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Issues: Whether portal-only uploading of notices or orders permits the petitioners to pursue remedial relief where service was not otherwise effected.
Analysis: The respondents could not distinguish the principles applied in the cited decision, under which mere uploading of a show-cause notice or order on the common portal, without acknowledgement or participation by the assessee, is insufficient service. The remedial consequences include restoration of proceedings or appeals, as applicable, and an opportunity to respond or pursue appellate remedies.
Conclusion: The petitioners are entitled to avail the remedies available under the adopted principles governing portal-only service of notices and orders.
Service of GST notices and orders through Common Portal - Limitation for appeal against portal-uploaded orders
Availability of relief where show-cause notices or adjudication orders were served only by uploading them on the Common Portal - HELD THAT: - The Court noted that the decision in Luxmi Traders v. Union Territory of Chandigarh & Ors. [2026 (7) TMI 1602 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT] held that mere portal uploading, absent acknowledgement of receipt or a reply, does not constitute sufficient service of a show-cause notice; further, service of a contested order-in-original solely through the portal does not trigger limitation for appeal. The respondents were unable to distinguish that decision, and the parties consented to disposal on that basis. [Paras 5, 6]
Final Conclusion: The batch of writ petitions was disposed of by extending to the petitioners the remedies recognised in Luxmi Traders v. Union Territory of Chandigarh & Ors. concerning service solely through the Common Portal.
Issues: Whether the pending reply to the show-cause notice proposing cancellation of GST registration required expeditious consideration by the tax authorities.
Analysis: The petition was confined to seeking an early decision on the reply already filed against the show-cause notice. No adjudication was made on the allegations underlying the proposed cancellation of registration.
Outcome: The respondent authorities were directed to consider and decide the matter expeditiously, preferably within three weeks.
Consideration of reply to GST registration cancellation notice - Failure to decide the taxpayer's reply to the notice proposing cancellation of GST registration - HELD THAT: - The Court confined its consideration to the limited prayer for disposal of the reply and directed the respondent authorities to consider and decide the matter expeditiously. [Paras 3]
The authorities were directed to decide the reply preferably within three weeks.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of with a direction for expeditious consideration and decision of the reply to the proposed GST registration cancellation notice.
Issues: Whether the statutory appellate remedy against cancellation of GST registration could be reopened despite delay beyond the limitation prescribed for appeal.
Analysis: The adopted ruling recognises that cancellation of GST registration has serious consequences for the conduct of business. Though the Appellate Authority is bound by the statutory outer limit for condoning delay, constitutional writ jurisdiction may be exercised in an appropriate case where the delay is plausibly explained and refusal to entertain the appeal would cause disproportionate hardship. The merits of the cancellation proceedings, including service of notice and compliance with natural justice, remain for the Appellate Authority.
Conclusion: The appellate remedy must be reopened and the appeal must receive merits consideration without rejection on limitation.
Restoration of GST appeal dismissed on limitation - Entitlement to restoration of the statutory appeal against cancellation of GST registration after its dismissal on limitation - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the controversy was covered by M/s S. Nabad Ali Mustak Ahmed [2025 (11) TMI 2051 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT] and disposed of the writ petition on the same terms. [Paras 3]
The statutory appellate remedy stood reopened in terms of the precedent, with the appeal to be considered on merits without dismissal on limitation.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of in the same terms as the earlier decision, reopening the statutory appeal for consideration on merits.
Issues: (i) Whether cancellation of GST registration from a date falling within the period of return-default was invalid for want of a separate notice or adequate opportunity; (ii) Whether writ jurisdiction could be exercised to condone delay beyond the statutory maximum for filing an appeal and require merits adjudication.
Issue (i): Whether cancellation of GST registration from a date falling within the period of return-default was invalid for want of a separate notice or adequate opportunity.
Analysis: Section 29(2)(c) of the Rajasthan Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits cancellation where returns have not been furnished continuously for six months, subject to an opportunity of hearing. The cancellation notice disclosed the return-default, but no reply was furnished. The effective date fell within, and not before, the period of default; it was therefore not retrospective cancellation in the strict sense requiring specific reasons for operation before the default. Section 29 requires notice of the proposed cancellation and does not require a further notice concerning the precise consequential date from which cancellation may operate.
Conclusion: The cancellation proceedings and cancellation order were valid; the issue was decided against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether writ jurisdiction could be exercised to condone delay beyond the statutory maximum for filing an appeal and require merits adjudication.
Analysis: Section 107 of the Rajasthan Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 prescribes a defined appeal period and a limited additional period for condonation. The appellate authority lacks jurisdiction to condone delay beyond that maximum period. Extraordinary writ jurisdiction cannot ordinarily be used to defeat this statutory limitation; interference after expiry may arise only in exceptional circumstances, such as patent lack of jurisdiction or a complete denial of natural justice. No such circumstance was established. Earlier contrary coordinate-bench decisions, having not accounted for binding precedent and an earlier binding coordinate-bench decision, were treated as per incuriam.
Conclusion: No writ relief to condone the delay or remit the appeal for merits consideration was warranted; the issue was decided against the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The registration cancellation and the appellate order refusing to entertain the belated appeal remain legally effective.
Ratio Decidendi: Extraordinary writ jurisdiction cannot ordinarily be invoked to circumvent a statutory appellate limitation that expressly restricts condonation, absent exceptional jurisdictional or natural-justice infirmity.
Cancellation of GST registration for non-filing of returns - Retrospective cancellation of GST registration - Statutory limitation for GST appeals - Exercise of writ jurisdiction despite expiry of appellate limitation
Validity of cancellation of GST registration for failure to furnish returns for a continuous period of six months, made effective from a date within the period of default - HELD THAT: - The power to cancel registration may be exercised where returns remain unfurnished for the stipulated continuous period, after affording an opportunity of hearing. Cancellation cannot mechanically be given retrospective operation; where it is made effective from a date anterior to the default, the Proper Officer must record objective and valid reasons. However, cancellation effective from a date falling within the period of default is not retrospective cancellation in the strict sense. The statute does not require a separate show-cause notice concerning the consequential date from which cancellation may operate, provided notice of the non-compliances forming the basis of proposed cancellation was issued. [Paras 16, 17, 18, 19]
The cancellation order was not invalid on the ground of retrospective operation or want of a separate show-cause notice.
Statutory limitation for GST appeals - Extraordinary writ jurisdiction and statutory limitation - Maintainability of a writ petition seeking condonation of delay beyond the maximum statutory period for appealing against cancellation of GST registration - HELD THAT: - Where the statute prescribes a period for appeal together with a limited condonable period, the appellate authority has no jurisdiction to condone delay beyond that limit. Though writ jurisdiction is not absolutely excluded after expiry of appellate limitation, it cannot ordinarily be invoked to circumvent the legislative scheme or to direct condonation and a merits remand. Interference with the original order after expiry of limitation is confined to exceptional circumstances, including patent want of jurisdiction or complete breach of natural justice. No such circumstance was established. The decisions taking a contrary view by routinely condoning delay were held per incuriam. [Paras 26, 27, 28, 29, 30]
The Court declined to condone the delay or remit the appeal for merits adjudication, and upheld dismissal of the statutory appeal as time-barred.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was dismissed. The cancellation of registration was sustained, and the Court declined to use writ jurisdiction to overcome expiry of the maximum statutory period for filing the appeal.
Issues: (i) Whether deferred annuity payments under the road concession agreements qualify for exemption as services by way of access to a road or bridge under Entry 23A of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate); (ii) Whether Circular No. 150/06/2021-GST dated 17.06.2021 impermissibly overrides the statutory exemption notification; (iii) Whether the earlier advance ruling exempting the petitioner precludes the Revenue from levying GST on the annuity payments.
Issue (i): Whether deferred annuity payments under the road concession agreements qualify for exemption as services by way of access to a road or bridge under Entry 23A of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate).
Analysis: The agreements required design, construction, operation and maintenance of roads, with half the project cost paid during construction and the balance paid in biannual annuity instalments after commencement of operations. These reciprocal obligations constituted taxable works-contract services and a supply for consideration. Entry 23A covers only services of access to a road or bridge under Heading 9967; it does not extend to road-construction services falling under Heading 9954 merely because their consideration is paid by deferred annuities. An exemption entry cannot be expanded to cover works-contract services not expressly included.
Conclusion: The annuity payments are consideration for taxable works-contract services and are not exempt under Entry 23A. This issue is decided against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether Circular No. 150/06/2021-GST dated 17.06.2021 impermissibly overrides the statutory exemption notification.
Analysis: The circular distinguishes exempt access-to-road services under Heading 9967 from taxable road-construction services under Heading 9954. Section 168 authorises the Board to issue instructions and clarifications to secure uniform implementation of the statutory scheme. The circular was treated as clarificatory of the proper classification and scope of the exemption, rather than as an amendment or curtailment of the notification.
Conclusion: The circular validly clarifies that deferred annuity payments for construction of roads do not receive the Entry 23A exemption. This issue is decided against the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether the earlier advance ruling exempting the petitioner precludes the Revenue from levying GST on the annuity payments.
Analysis: Taxability must be determined from the statutory notification and the true nature of the contractual services. An advance ruling based on a misreading of the applicable legal provisions cannot perpetually bind the implementing authorities where the statutory position is clarified under Section 168. The earlier ruling could not displace the conclusion that the services rendered were taxable works-contract services.
Conclusion: The earlier advance ruling does not bar GST levy on the annuity payments. This issue is decided against the assessee.
Final Conclusion: Deferred payments under the concession arrangements remain taxable as consideration for road-construction works-contract services, without the benefit of the exemption applicable to access-to-road services.
Ratio Decidendi: A deferred annuity paid as consideration for construction, operation and maintenance of roads is taxable as works-contract service and cannot be exempted as a service of access to a road or bridge merely because the payment is described as annuity.
GST exemption for road-access annuity services - Taxability of deferred annuity payments for road works contracts - Binding effect of advance rulings and clarificatory circulars
GST exemption for road-access annuity services - Works contract services for road construction - Applicability of the exemption under Entry 23A of Notification No. 12/2017 to annuity payments received under a concession agreement for design, construction, operation and maintenance of roads - HELD THAT: - The contractual obligations were not confined to providing access to a road or bridge on payment of annuity. They constituted taxable works-contract services involving construction, design and maintenance of roads, with the project cost partly paid during construction and the balance paid through deferred annuities. Entry 23A, falling under Heading 9967, exempts road-access services and does not extend to road-construction services falling under Heading 9954. An exemption for works-contract services could not be inferred where the notification did not expressly provide it. [Paras 12, 13, 14]
The annuity payments under the concession agreement were taxable as consideration for works-contract services and were not exempt under Entry 23A.
Clarificatory circulars under the CGST Act - Binding effect of advance rulings - Validity of the circular clarifying that deferred annuity payments for road construction are not exempt, and the effect of an earlier advance ruling granting exemption - HELD THAT: - The circular was held to clarify the applicable statutory position and to prevent misinterpretation in implementation of the Act; issuance of such instructions fell within the Board's statutory domain. The notification and the true nature of the services governed taxability. An earlier erroneous understanding by the advance ruling authority could not bind the implementing authorities after the Board clarified the law. [Paras 15, 16]
The challenge to the circular and the reliance on the earlier advance ruling were rejected.
Final Conclusion: The writ petitions were dismissed. The impugned circular was upheld in its application to the petitioner's deferred annuity receipts, which were held taxable as consideration for road works-contract services.
Issues: Whether the accused was entitled to regular bail in a prosecution alleging GST evasion through transportation of goods without invoices and e-way bills.
Analysis: The application was considered under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The record indicated that the accused was a transporter rather than a manufacturer or supplier, no computation or determination of GST liability attributable to him had been made, the charge sheet had been filed, he had remained in custody since 12.04.2026, and the trial was likely to take time. The assessment was made without commenting on the merits of the prosecution.
Conclusion: The accused was entitled to regular bail.
Regular bail in alleged GST evasion - Uncomputed GST liability of transporter - Grant of regular bail to a transporter accused of facilitating clandestine transportation of goods without invoices and e-way bills under the CGST Act. - HELD THAT: - The material recorded showed that the applicant was a transporter and neither the manufacturer nor supplier of the goods. The complainant's prior statement disclosed that no computation or determination of GST liability had been made against the applicant. Having regard to this circumstance, the filing of the charge-sheet, the period of custody and the likely time for trial, the Court considered bail appropriate without commenting on the merits.
The regular bail application was allowed, subject to furnishing the stipulated bond and sureties to the satisfaction of the trial court.
Final Conclusion: The applicant was granted regular bail in the alleged GST evasion case, subject to the conditions imposed by the trial court.
Issues: Whether a delayed statutory appeal against a GST adjudication order should be restored for adjudication on merits.
Analysis: Section 107(1) provides three months to file an appeal, while Section 107(4) permits presentation within a further period of one month. The appeal was filed beyond both periods. However, the claim that the petitioner rendered exempt services and the need for factual adjudication on that claim warranted an opportunity to pursue the appellate remedy.
Conclusion: The dismissal of the appeal on limitation was set aside and the appeal was restored for adjudication in accordance with law, with all merits contentions left open.
Restoration of time-barred GST appeal for adjudication of exemption claim - Dismissal of the GST appeal as filed beyond the period contemplated under section 107, where the petitioner asserted that its services were exempt and factual questions required appellate adjudication - HELD THAT: - Although the appeal was filed beyond the statutory period, including the further period which the Appellate Authority could allow, the Court considered it expedient to afford the petitioner an opportunity to pursue the appeal because it claimed exemption for the services rendered and factual questions required adjudication. The Court acted in view of Simplex Infrastructures Ltd., and Another [2022 (1) TMI 761 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT]. [Paras 5]
The appellate order was set aside and the appeal was restored for adjudication in accordance with law, with all merits contentions kept open.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was partly allowed; the order dismissing the appeal on limitation was set aside and the appeal was restored for decision on merits in accordance with law.
Issues: (i) Classification of Psyllium seeds (Isabgol) supplied in raw and unprocessed form. (ii) Whether Psyllium seeds stored in dry and ventilated godowns qualify as fresh seeds eligible for the nil-rate exemption.
Issue (i): Classification of Psyllium seeds (Isabgol) supplied in raw and unprocessed form.
Analysis: Sub-heading 1211 90 13 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 specifically identifies Psyllium seeds. The Chapter Notes and HSN Notes to heading 1211 include seeds of plants used primarily in pharmacy, including Plantago psyllium.
Conclusion: Psyllium seeds (Isabgol) are classifiable under sub-heading 1211 90 13 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.
