TaxTMI Updates e-Newsletter
Jun 23,2026

Blocking Electronic Credit Ledger (ECL) of petitioner - blocking of tax payer’s ECL by an amount exceeding the credit available at the time of issuance of said order by Commissioner or an officer authorized by him

The HC [2025 (12) TMI 699 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT], held that Rule 86A of the GST Rules, 2017 permits only a temporary restriction on the debit of legitimately available ITC in the Electronic Credit Ledger (ECL) where the Commissioner has reason to believe that such credit is fraudulently availed or ineligible. Endorsing the view of other HCs, it ruled that prior notice is not mandatory given the emergent nature of the power. However, "negative blocking" beyond the credit actually available in the ECL is impermissible. Authorities must use statutory recovery mechanisms under Sections 73 and 74 of the CGST/PGST Acts. The writ petition was allowed.

HELD THAT:- Delay was condoned, the Special Leave Petitions were dismissed for want of any ground for interference under Article 136, and the petitioners were left free to pursue other remedies for recovery in accordance with law.

Writ petition against assessment order despite statutory appellate remedy - Delay condonation in appeal under GST law - Challenged to the show cause notice and assessment order under the GST enactments - HELD THAT: - The Court declined to examine the merits of the challenge and accepted the course of relegating the petitioner to the appellate remedy. It permitted the petitioner to approach the appellate authority with the statutory pre-deposit and a delay condonation application, leaving it to that authority to consider whether the reasons for delay were satisfactory and, if so satisfied, to decide the appeal on merits. [Paras 5]

The petitioner was granted liberty to file an appeal within the time allowed by the Court, and the appellate authority was left to consider condonation of delay and thereafter the appeal on merits in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of without adjudicating the merits of the GST demand. Liberty was granted to the petitioner to pursue the statutory appeal with an application for condonation of delay and statutory pre-deposit, whereupon the appellate authority was to consider delay and, if condoned, decide the matter on merits.

Recovery of interest and penalty under GST - Discrepancy between order-in-original and Form GST DRC-07 summary - Garnishee notice without reflected demand in summary order - Violation of the Sections 78 and 79 -Rectification of Summary Order - Jurisdictional defect - Alternative statutory remedy - HELD THAT: - The Court found an apparent discrepancy between the order-in-original and the summary order in Form GST DRC-07 in the proceedings for FY 2018-19. Since the summary in Form GST DRC-07 reflected only the tax component and did not show the interest and penalty stated in the order-in-original, the garnishee notice in Form GST DRC-13 raising demand towards interest and penalty was held unsustainable in its present form. At the same time, the respondents were left at liberty to rectify Form GST DRC-07, after which it would be open to the petitioner to pursue the lawful statutory remedy. [Paras 8]

The impugned garnishee notice in Form GST DRC-13 was set aside, with liberty to the respondents to rectify Form GST DRC-07 and with liberty to the petitioner to avail legal remedy thereafter.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by setting aside the garnishee notice in Form GST DRC-13, as the demand for interest and penalty was not reflected in the existing Form GST DRC-07 summary. The respondents were permitted to rectify the summary order, and the petitioner was left free to take recourse to the remedy available in law thereafter.

Cancellation of GST registration - Defective show cause notice - Violation of principles of natural justice - Reasonable Opportunity of Hearing - Suppression of Facts - Wilful Misstatement - Cancellation of GST registration founded on a show cause notice which merely referred to statutory provisions without disclosing specific allegations, facts or particulars - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the cancellation order proceeded on allegations of fraud, wilful misstatement and suppression of facts, but the show cause notice did not set out any such allegation with supporting facts and particulars. Mere reference to statutory provisions was held insufficient to afford a reasonable opportunity to answer the case against the petitioner. Since the petitioner was thereby prevented from submitting an effective reply, the proceedings stood vitiated for breach of principles of natural justice. Following Nirakar Ramchandra Pradhan, Vs. Union of India & Ors [2023 (9) TMI 1176 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT], the Court held the cancellation order to be unsustainable, while leaving it open to the authority to issue a fresh notice in accordance with law. [Paras 6, 7, 8, 10]

The impugned cancellation order was set aside, the registration was directed to be restored forthwith, and liberty was reserved to issue a fresh show cause notice within the time stipulated by the Court.

Final Conclusion: The Court set aside the order cancelling the petitioner's GST registration on the ground that it was founded on a defective show cause notice and offended principles of natural justice. Registration was directed to be restored, with liberty to the authority to initiate fresh proceedings in accordance with law.

Territorial jurisdiction - inordinate delay - breach of procedural fairness - Seeking interim protection against coercive action - Proceedings transferred from Delhi to Mumbai through a corrigendum without authority - HELD THAT:- The Court issued notice in the writ petitions and directed that no coercive action be initiated against the petitioners on the basis of the impugned adjudication order without leave of the Court.

Liability of legal heirs for GST dues of deceased taxable person - Initiation of fresh adjudication after death of taxable person -Reverse Charge Mechanism -Interpretation of person chargeable with tax under GST - HELD THAT: - The Court held that Section 93 expressly covers a case where the business is discontinued and authorises recovery from the legal representative out of the estate inherited, including where the tax, interest or penalty is determined after his death. Section 74 uses the wider expression person chargeable with tax and not merely "taxable person"; that expression includes every person on whom the Act fastens liability, including a legal heir against whom liability is made recoverable under Section 93. The levy under Section 9 is on supply, but the statutory obligation to pay may be imposed on persons other than the supplier or registered taxable person under the scheme of the Act.

Once the statute authorises determination of liability after the death of the taxable person, the expression “determined after his death” must necessarily include the entire adjudicatory process contemplated under Sections 73, 74 or 74A of the CGST Act, as the case may be. Such process would include not merely the passing of the final order, but also the issuance of notices and all other procedural steps preceding determination. Any other interpretation would have the effect of altering the plain, simple and clear meaning of the express words employed in Section 93 of the CGST Act.

