential interest and penalty, cannot be sustained.
Ratio Decidendi: Amounts arising from breach, lapse, or accounting write-back are not taxable as consideration for tolerating an act unless an independent contractual obligation to tolerate exists and consideration is paid for that obligation.
Declared service of tolerating an act - amounts written off as unclaimed vendor balances and other outstanding credits - Extended period of limitation - absence of positive act to evade tax
Declared service - Consideration for taxable service - Taxability of amounts written off from unclaimed vendor balances and invalid unpresented cheques as consideration for tolerating an act - HELD THAT: - A declared service requires an activity carried out by one person for another for consideration. An obligation to refrain from an act, tolerate an act or situation, or do an act must arise under an independent express or implied agreement or contract, with consideration flowing from the other contracting party for performance of that obligation. Mere accounting recognition of income upon lapse or write-back of outstanding balances, without evidence that the amounts represented consideration for a taxable service rendered by the appellant, cannot attract service tax. [Paras 5]
The written-off amounts were wrongly treated as consideration for a declared service and the service-tax demand was unsustainable.
Invocation of the extended period for demand on written-off balances - HELD THAT: - The department produced no evidence of any positive act by the appellant to evade tax; nor had the appellant reduced any taxable activity. [Paras 5]
The extended period was wrongly invoked.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed, as the written-off balances were not consideration for any declared service and the extended period was not invocable.
Issues: Whether service tax under reverse charge is payable on royalty paid under mining lease agreements executed before 01.04.2016.
Analysis: The mining lease agreements, material to determine when the service of grant of mining rights was provided or agreed to be provided, had not been produced before either lower authority. Under the pre-01.04.2016 negative-list regime, services provided by Government, including grant of rights in natural resources, were generally not taxable; Government services to business entities became taxable after the amendment effective from 01.04.2016. The lease agreements require examination under the governing Tribunal decisions.
Outcome: The impugned order was set aside and the matter was returned for fresh adjudication.
Service tax under reverse charge - Consideration of material mining lease agreements - Service-tax demand on royalty paid to the Government under reverse charge where the mining lease agreements were not produced before the authorities
HELD THAT: - Determination of the taxability of the grant of mining rights required examination of the mining lease agreements, including whether the service was agreed to be provided before 01.04.2016. As those agreements had not been placed before either authority, the issue required fresh consideration in accordance with the law laid down by the Tribunal. [Paras 1, 3]
The impugned order was set aside and the matter remanded to the adjudicating authority for examination of the lease agreements and fresh decision; the merits were not adjudicated.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed by way of remand for fresh determination of the service-tax liability after considering the mining lease agreements.
Issues: Whether, after the commencement of the GST regime, tobacco and tobacco products remained subject to central excise duty and NCCD; whether the saving of the Central Excise Act, 1944 through Section 174 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was unconstitutional; and whether Section 136 of the Finance Act, 2001 stood impliedly repealed.
Analysis: The legal challenges were already governed by earlier writ and appellate decisions that had attained finality. The additional grounds did not warrant reopening those settled questions; grounds not covered by the earlier decisions could be pursued before the statutory appellate authority against the order in original.
Conclusion: The requested declarations concerning excise duty, the saving clause, and implied repeal were not granted; unrelated grounds against the order in original remained available for consideration in the statutory appeal.
Excise duty and National Calamity Contingent Duty on Tobacco and Tobacco products - Finality of prior adjudication after the commencement of the GST regime - Statutory appellate remedy
Whether excise duty and National Calamity Contingent Duty continued to apply to tobacco and tobacco products after the commencement of the GST regime, and whether the saving provision preserving the Central Excise Act, 1944 was unconstitutional or the NCCD levy was impliedly repealed? - HELD THAT: - The constitutional reliefs concerning levy of excise duty on tobacco products, the saving of the Central Excise Act, 1944, and the asserted implied repeal of the NCCD levy were held to be covered by earlier proceedings that had attained finality. [Paras 7, 8]
No interference was warranted with the dismissal of the writ petition insofar as those questions were concerned.
Availability of statutory appeal against the order in original on grounds not covered by the final prior adjudication - HELD THAT: - As the writ petition had been instituted shortly after the order in original and remained pending before the Court, the appellant was permitted to pursue the statutory appellate remedy on the remaining grounds. The direction concerning limitation was confined to the peculiar facts of the case. [Paras 8, 9, 10]
If filed within four weeks of receipt of the order, the statutory appeal was directed to be taken on record without objection as to limitation; all other contentions were kept open.