Issue (ii): Whether Psyllium seeds stored in dry and ventilated godowns qualify as fresh seeds eligible for the nil-rate exemption.
Analysis: Entry 87 of Notification No. 10/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025 exempts heading 1211 goods only when fresh or chilled, whereas Entry 71 of Schedule I to Notification No. 09/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025 applies to frozen or dried goods. The distinction turns on the condition of the goods when supplied by the trader, not merely when acquired from farmers. The stated storage in dry and ventilated godowns, coupled with absence of evidence of storage duration or immediate supply after harvest, was treated as drying. The analogy in Circular No. 163/19/2021-GST dated 06.10.2021 supports exclusion of goods dried in any manner from the fresh-produce exemption.
Conclusion: The seeds do not qualify as fresh or chilled and are not exempt under Entry 87; they are taxable at 5% under Entry 71 of Schedule I to Notification No. 09/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025.
Final Conclusion: The proposed supply is treated as a supply of dried Psyllium seeds under heading 1211 and falls outside the nil-rate entry for fresh or chilled seeds.
Ratio Decidendi: Eligibility for the exemption applicable to fresh or chilled plant seeds must be determined by the condition of the goods at the time of supply; goods rendered dried through storage do not retain eligibility for that exemption.
Classification of Psyllium seeds under Heading 1211 - GST exemption for fresh or chilled Psyllium seeds - Fresh and dried agricultural produce
Classification of Psyllium seeds under Heading 1211 - Classification of Psyllium seeds (Isabgol) supplied as raw material to processing units. - HELD THAT: - The tariff entry specifically identifies Psyllium seeds, and the HSN Notes include Plantago psyllium herbs and seeds within Heading 1211. The goods were therefore held classifiable under tariff sub-heading 1211 90 13. [Paras 6]
Psyllium seeds are classifiable under tariff sub-heading 1211 90 13.
GST exemption for fresh or chilled Psyllium seeds - Fresh and dried agricultural produce - Eligibility of Psyllium seeds stored in dry and ventilated godowns for exemption as fresh or chilled goods, or alternatively as goods of seed quality. - HELD THAT: - Eligibility depended upon the condition of the goods at the time of supply by the applicant. Applying the clarification distinguishing fresh goods from goods intentionally dried, the Authority held that storage in dry and ventilated godowns, coupled with the absence of information regarding the storage period, imparted a dried character to the seeds. The seeds could not therefore be treated as fresh or chilled. Since the specific Heading 1211 exemption applies only to fresh or chilled goods, the goods were held covered by the entry for frozen or dried goods; the alternative claim under the general entry for goods of seed quality was also rejected. [Paras 12, 13, 14, 16, 18]
The supplies do not qualify for exemption and are liable to GST at 5% as dried Psyllium seeds; the alternative exemption claim was rejected.
Final Conclusion: Psyllium seeds were held classifiable under tariff sub-heading 1211 90 13 and taxable at 5%, the claimed exemptions being unavailable.
Assessment u/s 153C - Addition u/s 68 - incriminating material found or not? - gross delay of 902 days in filing the special leave petition
HELD THAT:- There is a gross delay of 902 days in filing the special leave petition. The reasons assigned for seeking condonation of delay are neither satisfactory nor sufficient in law to condone the same. Hence, the application seeking condonation of delay is dismissed.
Further, we find that the issues which are raised in the special leave petition are covered by the judgment of this Court in Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd. [2023 (4) TMI 1056 - SUPREME COURT]In the circumstances, the special leave petition is also dismissed in terms of the said judgment on merits.
We fail to understand as to how the petitioner/Department has filed this special leave petition with 902 days delay when even according to the Department the matter is covered by an earlier judgment of Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd. (supra). This is an instance of burdening this Court with an unnecessary special leave petition and adding to the pendency.
Fees received for live transmission/live feed of cricket matches - Royalty receipts - service from which income was generated would clearly fall within the ambit of Explanation 2 as placed in Section 9(1)(vi) - distinction between a copyright and broadcast right -HELD THAT:- In view of the order Deputy Director of Income Tax International Taxation vs. Shine Satelite Public Company Ltd [2026 (1) TMI 1666 - SC ORDER] the Special Leave Petition stands dismissed.
Issues: Whether the transfer and centralisation of the assessee's case to Nashik under Section 127 was justified after completion of the searched person's assessment.
Analysis: The transfer was founded on administrative convenience and co-ordinated investigation concerning the searched person. That person's assessment had already been completed before the transfer orders were issued. Consequently, the stated purpose for centralising the assessee's case at Nashik no longer subsisted, and no reason remained for transferring the case from Mumbai.
Conclusion: The transfer orders were quashed, and the assessee's assessment is to be conducted in Mumbai under the appropriate charge.
Centralisation of assessment proceedings for coordinated investigation - Transfer of the petitioner's assessment case to Nashik for administrative convenience and coordinated investigation after completion of the searched person's assessment
HELD THAT: - The transfer orders were founded on the need for administrative convenience and coordinated investigation in relation to the searched group. Once the searched person's assessment had already been completed, transfer of the petitioner's case to Nashik would serve no purpose. [Paras 7]
The transfer orders were quashed, and the petitioner's assessment was directed to be conducted in Mumbai under the appropriate charge.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed to the extent of the challenge to the transfer orders. The merits of the proceedings, including all rights and contentions of the parties, were kept open.
Issues: Whether notices issued under Section 153C after a delay of ten months from completion of the searched person's assessment proceedings were valid.
Analysis: Section 153C requires the satisfaction note and consequential notice to be issued immediately. The satisfaction notes and notices were issued ten months after completion of the searched person's assessment proceedings. That interval was not a reasonable time and was governed by the binding determination in respect of the same assessee for other assessment years on identical facts.
Conclusion: The Section 153C notices were time-barred and invalid, in favour of the assessee.
Validity of assessment notice under section 153C - Immediate recording of satisfaction note
Whether notices issued u/s 153C after a delay of ten months from completion of the searched person's assessment proceedings were valid? - HELD THAT: - For the Assessment Years 2015-16, 2016-17, 2017-18, 2018-19 and 2021-22, this Court has already taken a view in the Petitioner’s own case that the notice dated 10th August 2023 issued under Section 153C of the IT Act is time barred as the same was not issued “immediately” as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Calcutta Knitwears [2014 (4) TMI 33 - SUPREME COURT] since it was issued ten months after the assessment proceedings of the searched person was completed viz. on 27th September 2022. This Court also held that ten months was not a reasonable time by which the Satisfaction Note ought to have been issued by AO of the searched person by relying upon its own decisions in Clear Channel India (P) Ltd. [2026 (2) TMI 1244 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] and c India Asset Management Ltd. [2026 (4) TMI 1041 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT]
A period of ten months after completion of the searched person's assessment was held not to satisfy the requirement that the satisfaction note and consequential notice be issued immediately; the notices were therefore time-barred. [Paras 5, 6]
The notices issued under section 153C for Assessment Year 2019-20 and Assessment Year 2020-21 were quashed.
Final Conclusion: The writ petitions were allowed and the impugned notices under section 153C for the relevant assessment years were quashed as time-barred.
Issues: Whether the Revenue established sufficient cause for condonation of 156 days' delay in filing an appeal.
Analysis: Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 permits condonation where sufficient cause is shown. The explanation disclosed the departmental process of scrutiny, obtaining opinions and approvals, collection of documents, settlement of the appeal memorandum and final approval for filing. A justice-oriented and pragmatic approach applies to bona fide administrative delays, and the decisive consideration is the sufficiency of the cause rather than the length of delay. The explanation was not shown to be mala fide or factually incorrect. Handwritten insertion of dates in the application did not, by itself, establish that it was mechanical or stereotyped.
Conclusion: The delay was sufficiently and bona fide explained and was condoned in favour of the Revenue.
Condonation of delay in filing income-tax appeal - 156 days' delay - Sufficient cause and governmental procedural delay
Condonation of delay in filing the Revenue's appeal under the Income-tax Act where the delay resulted from departmental scrutiny, approvals, collection of records and settlement of the appeal memorandum - HELD THAT: - The discretion to condone delay upon sufficient cause must be exercised with a liberal and justice-oriented approach. The length of delay is not decisive; the sufficiency and bona fides of the explanation are material. The departmental steps disclosed in the application constituted a bona fide explanation, which was neither specifically denied nor shown to be non-existent. The insertion of dates by hand did not, by itself, render the application cyclostyled or stereotyped, particularly when its contents materially explained the delay. [Paras 14, 15]
The delay was condoned and the interim application was allowed.
Final Conclusion: The Revenue established sufficient cause for the delay arising from bona fide departmental procedure. The delay was condoned, and the appeal was directed to be processed for admission.
Issues: Whether the Tribunal's acceptance of the Transactional Net Margin Method instead of the Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method for benchmarking sales to associated enterprises, including the consequential transfer-pricing adjustments, gave rise to a substantial question of law.
Analysis: The identical transfer-pricing questions had been decided for the assessee's preceding assessment year. Selection of the Most Appropriate Method and the related adjustments rested on factual findings supported by documentary material. A difference of opinion on the appropriateness of the Transactional Net Margin Method or the Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method does not warrant intervention under Section 260A unless the findings are perverse or contrary to Rules 10B and 10C of the Income-tax Rules. The remaining proposed questions concerning related economic and pricing adjustments were incidental to that central issue and required no separate adjudication.
Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose from acceptance of the Transactional Net Margin Method and the related transfer-pricing treatment; the issue was resolved in favour of the assessee.
Transfer pricing Adjustment - selection of most appropriate method - Comparable Uncontrolled Price method or Transactional Net Margin Method - substantial question of law
HELD THAT: - The questions concerning the transfer-pricing adjustment, adoption of CUP in preference to TNMM, and adjustments for differences between associated-enterprise and non-associated-enterprise transactions were identical to those decided in the assessee's own case for an earlier assessment year [2020 (2) TMI 1389 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT]
The earlier decision held that the Tribunal's fact-based acceptance of TNMM as the most appropriate method was neither perverse nor contrary to the material on record. A difference of opinion regarding the appropriate method does not, by itself, give rise to a substantial question of law under section 260A unless the method adopted is contrary to the prescribed rules. [Paras 6]
No substantial question of law arose from the Tribunal's decision on the transfer-pricing benchmarking issues.
Final Conclusion: The tax appeals were dismissed. The questions relating to the selection and application of the transfer-pricing method disclosed no substantial question of law, and the remaining questions were treated as incidental.
Issues: Whether reassessment initiated after four years from the end of the relevant assessment year was valid where it was founded on re-examination of material already available in the original scrutiny assessment.
Analysis: The recorded reasons showed that the Assessing Officer revisited the balance sheet, profit and loss account and other records already available during the original assessment. No fresh tangible material supported the formation of belief that income had escaped assessment. Since the reopening was beyond four years, the proviso to Section 147 required failure by the assessee to make a full and true disclosure of material facts. The relevant land-sale and accounting particulars had been furnished during the original proceedings, and a reassessment based on their reappraisal amounted to a change of opinion.
Conclusion: The Assessing Officer lacked jurisdiction to reopen the assessment under Section 147; the reassessment was invalid. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Ratio Decidendi: After four years from the relevant assessment year, reassessment cannot rest on a reappraisal of material already disclosed and examined in the original assessment without fresh tangible material and a demonstrated failure of full and true disclosure by the assessee.
Validity of reopening of assessment - ‘tangible material’ - change of opinion - Notice issued beyond the period of four years on the basis of the objections raised by the audit party - ITAT held case was based on the re-examination of the documents available on record before the Assessing Officer, and there was no new evidence or information which was available for reopening the case.
HELD THAT:- On perusal of the reasons recorded, it is apparent that the Assessing Officer has once again re-examined the documents and materials in the form of the balance-sheet while going through the particulars of the assessee’s income. Upon verification of the records, the Assessing Officer formed a belief that he had reason to believe that the income had escaped assessment, in the absence of any fresh tangible material to form such a reason to believe.
Admittedly, the reopening was made after four years, and therefore, as per the proviso to section 147 AO could not have assumed jurisdiction to reopen the assessment as held in case of Kelvinator of India Limited 2010 (1) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT] - No question of law, much less any substantial question of law, arises from the impugned order of the Tribunal.
Final Conclusion: The tax appeal was dismissed, no substantial question of law arising from the Tribunal's order quashing the reassessment for want of jurisdiction.
Issues: Whether consideration received from sale of software licences to non-residents constitutes royalty taxable in India, requiring deduction of tax at source.
Analysis: The issue was governed by the binding principle that payment for acquisition of software without transfer of any right or interest in the copyright is not royalty. The same issue concerning the assessee had also been resolved consistently in earlier proceedings.
Conclusion: Software-sale consideration was not royalty and did not attract tax deduction at source; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Royalty - receipts from sale of software licences to non-residents - Income deemed to accrue or arise in India - HELD THAT:- The appeal was dismissed as the questions raised were covered by the Supreme Court decision ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PRIVATE LIMITED [2021 (3) TMI 138 - SUPREME COURT] wherein held payment for acquisition of software without transfer of any right or interest in the copyright is not royalty.
Issues: Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against the Tribunal's order where the assessment order was passed by an Assessing Officer situated outside its territorial jurisdiction.
Analysis: An appeal against a Tribunal decision lies before the High Court having territorial jurisdiction over the Assessing Officer who passed the assessment order. The location of the assessee or subsequent centralisation of the case does not alter that appellate jurisdiction. As the assessment order was passed by the Assessing Officer at Coimbatore, the requisite jurisdiction did not vest in this High Court.
Conclusion: The appeal was not maintainable before this High Court; the appropriate jurisdictional High Court alone could entertain it.
Jurisdiction over appeals from Income-tax Appellate Tribunal orders
Maintainability of an appeal from an Income-tax Appellate Tribunal order before a High Court when the assessment order was passed by an Assessing Officer situated outside that High Court's territorial jurisdiction - HELD THAT: - As decided in M/S. ABC PAPERS LIMITED [2022 (8) TMI 863 - SUPREME COURT] appeal against every decision of the ITAT shall lie only before the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Assessing Officer who passed the assessment order is situated.
An appeal against an order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal lies only before the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Assessing Officer who passed the assessment order is situated. The subsequent transfer or centralisation of the assessee's case does not alter that appellate jurisdiction. Since the assessment order was passed at Coimbatore, this Court lacked jurisdiction. [Paras 6, 7]
The appeal was dismissed as not maintainable, with liberty to the appellants to file it before the appropriate jurisdictional High Court.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was held not maintainable before the Karnataka High Court because the assessment order had been passed by the Assessing Officer at Coimbatore. Liberty was reserved to pursue the appeal before the competent High Court.