Therefore, the words in Section 93 permitting determination after death necessarily comprehend the entire adjudicatory process, including issuance of notice and other preceding procedural steps under Sections 73, 74 or 74A. The Court declined to read into Section 93 a limitation that proceedings must have been initiated during the lifetime of the deceased, and held that the provision must be applied according to its plain language. [Paras 4]

Fresh proceedings against the legal heir were held maintainable under Section 93 read with Sections 73, 74 or 74A, subject in a discontinued business to recovery only to the extent of the inherited estate capable of meeting the charge.

Final Conclusion: The Court held that Section 93 of the CGST Act authorises initiation of fresh adjudicatory proceedings against the legal heir even after the death of the taxable person and even where the business has been discontinued and no earlier notice had been issued during the lifetime of the deceased. The writ petition was accordingly dismissed, with the liability of the legal heir in such a case confined to the extent of the inherited estate capable of meeting the charge.

Scope of remand directions - Adjudication on original show cause notice - Overreaching prior court order - Assessing Officer to issue a second show cause notice without carrying out the adjudication proceeding - Right of personal hearing as envisaged under Section 75(4) - Audi Alteram Partem - HELD THAT: - In the light of the directions passed by this Court vide common order[2024 (7) TMI 1788 - TELANGANA HIGH COURT] in the Writ Petitions referred to hereinabove, the Assessing Officer was obliged to adjudicate on the show cause notice after giving a personal hearing to the petitioner and upon consideration of any reply furnished by him. The course adopted by the Assessing Officer to issue a second show cause notice without carrying out the adjudication proceeding was something which was not permissible in view of the directions passed by the Court in the previous round of litigation. Such a course on the part of the Assessing Officer would in effect amount to overreaching the order of this Court, which cannot be permitted. In similar circumstances [2026 (6) TMI 1059 - TELANGANA HIGH COURT], this Court has remanded the matter to the Proper Officer in the case of the same petitioner [2024 (7) TMI 1788 - TELANGANA HIGH COURT]. Therefore, on this legal ground, this court constrained to interfere in the impugned adjudication order by setting it aside while giving an opportunity once again to the Assessing Officer to pass an order on the basis of the first show cause notice and compliance of the personal hearing after due consideration of the reply furnished by the petitioner, in accordance with law.

The impugned order was set aside and the matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer to pass a fresh order on the basis of the first show cause notice, after personal hearing and due consideration of the reply, in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by setting aside the impugned adjudication for Financial Year 2022-23, as the Assessing Officer had acted beyond the scope of the earlier remand. The matter was remitted for fresh decision on the first show cause notice after personal hearing and consideration of the petitioner's reply.

Input tax credit reconciliation between GSTR-3B and GSTR-2A - Import and SEZ procurement credits - Failure to consider statutory provisions and submissions - Excess availment and utilisation of input tax credit on account of mismatch between GSTR-3B and GSTR-2A

Input tax credit reconciliation between GSTR-3B and GSTR-2A - Import and SEZ procurement credits - Bill of Entry as document for import credit - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the adjudicating authority failed to appreciate that GSTR-2A, for the relevant period, did not by design capture details relating to imports and SEZ procurements, and that the petitioner had accounted for such procurements in GSTR-3B and later disclosed them in GSTR-9. The difference was found to arise from wrong disclosure of import and SEZ-related credit under the wrong table in GSTR-3B, and not from excess availment of credit. The Court also noted that for import credit the relevant supporting document was the Bill of Entry under the Rules, and that denial of credit merely by matching with GSTR-2A, in the facts of the period in question, was erroneous. [Paras 8, 9]

The finding confirming excess availment of input tax credit on this count, with consequential interest and penalty, was set aside.

Failure to consider statutory provisions and submissions - Reasoned adjudication - The remaining findings on corporate guarantee, cross-charges, promotion-expense credit, merchant export rate, export refund, reverse charge on import of services, and doctor consulting and patient counseling credit could not be sustained in their present form. - HELD THAT: - The Court found that, on the remaining issues, the impugned order was erroneous because it had been passed without taking into account the relevant statutory provisions, circulars, notifications, the judgments relied on by the petitioner, and the petitioner's submissions and written submissions. The determinative defect identified by the Court was failure of proper consideration by the adjudicating authority, warranting fresh adjudication rather than affirmation on merits. [Paras 10]

The findings on the remaining issues were set aside and the matter was remitted to the adjudicating authority for reconsideration afresh in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The petition was partly allowed. The demand based on alleged excess input tax credit arising from comparison of GSTR-3B with GSTR-2A in respect of import and SEZ-related credits was set aside, while the remaining issues were remanded for fresh consideration.

Validity of reassessment notice - Specified authority for sanction - Jurisdiction of Assessing Officer - Notice issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer(s) (JAO) v/s prescribed faceless mechanism or competent Faceless Assessment Officer(s) (FAO) - Effect of subsequent amending legislation on pending reassessment litigation - Insertion of new section 147A -

HELD THAT:- Revenue fairly states that the issues involved in this batch of matters is squarely covered by our order [2026 (5) TMI 54 - SC ORDER (LB)] and connected matters, read with order [2026 (5) TMI 855 - SC ORDER] and connected matters.

The appeals are, thus, disposed of in the same terms. The matters are remitted to the jurisdictional High Courts to be decided in light of the above-cited order(s) of this Court.

Validity of reassessment notice - reasons for re-opening the Assessment were not supplied to the Assessee and only the gist of the reasons were supplied -

Validity of reassessment notice - Reopening of the assessment where the assessee was supplied only the gist of the reasons and not the entire recorded reasons - HELD THAT: - The Court noted that the Tribunal had allowed the assessee's appeal on the ground that the recorded reasons for reopening were not supplied and only a gist was furnished. On examining the material, the Court found that the full reasons were later brought on record before the Tribunal, which itself showed that the entire reasons had never been supplied to the assessee at the relevant stage. On those facts, the Tribunal's view that the reopening was bad was held to be unexceptionable. [Paras 4]

The Tribunal was right in treating the reopening as unsustainable for non-supply of the full recorded reasons.