Final Conclusion: The writ appeal was disposed of without interfering with the dismissal of the writ petition on questions already concluded by final prior proceedings. The appellant was relegated to the statutory appellate remedy for the remaining grounds, subject to the direction on limitation.
Issues: Whether the penalty imposed on the assessee as majority shareholder of the holding company of Yogesh Associates was required to be separately remanded for fresh adjudication.
Analysis: The penalty imposed in the assessee's capacity as partner of Balaji Flexipack had attained finality. The distinct penalty of Rs. 20 crore related to the assessee's position as majority shareholder of the holding company of Yogesh Associates, whose matters had already been directed for de novo consideration. Both sides accepted that this distinct penalty issue had not been appropriately included in the remand direction.
Conclusion: The penalty issue of Rs. 20 crore is remitted to the adjudicating authority for de novo consideration along with the remanded matters of Yogesh Associates and the connected entities, in favour of the Revenue.
Penalty imposed on the assessee as majority shareholder of the holding company - HELD THAT:- On the parties' consensus, the CESTAT order was modified to remand the penalty imposed on the respondent in the capacity of majority shareholder for de novo consideration along with the remanded matters.
Issues: Whether an exporter of software services is entitled to refund of unutilised CENVAT credit for the relevant period even where the exported software service is not a taxable service.
Analysis: Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 governs refund of accumulated credit attributable to exported output services. The binding position applied was that the non-taxability of exported software services does not disentitle an eligible exporter from claiming refund of CENVAT credit. The substantial questions concerning Rule 5, the definition of taxable service, and Notification No. 18/2008-ST were already governed by that position.
Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to refund of CENVAT credit notwithstanding that the exported software service was not taxable.
Refund of CENVAT credit on exported software services - Entitlement to refund of CENVAT credit in respect of exported software services which were not taxable services
Whether the respondent-assessee would be entitled for refund of CENVAT Credit though the respondent is in export of software which is not taxable service? - HELD THAT: - Following the earlier decisions of this Court [2011 (9) TMI 450 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT], it was held that the non-taxability of exported software services did not disentitle the assessee from claiming refund of CENVAT credit. [Paras 5, 6, 7]
All the substantial questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue, and the appeal was disposed of accordingly.
Final Conclusion: The Revenue's appeal was disposed of by following the earlier decisions of this Court, with all substantial questions answered in favour of the assessee.
Issues: Whether appeals dismissed for non-compliance with the pre-deposit condition could be restored after the entire service-tax liability was subsequently recovered or paid.
Analysis: The entire amount directed to be deposited stood recovered by the Department and paid by the assessee, thereby satisfying the pre-deposit requirement under Section 35F. Dismissal for non-compliance should not permanently defeat the statutory right of appeal where belated compliance is established and the Revenue suffers no prejudice. Rule 41 empowers restoration of appeals where necessary to secure the ends of justice.
Conclusion: The Tribunal was required to restore the appeals for adjudication on merits after full compliance with the pre-deposit condition. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
Belated compliance with pre-deposit requirement - Restoration of appeal dismissed for non-compliance
Restoration of appeals dismissed for non-compliance with the pre-deposit condition after the entire service tax liability was recovered by the Department - HELD THAT: - Recovery of the entire service tax liability by the Department constituted sufficient compliance with the pre-deposit direction. A pre-deposit condition, though necessary for hearing an appeal on merits, cannot be used to deny the statutory right of appeal once compliance is subsequently shown. The Tribunal was required to exercise its power to secure the ends of justice and restore the appeals for adjudication on merits. [Paras 7, 8, 10]
The Tribunal's refusal to restore the appeals was held untenable; its order was quashed and the appeals were restored for decision on merits after affording hearing to the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The appeals were allowed, the Tribunal's order was quashed, and the appeals were restored to the Tribunal for disposal on merits in accordance with law.
Issues: (i) Whether CENVAT credit was admissible on commission paid to the sole selling agent for sales promotion and warranty-related installation, commissioning and after-sales services; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked.
Issue (i): Whether CENVAT credit was admissible on commission paid to the sole selling agent for sales promotion and warranty-related installation, commissioning and after-sales services.