Issues: (i) Whether credit of TDS deducted but not paid by the deductor would be allowed under Section 199 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, or whether the Department should merely be directed not to recover such demand under Section 205 of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) What would constitute sufficient proof of deduction of tax at source in the absence of Form 16 or Form 16A.
Issue (i): Whether credit of TDS deducted but not paid by the deductor would be allowed under Section 199 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, or whether the Department should merely be directed not to recover such demand under Section 205 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Analysis: Sections 199 and 205 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 require harmonious construction. Section 205 confers substantive protection once tax has actually been deducted from the assessee's income and is not conditional upon its subsequent remittance by the deductor. A construction denying credit because of the deductor's default would expose the deductee to double taxation and impose an impossible burden, since deposit, filing of TDS statements and generation of electronic records are beyond the deductee's control. The Department may verify the fact of actual deduction, but retains statutory remedies against the defaulting deductor rather than the deductee.
Conclusion: Where actual TDS deduction is established, TDS credit must be granted notwithstanding the deductor's non-payment, and the corresponding demand cannot be recovered, enforced or used for refund adjustment against the deductee. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): What would constitute sufficient proof of deduction of tax at source in the absence of Form 16 or Form 16A.
Analysis: In the electronic TDS regime, Form 16 or Form 16A may be unavailable precisely because the deductor failed to deposit tax or file the prescribed statement. Such forms therefore cannot be the exclusive proof of deduction. Reliable material may include salary slips, employment records, bank statements showing net receipts, invoices, payment advices, ledger accounts, payer confirmations, correspondence, insolvency claims and other contemporaneous surrounding evidence. Upon production of prima facie material, factual verification must be undertaken by the Department through appropriate inquiry.
Conclusion: The absence of Form 16 or Form 16A is not fatal; actual deduction may be established through other cogent and reliable evidence. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: A deductee who substantiates actual TDS deduction is entitled to effective credit and consequential tax treatment, while the Department must promptly verify the claim and ensure that unresolved mismatch demands remain non-prejudicial during such verification.
Ratio Decidendi: Once actual tax deduction at source is established, the deductee's entitlement to TDS credit cannot be defeated by the deductor's failure to deposit the deducted amount with the Government.
TDS credit despite deductor's default - Proof of tax deduction without Form 16 or Form 16A
TDS credit despite deductor's default - Harmonious construction of TDS credit and bar on recovery - Entitlement of a deductee to TDS credit where tax was deducted from the income or payment but was not deposited by the deductor with the Central Government - HELD THAT: - The provisions governing credit of TDS and the statutory bar on recovery from the deductee must be read harmoniously. The bar operates once actual deduction is established and cannot be defeated by the deductor's subsequent failure to remit the amount, an act wholly outside the deductee's control. The deductor's default cannot impose an impossible condition upon the deductee or result in double collection; the Department may verify the fact of deduction and proceed against the deductor under the statutory machinery. [Paras 54, 57, 59, 60, 61]
Upon verification of actual deduction, TDS credit must be granted, with consequential refund where due; a demand arising solely from the deductor's non-payment cannot be recovered, continued, or adjusted against subsequent refunds.
Proof of tax deduction without Form 16 or Form 16A - Verification of TDS credit claims - Proof of deduction of TDS where the amount is absent from Form 26AS and Form 16 or Form 16A is unavailable owing to the deductor's default - HELD THAT: - In the electronic TDS regime, the deductor's payment and statement filing ordinarily precede generation of Form 16 or Form 16A. Their absence, therefore, cannot be treated as conclusive against a deductee alleging non-payment by the deductor. Deduction may be proved by reliable and cogent material appropriate to the payment, including salary slips, bank records, invoices, payment advices, ledgers, correspondence and insolvency claims. On production of prima facie material, the Department must conduct factual verification, including inquiry from the deductor or other relevant person where required, rather than mechanically reject the claim on a mismatch. [Paras 73, 74, 76, 77, 78]
The claims in the batch were remanded for verification by the respective Assessing Officers; pending decision, the corresponding demands are to remain in abeyance without coercive recovery or refund adjustment, and a reasoned order is to be passed, preferably within six months.
Final Conclusion: The petitions were allowed to the extent of TDS claims arising from tax alleged to have been deducted but not remitted by the deductors. The impugned demands were set aside and the matters remanded for verification and consequential grant of credit, refund and rectification in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether depreciation is allowable on an acquired brand name and marketing and distribution network as intangible assets.
Analysis: Section 32(1)(ii) allows depreciation on specified intangible assets, including trade marks, licences, franchises and other business or commercial rights of similar nature. The acquired brand name and marketing and distribution network formed part of the opening written-down value of the relevant block of assets. These assets fell within the statutory scope of intangible assets and commercial rights eligible for depreciation.
Conclusion: Depreciation on the acquired brand name and marketing and distribution network is allowable under Section 32(1)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in favour of the assessee.
Ratio Decidendi: Acquired brand names and marketing and distribution rights that constitute business or commercial rights of similar nature are depreciable intangible assets under Section 32(1)(ii).
Depreciation on intangible assets - Business or commercial rights of similar nature - Depreciation on the acquired right to use the brand name "Arvind" and the marketing and distribution network -
HELD THAT: - The acquired brand-name right and marketing and distribution network formed part of the opening written-down value of the relevant block of intangible assets. Section 32(1)(ii) encompasses trade marks, licences, franchises and other business or commercial rights of similar nature; the enumerated categories were wide enough to cover these intangible assets. The interpretation in Smifs Securities Limited [2012 (8) TMI 713 - Supreme Court] treating goodwill as a business or commercial right of similar nature, supported this construction. [Paras 4, 5]
The depreciation claim was allowable; the question of law was answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the allowance of depreciation on the acquired brand-name right and marketing and distribution network for Assessment Year 2001-02.
Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings could be initiated on the basis of an inquiry-register entry seized from a real-estate broker, alleging undisclosed on-money payment in the assessee's land purchase.
Analysis: The seized entry predated the registered purchase by approximately nine months and reflected land available for sale, rather than a concluded transaction. It covered additional survey numbers and more than twice the area acquired by the assessee. The entry named an unconnected person, while neither the register nor the broker's statement referred to the assessee or co-purchasers. The broker's admissions also weakened the asserted presumption that every register entry represented an actual financial transaction. Mere overlap of certain survey numbers did not establish the requisite live and direct nexus between the seized material and the assessee's purchase.
Conclusion: The notice under Section 148 was unsustainable for want of a live nexus between the seized inquiry-register entry and the assessee; the reassessment notice was quashed, in favour of the assessee.
Reassessment based on seized material - Live nexus between seized material and assessee - On-money allegation in land purchase
Validity of reassessment notice alleging undisclosed on-money payment on purchase of land, founded solely on an entry in a seized real-estate broker's inquiry register - HELD THAT: - The inquiry-register entry predated the assessee's purchase by about nine months and, by the broker's own statement, recorded land available for sale and its asking rate, not a concluded transaction. The entry covered additional survey numbers and substantially larger land area than that purchased by the assessee, named an unconnected person, and neither the register nor the broker's statement referred to the assessee or the co-purchasers. The statutory presumption could not convert such an entry into conclusive evidence of an on-money transaction, particularly in view of the broker's admissions regarding the nature of the material.
Reassessment on seized material requires a live and direct nexus with the assessee; vague information and coincidence of some survey numbers do not meet that requirement.
The Court followed Naliniben Jagdishkumar Gandhi [2026 (1) TMI 1326 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] and found the case indistinguishable from the other decisions arising from the same search.
We find further support in two recent decisions of this Court arising from the very same search. In Trupti Aakash Desai [2026 (4) TMI 921 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] this Court, dealing with the search at B Safal Group conducted on 28.09.2021 and the very same seized inquiry register, held that the entries therein 'cannot be used in vacuum' and that a live and direct nexus between the seized material and the assessee sought to be reopened is a sine qua non.
In Kantilal Parsotamdas Patel [2026 (4) TMI 1889 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] this Court, following the aforesaid line of reasoning and dealing with a similar set of facts arising from the same search, quashed the reassessment proceedings.[Paras 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]
The notice under Section 148 was held unsustainable and was quashed.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed and the reassessment notice for assessment year 2021-22 was quashed. The seized inquiry-register entry, unsupported by a live nexus with the assessee's land transaction, could not validly found reopening.
Issues: Whether reassessment could be initiated on an audit objection alleging non-verification of sundry creditors, where cash purchases of raw hides and skins were legally permissible and no objective material established that the disclosed creditors were non-genuine.
Analysis: Section 40A(3) read with Rule 6DD(e)(ii) permits cash payments exceeding the prescribed limit for purchase of raw hides and skins. The assessee's books recorded the names of the sellers or creditors and the relevant mandi details; no objective material was identified to doubt those particulars or the physical existence of the sellers. In the absence of a pre-existing legal requirement to maintain PAN and address details of such sellers, their non-furnishing could not by itself support an adverse inference. An audit objection may at most generate suspicion, but reassessment jurisdiction requires objective material indicating that a specified part of the disclosed credits was non-genuine. Reassessment on such suspicion would amount to a fishing expedition.
Conclusion: The reassessment initiation lacked jurisdiction and was invalid, in favour of the assessee.
Reassessment jurisdiction based on objective material - Cash purchases of raw hides and skins - Unverified sundry creditors
Validity of reassessment proceedings concerning sundry creditors for purchases of raw hides and skins, initiated on an audit objection alleging absence of the creditors' PAN and address details - HELD THAT: - Cash purchases of raw hides and skins beyond the prescribed limit were legally permissible, and no statutory requirement mandated maintenance of PAN or address particulars of the sellers. The assessee's books contained the sellers' names and the Mandi from which they operated; their correctness had not been doubted on any objective material or meaningful enquiry. Absence of PAN and addresses could at best create suspicion and could not, without cogent material identifying any non-genuine sundry credit, found reassessment jurisdiction. Permitting reassessment on that basis would amount to a fishing enquiry. [Paras 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]
The satisfaction of escaped income lacked jurisdictional basis; the reassessment proceedings for Assessment Year 2017-18 were quashed.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed and the reassessment proceedings initiated for Assessment Year 2017-18 were quashed.
Issues: (i) Whether the ICDS adjustment relating to notional income from unwinding of an interest-free security deposit was taxable; (ii) Whether royalty recognised under Ind AS during the year could be taxed again after the entire upfront royalty had been offered to tax in an earlier year; (iii) Whether EPCG customs-duty benefits recognised as income under Ind AS were taxable notwithstanding the statutory treatment of grants connected with assets; (iv) Whether the difference between borrowing-cost capitalisation under Ind AS and ICDS IX constituted an impermissible double deduction; (v) Whether the cost of acquisition and consequential capital gain or loss on sale of TDRs could be determined without verification of the earlier-year assessment records; (vi) Whether the provision for leave entitlement had already been disallowed and would result in double disallowance; (vii) Whether gift expenditure was allowable on the basis of its nature, purpose and supporting evidence; (viii) Whether absence of Form 3CL could deny weighted deduction for an approved in-house research and development facility.
Issue (i): Whether the ICDS adjustment relating to notional income from unwinding of an interest-free security deposit was taxable.
Analysis: Taxable income is determined under the Income-tax Act and applicable ICDS, while Ind AS financial statements are only the starting point for computation. The rental income and corresponding amortisation arose solely from discounting and unwinding required by Ind AS 109; no actual rental income, receipt or enforceable right to receive the amount was established. The amortisation had been added back, and the net adjustment merely neutralised the accounting impact. The Revenue also identified no distinguishing fact to depart from the accepted treatment in other assessment years.
Conclusion: The security-deposit adjustment was not taxable; the addition was deleted in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether royalty recognised under Ind AS during the year could be taxed again after the entire upfront royalty had been offered to tax in an earlier year.
Analysis: The entire upfront royalty had been offered to tax in the earlier assessment year. Recognition of a portion of that receipt in the current financial statements under Ind AS was an accounting allocation over the agreement period and did not represent a fresh receipt or accrual. No material showed that the amount was additional consideration beyond the upfront royalty already taxed.
Conclusion: The royalty recognised under Ind AS could not be taxed again; the addition was deleted in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether EPCG customs-duty benefits recognised as income under Ind AS were taxable notwithstanding the statutory treatment of grants connected with assets.
Analysis: The tax treatment of a government grant connected with acquisition of assets is governed by Section 2(24)(viii) read with Explanation 10 to Section 43(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, rather than by its presentation as income under Ind AS 20. No independent taxable income apart from the asset-related duty benefit was shown, and the benefit was not included in the relevant block of assets for depreciation.
Conclusion: The EPCG-duty benefit could not be taxed solely because it was credited to the profit and loss account; the addition was deleted in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iv): Whether the difference between borrowing-cost capitalisation under Ind AS and ICDS IX constituted an impermissible double deduction.
Analysis: Computation of taxable income must give effect to the capitalisation methodology prescribed by ICDS IX, even where it differs from the method used in Ind AS financial statements. A computational difference does not establish double deduction without a specific demonstration that the same borrowing cost was actually deducted twice. The adjustment was not a fresh claim of expenditure.
Conclusion: The borrowing-cost adjustment did not constitute double deduction; the addition was deleted in favour of the assessee.
Issue (v): Whether the cost of acquisition and consequential capital gain or loss on sale of TDRs could be determined without verification of the earlier-year assessment records.
Analysis: The claimed cost of the TDRs depended on whether capital gains on surrender of land in the earlier year had been offered to tax, the basis on which the TDR cost was determined, and whether the loss on the first tranche of TDRs had been accepted. The correctness of the proportionate cost and consequential set-off could not be finally determined without examining those assessment records.
Conclusion: The TDR capital-gain and set-off issue was restored for fresh determination; no final finding was made on the assessee's claim.
Issue (vi): Whether the provision for leave entitlement had already been disallowed and would result in double disallowance.
Analysis: The primary verification required was whether the provision had already been added back in the computation of income under Section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961. If already disallowed, a further addition would result in double disallowance; otherwise, its allowability required examination under the applicable law.
Conclusion: The leave-entitlement issue was restored for limited verification; no final finding was made on the assessee's claim.
Issue (vii): Whether gift expenditure was allowable on the basis of its nature, purpose and supporting evidence.
Analysis: The allowability of the expenditure required examination of its nature, business purpose and documentary support. As the claim had not been conclusively adjudicated on merits and adequate opportunity was required, fresh consideration was necessary.
Conclusion: The gift-expenditure issue was restored for fresh adjudication; no final finding was made on allowability.
Issue (viii): Whether absence of Form 3CL could deny weighted deduction for an approved in-house research and development facility.