Reason to believe based on retracted statement - Reassessment founded on retracted admission - Reopening based solely on a director's statement justification when that statement had been retracted long before issuance of notice and the retraction had been upheld in appellate proceedings - HELD THAT: - The Court held that even if the gist supplied to the assessee were treated as the actual reasons, the only basis disclosed for the Assessing Officer's belief was the statement of the director treated as an admission. That statement had already been retracted before issuance of notice under Section 148 and before the assessment order, and the retraction had also been upheld by the appellate authority. Since the disclosed basis for the belief had thus ceased to survive, the Assessing Officer could not be said to have had the requisite reason to believe that income had escaped assessment. [Paras 5, 6, 7]

The reopening was independently unsustainable because the sole recorded basis for the belief of escapement was a retracted statement already discredited before the notice was issued.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed as no substantial question of law arose from the Tribunal's order. The Court upheld the Tribunal's view that the reopening for Assessment Year 2004-05 was invalid both because the full recorded reasons were not supplied and because the sole basis of reopening was a statement that had already been retracted and whose retraction had been upheld.

Reassessment against non-existent entity - Notice issued in name of dissolved company - Inapplicability of continuing liability after striking off

HELD THAT: - The Court found it undisputed that the company stood struck off and ceased to exist before issuance of the reopening notice. Applying Principal Commissioner Income Tax Vs. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. [2019 (7) TMI 1449 - SUPREME COURT] and following Jitendra Chandralal Navlani v. Union of India [2024 (2) TMI 643 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] it held that jurisdiction cannot be assumed against a non-existent entity, and participation by an ex-director does not cure the defect. Since the reassessment notice itself was invalid, the consequential order passed under Section 144 read with Section 147, being founded on that notice, was also unsustainable. The Court further held that Section 250 of the Companies Act, 2013 did not assist the Revenue, as on the date of the reopening notice there was no subsisting liability or obligation of the struck off company requiring performance. [Paras 16, 17, 18, 19]

The notice issued under Section 148 and the consequential reassessment order were quashed as having been issued against a non-existent company.

Final Conclusion: The Court held that reassessment proceedings initiated in the name of a company already struck off from the register are void in law. The reopening notice and the consequential reassessment order were therefore quashed, while leaving open the parties' rights and contentions in respect of any future steps that may otherwise be available in law.

Reopening of assessment - Change of opinion - Audit objections as tangible material

Reopening on depreciation claims - Change of opinion - Additional depreciation on computers and plant and machinery - HELD THAT: - The Court held that these matters had been specifically examined in the original scrutiny assessment through notices u/s 142(1), to which detailed replies and supporting disclosures were furnished. Once the AO had raised queries and the assessee had answered them, the issues must be treated as having been considered even if the assessment order did not discuss them. Reopening on the same material therefore amounted to a mere review on a change of opinion. The Court further held that the third proviso to Section 32(1) permitted the balance additional depreciation in the succeeding year where the asset had been put to use for less than 180 days in the earlier year, and that computers as well as computer software fell within plant and machinery under the Rules, leaving no bona fide basis for the belief of escapement. The recorded reasons on excess depreciation on computers were also found vague and lacking a live nexus between the material and the belief formed. [Paras 29, 30, 34, 35, 36]

The reassessment notice was invalid on these depreciation issues, being founded on matters already examined and, in part, on reasons contrary to the statutory scheme.

Deduction u/s 80G for CSR-linked donations - Change of opinion - Reopening in respect of deduction claimed u/s 80G on donations connected with CSR expenditure - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the Assessing Officer had during the original assessment specifically called for details of the deduction under Chapter VI-A, copies of Section 80G certificates, mode of payment, and clarification whether the amounts had been claimed as CSR expenditure. The assessee had disclosed that CSR expenditure had been disallowed in the computation and only the amount eligible under Section 80G had been separately claimed. These queries and answers showed that the matter had been examined threadbare in the original proceedings. Reopening the same claim on the basis that it amounted to double deduction was therefore only a review of the earlier assessment. [Paras 28]

The notice of reopening on the Section 80G claim was quashed as a mere change of opinion.

Depreciation on goodwill - Recurring depreciation claim - Change of opinion - HELD THAT: - The Court held that goodwill had entered the block of assets in an earlier year and the claim of depreciation on that transaction had already been examined and allowed in the assessment for the year of acquisition. Where such inquiry has been made in the year in which the asset enters the block, reopening in a subsequent year to deny the recurring depreciation claim would still amount to a change of opinion, since there is no separate transaction in the later year requiring fresh inquiry. The Court also held that, prior to the amendment made by the Finance Act, 2021, goodwill was to be treated as an intangible asset for purposes of depreciation; hence, for Assessment Year 2017-18, the belief that depreciation on goodwill was not allowable was not a valid basis for reopening. [Paras 31, 32]

The reassessment on depreciation of goodwill was unsustainable both because the matter had already been concluded in the earlier year and because the recorded basis did not reflect a valid reason to believe for the year under consideration.

Provision towards discount - Unascertained liability - Change of opinion - Reopening on the claim relating to excess discount over an earlier provision - HELD THAT: - The Court noted that, in the original assessment, the Assessing Officer had specifically sought a brief note on the deduction claimed in relation to the short provision made towards discount, and the assessee had explained that the provision made on estimate was lower than the actual discount and that the excess was therefore claimed in the return. Since the issue had been examined and accepted in the original assessment, the subsequent attempt to treat it as an inadmissible provision for an unascertained liability was only a change of opinion. [Paras 33]

The reopening on this issue was invalid.

Audit objections as tangible material - Reason to believe - Reopening within four years - whether Audit objections, in the facts of the case, did not constitute tangible material to justify reopening within four years? - HELD THAT: - The Court accepted that, though the first proviso to Section 147 was inapplicable as the notice was within four years, the Assessing Officer still had to possess a valid reason to believe and could not exercise the power of reassessment as a power of review. The only alleged new material was the audit party's objections. The Court held that where the original assessment records showed that the relevant issues had already been queried and answered, subsequent audit objections were merely the audit party's opinion on the same material and did not amount to tangible material for reopening. The Court also held that the proposition in Kalyanji Mavji & Co. [1975 (12) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT] insofar as it suggested reopening for oversight or mistake by the Income-tax Officer, was not good law in view of Indian and Eastern Newspapers Society [1979 (8) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT (LB)], and that the line of reasoning in Consolidated Photo & Finvest Ltd. [2006 (1) TMI 59 - DELHI HIGH COURT] did not assist the Revenue. [Paras 22, 23, 37, 38, 39]

The reassessment proceedings were without jurisdiction, the audit objections being insufficient to reopen matters already examined in scrutiny.