Analysis: The agreement appointed the service provider as sole selling agent to promote, develop and expand sales, with installation, commissioning and warranty services forming obligations connected with sale of the final goods. The monthly invoices described the consideration as commission for sale of machines and spares and service tax was paid under Business Auxiliary Service. Such warranty-related services enhanced the value of the goods and qualified as input services used in or in relation to manufacture. There was no evidence that the agreement was non-transparent or that the invoiced commission did not represent the stated services.
Conclusion: CENVAT credit on the commission service was admissible in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked.
Analysis: The allegation was founded on business records maintained in the ordinary course, without evidence of suppression from the department. The credit had been taken under a bona fide belief on an interpretative issue.
Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The demand founded on denial of the disputed credit could not be sustained either on merits or limitation.
Ratio Decidendi: Commission-based services of a selling agent, including warranty-related services contractually connected with the sale of dutiable final goods, qualify as input services where they enhance the value of those goods; an extended limitation period requires evidence of suppression.
CENVAT credit on sales commission for warranty services - Extended limitation for CENVAT credit demand
CENVAT credit on commission paid to the sole selling agent for sales promotion and warranty-related installation, commissioning and after-sales services - Input service credit for warranty obligations - Sales commission as Business Auxiliary Service - HELD THAT: - The monthly invoices classified the consideration as commission for sale of machines and spares and discharged service tax under Business Auxiliary Service. Free warranty repair and maintenance enriched the value of the goods and the service received from the selling agent was therefore an input service used in or in relation to manufacture. In the absence of evidence that the agency agreement was not transparent, the credit could not be denied even for the normal period.
As regards the issue on merit also we find that the issue was considered by the Tribunal in the matter of M/s. Radhe Renewable Energy Development Pvt. Ltd [2014 (11) TMI 578 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD] the service received by the appellant from their dealers is 'Business Auxiliary Service' which has to be treated as an input service for the appellant used in or in relation to manufacture of their final products, as free warranty repair and maintenance during warranty period, has enriched the value of the goods. [Paras 11]
The denial of CENVAT credit on the selling commission was held unsustainable.
Extended limitation for CENVAT credit demand - Absence of suppression of facts - HELD THAT: - The allegations rested on records maintained in the ordinary course of business, with no evidence of suppression from the Department. Since the appellant entertained a bona fide belief regarding credit eligibility and the dispute involved interpretation of law, invocation of the extended period was impermissible. [Paras 11]
The demand raised by invoking the extended period of limitation was held unsustainable.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether threshing, cleaning, sieving and sizing dried broken raw tobacco leaves, followed by bulk packing, amounts to manufacture or deemed manufacture attracting Central Excise duty.
Analysis: Central Excise duty under Section 3 applies only to goods produced or manufactured in India. Under Section 2(f), manufacture ordinarily requires emergence of a new commodity with a distinct name, character and use; it also includes processes specifically deemed to be manufacture. Chapter Note 3 of Chapter 24 treats labelling or relabelling, repacking from bulk packs to retail packs, or other treatment undertaken to render tobacco marketable to the consumer as manufacture. The mechanical processes involved no addition, chemical treatment, flavouring, blending, branding or retail packing. The tobacco retained its essential identity, and the incoming dried broken tobacco was already capable of being bought and sold. Bulk-to-bulk packing was not repacking into retail packs, and the processing did not confer marketability on an otherwise unmarketable product.
Conclusion: The stated activities do not amount to manufacture or deemed manufacture under Section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944; consequently, no Central Excise duty is payable merely for undertaking them.
Manufacture and deemed manufacture of unmanufactured tobacco - Marketability under Chapter Note 3 of Chapter 24 - Bulk-to-bulk packing -
Whether threshing, cleaning, sieving and sizing dried broken raw tobacco leaves, followed by bulk packing, amounts to manufacture or deemed manufacture attracting Central Excise duty? - HELD THAT: - The mechanical processes merely removed extraneous matter and segregated or standardised the size of tobacco leaves; no ingredient was added and the goods retained their essential identity as tobacco. The tobacco was already capable of being bought and sold before processing, and there was no material to show that the operations conferred marketability upon an otherwise non-marketable product. Further, there was neither labelling or relabelling nor repacking from bulk packs to retail packs; bulk-to-bulk packing did not attract the specific deeming provision. The processes consequently neither yielded a new commodity with a distinct name, character and use nor constituted treatment to render the product marketable to the consumer. [Paras 6]
The activities did not amount to manufacture or deemed manufacture under Section 2(f), and no Central Excise duty was payable merely on account of undertaking them.
Final Conclusion: The advance ruling held that the applicant's mechanical processing of dried broken tobacco leaves and their packing in bulk bags did not attract Central Excise duty.