Analysis: Approval of the in-house research and development facility in Form 3CM for the relevant period was undisputed. Furnishing Form 3CL was an act required from the prescribed authority, and the assessee had pursued its issuance. Failure of that authority could not defeat an otherwise eligible weighted deduction.
Conclusion: Absence of Form 3CL could not deny deduction under Section 35(2AB) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; the claim was allowed in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The additions arising solely from Ind AS accounting recognition and the denial of the research-and-development deduction were unsustainable, while the unresolved TDR, leave-entitlement and gift-expenditure matters require verification and fresh determination.
Ratio Decidendi: Accounting recognition under Ind AS does not by itself determine taxable income where the Income-tax Act or applicable ICDS prescribes a different computation, and an amount lacking real accrual or already taxed cannot be brought to tax again.
Ind AS accounting entries and taxable income under the Act and ICDS - Taxability of EPCG government grants recognised under Ind AS - Capitalisation of borrowing costs under ICDS IX - Cost of acquisition of transferable development rights received in exchange for land - Double disallowance of leave entitlement provision - Business expenditure on gifts-adequate opportunity of hearing - Weighted deduction for approved in-house research and development facility
ICDS adjustments relating to security deposits, royalty income, Government grants and borrowing costs - Ind AS accounting entries and taxable income under the Act and ICDS - Real income - Consistency in tax computation - Taxability of notional income arising from Ind AS recognition of an interest-free security deposit and deferred upfront royalty - HELD THAT: - Book entries under Ind AS are only the starting point for computing taxable income, which must be determined under the Act and applicable ICDS. The security-deposit adjustment merely neutralised notional amortisation and rental-income entries, without any actual accrual of rental income or double deduction. Likewise, royalty recognised in the accounts under Ind AS could not be taxed again when the entire upfront consideration had already been offered to tax in an earlier year. In the absence of any distinguishing facts or statutory change, the Revenue could not depart from the accepted treatment in other assessment years. [Paras 8, 9]
The additions relating to the security-deposit adjustment and royalty income were deleted.
Taxability of EPCG government grants recognised under Ind AS - Actual cost of assets - Consistency in tax computation - Taxability of customs-duty benefits under the EPCG Scheme credited to the accounts pursuant to Ind AS 20 - HELD THAT: - Recognition of the grant in the financial statements under Ind AS 20 does not determine its taxability. Where the Act specifically prescribes the treatment of a subsidy or grant connected with an asset for determination of actual cost, that treatment prevails over accounting presentation. The Revenue neither established independent taxable income nor controverted that the duty benefit was not included in the asset block for depreciation; nor did it show a distinguishing feature warranting departure from the accepted treatment in other years. [Paras 10, 11]
The addition relating to EPCG government-grant benefits was deleted.
Capitalisation of borrowing costs under ICDS IX - Double deduction - Consistency in tax computation - Disallowance of an ICDS IX adjustment arising from the difference between borrowing costs capitalised under Ind AS and those required to be capitalised for tax computation - HELD THAT: - Where ICDS IX prescribes a method of capitalisation different from Ind AS, taxable income must give effect to the ICDS computation. A methodological difference between book capitalisation and tax capitalisation does not by itself establish double deduction, particularly when no material shows that the same borrowing cost was allowed twice. The adjustment was a consequential computation adjustment and not a fresh expenditure claim; the Revenue also showed no basis to depart from the treatment accepted in other years. [Paras 11]
The disallowance of the borrowing-cost adjustment was deleted.
Cost of acquisition of transferable development rights received in exchange for land - Set-off of short-term capital loss - Determination of the cost of transferable development rights received on surrender of land and the consequential short-term capital gain or loss on sale of the balance rights - HELD THAT: - The assessee's claim to cost and the Revenue's objection to set-off were inseparable from determination of the correct cost of the transferable development rights. The assessment records for the earlier year required verification regarding taxation of the gain on surrender of land, the basis of cost attributed to the rights, acceptance of the loss on the first tranche, and the proportionate cost claimed for the balance rights. Until those matters were verified, the consequential set-off could not be finally determined. [Paras 14, 15]
The issue was remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh determination of the cost, resultant capital gain or loss, and consequential set-off after affording opportunity to the assessee.
Double disallowance of leave entitlement provision - Further disallowance of a provision for leave entitlement allegedly already disallowed in computing taxable income - HELD THAT: - The primary verification was whether the provision had already been added back in the computation of income. If so, a further disallowance could not be made; only if that claim was not established would its allowability require examination under the applicable law. [Paras 16]
The matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer for limited verification and fresh decision.
Business expenditure on gifts - adequate opportunity of hearing - Allowability of expenditure on gifts to employees and customers where the claim had not been conclusively adjudicated and adequate opportunity to substantiate it was lacking - HELD THAT: - As the allowability of the gift expenditure required examination of its nature, purpose, and supporting evidence, and had not been conclusively decided on merits, fresh adjudication was necessary after adequate opportunity to the assessee. [Paras 17]
The gift-expenditure issue was remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, and the corresponding Revenue ground was also allowed for statistical purposes.
Weighted deduction for approved in-house research and development facility - Non-furnishing of Form 3CL by prescribed authority - Eligibility for weighted deduction for an approved in-house research and development facility despite non-furnishing of Form 3CL by the prescribed authority - HELD THAT: - The relevant in-house research and development facility stood approved in Form 3CM. Furnishing Form 3CL was an act required of the prescribed authority, and the assessee could not be denied deduction for that authority's failure, particularly when the assessee had pursued issuance of the form. Following Rallis India Ltd. [2024 (12) TMI 904 - ITAT MUMBAI] the absence of Form 3CL was held not to defeat the claim. [Paras 18]
The weighted deduction claimed for the approved in-house research and development facility was allowed.
Final Conclusion: The assessee's claims concerning ICDS adjustments and weighted research-and-development deduction were allowed. The issues concerning transferable development rights, leave-entitlement provision, and gift expenditure were remanded for fresh adjudication; the Revenue's appeal was allowed only to that limited statistical extent.
Issues: (i) Whether consideration received on sale of transferable development rights obtained in exchange for surrendered land is chargeable to capital gains tax and the cost of acquisition deductible therefrom; (ii) Whether the scrutiny assessment was confined to verification of the refund claim and excluded examination of the transferable development rights receipt; (iii) Whether acceptance of exemption for similar transferable development rights receipts in the assessment of the assessee's brother required identical treatment.
Issue (i): Whether consideration received on sale of transferable development rights obtained in exchange for surrendered land is chargeable to capital gains tax and the cost of acquisition deductible therefrom.
Analysis: Transferable development rights are property and therefore capital assets. The surrender of land for transferable development rights constituted an exchange, followed by a separate transfer of the rights for cash. Unlike self-generated transferable development rights arising solely from regulatory entitlement, the rights in question were acquired by giving up an identifiable capital asset. Their cost of acquisition was consequently ascertainable as the cost attributable to the land surrendered. The computation mechanism did not fail, and the principle applicable where an asset has no conceivable cost of acquisition was inapplicable. The subsequent amendment concerning intangible assets for which no consideration is paid did not displace the actual cost incurred through surrender of land.
Conclusion: The sale consideration of the transferable development rights is chargeable to capital gains tax, against the assessee; however, the capital gains must be recomputed after deduction of the cost of acquisition attributable to the land exchanged.
Issue (ii): Whether the scrutiny assessment was confined to verification of the refund claim and excluded examination of the transferable development rights receipt.
Analysis: The notice merely identified the refund claim as an initial matter for verification and did not state that the case had been selected for limited scrutiny. It did not restrict examination of the chargeability of the receipt claimed as exempt.
Conclusion: The assessment was not confined to limited scrutiny, and examination of the transferable development rights receipt was valid, against the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether acceptance of exemption for similar transferable development rights receipts in the assessment of the assessee's brother required identical treatment.
Analysis: An assessment order in another taxpayer's case, without a conscious and binding acceptance of the same legal position on identical facts, does not establish a legal right to identical treatment. An erroneous or unexamined assessment does not bind the Revenue in a separate assessment, and estoppel does not operate against the correct application of statute.
Conclusion: The assessment of the assessee's brother did not require exemption of the receipt in the present case, against the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The receipt remains taxable as capital gains, with the allowable cost of land surrendered required to be deducted in computing the taxable gain.
Ratio Decidendi: Where transferable development rights are acquired in exchange for surrender of land, the land surrendered supplies an ascertainable cost of acquisition, so the capital gains computation mechanism remains operative on their subsequent sale.
Capital gains on transferable development rights received for surrendered land - Ascertainable cost of acquisition in exchange transactions - Scope of scrutiny assessment - Consistency and parity in tax assessments
Capital gains on transferable development rights received for surrendered land - Ascertainable cost of acquisition in exchange transactions - Taxability of consideration from sale of transferable development rights received in exchange for surrender of land, where the assessee claimed that the rights had no ascertainable cost of acquisition - HELD THAT: - The transferable development rights were capital assets acquired by surrendering land and building to the municipal authority. The surrender constituted an exchange, and the land given up represented an identifiable and ascertainable cost for acquiring the rights. The principle that capital gains computation fails where no cost can be conceived was inapplicable, since the computation provisions remained operative by attributing to the rights the cost of the land surrendered. Cases concerning self-generated development rights arising from regulatory entitlement, without surrender of an identified asset, were materially distinguishable. The transaction involved two distinct transfers: surrender of land for rights, and subsequent sale of those rights for cash. [Paras 34, 35, 36, 37, 47]
The sale consideration from the transferable development rights was chargeable under the head Capital gains; however, the Assessing Officer was directed to compute the gain after allowing the cost of acquisition attributable to the land exchanged.
Scope of scrutiny assessment - Competence of the AO to examine the taxability of transferable development rights where the scrutiny notice referred to verification of a refund claim - HELD THAT: - The notice did not state that the return had been selected for limited scrutiny; it only identified the refund claim as the initial matter for verification. It therefore did not restrict the assessment to that matter, and the assessment was open to complete scrutiny. [Paras 38]
The Assessing Officer was competent to examine the chargeability of the consideration received on sale of transferable development rights.
Consistency and parity in tax assessments - No estoppel against statute - Whether non-taxation of similar receipts from transferable development rights in the assessment of the assessee's brother required similar treatment for the assessee? - HELD THAT: - An assessment order in another taxpayer's case, without a conscious and binding acceptance of an identical legal position, does not establish parity or confer a right to identical treatment. Each assessee's income is independently assessable, and an erroneous or insufficiently examined assessment in another case cannot preclude correct application of the Act in the present case. [Paras 43, 44, 45, 46]
The claim for parity with the assessment of the assessee's brother was rejected.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed. The receipt from sale of transferable development rights remained taxable as capital gains, subject to recomputation after allowance of the cost attributable to the surrendered land.
Admissibility of departmental CRCL test reports over private laboratory reports - self-assessment and transaction value in export duty assessment - artificial splitting of consignments and proof of modus operandi - weight of confessional statements in departmental adjudication - relevance of discharge-port test reports in FOB contracts for assessment - refund of deposit where demand is dropped
HELD THAT:- Delay condoned.
However, we do not find any good ground to entertain the Appeal. Accordingly, the Civil Appeal is dismissed.
Inconclusive expert chemical report insufficient to prove misdeclaration - insufficiency of forensic report - reclassification based on one technical parameter or tentative wording in test report - transaction value under customs valuation - benefit of doubt - denial of opportunity to examine or cross examine the chemical examiner - prejudicial to principles of natural justice - Whether the report is complete and sufficient enough to conclude that the goods are ‘base oil’ and not ‘press distillate oil’.
HELD THAT:- Learned counsel for the appellant fairly states that M/S JJR ASSOCIATES [2023 (9) TMI 1398 - SC ORDER] which was preferred against the order relied upon by the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal in the impugned order has been dismissed vide order dated 18th September, 2023.
In such view of the matter, the civil appeals are dismissed.
Issues: Whether equipment moved from the Domestic Tariff Area to a Free Trade Warehousing Zone after completion of one petroleum contract and subsequently cleared into the Domestic Tariff Area under a fresh essentiality certificate for another contract qualifies as re-imported goods entitled to exemption under Serial No. 5 of Notification No. 45/2017-Customs dated 30.06.2017.
Analysis: The concessional import benefit under Notification No. 50/2017-Customs is conditional upon the equipment being deployed for the petroleum operation certified under the relevant essentiality certificate. Condition No. 48 of that notification provides a specific mechanism for transfer of equipment to another specified person for a subsequent eligible petroleum operation, subject to prescribed undertakings and customs safeguards. That express mechanism cannot be displaced by an implied alternative route through a Free Trade Warehousing Zone yielding an additional fiscal benefit.
Analysis: The statutory fictions under the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 regarding the customs treatment of Special Economic Zones and clearance into the Domestic Tariff Area operate for their prescribed purposes and do not create a universal re-import exemption. Re-import requires not merely identity of goods but continuity between the outward movement and their return. Equipment warehoused in a Free Trade Warehousing Zone after completion of one contract, and later cleared only upon securing a new domestic contract and a fresh essentiality certificate, is not returned in reversal of the earlier transaction. The original certified deployment is a closed transaction and the later clearance is founded on a distinct transaction. Rule 48(3) of the Special Economic Zones Rules, 2006 does not apply where the Free Trade Warehousing Zone merely holds the owner's goods without procuring them.
Conclusion: The subsequent clearance of the equipment from the Free Trade Warehousing Zone into the Domestic Tariff Area is a fresh import and not a re-import under Serial No. 5 of Notification No. 45/2017-Customs dated 30.06.2017; the claimed exemption is unavailable against the assessee.
Re-import exemption -petroleum-operation equipment moved through FTWZ - entitlement to exemption under Serial No. 5 of Notification No. 45/2017-Customs dated 30.06.2017 -Scope of statutory fiction - Conditional customs exemption
Eligibility of petroleum-operation equipment, moved from DTA to FTWZ after completion of the original contract and cleared back to DTA against a fresh essentiality certificate, for the residuary re-import exemption under Serial No. 5 of Notification No. 45/2017-Cus - HELD THAT: - The concession under Notification No. 50/2017-Cus. was conditional upon certified use for the specified petroleum operation and did not confer an unrestricted entitlement to retain and successively deploy the equipment for unrelated domestic contracts. Notification No. 50/2017-Cus. itself provided an express mechanism for transfer to another specified person for an eligible operation; the FTWZ route could not be employed to obtain an additional fiscal benefit.