Final Conclusion: The Court held that all six grounds of reopening related to matters already examined in the original scrutiny assessment and that the reassessment was founded only on audit objections without any tangible material. The notice u/s 148 and the order rejecting objections for Assessment Year 2017-18 were therefore quashed.

Transfer of case between Assessing Officers in the same city - Opportunity of hearing u/s 127(3) - Jurisdiction of transferee Assessing Officer after valid transfer

Validity of assessment after intra-city transfer - requirement of prior notice or opportunity of hearing - HELD THAT: - The Court held that Section 127 expressly permits transfer of a case from one Assessing Officer to another and, by virtue of sub-section (3), dispenses with any requirement of hearing where the officers are situated in the same city, locality or place. Since it was undisputed that the case was first transferred from the 4th respondent to the 2nd respondent and thereafter to the 1st respondent, and that all the officers were functioning within the same city, the transfers squarely fell within Section 127(3).

The Court further held that Section 127 permits transfer at any stage of the proceedings and preserves the validity of notices already issued, with the result that the assessment proceedings validly continued before the transferee officer. Once the transfer orders were found to be in conformity with law, the assessment order could not be assailed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the transferee authority. [Paras 7, 8, 9, 10, 12]

The challenge to the transfer orders and to the consequential assessment on the ground of want of jurisdiction was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was dismissed. The Court held that the intra-city transfers of the petitioner's case were valid under Section 127(3), and therefore the assessment made by the transferee officer could not be invalidated for want of jurisdiction, while leaving it open to the petitioner to challenge the assessment on other grounds before the competent forum.

Deduction for housing projects u/s 80IB(10) - Minimum one-acre plot requirement for eligible housing project - Exclusion of land used for personal residence from project plot area

Whether Deduction for the housing project was not allowable where the land on which the project itself was constructed measured less than one acre and the assessee sought to include adjoining land used for her own residence to satisfy the statutory minimum? - HELD THAT: - Tribunal held that the condition in section 80IB(10)(b) attaches to the specific plot of land on which the eligible housing project is developed and constructed. Land forming part of the approved project, including integral common amenities, may be counted; but land not forming part of the housing project and used for any other purpose cannot be added merely because it is contiguous or owned by the assessee.

On the Tribunal's own findings, the housing project stood on about 70 cents, and the balance land was used for the assessee's personal residence. The statutory requirement was therefore not met. The decision in Vandana Properties [2012 (4) TMI 54 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] was held not to assist the assessee, since it did not lay down that a project built on less than one acre could qualify by clubbing it with separate land on which the assessee had constructed her own residential house. [Paras 17, 18, 19, 20, 22]

The disallowance of deduction u/s 80IB(10) was upheld for both years and the orders of the lower authorities were confirmed.

Final Conclusion: Both appeals were dismissed. Tribunal held that the minimum one-acre condition u/s 80IB(10)(b) had to be satisfied by the land on which the housing project itself stood, and not by adding separate land used for the assessee's personal residence.

Validity of satisfaction note u/s 153C - Requirement that seized material must bear on determination of total income - Initiation of proceedings u/s 153C for the impugned assessment years as satisfaction note of the AO of the other person did not record that the seized material had any bearing on the determination of the assessee's total income

HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined the satisfaction note recorded in the case of the assessee and found that, though it referred to material stated to have been found during search and to certain ledger entries, it did not record the statutory satisfaction that such seized material had any bearing on the determination of the total income of the assessee.

Applying the ratio of Saksham Commodities Ltd. [2024 (4) TMI 461 - DELHI HIGH COURT] and Naveen Kumar Gupta [2024 (11) TMI 1071 - DELHI HIGH COURT] the Tribunal held that absence of this essential jurisdictional satisfaction vitiated the notice issued u/s 153C. Since the very assumption of jurisdiction failed on this legal ground, the consequential assessment orders were liable to be quashed, and the remaining legal grounds as well as the merits were left unadjudicated. [Paras 8, 9, 10]

The notice issued u/s 153C and the consequent assessment orders for both assessment years were quashed.

Final Conclusion: Both appeals were allowed. The Tribunal quashed the notice under section 153C and the consequential assessment orders for A.Ys. 2014-15 and 2015-16 on the ground that the recorded satisfaction did not state that the seized material bore on the determination of the assessee's total income.

Exemption for capital gains invested in purchase of plot and construction of residential house - Safe harbour tolerance under stamp duty valuation for taxation of property purchase difference

Exemption for capital gains invested in purchase of plot and construction of residential house - Beneficial interpretation of residential house construction exemption - Delay in construction due to COVID-19 disruptions - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the provision granting exemption for investment in a residential house is a beneficial provision and must receive a liberal and purposive interpretation. It found that the statute requires investment towards acquisition or construction of a residential house within the prescribed period, and does not make production of a completion certificate or strict completion within that period the sole test where the investment in the residential project is otherwise established. On the record, the purchase of the plot for residential construction, the obtaining of planning approval and building permit, and the subsequent construction of the house were not in dispute.

The Tribunal further held that the delay substantially overlapped with the extraordinary disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, including restrictions on labour, materials and governmental functioning, and that such circumstances could not be treated as ordinary delay. It therefore rejected the restrictive approach of confining relief only to the specific period covered by the CBDT notification, and held that substantial compliance with the requirement of investment in a residential house stood established. [Paras 30, 31, 32, 33, 34]

The disallowance of the claimed exemption was held unjustified, and the Assessing Officer was directed to allow the exemption.

Safe harbour tolerance under stamp duty valuation for taxation of property purchase difference - Curative application of enhanced tolerance band - Addition on account of difference between purchase consideration and stamp duty value where the variation was below 10% - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the difference between the actual consideration and the stamp duty valuation was less than 10%. It held that the enhancement of the permissible tolerance band from 5% to 10% was introduced to remove genuine hardship arising from minor valuation differences and was therefore remedial in character. Proceeding on that basis, it held that where the legislature itself had recognized variations up to 10% as reasonable, the benefit of that curative amendment could not be denied in a case where the variation admittedly fell below that threshold. On that reasoning, the addition under the provision taxing such differential value did not survive on merits. [Paras 36, 37, 38, 39]

The addition based on the stamp duty valuation difference was held unsustainable and was directed to be deleted.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed on merits. Exemption for investment in construction of a residential house was directed to be granted, and the addition based on the difference between the purchase price and the stamp duty value was deleted; the challenge to reassessment jurisdiction was left open as academic.

