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Issues: Whether Sections 69 and 70(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 are unconstitutional.
Analysis: The vires challenge stood rejected by the binding determination that powers to summon, arrest and prosecute for GST levy, collection and evasion-control are ancillary and incidental to the legislative power under Article 246A of the Constitution of India.
Conclusion: Sections 69 and 70(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 are constitutionally valid; the issue is decided against the assessee.
Seeking a declaration that Sections 69 and 70(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, are unconstitutional
HELD THAT:- As decided in Radhika Agarwal [2025 (2) TMI 1162 - SUPREME COURT (LB)] this Court has rejected the challenge to the vires of Sections 69 and 70 of the CGST Act and held that a penalty or prosecution mechanism for the levy and collection of GST, and for checking its evasion, is a permissible exercise of legislative power. The GST Acts, in pith and substance, pertain to Article 246- A of the Constitution and the powers to summon, arrest and prosecute are ancillary and incidental to the power to levy and collect goods and services tax. In view of the aforesaid, the vires challenge to Section 69 and 70 of the CGST Act must fail and is accordingly rejected.
In light of the aforesaid judgment, no further orders are required in the present writ petition.
Issues: (i) Whether alleged non-consideration of the reply and supporting documents justified writ interference despite the statutory appellate remedy; (ii) Whether DGGI and the Additional Commissioner, CGST Delhi North, had jurisdiction to issue and adjudicate the common notice; (iii) Whether reliance on Circular No. 171/03/2022-GST rendered the demand under Section 74 amenable to writ interference.
Issue (i): Whether alleged non-consideration of the reply and supporting documents justified writ interference despite the statutory appellate remedy.
Analysis: Article 226 jurisdiction need not be exercised where Section 107 provides an effective appellate remedy capable of undertaking factual scrutiny. The impugned order recorded the personal hearing and disclosed its reasons for rejecting input tax credit, notwithstanding an erroneous reference to the date of written submissions and the absence of separate discussion of every document. Verification of work orders, subcontracts, invoices, payments and evidence of execution requires factual appraisal available in appeal.
Conclusion: The alleged inadequacy in consideration of the reply and documents does not warrant writ intervention and is to be pursued in statutory appeal, against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether DGGI and the Additional Commissioner, CGST Delhi North, had jurisdiction to issue and adjudicate the common notice.
Analysis: Notification No. 14/2017-Central Tax vested specified DGGI officers with the powers of Central tax officers throughout India. Administrative allocation to State tax authorities does not exclude intelligence-based enforcement by DGGI. The applicable adjudication allocation instruments designated Delhi North for the common notice because the noticee with the highest tax demand was located in Delhi, and the revised allocation likewise retained Delhi North as the designated authority.
Conclusion: DGGI and the Additional Commissioner, CGST Delhi North, had jurisdiction over the common notice and its adjudication. The jurisdictional objection fails, against the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether reliance on Circular No. 171/03/2022-GST rendered the demand under Section 74 amenable to writ interference.
Analysis: The Circular differentiates between ineligible input tax credit used for genuine outward supplies and cases where both inward and outward invoices lack underlying supplies. Determination of the applicable situation, the validity of recovery under Section 74, and the resulting consequences for penalties depends upon characterization of the underlying transactions and examination of the evidentiary record. Section 107(11) enables the appellate authority to undertake that inquiry and confirm, modify or annul the adjudication.
Conclusion: Invocation of the Circular does not by itself justify writ interference. Its applicability and consequences remain open for appellate determination, against the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The enforcement and adjudicatory jurisdiction challenge stands conclusively rejected, while the factual and substantive challenges concerning input tax credit, demand, interest, penalties and applicability of the Circular remain for determination in the statutory appellate forum.
Writ jurisdiction and alternative statutory remedy - Jurisdiction of intelligence-based GST enforcement against State-assigned taxpayers - Common show-cause notice - allocation of adjudication
Writ jurisdiction and alternative statutory remedy - Input tax credit - factual appraisal of supporting documents - Availability of writ relief against an appealable GST adjudication order where the alleged non-consideration of documents, entitlement to input tax credit and applicability of Circular No. 171/03/2022-GST required factual appraisal. - HELD THAT: - Non-reproduction of the reply did not by itself establish that it had been ignored. The adjudication order disclosed the basis for rejecting the input tax credit claim, namely absence of actual supplies, non-fulfilment of statutory conditions and failure to discharge the burden of proof. Determination of the petitioners' case required correlation of work orders, subcontracts, invoices, payments and evidence of execution. The appellate authority was competent to undertake the necessary inquiry and decide the factual and legal questions, including the applicability of the Circular; their invocation did not render the proceedings jurisdictionally defective. [Paras 14, 15, 22, 23, 24]
No exceptional ground was made out to bypass the statutory appeal; the merits of the input tax credit demands, interest, penalties and the Circular were left open for appellate consideration.
Jurisdiction of intelligence-based GST enforcement against State-assigned taxpayers - Jurisdiction of DGGI to investigate and issue proceedings against taxpayers administratively assigned to State tax authorities. - HELD THAT: - Specified DGGI officers had been appointed as Central tax officers with powers exercisable throughout India. Administrative assignment of registrations to the State tax administration did not exclude intelligence-based enforcement by Central officers, particularly where the investigation concerned an alleged multi-State chain of transactions. [Paras 16]
The State-wise administrative assignment of the petitioners' registrations did not exclude DGGI jurisdiction.
Common show-cause notice - allocation of adjudication - Allocation of adjudication of a common show-cause notice involving noticees in more than one Commissionerate to Delhi North rather than Chennai or Rangareddy. - HELD THAT: - The governing notifications empowered Additional and Joint Commissioners in Delhi North to adjudicate DGGI notices throughout India. Under the applicable allocation circular, a common notice was to be adjudicated with reference to the principal place of business of the noticee having the highest tax demand, which placed the matter in Delhi North. The revised allocation also mapped the concerned Delhi East matter to the common adjudicating authority at Delhi North. [Paras 17, 18, 19, 20]
Delhi North was the designated adjudicating Commissionerate, and no corrigendum or transfer of the common show-cause notice was required.