SEZ statutory fiction is confined to its intended purpose and cannot manufacture a re-import exemption under Notification No. 45/2017-Cus. The return from FTWZ was occasioned by a new domestic contract and fresh essentiality certificate, not by reversal or restoration of the original outward movement. Identity of the equipment alone did not establish the continuity necessary for re-import. The same inward movement could not simultaneously be characterised as an import for the petroleum-operation concession and as a re-import for a separate exemption. [Paras 63, 65, 66, 67, 68]
Clearance of the equipment from FTWZ to DTA pursuant to a subsequent essentiality certificate constitutes a fresh import, not a re-import under Serial No. 5 of Notification No. 45/2017-Cus.; the claimed exemption was therefore unavailable.
Final Conclusion: The appeals were dismissed. The proposed FTWZ-to-DTA movement pursuant to a fresh essentiality certificate was held to be a fresh import, and not eligible for the residuary re-import exemption.
Issues: Whether the setting aside of revocation of the Customs Broker licence for alleged violations of Regulations 10(d), 10(e) and 10(f) of the Customs Broker Licensing Regulations, 2018, gave rise to a substantial question of law.
Analysis: The revocation proceedings concerned alleged regulatory breaches in relation to export shipments for which Let Export Orders had been issued under Section 51 of the Customs Act, 1962. CESTAT found the allegations unsustainable by applying its reasoned decision in an identical matter concerning the same exporter. No material factual distinction between that matter and the present case was demonstrated, and the Revenue had accepted the earlier CESTAT decision without challenge.
Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose; the order setting aside revocation of the Customs Broker licence stood undisturbed.
Customs Broker licence revocation - Parity with unchallenged co-ordinate Tribunal order
Sustainability of the setting aside of revocation of a Customs Broker licence for alleged contravention of the Customs Broker Licensing Regulations, 2018, where an analogous Tribunal order concerning the same exporter had been accepted by the Department - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal had applied its earlier decision concerning another Customs Broker JOHN K MATHEW BEEJAY CLEARING AND FORWARDING AGENCY [2024 (8) TMI 410 - CESTAT MUMBAI] and the same exporter, holding that the alleged contraventions were not established. The Revenue failed to demonstrate any material factual distinction between the two matters and admitted that it had not challenged, and had accepted, the earlier Tribunal order. Consequently, no substantial question of law arose from the Tribunal's order. [Paras 6]
The Tribunal's order setting aside revocation of the Customs Broker licence was upheld and the Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed as the Revenue showed no material distinction from the analogous Tribunal decision which it had accepted, and no substantial question of law arose.
Issues: Whether the Tribunal could set aside the licensing order on the grounds of inordinate delay in the inquiry and identity of the investigating and inquiry officers, without determining the alleged breaches of customs broker obligations on merits.
Analysis: The record showed that the inquiry report followed the show-cause notice within the prescribed period; consequently, the premise of inordinate delay and resulting prejudice was factually incorrect. The officers performing the investigation and inquiry functions were different. The finding of a breach of the principles of natural justice was therefore also founded on an incorrect factual premise. The alleged violations of the customs broker obligations had not been examined on merits.
Conclusion: The setting aside of the licensing order was unsustainable; the alleged violations of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 must be adjudicated on merits.
Customs Broker licence proceedings - factual foundation of procedural prejudice - Setting aside of the order in Customs Broker licence proceedings on grounds of delay in inquiry and identity of investigating and inquiry officers - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal's findings of inordinate delay and breach of natural justice rested on factually incorrect premises. The show cause notice was issued on 3rd October 2023 and the inquiry report was submitted on 26th December 2023; further, the investigating officer and the inquiry officer were different officers. The Tribunal had not examined the alleged breaches of the Customs Broker's obligations on merits. [Paras 4, 5, 6]
The Tribunal's order was set aside and the appeal was remanded to the Tribunal for an independent decision on merits regarding the alleged violations of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018. The restored licence may be used for carrying on business pending that decision.
Final Conclusion: The Revenue's appeal was allowed and the matter was remanded for adjudication on merits. No opinion was expressed on the alleged regulatory violations.
Issues: Whether drawback paid pursuant to self-assessment based on an incorrect classification of exported goods can be recovered directly under Section 75A(2) without reassessment or provisional assessment under the Customs Act, 1962.
Analysis: Drawback was paid on the basis of the exporters' self-assessment in the shipping bills. Where a subsequent verification discloses misclassification affecting the assessment, the statutory scheme requires recourse to reassessment under Section 17(4), or, where applicable, the assessment mechanism under Section 18. Recovery under Section 75A(2) applies only after the recoverable excess amount has been determined and crystallised through the prescribed assessment process.
Conclusion: Direct recovery of the drawback under Section 75A(2), without first reassessing or otherwise determining the liability under Sections 17 or 18, is impermissible and the recovery proceedings are unsustainable.
Recovery of excess drawback following self-assessment - Reassessment before recovery of drawback
Recovery of drawback paid on self-assessed export shipping bills, where handicrafts/artistic wooden furniture had been wrongly classified under furniture entries instead of the entry for handicrafts/artware of wood, without first reassessing the self-assessment - HELD THAT: - Though the exported goods were misclassified and the self-assessment resulted in payment of excess drawback, the payment continued to be one made pursuant to a subsisting self-assessment. Where misclassification is subsequently detected, the proper officer must have recourse to reassessment u/s 17(4), or to the procedure under Section 18 where applicable, to crystallise the liability. Recovery under Section 75A(2) cannot be directly initiated before such reassessment and determination. [Paras 14, 15, 16, 17]
The recovery proceedings and the consequential revisional and appellate orders were set aside as founded on a misapplication of law; the respondents were left at liberty to proceed under Sections 17 and 18, if permissible in law.
Final Conclusion: The writ petitions were allowed and the impugned orders were set aside. The respondents may pursue reassessment or other action under Sections 17 and 18 of the Customs Act, 1962, if law permits.
Issues: Whether a transferee importer using DFIA licences obtained through fraudulent exports is liable for customs duty and penalty despite claiming to be a bona fide purchaser.
Analysis: The DFIA licences used for duty-free imports had been procured on the basis of fabricated exports. The importer did not independently verify the genuineness of the licences, underlying exports, issuing exporter, or related customs documentation. Mere purchase through intermediaries and payment through banking channels did not establish the requisite due diligence. The materially identical fraud investigation and the governing coordinate-bench decisions required transferee importers to verify the authenticity of the licences and release documents; reliance solely on brokers was insufficient.
Conclusion: The transferee importer was liable for the customs duty and penalty because the fraudulently obtained DFIA licences were void ab initio and no due diligence was established. The issue is decided against the assessee.
Duty-free import under fraudulently obtained DFIA licences - Due diligence by transferee licence holders - Penalty for utilisation of fraudulent export incentive licences
Liability of a transferee importer for customs duty and penalty upon utilisation of DFIA licences procured through fake exports - HELD THAT: - Tribunal held that the said controversy stood concluded by the earlier Larger Bench/Coordinate Bench decision in Mercedes Benz India Pvt. Ltd. [2020 (2) TMI 437 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] which held that the importers purchasing transferable licences cannot escape liability, verification from DGFT website alone is insufficient, importers must verify the TRA and documents, absence of due diligence renders them liable for duty, interest and penalty.
The licences used for duty-free imports had originated from fabricated exports. A transferee importer cannot avoid liability merely by asserting purchase through intermediaries; it must independently verify the authenticity of the licences, underlying export documents and relevant release advice. The appellant made no verification from the licensing or Customs authorities and undertook no enquiry regarding the genuineness of the exports or the issuing exporter. In the identical fraudulent-licence scheme, the prior Tribunal decisions required such due diligence, and their ratio was held applicable. [Paras 6, 8]
The duty demand was sustainable and, consequently, the penalty was also sustainable.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order confirming customs duty and penalty was upheld, and the appeal was dismissed.
Issues: (i) Whether demands under Section 28 could be sustained before finalisation of provisional assessments under Section 18; (ii) Whether redemption fine and penalties could be imposed after provisionally assessed goods had been exported and were unavailable for confiscation.
Issue (i): Whether demands under Section 28 could be sustained before finalisation of provisional assessments under Section 18.
Analysis: The export bonds expressly recorded an undertaking to pay duty finally assessed and were executed under Section 18, establishing that the exports were provisionally assessed rather than finally reassessed under Section 17. Regulation 5 of the Customs (Finalization of Provisional Assessment) Regulations, 2018 required finalisation within two months of receipt of the test reports. No final assessment had been made. Recovery proceedings for non-levy or short-levy under Section 28 could not be initiated while the assessment remained provisional.
Conclusion: The show cause notices and consequential duty demands issued before finalisation of the provisional assessments were premature and legally unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether redemption fine and penalties could be imposed after provisionally assessed goods had been exported and were unavailable for confiscation.
Analysis: The goods were exported on execution of Section 18 bonds and were neither seized under Section 110 nor provisionally released. Since the exported goods were unavailable for confiscation, imposition of redemption fine under Section 125 was not sustainable.
Conclusion: Redemption fine and penalties were not imposable and were set aside, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: Recovery action must follow finalisation of the provisional assessments, and exported goods unavailable for confiscation cannot attract redemption fine.
Ratio Decidendi: Recovery proceedings for short-levy cannot be maintained under Section 28 while an assessment made under Section 18 remains unfinalised; redemption fine cannot be imposed where exported goods are unavailable for confiscation.
Provisional assessment and recovery of short-levied duty - Redemption fine on exported goods unavailable for confiscation
Provisional assessment and recovery of short-levied duty - Recovery proceedings for export duty on rice cleared against bonds pending test reports, initiated before finalisation of provisional assessments - HELD THAT: - The bonds were expressly executed under Section 18 and obliged the exporters to pay duty finally assessed upon an adverse test report. The exports were therefore cleared on provisional assessment, not by provisional release or reassessment. A provisional assessment had to be finalised within the prescribed process before recovery proceedings for non-levy or short levy could be initiated; as no final assessment had been made, the show cause notices were premature and unsustainable. [Paras 7]
The duty-demand proceedings initiated before finalisation of the provisional assessments were set aside.
Redemption fine on exported goods unavailable for confiscation - Imposition of redemption fine and penalties in respect of rice already exported after provisional clearance under bonds - HELD THAT: - The impugned goods were never seized under Section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962, nor were they provisionally released as claimed by the department. Rather, the goods were allowed to be exported upon the execution of bonds under Section 18 of the Act. Since the goods have already been exported and are unavailable for confiscation, a redemption fine under Section 125 of the Customs Act, 1962, cannot be legally sustained. This position is well-supported by the judgment of Punjab & Haryana in the case of CC, Amritsar vs. M/s Raja Impex (P) Ltd [2008 (4) TMI 320 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH]. [Paras 9]
The redemption fine and penalties were set aside.
Final Conclusion: The impugned orders were set aside and all the appeals were allowed with consequential relief in accordance with law. The Tribunal left the merits of the rice classification open.
Issues: Whether conversion of shipping bills from the Advance Authorisation Scheme to the Duty Drawback Scheme could be denied on the basis of the three-month limitation in Circular No. 36/2010-Cus. or the subsequently issued notification prescribing a time limit.
Analysis: Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962 does not prescribe a limitation period for amendment of shipping bills after export, subject to the statutory requirement of contemporaneous documentary evidence. The three-month limitation in Circular No. 36/2010-Cus. was ultra vires Section 149 and could not defeat entitlement to a consequential export benefit. Notification No. 11/2022-Customs (N.T.) dated 22.02.2022, prescribing time limits for post-export conversion in specified cases, could not be applied retrospectively to exports made before its issuance.
Conclusion: Conversion of the shipping bills from Advance Authorisation to Duty Drawback could not be denied on limitation grounds, and the export benefit was required to be extended in favour of the assessee.
Post-export conversion of shipping bills from Advance Authorisation to duty drawback - Validity of limitation under Circular No. 36/2010-Cus -Prospective application of post-export conversion notification
Conversion of shipping bills for exports initially declared under the Advance Authorisation Scheme to the duty drawback scheme denied solely because the request was made beyond three months from the Let Export Order - HELD THAT: - The three-month limitation prescribed by Circular No. 36/2010-Cus. was ultra vires Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962, as held in Union of India Vs. Mahalaxmi Rubtech Ltd. [2023 (4) TMI 1272 - SC ORDER] The decisions in M/s Suzlon Energy Limited [2013 (3) TMI 506 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] and Anil Sharma Versus Union of India [2017 (2) TMI 50 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] relied upon by the Department, no longer represented the governing legal position. Once export had taken place, the consequential export benefit could not be refused merely on the circular-based limitation. [Paras 4]
The appellant was entitled to post-export conversion of the shipping bills and consequential duty drawback benefit.
Prospective application of post-export conversion notification - Notification No. 11/2022-Cus. (N.T.), prescribing a time limit for post-export conversion of shipping bills in specified cases applicable to the exports in question or not? - HELD THAT: - The notification could not be applied retrospectively to exports made between October, 2019 and January, 2022. [Paras 4]
The notification did not govern the appellant's request for conversion.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed. The appellant's shipping bills were held eligible for conversion from the Advance Authorisation Scheme to the duty drawback scheme, without denial based on the circular-prescribed limitation or the subsequent notification.
Issues: (i) Whether customs duty and interest remained payable for failure to fulfil the export obligation under the EPCG exemption, notwithstanding flood damage to the imported machinery. (ii) Whether confiscation, redemption fine, and penalty could be sustained for that failure.
Issue (i): Whether customs duty and interest remained payable for failure to fulfil the export obligation under the EPCG exemption, notwithstanding flood damage to the imported machinery.
Analysis: Notification No. 97/2004-Customs required fulfilment of the stipulated export obligation and mandated payment of proportionate duty with interest upon default. Though the machinery was installed, subsequently damaged beyond repair in the Surat floods, and the export obligation remained unfulfilled for reasons beyond control, no waiver of export obligation had been obtained from the committee or the licensing authority under the waiver mechanism inserted by Notification No. 72/2007-Customs. The exemption conditions therefore required strict application.
Conclusion: The demand of duty saved and interest is sustainable; this issue is against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether confiscation, redemption fine, and penalty could be sustained for that failure.
Analysis: The imported machinery had been installed and was damaged by unprecedented floods. The failure to meet the export obligation in these circumstances did not justify confiscation under Section 111(o) or penal consequences under Section 112(a), notwithstanding the surviving duty and interest liability.
Conclusion: Confiscation, redemption fine, and penalties are unsustainable and are set aside; this issue is in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The fiscal consequences of non-fulfilment of the EPCG export obligation remain enforceable, while the confiscatory and penal consequences are removed.