Carry forward and set off of short term capital loss - Belated loss return u/s 139(3) - Challenge to denial of carry forward in subsequent assessment year

Set off of capital gains of A.Y. 2024-25 against carried forward short term capital loss of A.Y. 2020-21 where the loss return for A.Y. 2020-21 had been filed beyond the prescribed time and the denial of carry forward in that year was not separately remedied - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that section 80 makes compliance with the requirement of a return filed under section 139(3) mandatory for carry forward and set off of loss. Since the return for A.Y. 2020-21 had admittedly been filed beyond the due date, the benefit of carry forward stood denied when that return was processed.

The record did not show any application seeking extension of time or condonation of delay for that year. The decision in CIT vs. Kullu Valley Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd. [1970 (4) TMI 14 - SUPREME COURT] was distinguished on facts, as the present dispute arose from an attempt in A.Y. 2024-25 to obtain relief against the earlier denial of carry forward for A.Y. 2020-21. The Tribunal held that such remedy did not lie in the appeal for the subsequent assessment year. [Paras 7, 8]

The assessee was not entitled to set off the capital gains of A.Y. 2024-25 against the short term capital loss of A.Y. 2020-21, and the denial of such carry forward could not be reopened in the appeal for A.Y. 2024-25.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal dismissed the appeal and upheld the denial of set off of A.Y. 2024-25 capital gains against the short term capital loss of A.Y. 2020-21. It held that the consequence of denial of carry forward in A.Y. 2020-21 could not be challenged in proceedings for the subsequent assessment year.

Unexplained money from cash deposits - Cash deposits sourced from recorded withdrawals - Addition of entire sales receipts - Rejection of cash book for negative cash balance -

HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the appellate authority had rejected the cash book and cash summary on the basis of negative cash balances and other discrepancies, but the assessee's explanation showed that the alleged negative balances arose from inadvertent recording and computational errors. It further noted that the fact of substantial cash withdrawals during the year was not disputed by the AO and there was no material to show that the withdrawn cash had been utilised elsewhere.

The supposed geographical discrepancy in withdrawals and deposits was also found to be contrary to the bank statements, and the difference between the demonetisation-period deposits reflected in the accounts and the larger figure in the data was held to be attributable to different accounting perimeters. On the overall facts, the Tribunal held that the deposits stood substantially explained and, since the purchases were not doubted, the entire sales could not be brought to tax as unexplained money. The additional evidence sought to be produced at the Tribunal stage was, however, not admitted. [Paras 6, 7]

The addition sustained by the appellate authority was reduced and only a lump-sum addition of Rs. 5 lakhs was directed to be retained, with consequential recomputation of income.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was partly allowed. The Tribunal declined to admit additional evidence at the appellate stage, held that the cash-deposit addition could not be sustained in the amount confirmed by the appellate authority, and restricted the addition to Rs. 5 lakhs with a direction for recomputation.

Jurisdiction u/s 153C - Year-wise incriminating material - Omnibus satisfaction note - Mechanical/common satisfaction note for multiple assessment years

HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that recording of satisfaction is the foundation for invoking jurisdiction u/s 153C and such satisfaction must be specific, based on cogent material, and must show that the seized material pertains to the assessee and has a bearing on determination of total income for the relevant assessment year.

On examination of the satisfaction note, it found that the note was common for several years, did not distinguish the year under consideration, did not identify any specific incriminating document for that year, and disclosed no prima facie analysis of undisclosed income.

The material relied upon was also stated to be a third-party ledger, unsupported by independent corroboration or meaningful enquiry, and could not be treated as incriminating in the absence of nexus with undisclosed income of the assessee. Since the assessment year was unabated, the absence of year-specific satisfaction vitiated the jurisdiction at the threshold. [Paras 5, 6, 7, 9, 10]

The notice issued u/s 153C and the consequent assessment order were quashed, and the Revenue's challenge on merits was left open without adjudication.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal upheld the order quashing the assessment for Assessment Year 2014-15 on the ground that jurisdiction under section 153C was assumed on the basis of a common, vague and mechanical satisfaction note lacking year-specific incriminating material. The Revenue's appeal was accordingly dismissed, and the merits of the additions were left open.

Notional interest on loans to subsidiary - Consistency in assessee's own case

HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the dispute on taxing notional interest from the assessee's advances to its subsidiary had repeatedly arisen in the assessee's own case and had been consistently decided in its favour by the first appellate authority as well as the coordinate bench.

Since the Revenue could not show any distinguishing fact or change in law for the year under consideration, the CIT(A) was justified in following those binding precedents and deleting the addition. The pendency of the Revenue's appeals before the High Court against earlier orders did not, by itself, justify a departure from the settled view in the assessee's own case. [Paras 6]

The addition made on account of notional interest on loans and advances to the subsidiary was rightly deleted, and the Revenue's challenge failed.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order deleting the addition of notional interest on advances to the subsidiary for AY 2023-24, holding that the issue stood covered in the assessee's own case on identical facts. The Revenue's appeal was dismissed.

Unexplained investment in immovable property - Primary onus u/s 69 - Family-funded property purchase without formal gift deed - Banking trail as source explanation - Absence of formal gift deed

HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the assessee had discharged the primary onus by producing the sale deed, the father's bank statement and the details showing direct payment by the father to the seller through banking channels. Once the immediate and proximate source of the investment stood explained, the burden shifted to the Revenue to bring adverse material to dislodge that explanation.

AO had not disputed the identity of the father, his status as a regular assessee, or the fact of payment through bank. Mere suspicion regarding the antecedent credits in the father's bank account could not justify an addition u/s 69 in the hands of the assessee, particularly when there was no material to suggest that she had any undisclosed income of her own.