Final Conclusion: The writ petitions were disposed of by relegating the petitioners to the statutory appellate remedy, while rejecting the jurisdictional objections. The disputed merits of the input tax credit demands, interest and penalties were left open for decision in appeal.
Issues: (i) Whether the Common Adjudicating Authority had jurisdiction to adjudicate a composite show-cause notice and whether the impugned circulars validly selected that authority. (ii) Whether the highest-demand criterion for selection of the Common Adjudicating Authority is arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (iii) Whether writ jurisdiction could be invoked to challenge the merits of the adjudication despite the statutory appellate remedy.
Issue (i): Whether the Common Adjudicating Authority had jurisdiction to adjudicate a composite show-cause notice and whether the impugned circulars validly selected that authority.
Analysis: Sections 3, 5(3) and 167 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 require jurisdiction-conferring or function-transferring measures to be made through notification, whereas Section 168 permits administrative directions for uniform implementation of an existing jurisdiction. Notification No. 2/2017-Central Tax, as amended by Notification No. 2/2022-Central Tax, vested specified Additional and Joint Commissioners with pan-India jurisdiction over notices issued by the investigative authority. The circulars did not enlarge that jurisdiction or appoint an officer outside the notified class; they provided an administrative method for choosing one among officers already competent to decide a composite notice. The absence of an express recital of approval did not invalidate the circulars without material showing absence of authority. The notified appellate hierarchy remained available in the Commissionerate where the Common Adjudicating Authority was posted.
Conclusion: The Common Adjudicating Authority was lawfully vested with jurisdiction, and the impugned circulars validly operated as an administrative allocation mechanism.
Issue (ii): Whether the highest-demand criterion for selection of the Common Adjudicating Authority is arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Analysis: The criterion is objective, quantifiable and uniformly applicable. It bears a rational nexus to securing a single, consistent adjudication of a common investigation and avoiding conflicting factual findings. Its application involves no discretionary choice by the issuing officer and does not amount to impermissible sub-delegation of adjudicatory power.
Conclusion: The highest-demand criterion is constitutionally valid and does not offend Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Issue (iii): Whether writ jurisdiction could be invoked to challenge the merits of the adjudication despite the statutory appellate remedy.
Analysis: The jurisdictional challenge was entertained as a recognised exception to the rule requiring exhaustion of an efficacious statutory remedy. Once the jurisdictional foundation of the order was sustained, the remaining challenges concerning the demand, evidence and natural justice fell within the appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
Conclusion: Challenges on merits are to be pursued before the statutory Appellate Authority and are not amenable to determination in the writ proceedings.
Final Conclusion: The notified pan-India adjudication framework and the administrative mechanism for common adjudication are legally sustained, while all unresolved challenges to the tax demand remain available before the statutory appellate forum.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a notification has already vested a defined class of officers with jurisdiction, an administrative circular may validly select one competent officer for common adjudication of a composite notice without independently conferring or transferring jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction of Common Adjudicating Authority for composite DGGI show cause notices - Constitutional validity of highest-demand criterion for common adjudication - Alternative statutory remedy in GST adjudication
Jurisdiction of Common Adjudicating Authority for composite DGGI show cause notices - Administrative allocation of adjudicatory functions - Appellate forum for common adjudication orders - Jurisdiction of the Common Adjudicating Authority and the appellate forum for a composite show cause notice issued by the DGGI. - HELD THAT: - The governing notifications had already vested specified Additional and Joint Commissioners with pan-India jurisdiction to adjudicate DGGI notices. While a circular issued to ensure uniformity cannot itself confer, transfer or enlarge jurisdiction, it may operationalise jurisdiction validly conferred by notification. The impugned Circular neither appointed an officer nor enlarged territorial jurisdiction, but uniformly selected one from among officers already competent to adjudicate a composite notice. The notification was not required to identify an officer for every possible combination of noticees; nor did the absence of a recital of authority or approval, without material showing its absence, invalidate the Circular. The appellate forum was already notified for the Commissionerate in which the Common Adjudicating Authority was posted, and the subsequent circular merely clarified that position. [Paras 29, 30, 31, 33, 40]
The Common Adjudicating Authority and the corresponding notified appellate forum were held to have jurisdiction, and the impugned Circular was upheld as a valid administrative allocation-of-business measure.
Constitutional validity of highest-demand criterion for common adjudication - Impermissible sub-delegation of statutory power - Validity under Article 14 of the highest-demand criterion for selecting the Common Adjudicating Authority. - HELD THAT: - The highest-demand criterion was objective, quantifiable and uniformly applicable. It bore a rational nexus with securing a single and consistent adjudication arising from one investigation and preventing conflicting findings on the same facts. Application of that prescribed criterion involved no discretion in the officer issuing the composite notice and did not amount to impermissible sub-delegation of statutory power. [Paras 35, 36]
The highest-demand criterion was held non-arbitrary, and the challenge under Article 14 was rejected.
Alternative statutory remedy and writ jurisdiction - Exercise of writ jurisdiction against the adjudication order when a statutory appellate remedy was available. - HELD THAT: - Although writ jurisdiction may be exercised where the very existence of jurisdiction is challenged, the petitions were entertained only to examine that limited question. Once the jurisdictional challenge failed, no ground remained for writ review of the merits, evidentiary questions or alleged breach of natural justice, all of which could appropriately be raised in the statutory appeal. [Paras 37, 38, 39]
The merits were left open for determination by the statutory Appellate Authority.