EPCG duty exemption - fulfilment of export obligation - Confiscation and penalty for non-fulfilment of EPCG export obligation - Strict interpretation of exemption notification -
Recovery of customs duty and interest on imported embroidery machines where the export obligation under the EPCG exemption was not fulfilled - HELD THAT: - The concessional import was expressly conditional upon fulfilment of the stipulated export obligation, and failure attracted payment of the duty saved with interest. Although the machinery was damaged in floods, the appellants produced no waiver of export obligation from the competent Committee or the DGFT authorities. The exemption notification had therefore to be strictly construed, and the appellants had not established compliance with its conditions.
The decision in Rajdarbar Heritage Ventures Limited [2026 (6) TMI 120 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] was distinguishable, since that case involved partial fulfilment of export obligation and interest was not demanded under Section 28AA. [Paras 5]
The demand of duty saved under the EPCG scheme, together with interest, was upheld.
Confiscation of EPCG capital goods - Penalty for non-fulfilment of export obligation - Confiscation, redemption fine and penalty in respect of EPCG-imported embroidery machines damaged in floods and incapable of fulfilling export obligation - HELD THAT: - The imported machinery had been installed, but was submerged and damaged beyond repair in unprecedented floods. In the circumstances recorded, while the statutory liability to pay the duty saved and interest remained enforceable for non-fulfilment of export obligation, confiscation of the machinery and consequential penal consequences were not sustained.
Failure to fulfil specified export obligation would require payment of duty so saved along with interest. We rely on the decision of Dilip Kumar & Co [2018 (7) TMI 1826 - SUPREME COURT (LB)] wherein held that exemption notification should be interpreted strictly; the burden of proving applicability would be on the assessee to show that his case comes within the parameters of the exemption clause or exemption notification. Similar findings was given in the case of Favourite Industries [2012 (4) TMI 65 - SUPREME COURT] Therefore, we uphold duty demand and the interest liability on the appellants and set aside confiscation of imported machinery under Section 111(o), redemption fine and the penalty imposed on the appellant(s) under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962. The impugned orders are modified to the above extent.[Paras 5]
Confiscation under Section 111(o), redemption fine and penalties under Section 112(a) were set aside.
Final Conclusion: The appeals were partly allowed. The duty demand and interest liability were sustained, while confiscation of the imported machinery, redemption fine and penalties were set aside.
Issues: Whether the condition of furnishing a bank guarantee equivalent to approximately 80% of the value of imported goods for their provisional release was excessive, and the appropriate conditions for release pending adjudication.
Analysis: Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962 permits release of seized goods on conditions that safeguard Revenue during pending adjudication while enabling the importer to deal with the goods. A bank guarantee fixed at approximately 80% of the goods' value was onerous. Since the anti-dumping duty liability remained under investigation and no merits determination was made, a balanced security condition was required.
Conclusion: The provisional-release condition was modified to require a bank guarantee of 30% of the differential duty together with a bond for the full value of the seized goods; the goods were directed to be released in a time-bound manner.
Provisional release of seized imported goods - Reasonableness of bank guarantee condition
Conditions for provisional release of imported printing machinery pending investigation into liability to anti-dumping duty - HELD THAT: - The purpose of provisional release is to safeguard revenue pending adjudication while enabling the importer to deal with the goods rather than leaving them under seizure. A bank guarantee equivalent to approximately 80% of the value of the goods was held onerous in the circumstances. [Paras 4]
The goods were directed to be released upon execution of a bond for their full value and furnishing of a bank guarantee for 30% of the differential duty, in a time-bound manner.
Final Conclusion: The provisional-release condition was modified as excessive. Release was ordered against a full-value bond and bank guarantee for 30% of the differential duty.
Issues: (i) Whether the Customs Broker violated Regulation 10(a) of the Customs Broker Licensing Regulations, 2018 by not obtaining authorisation directly from the importers; (ii) Whether the Customs Broker violated Regulation 10(d) of the Customs Broker Licensing Regulations, 2018 by failing to advise importers regarding compliance and to report alleged overvaluation; (iii) Whether the Customs Broker violated Regulation 10(n) of the Customs Broker Licensing Regulations, 2018 by inadequately verifying the identity, credentials, address and functioning of its importer-clients.
Issue (i): Whether the Customs Broker violated Regulation 10(a) of the Customs Broker Licensing Regulations, 2018 by not obtaining authorisation directly from the importers.
Analysis: Regulation 10(a) requires a Customs Broker to obtain proper authorisation from its client and produce it when required. The record contained authorisation letters from the importers. The regulation does not mandate that authorisation must invariably be obtained directly from the importer rather than through an intermediary.
Conclusion: No violation of Regulation 10(a) was established; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the Customs Broker violated Regulation 10(d) of the Customs Broker Licensing Regulations, 2018 by failing to advise importers regarding compliance and to report alleged overvaluation.
Analysis: No evidence established that the Customs Broker failed to advise its clients to comply with applicable law. The imports were covered by First Check Bills of Entry and underwent customs examination, including physical verification and valuation by approved valuers. A Customs Broker is not required to act as an expert to verify the quality or valuation of imported stones, and the subsequent discovery of inferior quality did not establish a failure to advise or report non-compliance.
Conclusion: No violation of Regulation 10(d) was established; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether the Customs Broker violated Regulation 10(n) of the Customs Broker Licensing Regulations, 2018 by inadequately verifying the identity, credentials, address and functioning of its importer-clients.
Analysis: The Customs Broker obtained IEC, GSTIN, PAN and other KYC documents, along with supporting records, none of which was shown to be forged. Regulation 10(n) requires reliance on reliable, independent and authentic documents; it does not require a Customs Broker to independently verify every government-issued document or physically verify the importer's continued existence and operations at its declared premises. Subsequent field verification revealing that certain importers were unavailable at the stated addresses could not, by itself, establish a breach.
Conclusion: No violation of Regulation 10(n) was established; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The findings supporting revocation of the Customs Broker licence and forfeiture of the security deposit lacked legal basis.
Ratio Decidendi: A Customs Broker that obtains and relies on authentic KYC and authorisation documents is not required to undertake independent physical verification of the client or assume responsibility for valuation and quality matters examined by customs authorities under First Check assessment.
Customs Broker authorisation from importers - Customs Broker's duty to advise clients - KYC verification by Customs Broker - First Check Bills of Entry and Customs Broker liability
Customs Broker authorisation from importers - Violation of the requirement to obtain authorisation from importers for acting as Customs Broker - HELD THAT: - Regulation 10(a) requires the Customs Broker to obtain proper authorisation from its clients, but does not mandate that the authorisation must be received directly from the importer in every case. As authorisation letters from the concerned importers were available on record, the alleged violation was not established. [Paras 6]
The charge of violation of Regulation 10(a) was held unsustainable.
Customs Broker's duty to advise clients - First Check Bills of Entry and Customs Broker liability - Violation of the duty to advise importers to comply with customs law in respect of imports cleared after First Check assessment and examination - HELD THAT: - There was no evidence that the Customs Broker had failed to advise its clients to comply with the applicable law. The goods were examined under First Check Bills of Entry, including physical examination and valuation by government-approved valuers. Tribunal held that, in those circumstances, the Customs Broker could not be faulted for failure to advise the importers or for the subsequently detected inferior quality or overvaluation of the imported stones. [Paras 6, 8]
The charge of violation of Regulation 10(d) was not proved.
KYC verification by Customs Broker - Verification of importer's declared business address - Violation of KYC verification obligations on the ground that certain importers were subsequently found non-existent at their declared addresses - HELD THAT: - Having obtained IEC, GSTIN, PAN and other KYC documents issued by competent authorities, the Customs Broker had complied with Regulation 10(n). The Regulation did not require it to independently verify every document or physically verify the importers' existence and functioning at the registered premises. Subsequent field verification showing that certain importers were unavailable at their declared addresses could not, without more, establish breach by the Customs Broker. [Paras 6]
The charge of violation of Regulation 10(n) was held not established.
Final Conclusion: The alleged breaches of Regulations 10(a), 10(d) and 10(n) of the Customs Broker Licensing Regulations, 2018 were not established. The revocation of the Customs Broker licence and forfeiture of the security deposit were set aside, and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether the forfeiture of 25% of the successful bid amount, including the claim for refund, required fresh determination under Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
Analysis: The question of satisfaction of the requirements under Section 74, including the loss allegedly suffered by the Official Liquidator and the interpretation of the e-auction terms concerning EMD and security deposit, had not been canvassed or determined before the Company Judge. The relevant auction clauses also required examination as to whether forfeiture was referable to 10% EMD or 25% of the bid amount.
Outcome: No final determination on the merits of the forfeiture or refund claim was made; the issue was directed to be considered afresh.
Forfeiture of earnest money in e-auction - Failure to consider statutory requirements for contractual forfeiture
Whether the forfeiture of 25% of the successful bid amount, including the claim for refund, required fresh determination under Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872? - HELD THAT: - The question whether the conditions for forfeiture under Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, including the necessity and quantum of loss, had not been canvassed before the Company Judge and was consequently not considered. Further, the e-auction provisions concerning whether the forfeitable amount was to be reckoned as 25% or 10% also required examination. The Court therefore declined to record findings on the merits. [Paras 19, 20, 21, 22, 24]
The impugned order was set aside to the extent of the claim for refund, and that issue was remitted to the Company Judge for fresh decision after permitting completion of pleadings; merits were left open.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was partly allowed by setting aside the order only insofar as it rejected the claim for refund. The matter was remitted for fresh consideration without any expression on the merits of the forfeiture.
Issues: Whether a public authority is obliged under the Right to Information Act, 2005 to obtain information from a private body in order to furnish it to an information applicant.
Analysis: The right to information extends to material held by or under the control of a public authority. Information relating to a private body is disclosable only where the public authority can access it under another law, subject to the preconditions and restrictions imposed by that law. The Act does not require a public authority to collect, collate, create, or obtain information that is not available in its records merely to answer an information request. The impugned directions requiring the regulator to procure information from a private exchange were inconsistent with this position.
Conclusion: A public authority is not obliged to obtain information from a private body solely for furnishing it under the Right to Information Act, 2005; the impugned directions were unsustainable.
Right to information - information held by or under control of public authority - Information relating to private bodies under regulatory powers - statutory access and preconditions
Whether a public authority is obliged under the Right to Information Act, 2005 to obtain information from a private body and furnish it to an applicant? - HELD THAT: - The right to information extends to information held by or under the control of the public authority when the request is made. Although information concerning a private body may fall within the definition of information where it can be accessed under another law, the conditions and restrictions governing such access continue to apply. The Act does not require a public authority to collect or collate information not available in its records merely because it possesses regulatory power to call for such information from a private body.
Although the applicants under the RTI Act, who are respondents in these petitions, despite service of notice, have not appeared to contest these petitions, we find that since the position of law is clarified by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgement in the case of CPIO vs. Subhash Chandra Agarwal [2019 (11) TMI 895 - SUPREME COURT] the writ petitions deserve to be allowed and the orders impugned in these writ petitions deserve to be quashed and set aside.[Paras 14, 16, 21, 23]
The directions requiring SEBI to obtain information from BSE and supply it to RTI applicants were unsustainable and were quashed.
Final Conclusion: All the writ petitions were allowed and the impugned CIC orders were quashed and set aside.
Issues: Whether interim relief should be granted against the securities-market debarment to enable completion of the approved preferential issue of fully convertible warrants and limited mutual-fund transactions.
Analysis: The preferential issue had been approved by 76.64% of the public shareholders, who comprised about 96% of the shareholding, and was expected to raise substantial capital. No charge concerning dealing in securities had been made against the company. The regulatory position that the investment could proceed after expiry of the debarment, without identifying any other legal bar, supported limited interim protection. The merits of the underlying proceedings were expressly kept open.
Outcome: Limited interim stay granted to permit completion of the preferential warrant issue upon deposit of the penalties, with the debarment otherwise continuing; the time for issuance was extended by one week and ordinary-course mutual-fund transactions were permitted.
Interim suspension of securities-market debarment - Preferential issue of fully convertible warrants - Shareholder-approved capital infusion
Interim suspension of securities-market debarment - Whether interim relief should be granted against the securities-market debarment to enable completion of the approved preferential issue of fully convertible warrants and limited mutual-fund transactions? -HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted that the proposed investment had been approved by the non-promoter public shareholders, who constituted the predominant shareholding, and that no legal bar to the investment, apart from the impugned debarment direction, was identified. As SEBI accepted that the investment could be made after expiry of the debarment period, the Tribunal held that postponing the shareholder-approved capital infusion lacked logic and that the warrant issue would benefit the public shareholders. The merits of the remaining challenges were kept open for final hearing. [Paras 13, 14]
The debarment direction was stayed to the limited extent necessary to permit completion of the preferential warrant issue, subject to both appellants depositing the full penalty within one week; the debarment otherwise continued, and the time for issuance was extended by one week.
Use of mutual funds for ordinary-course business requirements - Interim access by the company to mutual funds during securities-market debarment - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal permitted mutual-fund transactions only for the company's day-to-day requirements in the ordinary course of business, while excluding their use for any other purpose, including payment of the proposed dividend.
The company was permitted to undertake mutual-fund transactions solely for ordinary-course business requirements and not for payment of the proposed dividend or any other purpose.
Final Conclusion: The interim applications were partly allowed. The appellants were permitted, subject to deposit of the full penalty, to complete the preferential warrant issue and the company could use mutual funds only for ordinary-course business requirements; the debarment otherwise remained in force pending further orders.
Issues: Whether a writ petition challenging an order of the National Company Law Tribunal in liquidation proceedings should be entertained when an appellate remedy is available under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
Analysis: Although the constitutional jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 is not curtailed by statutory provisions, Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 confers a broadly worded right of appeal upon every person aggrieved by an order of the adjudicating authority under Part II of the Code. Since the provision covers an aggrieved person and does not restrict the nature of the appealable order, judicial discipline requires recourse to the statutory appellate mechanism rather than invocation of writ jurisdiction.
Conclusion: The writ petition challenging the National Company Law Tribunal's order ought not to have been entertained where the statutory appellate remedy under the Code was available.
Alternative remedy under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code - Appellate remedy against orders of the Adjudicating Authority
Maintainability of a writ petition challenging an order passed by the National Company Law Tribunal during liquidation proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, despite the statutory appellate remedy - HELD THAT: - Though the constitutional powers under Articles 226 and 227 cannot be curtailed by statute, judicial discipline requires that an order passed under a statutory regime be challenged through the remedy provided by that regime.
Section 61 confers, in broad terms, a right of appeal upon any person aggrieved by an order of the Adjudicating Authority under Part II of the Code, without limiting the nature of the order appealable. The High Court ought therefore to have refrained from entertaining the writ petition when the aggrieved persons could pursue that appellate remedy.