Tribunal further held that, in the family context, absence of a formal gift deed by itself did not render the transaction unexplained once the payment trail and source of payment were established. On the material already available on record, remand was found unnecessary. [Paras 8, 9, 10, 11]

The addition under section 69 was held unsustainable and was directed to be deleted in entirety.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) and decided the matter on merits. It held that the investment in the property stood explained by direct payment from the father's disclosed bank account and, accordingly, deleted the addition under section 69; the assessee's appeal was allowed.

Characterisation of surrendered income arising from business activity - Application of unexplained expenditure provisions vis-a-vis normal business income - Taxability u/s 115BBE where no independent unexplained source is found

Whether addition sustained as alleged unexplained cash expenditure could not be assessed under the deeming provisions for unexplained income where the assessee's only source was business income and no independent unexplained source was found? - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the determinative test was whether the impugned amount could be linked to any source other than the assessee's regular business. Since the record showed that the assessee had only business income and there was no material of any separate unexplained source, the addition could not be treated as income from unexplained sources for applying section 115BBE.

Following decision in Nishatbegum Syed Baba Rasool Patel Show Company [2025 (6) TMI 1988 - ITAT PUNE] the Tribunal accepted that where the surrendered or added amount arises in the course of the business itself and the Revenue does not establish any distinct source outside that business, it is liable to be assessed as normal business income. [Paras 5, 6]

AO was directed to assess the sustained addition as business income and not u/s 69A read with section 115BBE.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal partly allowed the appeal and held that the sustained addition was assessable as normal business income. In the absence of any material showing an independent unexplained source, taxation under the deeming provisions read with section 115BBE was held to be unwarranted.

Penalty u/s 270A - under-reporting of income - Disallowance of depreciation by charitable trust - Nil assessed income and absence of tax effect

Whether penalty u/s 270A can be sustained merely because the assessee’s claim of depreciation has been disallowed u/s 11(6), when, after giving effect to the appellate order in quantum proceedings, the income of the assessee remains Nil and no tax is ultimately payable? - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that penalty under section 270A is not an automatic consequence of every disallowance. The provision requires a real statutory case of under-reporting, namely that the assessed income is greater than the income determined in the return, or that the matter otherwise falls within the conditions contemplated by the section.

In the present case, though depreciation was disallowed, the assessee's income, after giving effect to the appellate order allowing accumulation, remained Nil. There was no positive assessed income, no tax payable, and no demonstrated benefit of carry forward or set-off. The Tribunal held that disallowance of an inadmissible claim is not by itself equivalent to under-reporting of income, particularly in the case of a charitable trust whose income continues to remain exempt and assessed at Nil. Following Podar Literacy and Education Trust [2025 (12) TMI 1857 - ITAT MUMBAI] the Tribunal found that the essential statutory basis for penalty was absent. [Paras 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]

The penalty levied u/s 270A on the disallowance of depreciation was held to be unsustainable and was deleted.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal allowed the appeal and deleted the penalty. It held that where, after giving effect to the quantum appellate order, the charitable trust's income remained Nil and no tax was payable, disallowance of depreciation under section 11(6) did not constitute under-reporting of income for purposes of section 270A.

Maintainability of writ petition against show cause notice - Classification dispute in customs tariff - availability of statutory remedies - Pre-consultation hearing - Violation of natural justice - Demand-cum-show cause notice issued under Sections 124 and 28

Maintainability of writ petition against show cause notice - Classification dispute in customs tariff - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the impugned notice was founded on a classification issue, namely whether the imported goods were classifiable under the chapters asserted by the petitioner or under Chapter 87 as contended by the respondents for levy of customs duty. Such controversy required adjudication by the statutory authority and did not justify immediate writ interference. Though the principle that a High Court may interfere at the show cause notice stage where the notice is without jurisdiction or amounts to abuse of process was not disputed, the Court found that the present case did not fall within that exception. [Paras 13, 14, 16, 17]

The petitioner was relegated to submit its reply to the show cause notice and pursue the statutory process, and writ jurisdiction was declined at that stage.

Pre-consultation hearing and pleading of natural justice challenge - HELD THAT: - The Court found that there was no specific pleading in the writ petition that no hearing had been granted at the pre-consultation stage, a position fairly not disputed by counsel for the petitioner. In that view, the Court declined to entertain the writ petition on the ground of violation of natural justice on that count, while observing that the contention could be placed before the respondents for consideration in the adjudication. [Paras 15]

The natural justice challenge based on absence of pre-consultation hearing was not examined in writ jurisdiction and was left open to be urged before the adjudicating authority.

Final Conclusion: The Court declined to interfere with the customs show cause notice in writ jurisdiction, holding that the matter involved an adjudicable classification dispute and did not fall within the recognised exceptions for interference at the notice stage. The petitioner was directed to file its reply, and the competent authority was directed to adjudicate the notice after granting proper hearing.

Remand for consideration of contention not urged before Tribunal - Suspension of Container Freight Station approval pending enquiry -HELD THAT: - The suspension order has been revoked by making certain observations on the merits of the matter when the enquiry is still to be initiated, and the investigation is ongoing by the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI). In such a scenario, the suspension order could not have been revoked, was the submission of the Revenue.

The Court found that the proposition pressed on behalf of the Container Freight Station before it, namely that suspension under Regulation 11(2) of the Handling of Cargo in Customs Areas Regulations, 2009 is only preventive and could not continue once the required material had been supplied, was not the case canvassed before the Tribunal. Since that proposition had not been urged before the Tribunal, the Tribunal had given no finding on it. In these circumstances, and with parties agreeing to that course, the impugned order was set aside and the matter remanded to the Tribunal for fresh consideration of the question of suspension, with all merits kept open. The suspension order consequently stood revived pending disposal of the appeal before the Tribunal, and the Court directed that the restored appeal be heard by a different Bench in the peculiar facts of the case. [Paras 7, 8, 9, 10, 13]

The impugned Tribunal order was set aside and the appeal restored to the Tribunal for fresh decision on suspension of the Container Freight Station approval; pending such decision, the suspension order stood revived.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was disposed of by setting aside the Tribunal's order and remanding the matter for fresh consideration, as the determinative contention had not been urged before the Tribunal. The High Court left all merits open and directed that the restored appeal be heard by a different Bench, while reviving the suspension in the meantime.

Jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal under the proviso to section 129A of the Customs Act - baggage proviso - distinction between "baggage" and "currency" for jurisdictional purposes - Foreign currency seizure before Customs clearance - Strict construction of exclusion of appeal - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the exclusion of appellate jurisdiction for orders relating to goods imported or exported as baggage must be construed strictly. Since the appellant was intercepted before entering the Customs clearance area, and the proceedings did not arise from baggage declaration, baggage assessment, baggage examination or Customs clearance of accompanied baggage, the subject-matter could not be treated as one directly and substantially relating to export of goods as baggage. The real controversy concerned seizure and confiscation of foreign currency for alleged violation of FEMA or Customs restrictions. The decisions cited by the revenue were found distinguishable, while the ruling in Commissioner of Customs Vs Vinod Kumar Shaw & Anr.[2010 (12) TMI 1335 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT] was applied for the principle that currency and baggage are distinct, and that a case concerning seized currency is not, for that reason alone, a baggage matter excluded from the Tribunal's jurisdiction. [Paras 8, 9, 11, 12, 13]

The preliminary objection was rejected, and the appeal was held maintainable before the Tribunal for hearing on merits.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal held that the dispute was not one relating to goods exported as baggage so as to attract the bar under the proviso to Section 129A(1). The appeal was therefore held maintainable and directed to be listed for hearing on merits.

Maintainability of writ against pending tribunal proceedings - Alternative statutory remedy - Forum shopping - Abuse of Process - Judicial Restraint - Seeking direction to the Tribunal for early listing of the transfer application, or a restraint against the adjudicating bench from proceeding with the resolution plan approval application - maintainable in exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 - HELD THAT: - The Petitioner has not challenged any order passed by Respondent No. 1 or Respondent No. 2. Instead, the Petitioner seeks a direction to Respondent No. 1 for early listing and disposal of the Transfer Application before Respondent No. 2 pronounces orders in the Application seeking approval of the Resolution Plan. In the alternative, the Petitioner seeks a direction to Respondent No. 2 to maintain status quo in respect of the Application for approval of the Resolution Plan until the Transfer Application is adjudicated by Respondent No. 1.

Respondent No. 1 is a Tribunal presided over by its President, and the constitution of a special Bench, as well as the listing of matters during the vacation period, falls within the exclusive prerogative of the Hon’ble President of Respondent No. 1. Instead of mentioning the matter or moving an appropriate application before the Hon’ble President of Respondent No. 1, the Petitioner has approached this Court seeking the directions set out hereinabove.

It is well settled that High Courts ought ordinarily to refrain from invoking their extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution where proceedings are pending before the competent Tribunal.

The Court held that constitution of a special Bench and listing of matters during the vacation period lay within the exclusive prerogative of the President of the Tribunal, and such directions could not be issued by the High Court in writ jurisdiction. It further held that where proceedings were pending before the competent Tribunal, the High Court ought ordinarily to refrain from exercising extraordinary jurisdiction, particularly when the petitioner had already availed an alternative statutory remedy by filing an appeal before the appellate tribunal and could also seek urgent listing before the Tribunal itself. The Court also found that the transfer application had been filed at a belated stage after participation in the insolvency proceedings, and that approaching multiple forums for substantially identical reliefs amounted to forum shopping and abuse of process. [Paras 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]

The writ petition was dismissed as misconceived, not maintainable in the circumstances, and an abuse of process, with costs.

Final Conclusion: The Court declined to interfere under Articles 226 and 227, holding that the petitioner must pursue remedies before the competent tribunal and the appellate forum. The writ petition was dismissed with costs on the ground that it was misconceived and constituted forum shopping and abuse of process.

Finality of liquidator's determination of security interest - Distribution of sale proceeds among secured creditors - Tentative determination -Waterfall mechanism -HELD THAT: - The Appellate Tribunal held that the Liquidator's decision, read as a whole, merely reflected the position arising from the earlier order and was intended to be placed before the pending appeal in which that order itself was under challenge. The statement that security interest and distribution entitlements stood determined in terms of the earlier order could not be read in isolation as creating a binding and final adjudication overriding or foreclosing the pending appellate consideration. Since the decision itself indicated that it was tentative and subject to the outcome of the pending appeal, no party could derive any definitive advantage from it at that stage. [Paras 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]

It was clarified that the observation in paragraph 45 of the Liquidator's decision was not conclusive and that the decision would be considered only in the pending appeal against the earlier order; the appeal was accordingly closed subject to that clarification.

Final Conclusion: The Appellate Tribunal clarified that the Liquidator's decision on security interest and distribution entitlements was only tentative, being founded on the earlier order already under challenge, and did not attain independent finality. On that clarification, the appeal was closed.

Repayment of deposit by company - Proof of deposit with respondent company - Insolvency moratorium overriding pending proceedings - Claim under Section 73(4) - Moratorium under Section 14 - Separate legal entity - Corporate insolvency resolution process

Repayment of deposit by company - Proof of deposit with respondent company - HELD THAT: - The Appellate Tribunal upheld the finding that the burden lay on the appellant to prove that the amount was advanced to the respondent company as a deposit attracting the remedy for repayment. The material on record did not show that the amount was credited to the respondent company's account; on the contrary, the bank details and receipt relied upon indicated credit and acknowledgment by Kerala Trade Centre, treated as a separate entity. In the absence of proof that the respondent company had received the amount as its deposit, the petition against it was not maintainable on that footing. [Paras 8, 9]

The dismissal of the petition for repayment against the respondent company was affirmed, with liberty to pursue appropriate remedy against Kerala Trade Centre.

Insolvency moratorium overriding pending proceedings - HELD THAT: - The Appellate Tribunal held that once the respondent company had been admitted into CIRP and moratorium had come into operation, continuation of the proceedings was barred. It further held that, by reason of the overriding effect of the insolvency law, the appellant's remedy survived only through submission of its claim in the insolvency process in accordance with the statutory distribution mechanism. [Paras 10]

The appeal was treated as infructuous in view of the moratorium, without prejudice to the appellant's right to lodge its claim in the insolvency proceedings.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed on merits because the appellant did not prove that the amount claimed was a deposit received by the respondent company. In any event, the respondent having entered CIRP, the appeal was rendered infructuous and the appellant was left to pursue its claim in the insolvency process.