Final Conclusion: The petitions challenging the common adjudication arrangement were dismissed. The petitioners were left to pursue the statutory appellate remedy on all merits contentions and could seek exclusion of the pendency period in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether an ex parte tax assessment order could be sustained where it was not passed on the notified hearing date and no notice of the subsequently fixed hearing date was given.
Analysis: Where the assessing authority does not decide the matter on the date fixed for hearing and instead fixes another date, it must communicate that subsequent date to the taxpayer. Failure to do so deprives the taxpayer of an effective opportunity of personal hearing and results in a breach of the principles of natural justice.
Conclusion: An ex parte assessment made without notice of the subsequent hearing date is unsustainable for breach of natural justice.
Ex parte GST assessment without notice of subsequent hearing - Natural justice denied - HELD THAT: - Where the authority does not pass an order on the date fixed for hearing and fixes a subsequent date without communicating it to the assessee, the resulting ex parte order is contrary to the requirements of natural justice. The Court followed the coordinate Bench decision on materially similar facts in Shubham Steel Traders Vs. State of U.P. and Another [2024 (2) TMI 1180 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] [Paras 5]
The impugned assessment order was quashed, with a direction to afford personal hearing and pass a reasoned order in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by quashing the ex parte assessment order for breach of natural justice and directing fresh consideration after affording personal hearing.
Issues: Whether a show cause notice and adjudication order electronically uploaded on the GST portal, but bearing neither a physical signature nor a digital signature, are legally valid under Rule 26(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017.
Analysis: Rule 26(3) makes electronic issuance and authentication through a digital signature certificate, e-signature, or other Board-notified mode cumulative and mandatory requirements. Portal upload, generation of an ARN or reference number, and the officer's authenticated portal login establish only access to the portal; they do not authenticate the contents of a particular notice or order. A signature attributes the document to the competent officer, fixes responsibility, and protects against arbitrariness. No notified alternative mode of verification was shown. The complete absence of authentication is a jurisdictional defect, not a curable irregularity under Section 160. The statutory appellate remedy does not bar writ jurisdiction where the purported adjudication order has no legal existence.
Conclusion: The unsigned show cause notice and adjudication order were non est in law; consequently, the recovery notice and bank-account attachment founded on them could not survive. Fresh proceedings may be initiated in accordance with law using duly authenticated documents.
Authentication of electronic GST notices and adjudication orders - Alternative remedy against non est statutory order
Unsigned electronic GST notices and adjudication orders - Mandatory authentication under Rule 26(3) - Legal validity of an electronically issued show cause notice and adjudication order bearing neither a digital nor a physical signature - HELD THAT: - Rule 26(3) mandates not merely electronic issuance but authentication of every notice and order through a digital signature certificate, E-signature, or another mode notified by the Board. Authentication of an officer's portal login cannot substitute authentication of the document's contents: a login authenticates access, whereas a signature attributes and authenticates the contents. In the absence of any signature or notified mode of verification, the documents lacked legal existence; the defect was jurisdictional and not a curable irregularity. [Paras 16, 17, 20, 23]
The unsigned show cause notice and adjudication order were held non est and were quashed, together with the consequential recovery notice and bank-account attachment; liberty was reserved for fresh proceedings in accordance with law.
Alternative remedy against non est statutory order - Availability of statutory appeal where the challenged adjudication order has no legal existence for want of authentication - HELD THAT: - A statutory appeal presupposes the existence of an order. Once the adjudication order was found non est for want of mandatory authentication, the alternative-remedy objection could not bar the writ jurisdiction. [Paras 21]
The objection based on the availability of an appeal was rejected.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed, the unsigned statutory documents and consequential recovery action were set aside, and the competent authority was left at liberty to initiate fresh proceedings in accordance with law.
Issues: (i) Whether the show-cause notice issued on 29.11.2024 satisfied the requirement under Section 73(2) that it be issued at least three months before the terminal date for an order under Section 73(10); (ii) Whether the ex parte determination under Section 73(9) should be interfered with to afford an opportunity to contest the show-cause notice.
Issue (i): Whether the show-cause notice issued on 29.11.2024 satisfied the requirement under Section 73(2) that it be issued at least three months before the terminal date for an order under Section 73(10).
Analysis: Section 73 establishes a single statutory adjudicatory process beginning with the notice under Section 73(1) and culminating in the order under Section 73(9), subject to the outer limit in Section 73(10). A month is a calendar month under Section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and the date of issuance is excluded while computing the prescribed interval under Section 9 of that Act. Section 73(2) requires a minimum available interval before the statutory terminal date; it does not prescribe an independent backward-calculated corresponding-date cut-off. Excluding 29.11.2024, the full calendar months of December 2024, January 2025 and February 2025 were available before 28.02.2025.
Conclusion: The notice was within the limitation prescribed by Section 73(2), in favour of the Revenue.
Issue (ii): Whether the ex parte determination under Section 73(9) should be interfered with to afford an opportunity to contest the show-cause notice.
Analysis: The statutory scheme under Sections 73 and 75 contemplates an opportunity to contest the proposed demand before its determination. Since the proceedings had culminated during the pendency of the challenge, an opportunity to submit a reply to the notice was necessary to enable adjudication after consideration of the appellant's defence.
Conclusion: The determination under Section 73(9) was interfered with to enable the appellant to contest the notice, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The notice remains valid, but the demand requires fresh completion of the statutory adjudicatory process after the appellant is given the specified opportunity to respond.
Ratio Decidendi: For Section 73(2), the minimum interval of three months is satisfied where, after excluding the date of issuance of notice, three calendar months remain available before the terminal date under Section 73(10); a backward corresponding-date calculation is not an independent limitation cut-off.