Orders passed in proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘Code’) must be challenged within the framework of the Code and not through a writ petition as has been held by this Court in Committee of Creditors of KSK Mahanadi Power Company Ltd. v. Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Ltd. [2024 (10) TMI 1624 - SUPREME COURT] and Mohammed Enterprises (Tanzania) Ltd. v. Farooq Ali Khan [2025 (1) TMI 354 - SUPREME COURT]. [Paras 6, 7]
The High Court's order was set aside and the writ petition was dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy, with liberty to the writ petitioners to pursue the appropriate remedy under the Code. If an appeal is filed before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal within the stipulated period with an application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, exclusion of the period spent before the High Court and this Court shall be considered in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed. The writ petition challenging the NCLT order was dismissed for availability of the statutory appellate remedy under the Code, subject to the stated liberty concerning exclusion of time under the Limitation Act.
Issues: Whether admission of a corporate insolvency resolution process application was vitiated because the financial creditor relied on photocopies of documents.
Analysis: Section 7 permits ascertainment of default from an information utility record or other evidence furnished by the financial creditor. The record of default from the information utility was furnished and was undisputed. The material also established that the corporate debtor had availed the loans, while the pleaded date of default had not been challenged and was recorded as having been conceded before the adjudicating authority. A challenge to the accuracy of that factual recording could not be entertained without first seeking correction of the adjudicating authority's order.
Conclusion: The admission order was not vitiated by reliance on photocopies and is sustained, against the corporate debtor.
Admission of corporate insolvency resolution process on proof of default - Record of default from information utility
Admission of the corporate insolvency resolution process on the basis of the information utility record and other material, despite objection to reliance on photocopies of loan documents - HELD THAT: - For admission of an application by a financial creditor, the adjudicating authority is required to ascertain the existence of default from information utility records or other evidence furnished. The undisputed record of default filed with NeSL, together with the material showing that the corporate debtor had availed the loans and had not challenged the pleaded default date, established default. The objection concerning photocopies of documents therefore did not vitiate the admission order. [Paras 4, 5, 6, 8]
The challenge to the admission of the corporate insolvency resolution process was rejected and the writ petition was dismissed.
Final Conclusion: The High Court found no infirmity in the order admitting the financial creditor's application for corporate insolvency resolution process and dismissed the writ petition without costs.
Issues: Whether a writ petition challenging an order of the Disciplinary Committee under Section 220(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is maintainable when a statutory appeal under Section 220(7) is available before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal.
Analysis: Although the disciplinary order did not conclusively determine the consequences of the alleged misconduct, it was passed after consideration of a show-cause notice issued under Section 219 and expressly invoked the Disciplinary Committee's jurisdiction under Section 220(2). The order consequently fell within the class of disciplinary orders made appealable by Section 220(7), which became operative before its issuance. The statutory appeal constituted an efficacious alternative remedy, making recourse to writ jurisdiction inappropriate at the first instance.
Conclusion: The challenge must be pursued through the statutory appeal before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal under Section 220(7) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
Alternative statutory remedy against disciplinary committee order - Maintainability of writ petition
Maintainability of the writ petition challenging the disciplinary committee's disposal of a show-cause notice under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code - HELD THAT: - Though the impugned order did not finally determine the consequences of the alleged misconduct, it was passed by the disciplinary committee upon the show-cause notice and expressly in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 220(2) of the Code. It consequently fell within the appellate remedy newly provided by Section 220(7), which permits an appeal to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal against orders under Section 220(2) to (5). An efficacious statutory remedy being available, writ jurisdiction ought not to be invoked in the first instance. [Paras 9, 10, 11, 12]
The writ petition was dismissed without examination of the merits, leaving the petitioner to pursue the statutory appeal; the appellate tribunal may consider the pendency of the writ petition while examining delay, if any.
Final Conclusion: The petition was dismissed on the ground of the available statutory appellate remedy before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, without any opinion on the merits of the disciplinary controversy.
Issues: Whether a company petition dismissed for want of prosecution could be restored despite the restoration application being filed beyond the thirty-day period under Rule 48 of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016.
Analysis: Rule 48(2) prescribes thirty days for seeking restoration upon sufficient cause for non-appearance, but does not impose an absolute prohibition against restoration after that period. The provision must be read harmoniously with Rule 11, which preserves inherent powers necessary to meet the ends of justice. The explanation that counsel missed the hearing because the sitting was preponed remained unrebutted. The restoration application had also been accompanied by a delay-condonation application which was not registered or placed before the Tribunal; the applicant could not be prejudiced by that omission.
Conclusion: The thirty-day period under Rule 48(2) was capable of condonation in the circumstances, and the restoration application was maintainable. The dismissal order was set aside and the company petition was restored for decision on merits.
Restoration of petition dismissed for default - Inherent powers to condone delay - Litigant not to suffer for counsel's default
Restoration of a company petition dismissed for want of prosecution where the restoration application was filed beyond thirty days and the counsel's non-appearance resulted from a bona fide misunderstanding regarding the sitting time - HELD THAT: - Rule 48(2) prescribes thirty days for seeking restoration but does not impose an absolute bar against an application made thereafter. The delay provision must be read rationally and harmoniously with the Tribunal's inherent power under Rule 11 to secure the ends of justice.
The unrebutted explanation that counsel could not appear because of a misunderstanding caused by preponement of the sitting constituted a bona fide contingency; the litigant could not be prejudiced for counsel's default. Further, where a supporting delay-condonation application had been filed but was not placed before the Tribunal, limitation alone could not justify rejection of restoration. [Paras 6, 7, 8, 9]
The impugned order was quashed; the restoration application was allowed and the company petition was restored to its original number for decision on merits.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was disposed of by allowing restoration of the company petition dismissed for want of prosecution, subject to its determination on merits.
Issues: (i) Whether referral charges received for facilitating vehicle loans and insurance policies constitute taxable Business Auxiliary Service; (ii) Whether penalty for suppression could be sustained despite payment of the service-tax liability before issuance of the show-cause notice.
Issue (i): Whether referral charges received for facilitating vehicle loans and insurance policies constitute taxable Business Auxiliary Service.
Analysis: Section 65(105)(zzb) of the Finance Act, 1994 covers Business Auxiliary Service. The agreements with banks and the insurer showed that the assessee promoted and marketed their lending and insurance services by informing dealers and customers about the available facilities and facilitating customer referrals. The referral charges were consideration for that promotional activity.
Conclusion: The referral charges are taxable as Business Auxiliary Service, against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether penalty for suppression could be sustained despite payment of the service-tax liability before issuance of the show-cause notice.
Analysis: Section 73(3) of the Finance Act, 1994 requires the Department to refrain from issuing a notice where the short-paid tax liability is discharged before notice. The entire liability had been paid before the show-cause notice, and uncertainty regarding taxability accounted for the non-disclosure of referral income under Business Auxiliary Service in the returns.
Conclusion: Penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 is unsustainable and is set aside, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: Service tax remains payable on the referral charges, while the surviving penalty liability is removed.
Ratio Decidendi: Referral activity undertaken under agreements to promote banks' lending and insurers' services constitutes Business Auxiliary Service; where the tax liability is fully discharged before the show-cause notice, penalty cannot be sustained under the pre-notice payment framework.
Business Auxiliary Service - referral charges for motor vehicle loans and insurance - Pre-notice payment of service tax - penalty
Business Auxiliary Service - referral charges for motor vehicle loans and insurance - Taxability of referral charges received by an automobile dealer from banks and an insurer for customers availing vehicle loans and insurance policies. - HELD THAT: - The agreements disclosed that the appellant promoted the banking and insurance business by informing dealers, service centres and vehicle purchasers about available financial facilities and lending arrangements. The referral charges were therefore consideration for promoting and marketing the services of banks and the insurance company, and constituted Business Auxiliary Service. [Paras 4, 5]
The referral charges were held taxable as Business Auxiliary Service.
Pre-notice payment of service tax - penalty - Liability to penalty where service tax on referral charges had been paid before issuance of the show-cause notice. - HELD THAT: - Section 73(3) requires the Department to refrain from issuing notice where a short levy or short payment is made good before notice. In view of the uncertainty regarding taxability and the payment of the entire liability before notice, penalty was not warranted, irrespective of whether notice could have been issued within the extended period. [Paras 6]
The penalty under Section 78 was set aside; the Tribunal's deletion of penalty under Section 76 remained undisturbed.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was partly allowed. While the referral charges were held taxable as Business Auxiliary Service, the penalty under Section 78 was set aside because the tax liability had been discharged before issuance of notice.
Liability to pay service tax on fees charged under "Standard & Labelling" and "Processing Fee" as falling within “Technical Inspection and Certification Service” under Section 65(108) read with Section 65(105)(zzi) of the Finance Act, 1994 - appellant fairly states that the decision which has been relied upon by Custom Excise Service Tax Appellate Tribunal [2025 (9) TMI 1752 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] while passing the impugned order has not been subjected to challenge and therefore, the same has attained finality.
HELD THAT:- In such view of the matter, the appeal is dismissed.
Issues: Whether services performed in India in relation to external commercial borrowing facilities booked by the Singapore head office constituted intermediary services liable to service tax.
Analysis: The Indian branch and its Singapore head office were the same legal person; consequently, activities between them could not be treated as services supplied by one person to another. Independently, intermediary service requires three parties, an identifiable main supply between two principals, and a separate ancillary arrangement or facilitation service. The Indian office performed loan-origination, structuring, credit assessment, monitoring and related functions on its own account, while the Singapore office alone entered into and bore the risks of the credit facilities. The remuneration was independently determined and was not consideration for facilitating a supply between the head office and borrowers. Rule 3, rather than Rule 9(c), governed the place of provision.
Conclusion: The activities were not intermediary services and were not liable to service tax; the service-tax demand and consequential penalties were unsustainable.
Service tax as ‘intermediary services’ - Service between branch office and head office - Place of provision of services
Taxability of loan origination, credit assessment, structuring, disbursement and loan-management activities performed by the Indian bank office for its Singapore head office as intermediary services - HELD THAT: - The Indian office and the Singapore head office were held to be the same legal person; consequently, activities between them could not be treated as services rendered by one person to another. Independently, the activities did not satisfy the requirements of intermediary services: there was no arrangement involving three distinct parties, no identifiable main and ancillary supplies, and the remuneration was independently determined rather than linked to the lending service supplied by the Singapore office to borrowers. The Indian office performed the principal functions on its own account, while the Singapore head office alone entered into and finally decided the external commercial borrowing arrangements. See M/S CHEVRON PHILLIPS CHEMICALS INDIA PVT. LTD. [2024 (2) TMI 21 - SC ORDER][Paras 8, 9, 10]
The activities were not intermediary services and were not liable to service tax; the consequential demand and penalties were unsustainable.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed. The service tax demand and penalties on the disputed activities were held unsustainable.
Issues: (i) Whether the appellant's activities were classifiable as Site Formation and Clearance Service or Works Contract Service; (ii) Whether a sub-contractor was liable to service tax where the main contractor allegedly paid tax on the entire contract value; (iii) Whether the extended period for raising the service-tax demand was invocable.
Issue (i): Whether the appellant's activities were classifiable as Site Formation and Clearance Service or Works Contract Service.
Analysis: The contractual activities predominantly comprised excavation, earthwork, transportation, filling, dozing, compacting, dust suppression, and handling of rocks. Applying the dominant nature of the composite contract, the activities were found to be principally site formation and clearance activities rather than works contract service.
Conclusion: The services were classifiable as Site Formation and Clearance Service, against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether a sub-contractor was liable to service tax where the main contractor allegedly paid tax on the entire contract value.
Analysis: The settled position was applied that a sub-contractor providing taxable services to a main contractor has an independent liability to discharge service tax. Any entitlement of the main contractor to avail credit of tax paid by the sub-contractor does not remove that liability.
Conclusion: The sub-contractor was liable to pay service tax on the services provided to the main contractor, against the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether the extended period for raising the service-tax demand was invocable.
Analysis: The dispute regarding taxability of sub-contractor services involved an interpretative controversy that had persisted until the departmental clarification issued in 2007. In the absence of cogent evidence of deliberate suppression or wilful misstatement, the extended limitation period could not be applied.
Conclusion: The extended period was not invocable and the demand was barred by limitation, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: Though the services were taxable and the sub-contractor bore an independent tax liability, recovery could not be sustained because it depended upon an impermissible invocation of the extended limitation period.
Ratio Decidendi: Where tax liability turns on a bona fide interpretative dispute and there is no cogent evidence of wilful suppression or deliberate misstatement, the extended period of limitation cannot be invoked.
Classification of excavation and site-preparation contracts - Service tax liability of sub-contractors - Extended limitation for interpretational service-tax disputes
Classification of excavation and site-preparation contracts - Site Formation and Clearance Service - Works Contract Service - The excavation, loading, transportation, filling, dozing, compaction and allied site-preparation activities executed at the integrated steel plant were classifiable as Site Formation and Clearance Service and not as Works Contract Service - HELD THAT: - The adjudicating authority had examined the contractual documents and found excavation in soil and rock filling to be the dominant element of the composite contract. The Tribunal found no merit in the claim that the activities constituted Works Contract Service. [Paras 8]
The classification under Site Formation and Clearance Service was sustained.
Service tax liability of sub-contractors - sub-contractor providing taxable services to a main contractor remained liable to service tax notwithstanding payment of tax by the main contractor on the contract value - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the question stood settled by the Larger Bench decision in CST, New Delhi Vs Melange Developers Pvt Ltd [2019 (6) TMI 518 - CESTAT NEW DELHI-LB] Payment of service tax by the main contractor did not extinguish the sub-contractor's independent liability, though the main contractor could avail credit of the tax paid by the sub-contractor. [Paras 9]
The plea that the appellant, as sub-contractor, was not liable to tax was rejected.
Extended limitation for interpretational service-tax disputes - Wilful suppression - Whether extended period could not be invoked for the service-tax demand against the sub-contractor where the liability arose from the Board's 2007 circular and the dispute was interpretational? - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal applied its earlier decisions holding that uncertainty regarding a sub-contractor's liability before and around the clarification issued in 2007 made the matter one of interpretation. In the absence of cogent evidence of wilful suppression or deliberate misstatement, the extended period was unavailable. [Paras 10, 11]
Although the demand was sustainable on merits, it was set aside in its entirety as time-barred.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed. While the service classification and the appellant's liability as a sub-contractor were upheld on merits, the demand was set aside as barred by limitation.
Issues: Whether Cenvat credit on input services could be denied because the service-provider invoices were issued in the name of the head office, which was not registered as an Input Service Distributor.