Reasoned adjudication - Non-speaking order - Application of mind - Failure to consider pleadings - Application seeking directions against the Liquidator - failure to consider the grounds raised and to record reasons on the reliefs claimed - HELD THAT: - The Appellate Tribunal held that an adjudicatory order must deal with the pleadings raised by the parties and disclose reasons for accepting or rejecting the reliefs sought. Where the Tribunal does not consider the contentions raised in the application and does not record findings on them, the order becomes a non-speaking order and stands vitiated for non-application of mind.

The basic governing principles of adjudication is that whatever plea has been taken by the parties to the proceedings in a judicial proceeding, that has to be considered by the Court/Tribunal while deciding the controversy inter se between the parties in order to repose confidence among the litigants that their matter has been considered on merits, to avoid any arbitrariness that may come in and to attach fairness to the proceedings that, is being adjudicated upon by the Ld. Court/Tribunal. In any adjudicated matter, in which the pleadings, raised by the parties are not considered and no finding are recorded either accepting or denying the contentions raised by the parties to the proceedings, the resultant order will have to be treated as vitiated because it will amount to be an order which is non-speaking. Passing of an order without assigning any reasons goes against the tenets of the adjudication of a case on merits, which is the basic spirit contemplated for the purposes of an effective adjudication of a controversy between the parties. Passing of an order without assigning reasons on the pleadings raised by the parties, would vitiate the very purpose of adjudicatory role which has been assigned to the courts/ the Tribunals to settle the controversy between the parties, on merits. At the least, a litigant is entitled to learn the reasons for not accepting his plea, and that can be possible only when the court discloses its mind by assigning reasons. Since the impugned order granted only part of the relief and did not address the remaining prayers or record reasons on merits, it could not be sustained. [Paras 12, 13, 14]

The impugned order was quashed and the application was remitted to the NCLT for fresh decision on merits, without any expression of opinion on the underlying merits.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed on the limited ground that the impugned order was unreasoned and passed without consideration of the pleadings. The matter was remanded to the NCLT for fresh adjudication of the application on merits.

Refund of service tax deposited under different assessee code - Technical error in accounting code - Unjust enrichment and investigation deposit - Pre-deposit refundable on failure of demand - Adjustment of payment under wrong registration - Admissibility of the part of the refund claim - Principle of Mutuality - Unjust Enrichment - Wrong Accounting Code

Refund of service tax deposited under different assessee code - Technical error in accounting code-HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the entire amount had admittedly reached the Government exchequer and the Department itself had treated Ashirwad Palace as a single unit while issuing the demand and seeking appropriation. Having raised and recovered the demand in that manner, the Revenue could not split the same residential complex into two entities at the refund stage and defeat the claim on a bookkeeping distinction. Following the principle recognised in Devang Papers Mills Pvt Ltd. [2016 (1) TMI 389 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] and the Tribunal decisions dealing with payment under a wrong registration code, the Tribunal held that such discrepancy is a matter of internal adjustment at the Department's end and cannot extinguish the substantive right to refund once the levy itself failed. The amount recovered during investigation, after the Revenue withdrew its appeal against the order allowing the assessee's case on mutuality, was liable to be returned and could not be retained on technical grounds. [Paras 4, 5]

The rejection of the balance refund on the ground of deposit under a different assessee code was held unsustainable, and the appellant was held entitled to refund of the entire amount with applicable interest on the unpaid balance.

Unjust enrichment and investigation deposit - Pre-deposit refundable on failure of demand - Mutuality and non-levy of service tax - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that amounts deposited during investigation to secure the Revenue partake the character of pre-deposit and not of self-assessed tax passed on to customers. Once the demand was set aside on merits, the retained amount lost the character of tax, and the bar of unjust enrichment under Section 11B could not be mechanically invoked. Since service tax itself was not leviable on the appellant's collections from members due to mutuality, there was no basis to treat those collections as inclusive of service tax or to infer passing on of incidence. The Department therefore had no authority to retain the amount after the levy had failed. [Paras 4, 5]

The Revenue's appeal founded on unjust enrichment was rejected, and the order setting aside the refund already sanctioned was itself set aside.

Final Conclusion: Both impugned appellate orders were set aside. The Tribunal held that the entire amount deposited during investigation was refundable, the technical objection based on different assessee codes was untenable, and the bar of unjust enrichment was inapplicable; the unpaid balance was directed to be refunded with applicable interest.

Refund of service tax paid under mistake of law - Double payment of service tax on the same taxable service - barred by limitation under Section 11B -Limitation for refund of amounts not payable as tax

Whether the appellant is entitled to claim refund of the amount of Service Tax paid by them on transportation of goods by CONCOR or not, on which CONCOR had already paid Service Tax and the appellant has also paid Service Tax under reverse charge mechanism ? - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the /determinative fact was whether service tax on the transportation services rendered by CONCOR had been paid twice, once by CONCOR and again by the appellant under reverse charge on the same service. If the appellant had discharged tax under reverse charge by mistake on an activity on which CONCOR had already paid service tax, the amount so paid by the appellant would be refundable. Since this factual position required examination of the relevant payments and records, the matter was remitted to the adjudicating authority for verification and fresh decision in accordance with law. [Paras 11]

The question of refund on the alleged double payment was not finally decided on merits and was remanded to the adjudicating authority for factual verification.

Limitation for refund - Applicability of Section 11B - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that where service tax is paid by mistake under reverse charge, though not payable by the assessee, the limitation prescribed under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 cannot be invoked. Applying the principle stated by the Calcutta High Court in Commissioner of Service Tax, Kolkata v. M/s. Electrosteel Castings Ltd. [2025 (1) TMI 633 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT] it was concluded that the bar of limitation did not apply to the refund claims in the facts of the case. [Paras 12]

The ground of rejection based on limitation was set aside, and the refund claims were held not hit by the period prescribed under Section 11B.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal held that the refund claims were not barred by limitation, since the appellant's case was of service tax paid by mistake on an amount not payable by it. The dispute as to whether there was double payment of service tax on the same rail transportation service was remanded to the adjudicating authority for factual verification and fresh decision in accordance with law.