Minimum interval for GST show cause notice before statutory adjudication deadline - Computation of statutory period in calendar months - Opportunity to contest show cause notice after ex parte GST adjudication
Minimum interval for GST show cause notice before statutory adjudication deadline - Computation of statutory period in calendar months - Timeliness of a show cause notice issued under the GST determination mechanism where it was required to be issued at least three months before the outer limit for passing the adjudication order - HELD THAT: - The statutory scheme treats issuance of notice and final determination as connected stages of one adjudicatory process. The requirement of a notice at least three months before the terminal date regulates the minimum interval between initiation and culmination; it does not prescribe an independent limitation date obtained by mechanically counting backward from the terminal date. A month is a calendar month and, upon exclusion of the date of issuance of notice, the requisite intervening period was available before expiry of the statutory deadline. [Paras 36, 37, 39, 40, 42]
The show cause notice was held to be within the period prescribed for its issuance, and the challenge to its validity on limitation failed.
Opportunity to contest show cause notice after ex parte GST adjudication - Entitlement to an opportunity to reply to the show cause notice where an ex parte adjudication order was passed during pendency of the writ proceedings - HELD THAT: - Taking note of the interim protection granted during the writ proceedings and the culmination of the proceedings by an ex parte order meanwhile, the Court considered it appropriate in the interests of justice to enable the appellant to contest the notice. It expressly left the merits of the proposed demand and the defence open. [Paras 44, 45, 46]
The adjudication order was interfered with to permit a reply to the notice within the stipulated time and completion of fresh proceedings thereafter; failing such reply, that order would revive.
Final Conclusion: The writ appeal was dismissed insofar as the show cause notice was held timely. However, the appellant was afforded a conditional opportunity to contest the notice, with the ex parte adjudication order to revive if no reply is filed within the prescribed time.
Issues: Whether the mandatory appellate pre-deposit could be adjusted against input tax credit already recovered from the electronic credit ledger, warranting restoration of the appeal for decision on merits.
Analysis: Section 107(6)(b) requires payment of 10% of the disputed tax for maintaining an appeal. The credit already recovered exceeded the prescribed pre-deposit, and adjustment of electronic credit ledger balance towards that requirement was permissible in the peculiar facts, consistently with the applicable approach to utilisation of such credit for pre-deposit.
Conclusion: The recovered credit shall be adjusted towards the statutory pre-deposit, and the appeal shall be restored for adjudication on merits. This is in favour of the assessee.
Adjustment of recovered electronic credit towards appellate pre-deposit - Adjustment of credit already recovered from the electronic credit ledger towards the mandatory pre-deposit for maintaining the GST appeal
HELD THAT: - Having regard to the earlier ruling permitting utilisation of electronic credit ledger balance for payment of the statutory pre-deposit, the Court noted that the credit already recovered exceeded the pre-deposit requirement. As the petitioner confined its claim to adjustment and did not press for refund of the excess credit, adjustment was permitted in the peculiar facts of the case.
This Court in the case of M/s. Shiv Crakers [2024 (3) TMI 832 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] while examining an issue of adjustment of credit towards pre-deposit has held that the taxpayer may utilize the amount available in the electronic credit ledger to pay 10% of tax in dispute as prescribed under Section 107(6) of the CGST Act and accordingly, the Court had set aside the appeal and directed the appeal to be restored to its original file. This Court had also placed reliance on the decision of the Bombay High Court in case of Oasis Realty Vs. The Union of India and ors [2022 (10) TMI 42 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] [Paras 6, 7]
The dismissal of the appeal for non-payment of pre-deposit was quashed, and the appeal was restored for decision on merits after adjustment of the statutory pre-deposit from the recovered electronic credit; all merits contentions were left open, and the order was not to be treated as a precedent.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by restoring the GST appeal and directing adjustment of the mandatory pre-deposit from the electronic credit already recovered.
Issues: Whether failure to issue the notice under Section 129(3) within seven days of detention and seizure of goods and conveyance vitiates the consequential penalty proceedings.
Analysis: Section 129(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 prescribes mandatory timelines governing detention, seizure and penalty proceedings. The prescribed period protects against arbitrary or prolonged exercise of coercive powers and requires strict compliance. The goods and conveyance were detained on 02.09.2024, whereas the notice was issued only on 11.09.2024 and uploaded thereafter, beyond the stipulated seven-day period.
Conclusion: The delay in issuing the notice breached the mandatory requirement of Section 129(3) and vitiated the detention-and-penalty proceedings; the appellate and proper-officer orders could not stand.
Mandatory statutory timeline for notice following detention of goods under GST
Validity of detention and penalty proceedings where the notice under section 129(3) was not issued within seven days of detention of the goods and conveyance - HELD THAT: - The statutory timeline regulates coercive powers of detention and seizure and safeguards against arbitrary or prolonged detention. The use of "shall", the legislative object, and the rights affected require strict compliance; consequently, even a one-day delay in issuance of the notice vitiated the proceedings. [Paras 5, 6, 7, 8]
The orders imposing and affirming the penalty were set aside for breach of the mandatory timeline under section 129(3), without precluding proceedings otherwise permissible under the Act.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed and the impugned detention and penalty orders were set aside for non-compliance with the mandatory statutory timeline. The deposited penalty was directed to be released after due verification.
Issues: Whether interim protection should continue pending consideration of challenges to orders raising GST demands where the adjudicating authority recorded inability to reconcile extensive e-way bill, invoice and accounting data.
Analysis: The orders indicated a prima facie inability to analyse and reconcile the delivery channels, e-way bills, invoices and supporting accounting records. The material comprised a substantial volume of entries, e-way bills and invoices, and no further material had been sought from the petitioner for reconciliation. The complexity of the amounts and documents warranted consideration of the petitions.
Outcome: Rule issued and the existing ad-interim relief continued until final disposal of the petitions.