Analysis: Rule 9 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 permits verification of receipt and accounting of input services notwithstanding defects in invoice particulars. During the relevant period, there was no requirement that credit relating to head-office invoices be distributed proportionately through an Input Service Distributor. The absence of Input Service Distributor registration was a procedural irregularity where no unintended credit benefit or revenue loss resulted.
Conclusion: Cenvat credit was admissible to the assessee; denial solely for want of Input Service Distributor registration of the head office was unsustainable.
Cenvat credit on input-service invoices issued to head office - Input Service Distributor registration as procedural irregularity
Availability of Cenvat credit to a unit on input-service invoices issued in the name of its head office where the head office was not registered as an Input Service Distributor - HELD THAT: - Following Samita Conductors Ltd. [2012 (11) TMI 432 - CESTAT, AHMEDABAD] and Doshion Ltd. [2012 (10) TMI 952 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD] the Tribunal held that absence of Input Service Distributor registration could not, in the circumstances, defeat credit on services received. The omission to obtain such registration was treated as a procedural irregularity. [Paras 9]
The demand based on denial of Cenvat credit was set aside and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order denying Cenvat credit was set aside, and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether CENVAT credit of service tax paid on transportation of fly ash from a captive thermal power plant to an ash pond is admissible as an input service connected with manufacture of dutiable final products.
Analysis: Fly ash arose during generation of electricity in the captive thermal power plant, and that electricity was used in manufacturing dutiable final products. Its transportation and disposal were necessary environmental-compliance activities. The fly ash was also cleared on payment of excise duty. The identical issue for an earlier period had already been resolved in favour of the assessee, and the same rationale applied to the subsequent period.
Conclusion: CENVAT credit of service tax paid on fly-ash transportation is admissible; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
CENVAT credit on fly ash transportation services - Input service nexus with manufacture of dutiable final products
Admissibility of CENVAT credit of service tax paid on transportation of fly ash generated in the captive thermal power plant to the ash pond - HELD THAT: - We find that the issue is squarely covered M/s. Shyam Metalics & Energy Limited [2023 (1) TMI 737 - CESTAT KOLKATA] wherein it has been held that the appellant would eligible for the Cenvat Credit for the Service Tax paid by them on account of Fly Ash movement.
On an identical issue, the Banglore Bench in the case of ACC Ltd [2026 (8) TMI 94 - CESTAT BANGALORE] wherein held 'Just extraction of the fly ash generated In the Thermal Power Plant cannot be said to be "manufacture of fly ash" by the appellant. Fly ash has been manufactured by the Thermal Power Plant not by the appellant. The Department's stand is absurd, therefore, Rule 6(1) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 is not applicable at all. Since the services, in question, have been availed for erection, installation & commissioning, repairing and maintenance and insurance of the fly ash extraction plant installed by the appellant at the Thermal Power Plant, these services have to be treated as the services in or in relation to the manufacture of the cement by the appellant and would be eligible for Cenvat credit. In view of this, the impugned order is not sustainable' [Paras 4, 5, 6]
The impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and consequential relief was granted in accordance with law.
Issues: (i) Whether Cenvat credit on fuel oil received under duty-paid invoices can be denied to the recipient on the ground that the supplier's activity did not amount to manufacture; (ii) Whether the demand invoking the extended period was sustainable where the credit had been disclosed in ER-1 returns.
Issue (i): Whether Cenvat credit on fuel oil received under duty-paid invoices can be denied to the recipient on the ground that the supplier's activity did not amount to manufacture.
Analysis: Under the Cenvat credit framework, the supplier is responsible for assessing and paying excise duty, while the recipient must establish receipt, accounting and use of duty-paid inputs. As receipt and use of the fuel oil in manufacture were undisputed, the recipient was not required to reassess whether the supplier's process constituted manufacture under Section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944.
Conclusion: Cenvat credit could not be denied to the assessee by questioning the duty paid by the supplier; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the demand invoking the extended period was sustainable where the credit had been disclosed in ER-1 returns.
Analysis: The Cenvat credit had been taken during 2007-08 and disclosed in the ER-1 returns. This disclosure negatived suppression of facts by the assessee, whereas the show-cause notice was issued only on 21.08.2012.
Conclusion: The extended period was unavailable and the demand was time-barred; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The confirmed excise-duty demand is unsustainable both on the recipient's substantive entitlement to credit and on limitation.
Ratio Decidendi: A recipient of inputs under duty-paid invoices is entitled to Cenvat credit upon establishing receipt and use of the inputs, and cannot be required to reassess the supplier's duty liability; disclosed credit cannot support an allegation of suppression for invoking extended limitation.
CENVAT credit on duty-paid inputs - Recipient's obligation to verify supplier's duty assessment - Extended limitation-suppression of facts
CENVAT credit on duty-paid Fuel Oil - Recipient's obligation to verify supplier's duty assessment - Eligibility to CENVAT credit on Fuel Oil received and used in manufacture where the Department disputed whether the supplier's activity amounted to manufacture. - HELD THAT: - The receipt and use of the Fuel Oil in the appellant's manufacturing activity were undisputed. A recipient availing credit is required to ensure that duty has been paid and that the inputs have been received, accounted for and properly used; it is not required to undertake the supplier's assessment or determine whether duty was payable on the supplier's activity. The duty paid by the supplier could not therefore be questioned at the recipient's end. [Paras 6, 7]
The denial of CENVAT credit and the consequential demand were set aside.
Extended limitation-suppression of facts - Disclosure in ER-1 returns - Invocation of the extended period for recovery of CENVAT credit disclosed in ER-1 returns. - HELD THAT: - Since the CENVAT credit had been taken and disclosed in the ER-1 returns, no suppression of facts by the appellant was established. [Paras 8]
The confirmed demand was independently set aside as time-barred.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed, the impugned order and confirmed demand were set aside, and consequential relief was held admissible in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether statutory interest was payable on the delayed refund after release of the principal refund amount.
Analysis: The principal refund grievance stood redressed upon clearance of the refund amount. Since the date of release of the principal amount was ascertainable, the Department could quantify the statutory interest payable under the applicable refund rule.
Conclusion: Statutory interest on the delayed refund is payable to the assessee and must be quantified and released.
Statutory interest on delayed tax refund - Entitlement to statutory interest on refund under the Telangana Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 after release of the principal refund amount - HELD THAT: - As the principal refund had been cleared, the date of its release enabled the Department to quantify the statutory interest payable on account of delay. [Paras 4, 5]
The Commercial Tax Department was directed to quantify and release the statutory interest on the delayed refund within two months; the petitioner was permitted to submit a separate application or representation for that claim.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of after redressal of the claim for principal refund, with a direction for quantification and release of statutory interest on the delayed refund.
Issues: Whether the interim moratorium under Section 96 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 stays prosecution under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 against directors or persons responsible for a company, where the company issued the dishonoured cheque towards its own debt.
Analysis: Section 96 applies to legal action or proceedings in respect of the debt of the person against whom personal insolvency resolution is initiated. A company has an independent juristic existence, and a debt incurred by it remains its debt; it does not become the personal debt of its directors. Directors are prosecuted under Section 141 because of statutory vicarious liability, which does not alter the character of the underlying corporate debt. The binding position is that proceedings under Section 138 are penal in character and are not merely debt-recovery proceedings; personal insolvency moratorium cannot be invoked to avoid criminal prosecution. The pending reference concerning the compensatory component of such proceedings does not dilute the binding effect of the existing decisions or warrant suspension of trials. Any moratorium affecting recovery of compensation, if ordered, does not justify staying the criminal trial.
Conclusion: The interim moratorium under Section 96 does not stay the prosecutions under Sections 138 and 141 against the directors or responsible persons; the issue is decided against the Applicants/Petitioners.
Ratio Decidendi: A personal insolvency moratorium does not bar criminal prosecution of directors under Sections 138 and 141 for dishonour of a cheque issued by the company towards its corporate debt, since vicarious criminal liability does not convert that corporate debt into the directors' personal debt.
Personal insolvency moratorium and cheque dishonour prosecution - Vicarious criminal liability of company directors - Precedential effect of a reference to a larger Bench
Applicability of the interim moratorium under Section 96 of the IBC to prosecution of directors and persons in charge under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for dishonour of cheques issued by the company towards its own debt - HELD THAT: - The debt underlying the dishonoured cheques remained the debt of the corporate entity, which has an independent juristic existence; the directors were arraigned by virtue of the statutory vicarious liability under Section 141 and not as primary personal debtors.
The interim moratorium under Section 96 operates in respect of debts of the person by or against whom the personal insolvency process is initiated and is intended to postpone civil debt-recovery actions, not criminal prosecution. The criminal aspect of a cheque-dishonour prosecution, including the directors' personal criminal liability, is consequently not interdicted by the moratorium. Any question concerning recovery of compensation, if ordered, arises only at the appropriate subsequent stage and affords no basis to stay the trial. [Paras 90, 91, 92, 93, 94]
The applications seeking stay of the cheque-dishonour prosecutions were rejected; the trials against the directors and responsible persons may continue notwithstanding the interim moratorium.
Precedential effect of a reference to a larger Bench - Whether the trials should be deferred pending the larger Bench's determination of questions referred concerning the compensatory aspect of cheque-dishonour proceedings? - HELD THAT: - A reference to a larger Bench does not dilute the binding force of existing decisions unless they are modified or altered, and a High Court cannot decline to apply the law as it stands merely because a reference is pending. The referred decision itself maintained that the criminal aspect of proceedings under Section 138 is unaffected by the personal insolvency moratorium. In view of the advanced stage and prolonged pendency of the complaints, no case for staying the trials pending the reference was made out. [Paras 85, 86, 88, 93, 94]
The request to defer or stay the trials until disposal of the larger Bench reference was rejected.
Final Conclusion: The applications and writ petitions were dismissed. The interim orders were vacated, and the request to continue the stay of the cheque-dishonour trials was rejected.
Issues: (i) Whether cognizance orders in cheque-dishonour complaints could be quashed under inherent jurisdiction when the trials had reached the defence-evidence stage and the objections turned on disputed facts; (ii) Whether two complaints concerning ten dishonoured cheques arising from the same transaction were maintainable; (iii) Whether non-reflection of the transaction in income-tax returns or an alleged breach of the Income-tax Act invalidated the debt or rebutted the statutory presumption.
Issue (i): Whether cognizance orders in cheque-dishonour complaints could be quashed under inherent jurisdiction when the trials had reached the defence-evidence stage and the objections turned on disputed facts.
Analysis: Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code is exceptional and cannot be used to conduct a mini-trial or resolve contested matters such as whether the cheques were security cheques, the existence of a legally enforceable debt, service of demand notice, or the effect of a settlement. The complaints prima facie disclosed the ingredients of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and the statutory presumption under Section 139 remained available for consideration at trial. As defence evidence had substantially progressed, factual appreciation properly lay with the Trial Magistrate.
Conclusion: Quashing of the cognizance orders and complaints was not warranted.
Issue (ii): Whether two complaints concerning ten dishonoured cheques arising from the same transaction were maintainable.
Analysis: The ten cheques were covered by two demand notices, with one complaint relating to nine cheques and the other to one cheque. Separate complaints founded on the two notices were within the Trial Magistrate's jurisdiction. A consolidated demand notice may validly cover dishonour of multiple cheques arising from the same transaction.
Conclusion: The two cheque-dishonour complaints were maintainable.
Issue (iii): Whether non-reflection of the transaction in income-tax returns or an alleged breach of the Income-tax Act invalidated the debt or rebutted the statutory presumption.
Analysis: Section 269B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 concerns acquisition of immovable property for undervaluation and has no relevance to cheque-dishonour proceedings. Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961 regulates the mode of accepting specified sums; its breach attracts the statutory penalty under Section 271D and does not make the underlying transaction unenforceable. Non-reflection of the transaction in income-tax returns does not, by itself, displace the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
Conclusion: The alleged income-tax non-compliance did not invalidate the debt or rebut the statutory presumption.
Final Conclusion: The cheque-dishonour proceedings must continue to conclusion before the Trial Magistrate on the evidence led by the parties.
Ratio Decidendi: Inherent jurisdiction cannot be invoked to adjudicate disputed defences or displace statutory presumptions in a cheque-dishonour prosecution that prima facie satisfies Section 138 and has reached an advanced stage of trial.
Inherent jurisdiction to quash cheque dishonour proceedings - Consolidated complaint for dishonour of multiple cheques - Statutory presumption of legally enforceable debt
Inherent jurisdiction to quash cheque dishonour proceedings - Disputed questions of fact at advanced stage of trial - Quashing of cheque dishonour complaints at the stage when the complainant's evidence was complete and defence evidence had substantially commenced - HELD THAT: - Once the complaints prima facie disclosed the ingredients of the offence, the questions whether the cheques were security cheques, whether a legally enforceable debt existed, whether notice was actually served, and the effect of a settlement were disputed factual matters for determination by the trial court. The inherent power cannot be employed to conduct a mini-trial or to short-circuit proceedings at such an advanced stage, particularly when the statutory presumption under section 139 remains to be tested on evidence. [Paras 17, 18, 23, 25, 26]
The cognizance orders and the complaints were not liable to be quashed; the trial court was directed to conclude the trials expeditiously.
Consolidated complaint for dishonour of multiple cheques - Consolidated demand notice - Maintainability of two complaints arising from ten dishonoured cheques issued in one transaction, where two demand notices were issued - HELD THAT: - Separate complaints founded on the two demand notices were maintainable. A single complaint concerning dishonour of more than three cheques is maintainable where a consolidated demand notice is served upon the accused; the fact that all the cheques arose from the same transaction did not preclude the two complaints. [Paras 20]
The objection to the maintainability of the complaints was rejected.
Income-tax compliance and legally enforceable debt - Presumption under section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act - Effect of alleged non-reflection of the underlying transaction in the complainant's income-tax returns on the statutory presumption and enforceability of the debt in cheque dishonour proceedings - HELD THAT: - Mere non-reflection of the transaction in income-tax returns does not, by itself, displace the presumption under section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. A breach of the provision governing acceptance of specified sums under the Income-tax Act attracts the prescribed penalty but does not render the transaction unenforceable under section 138 or rebut the presumptions under sections 118 and 139; the provision concerning appointment of a competent authority for acquisition of undervalued immovable property was irrelevant. [Paras 21, 22]
The challenge founded on the alleged income-tax violation was rejected.
Final Conclusion: The petitions seeking quashing of the cheque dishonour complaints were dismissed. The trial court was directed to complete the remaining evidence through day-to-day proceedings and dispose of both complaints expeditiously.
TaxTMI