Issuance of C-Forms for interstate purchase of Extra Neutral Alcohol - Status quo on GST treatment of Extra Neutral Alcohol - HELD THAT:- We are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the High Court [2026 (3) TMI 1752 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] hence, the special leave petition is dismissed.
Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to a further extension for making the statutory pre-deposit after expiry of the period fixed by an earlier coordinate-bench order.
Analysis: The earlier order had set aside the appellate dismissal conditional upon appearance before the appellate authority and furnishing the statutory pre-deposit within 30 days, while expressly providing that the earlier dismissal would revive upon non-compliance. The deposit was made after the stipulated period. Granting a further extension or directing acceptance of the delayed deposit would nullify the binding directions of the coordinate bench in a separate writ proceeding.
Conclusion: The petitioner was not entitled to further time or a direction to accept the delayed statutory pre-deposit; the issue was decided against the assessee.
Conditional statutory pre-deposit - further extension for making the statutory pre-deposit after expiry of the period fixed by an earlier coordinate-bench order.
HELD THAT: - The Coordinate Bench had set aside the earlier dismissal only upon the condition that the statutory pre-deposit be made within the stipulated period, and had expressly provided that the set-aside order would revive upon non-compliance.
As the deposit was made after that period, the petitioner failed to avail of the liberty granted. A separate writ petition could not be used to extend the period or require acceptance of the delayed deposit, as that would nullify the Coordinate Bench's directions [2025 (5) TMI 1812 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT]. [Paras 6, 7]
The writ petition was dismissed, without prejudice to the petitioner's right to seek review of the Coordinate Bench's order.
Final Conclusion: The challenge to dismissal of the appeal for delayed statutory pre-deposit was rejected because the conditional direction of the Coordinate Bench could not be varied in a separate writ proceeding.
Issues: Whether the complaints contained sufficient averments to fasten vicarious liability on the petitioner under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for dishonour of cheques under Section 138.
Analysis: Liability of a company director for an offence by the company requires averments that, at the time of the offence, the director was both in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business, or that the offence occurred through the director's consent, connivance or neglect. Directorship alone does not create deemed criminal liability. The petitioner was neither a party to the underlying agreement nor a signatory to the cheques, and the complaints contained only general allegations against all accused without material particulars of the petitioner's role in the company's day-to-day affairs or in the cheque transactions. The process-issuing orders also did not address the statutory requirements for vicarious liability.
Conclusion: The petitioner could not be prosecuted under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 on the basis of the deficient complaints; the issue is decided in favour of the petitioner.
Vicarious criminal liability of non-signatory Director for cheque dishonour - Specific averments under section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act - Responsibility for Conduct of Business
HELD THAT: - For fastening vicarious liability under section 141, the complaint must specifically aver that the person sought to be prosecuted was, at the relevant time, both in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business; such liability cannot be inferred merely from directorship. The complaint contained only general allegations against the accused and disclosed neither the petitioner's role in the day-to-day affairs or financial transactions of the company nor consent, connivance or neglect in relation to the dishonoured cheques.
In case of K. S. Mehta [2025 (3) TMI 255 - SUPREME COURT] Supreme Court reiterated principles laid down in case of Hitesh Verma [2025 (3) TMI 254 - SC ORDER] and observed that complaints lacking specific averments, that establish direct nexus between financial transactions in question on involvement of accused in company’s financial affairs, accused cannot be held vicariously liable under Section 141 of NI Act.
Director in Company cannot be deemed to be in-charge and responsible for Company for conduct of its business, unless requirement of Section 141 of NI Act is complied with and factual backdrop to make such requirement is specifically averred in complaint. In present case, averments in complaint are absolutely silent so far as role of petitioner to make out requirement under Section 141 of NI Act. In wake of fact that petitioner was neither party to agreement nor he is signatory to cheque, merely because he was appointed as additional Director at the time of presentation / dishonored of cheque, in absence of specification as to his role in Company, he cannot be prosecuted for offence under Section 138 of NI Act. Pertinently, complaint is absolutely silent as to when petitioner become Director of Company or as to what role he had in day to day business of Company. [Paras 13, 14, 15]
The issuance of process against the petitioner was unsustainable, and the criminal complaints and consequential process were quashed as against the petitioner.
Final Conclusion: The writ petitions were allowed and the prosecution under section 138 read with section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was quashed as against the petitioner.
TaxTMI