Show-cause notices and Orders-in-original issued u/s 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax (CGST) Act, 2017 - interim protection continuation pending consideration of challenges to orders raising GST demands
HELD THAT:- Prima facie, we are of the opinion that the impugned Orders-in-original depict the inability of the adjudicating authority in closely analyzing the details of delivery channels, corresponding e-way bills, invoices, etc., as he himself has expressed his inability to undertake such exercise, as there is no mechanism to understand this.
The petitioner was never called upon to supply any additional material by the adjudicating authority, and as informed to us, there are almost 4.5 lakhs e-way bills and 2.5 lakhs invoices, which would suggest that there was no intention of the petitioner to suppress or evade the liability of payment of the GST.
Issue RULE. Learned Senior Standing Counsel Ms. Sancheti waives service of notice of rule for and on behalf of the respondent.
Issues: Whether the delay in filing the statutory GST appeal should be condoned and the appeal considered on merits.
Analysis: Although the Appellate Authority is bound by the limitation prescribed under the GST enactments, the delay arose from circumstances beyond the assessee's control, including lack of effective knowledge of the proceedings and order. Refusal to permit merits adjudication in these circumstances would cause grave prejudice. The consistent approach permitting delayed appeals to be entertained on merits was applied.
Conclusion: The delay was condoned and the assessee was entitled to have its appeal entertained and adjudicated on merits.
Condonation of delay in GST appeal - Condonation of delay in filing an appeal against a GST demand where the appeal could not be filed within the statutory period for reasons beyond the assessee's control.
HELD THAT: - Though the Appellate Authority was bound by the statutory limitation prescribed for appeals, the Court held that non-adjudication on merits, in the circumstances preventing timely filing, would cause grave injury and prejudice.
Following the consistent approach adopted in the earlier decision LUXMI TRADERS [2026 (7) TMI 1602 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT] and agreeing with the view concerning portal-based service, the Court found that the appeal deserved consideration on merits. [Paras 6, 7, 9, 10, 11]
The delay was condoned and the Appellate Authority was directed to entertain and decide the appeal on merits, subject to its filing within the stipulated period.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed to the extent of condoning the delay, and the statutory appeal was directed to be entertained and adjudicated on merits.
Issues: (i) Whether proceedings under Section 74 of the Karnataka Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 could be sustained for the same tax period after adjudication under Section 73 had been completed; (ii) Whether the ex parte adjudication under Section 73 and consequential recovery proceedings required restoration for fresh consideration.
Issue (i): Whether proceedings under Section 74 of the Karnataka Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 could be sustained for the same tax period after adjudication under Section 73 had been completed.
Analysis: The Section 74 proceedings covered the period that included the period already adjudicated under Section 73. The Section 73 adjudication preceded the Section 74 adjudication. Completion of a separate Section 74 proceeding after the Section 73 adjudication for the same period was incongruous.
Conclusion: In favour of the assessee. The Section 74 show-cause notice and adjudication proceedings were quashed.
Issue (ii): Whether the ex parte adjudication under Section 73 and consequential recovery proceedings required restoration for fresh consideration.
Analysis: The Section 73 proceedings had concluded ex parte. The assessee asserted entitlement to exemption and sought to place supporting documents for examination. A complete adjudication required consideration of those materials to determine whether the alleged mismatch or erroneous turnover declaration could be sustained.
Conclusion: In favour of the assessee. The Section 73 adjudication order and consequential garnishee notice were quashed, and the proceedings were restored for reconsideration after receipt of the assessee's reply and documents.
Final Conclusion: The overlapping Section 74 demand for the period already adjudicated under Section 73 cannot stand, while the Section 73 liability must be determined afresh upon consideration of the assessee's material.
Ratio Decidendi: For the same tax period, culmination of proceedings under Section 74 after completed adjudication under Section 73 is incongruous; an ex parte Section 73 adjudication may be restored where relevant material requires examination for a complete determination.
Simultaneous GST adjudication proceedings under Sections 73 and 74 - Ex parte GST adjudication - reconsideration on production of exemption documents
Simultaneous GST adjudication proceedings under Sections 73 and 74 - Sustainability of proceedings under Section 74 after adjudication of proceedings under Section 73 for the same financial period - HELD THAT: - The Court held that culmination of the proceedings under Section 74 after an adjudication order had already been passed under Section 73 was incongruous. [Paras 5]
The show cause notice, adjudication order and summary order in the Section 74 proceedings were quashed.
Ex parte GST adjudication - reconsideration on production of exemption documents - Restoration of ex parte proceedings under Section 73 for consideration of the claimed exemption and supporting documents - HELD THAT: - As the Section 73 proceedings had concluded ex parte and the petitioner asserted that documents could be produced to substantiate the claimed exemption, the Court considered reconsideration necessary for a complete adjudication of the alleged mismatch or erroneous declaration. The merits of the exemption claim were left for fresh consideration. [Paras 6]
The Section 73 adjudication order, its summary and the consequential garnishee notice were quashed, and the proceedings were restored for reconsideration after receipt of the petitioner's reply and documents.
Final Conclusion: The Section 74 proceedings were quashed as incongruous with the prior adjudication under Section 73. The ex parte Section 73 adjudication was restored for fresh consideration after affording the petitioner an opportunity to file its reply and supporting documents.
Issues: (i) Whether Central Tax Authorities could initiate proceedings on the same subject matter after State Tax Authorities had already initiated adjudication proceedings; (ii) Whether the State Tax adjudication orders required reconsideration to afford the assessee an opportunity to respond and substantiate its exemption claim.
Issue (i): Whether Central Tax Authorities could initiate proceedings on the same subject matter after State Tax Authorities had already initiated adjudication proceedings.
Analysis: Section 6(2)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 bars proceedings by a Central Tax proper officer on a subject matter for which proceedings have already been initiated by a proper officer under the State Goods and Services Tax Act. The State Authorities had initiated adjudication proceedings earlier for the relevant tax periods.
Conclusion: The Central Tax show cause notice and adjudication order on the same subject matter were impermissible and were quashed, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the State Tax adjudication orders required reconsideration to afford the assessee an opportunity to respond and substantiate its exemption claim.
Analysis: The assessee asserted that a personal hearing sought in response to one notice had not been granted and that it could produce invoices, works contract documents and other records to establish eligibility for exemption where the value of goods supplied was below 25% of the works contract value. The records indicated that such material could be relevant to the exemption claim.
Conclusion: The State Tax adjudication orders and consequential garnishee notices were quashed, with liberty to file responses to the show cause notices and have all issues reconsidered, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: Parallel Central Tax proceedings are barred once State Tax proceedings on the same subject matter have commenced, while the surviving State Tax proceedings must be reconsidered after the assessee is afforded an opportunity to place its material on record.
Ratio Decidendi: Once proceedings on a subject matter are initiated by a State Tax proper officer, Section 6(2)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 prohibits initiation of proceedings by a Central Tax proper officer on that same subject matter.
Bar on parallel proceedings on same subject matter under GST laws - Opportunity to respond to show-cause notice before adjudication
Bar on parallel proceedings on same subject matter under GST laws - Initiation of Central GST proceedings on the same subject matter after prior initiation of State GST adjudication proceedings. - HELD THAT: - The plain language of section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act precludes initiation of proceedings by a Central Tax proper officer on a subject matter on which proceedings have already been initiated by a State GST proper officer. As the State Authorities had first commenced adjudication proceedings, the subsequent Central Tax proceedings could not continue. [Paras 5]
The Central Tax show-cause notice and consequential adjudication order were quashed.
Opportunity to respond to show-cause notice before adjudication - Works-contract exemption for predominant service supply - Opportunity to furnish documents and responses in respect of the claimed exemption for street-light works contracts where the value of goods supplied is stated to be below the prescribed proportion of the contract value - HELD THAT: - The Court noted that, if the petitioner demonstrated that the value of goods supplied under the works contracts did not constitute 25% of their value, it could be entitled to the claimed exemption. Since this aspect was also recorded in one of the adjudication orders, the petitioner was required to be afforded an opportunity to place the relevant material and respond to the show-cause notices; the merits of the exemption claim were left open. [Paras 7]
The State Tax adjudication orders and consequential garnishee notices were quashed, with liberty to file responses to the respective show-cause notices subject to deposit of 10% of the tax demand; all questions were left open for consideration.
Final Conclusion: The subsequent Central Tax proceedings were quashed as barred by prior State GST proceedings on the same subject matter. The State Tax adjudication orders were also quashed to enable the petitioner to respond to the show-cause notices subject to the stipulated deposit, with the merits kept open.
Issues: Whether the petitioners were entitled to anticipatory bail in connection with alleged wrongful availment of input tax credit on invoices issued by suppliers.
Analysis: Under Sections 69 and 132 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, arrest for the specified cognizable and non-bailable offences requires the Commissioner's recorded reasons to believe, founded on material establishing the statutory conditions; arrest cannot be made merely to investigate whether those conditions exist. A purchaser holding valid registration, invoices, proof of payment of invoice value and tax through banking channels, and filed returns cannot ordinarily be denied input tax credit merely because the supplier's registration was subsequently cancelled or the supplier later became unavailable, unless fraud or collusion is shown. The petitioners had no antecedents, had responded to summons, undertook to furnish documents establishing actual receipt of goods, and agreed to cooperate. In these circumstances, custodial interrogation was not necessary in the absence of prima facie material of collusion with the suppliers.
Conclusion: The petitioners were entitled to anticipatory bail subject to conditions ensuring their cooperation with the investigation.
Anticipatory bail in alleged fraudulent input tax credit cases - Purchaser's input tax credit and supplier default - Arrest based on reasons to believe under the CGST Act Custodial interrogation of registered purchaser
HELD THAT: - A purchaser holding valid registration, invoices, and proof of payment of invoice value and tax through banking channels, and having filed returns, cannot ordinarily be denied input tax credit or held liable for the supplier's default unless fraud or collusion is established. Subsequent cancellation or non-existence of the supplier, by itself, does not justify denial of credit to the purchaser; recovery would ordinarily lie against the defaulting supplier.
Where actual receipt of goods can be established through documentary material and there is no prima facie material of collusion, custodial interrogation merely to verify such receipt is ordinarily unnecessary. Arrest for the cognizable offences must rest on the Commissioner's recorded reasons to believe, founded on material demonstrating satisfaction of the statutory requirements, and not on suspicion alone. [Paras 17, 18, 19, 21, 27]
Anticipatory bail was granted, subject to conditions requiring cooperation with the investigation, production of necessary documents, and compliance with the stipulated safeguards.
Final Conclusion: The petitions were allowed and the petitioners were granted anticipatory bail in relation to the alleged wrongful availment of input tax credit, subject to the conditions imposed.
Issues: Whether interim protection against the impugned GST demands for the period from 01.07.2017 to 31.07.2019 should be granted pending adjudication of the writ petition.
Analysis: Paragraph 2.2 of the Circular dated 01.08.2023, regularising the GST-rate issue concerning un-fried or un-cooked snack pellets manufactured through extrusion for the past period up to 27.07.2023 on an "as is" basis, was prima facie found directly applicable. No satisfactory basis to distinguish its applicability was shown. No final adjudication on the validity of the demands was made.
Outcome: The writ petition was admitted and the effect and operation of the impugned demands were stayed upon furnishing an auto-renewable fixed deposit for 10% of the demand. The matter was listed for further hearing.
GST rate on the un-fried or un-cooked snack pellets manufactured through the process of extrusion - issue of the past period upto 27.07.2023 was regularized on an “as is” basis - Counsel submits that the present dispute pertains to the GST rate on the admitted product of the petitioner for the period from 01.07.2017 to 31.07.2019.
HELD THAT:- Paragraph 2.2 of the Circular dated 01.08.2023, regularising the GST-rate issue concerning un-fried or un-cooked snack pellets manufactured through extrusion for the past period up to 27.07.2023 on an "as is" basis, was prima facie found directly applicable. No satisfactory basis to distinguish its applicability was shown. No final adjudication on the validity of the demands was made.
The writ petition was admitted and the effect and operation of the impugned demands were stayed upon furnishing an auto-renewable fixed deposit for 10% of the demand. The matter was listed for further hearing.
Issues: (i) Whether the High Court could entertain the anticipatory-bail applications despite the direction to approach the jurisdictional court; (ii) Whether anticipatory bail was warranted for the alleged GST-evasion offences.
Issue (i): Whether the High Court could entertain the anticipatory-bail applications despite the direction to approach the jurisdictional court.
Analysis: The expression "jurisdictional court" in relation to anticipatory bail includes both the High Court and the Court of Session. The applicants therefore had the discretion to invoke the jurisdiction of either forum, and the direction contained in the transit-bail order did not restrict them to the Principal Sessions Court alone.
Conclusion: The applications before the High Court were maintainable, in favour of the petitioners.
Issue (ii): Whether anticipatory bail was warranted for the alleged GST-evasion offences.
Analysis: The alleged offences under Section 132(1)(a) read with Section 132(1)(i) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 carry a maximum sentence of five years and are compoundable. Although economic offences were alleged, the gravity of offence had to be assessed with reference to the prescribed punishment and surrounding circumstances. The relevant documentary, financial and electronic records had substantially been seized by the authorities; the applicants had established business roots and undertook to cooperate with the investigation. In these circumstances, custodial interrogation was not necessary.
Conclusion: Anticipatory bail was warranted, in favour of the petitioners.
Final Conclusion: The applicants were entitled to protection from arrest upon compliance with the safeguards imposed, while remaining subject to investigation and trial.
Ratio Decidendi: In an anticipatory-bail application concerning an economic offence, the economic nature of the allegation alone does not make custody indispensable where the statutory punishment is limited, material records are secured, and the accused is available for investigation.
Anticipatory bail in GST evasion offences - Concurrent jurisdiction for anticipatory bail
High Court and Court of Session jurisdiction for anticipatory bail - Maintainability of anticipatory-bail petitions before the High Court where transit bail required the petitioners to approach the jurisdictional court - HELD THAT: - The expression "jurisdictional Court" for an application for anticipatory bail includes both the High Court and the Court of Session. The petitioners therefore had the discretion to approach either forum, and were not confined to the Principal Sessions Court. [Paras 6]
The anticipatory-bail petitions before the High Court were held maintainable.
Anticipatory bail in alleged GST evasion - Necessity of custodial interrogation - Grant of anticipatory bail for the alleged GST evasion offence and the necessity of custodial interrogation - HELD THAT: - While the allegation concerned an economic offence, the prescribed maximum punishment was five years and the offences were compoundable. The relevant documentary and digital records had substantially been seized and were in the authorities' custody; the petitioners had established business roots and undertook to cooperate with the investigation. Custodial interrogation was consequently not required. [Paras 7, 8, 9, 10]
Anticipatory bail was granted subject to conditions concerning deposit, surrender of passports, reporting to the authorities, execution of bonds and cooperation with the investigation. On breach of any of the aforesaid conditions, the learned Magistrate/Trial Court is entitled to take appropriate actions against the petitioners in accordance with law as if the conditions have been imposed and the petitioners released on anticipatory bail by the learned Magistrate/Trial Court himself as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.K. Shaji v. State of Kerala [2005 (10) TMI 599 - SUPREME COURT].
Final Conclusion: The petitions were held maintainable, and anticipatory bail was granted subject to the stipulated conditions.
Assessment u/s 153C - Whether documents seized related to undisclosed income “relating to” or “pertaining to” the petitioners? - HELD THAT:- No good ground to interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court [2025 (12) TMI 297 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT]
Accordingly, the Special Leave Petition is dismissed.
Issues: Whether criminal prosecution for failure to deposit tax deducted at source could be sustained against a person treated as the principal officer on the erroneous premise that she was a director of the deductor company.
Analysis: The show-cause notice, order treating the petitioner as principal officer, sanction for prosecution, and complaint each proceeded on the assertion that she was a director of the company. The Revenue acknowledged that she had never been a director. The foundational fact used to attribute principal-officer status and criminal responsibility was therefore incorrect.
Conclusion: A person who was never a director of the company cannot be subjected to prosecution as its principal officer solely on the erroneous assertion of directorship.
Prosecution of a person wrongly treated as Principal Officer - Vicarious liability for non-deposit of tax deducted at source - offences u/s 276B r/w Sections 278B and 278E alleging that the accused persons had not deposited the requisite TDS (Tax Deducted at Source) within the stipulated time
HELD THAT: - The show-cause notice, the order treating the petitioner as Principal Officer, the sanction order and the complaint all proceeded on the basis that she was a Director of the company. The Department admitted that she had never been a Director. Her prosecution on that erroneous premise was therefore fallacious and unsustainable. [Paras 5, 6, 7]
The prosecution, insofar as it concerned the petitioner, was quashed.
Final Conclusion: The petition was allowed and the prosecution against the petitioner was quashed on the peculiar facts of the case. The order was directed not to be treated as a precedent.
Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings initiated against an amalgamating company can survive after the same income for the same assessment year has been assessed in the hands of its amalgamated successor.
Analysis: The Revenue issued a reassessment notice to the amalgamating company regarding alleged accommodation entries. Subsequently, it initiated reassessment against the amalgamated company for the same assessment year and assessed the identical share application money in the successor's hands. By doing so, the Revenue unequivocally treated the successor as the proper person liable to assessment after amalgamation. The same income cannot be subjected to parallel reassessment proceedings or taxed twice, particularly where one proceeding is against an entity that has ceased to exist.
Conclusion: The reassessment notice and consequential proceedings against the amalgamating company cannot survive and were quashed. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Double taxation of identical income after amalgamation
Parallel reassessment proceedings against amalgamating and amalgamated companies - Assessment of income in hands of the right person - Survival of reassessment proceedings against the amalgamating company after the identical share application money had been assessed in the hands of its amalgamated successor for the same assessment year - HELD THAT: - The Revenue consciously assessed the income pertaining to the amalgamating company in the hands of the petitioner as its successor. Since the same income had thereby been brought to tax in the hands of the person identified by the Revenue as liable to assessment, the impugned proceedings could not simultaneously be kept alive against the amalgamating company.
The fundamental prohibition against double taxation, unless expressly authorised, and the obligation to assess income in the hands of the right person precluded parallel reassessment proceedings for the identical income. [Paras 7, 8, 9]
The reassessment notice issued to the amalgamating company and all consequential proceedings were quashed; the separate challenge to a notice issued in the name of a non-existent company was left open.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed and the reassessment notice issued to the amalgamating company, along with consequential proceedings, was quashed because the identical income had already been assessed in the hands of the amalgamated successor.
Exchange of Information - Advantage of extension of limitation period by a year, as provided in clause (ix) of the explanation to Section 153(B) - Limitation and time-barred assessments - Scope of treaty between India and Swiss Confederation - reference to the Foreign Tax and Tax Research Division (FT&TR) relying on Article 26 of the India Hong Kong treaty, so as to enable assessment for AY 2017-18 - information relatable to the fiscal year
HELD THAT:- Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the considered opinion that the appeal is liable to be dismissed in light of the judgment of this Court in the case of Sneh Lata Sawhney [2025 (5) TMI 1338 - DELHI HIGH COURT] which has further been followed and elaborated by this Court in the case of Sanjay Jain [2026 (1) TMI 1418 - DELHI HIGH COURT]
Outcome: The reassessment notice for Assessment Year 2014-15 and all consequential proceedings were quashed and set aside.
Reassessment notice - revenue's proposal to drop proceedings
Validity of reassessment proceedings against the purchasing company where the Revenue proposed to drop them while reserving its right to proceed against the seller company - HELD THAT: - Upon the Revenue's statement that it proposed to drop the proceedings against the petitioner, the reassessment notice and all consequential proceedings could not survive. [Paras 3, 4]
The reassessment notice for Assessment Year 2014-15 and proceedings pursuant to it were quashed and set aside; the writ petition was allowed.
Final Conclusion: The reassessment notice and consequential proceedings against the petitioner for Assessment Year 2014-15 were quashed after the Revenue stated that it proposed to drop those proceedings.
Issues: Whether the Tribunal's common order disposing of seven appeals was sustainable despite being unreasoned and having been issued for appeals heard and pronounced on different dates.
Analysis: The common order contained no meaningful consideration of the parties' contentions or the issues arising from the assessments. It also purported to dispose of two sets of appeals that had been heard and pronounced on different dates. These defects demonstrated undue haste, procedural irregularity and absence of the reasoned adjudication expected from the final fact-finding appellate authority.
Conclusion: The Tribunal's common order could not be sustained; the underlying appeals are to receive fresh and independent adjudication by a Bench other than the Bench that issued the impugned order, with all merits left open.
Reasoned appellate orders - Non-application of mind - Validity of the Tribunal's common order disposing of seven appeals without dealing with the contentions or issues involved, while recording inconsistent hearing and pronouncement dates for the respective sets of appeals
HELD THAT: - The Tribunal's order was bereft of logic, reasoning and rationale. Its disposal of appeals heard on different dates through a common order, coupled with failure to address the parties' contentions and the issues arising, disclosed undue haste and non-application of mind. Such negligence in appellate fact-finding adjudication could not be countenanced. [Paras 6, 7, 9]
The impugned Tribunal orders were quashed and the seven appeals were restored to their original numbers for fresh decision by a different Bench, without any expression on the merits.
Final Conclusion: The appeals were disposed of by setting aside the Tribunal's orders and restoring the matters for fresh adjudication by another Bench. The merits were expressly left open.
Issues: Whether the reassessment notice and order for Assessment Year 2021-22, founded on the alleged cessation of interest liability following acquisition of the corporate debtor as a going concern, were valid.
Analysis: Under the clean slate principle applicable to a corporate debtor sold as a going concern in liquidation, past liabilities and investigations stand extinguished and cannot be imposed upon the purchaser. The reopening under Sections 148 and 148A was founded on surmises and conjectures that interest might have been claimed as a deduction, despite the assessee's records showing that no such interest had been claimed since the account became a non-performing asset. The identical alleged cessation of liability had already been the basis of reassessment proceedings for earlier assessment years and could not be repeatedly brought to tax. The order under Section 148A(3) also failed to address the clean slate defence and relevant statutory records.
Conclusion: The reassessment notice and order were invalid and were quashed and set aside in favour of the assessee.
Clean slate principle in sale of corporate debtor as a going concern - Reopening of assessment on surmises and conjectures - Repeated taxation of the same income in different assessment years
Clean slate principle in sale of corporate debtor as a going concern - Extinguishment of past liabilities upon liquidation sale - Reopening based on a past interest liability after sale of the corporate debtor as a going concern under the liquidation process - HELD THAT: - The purchaser of a corporate debtor sold as a going concern under the liquidation process is entitled to a clean slate, under which past liabilities and investigations stand extinguished. The alleged cessation of the past interest liability could not therefore be foisted upon the purchaser. [Paras 8, 10]
The reopening founded on the alleged past liability was unsustainable.
Reopening of assessment on surmises and conjectures - Repeated taxation of the same income in different assessment years - Failure to consider material reassessment reply - Reopening on the assumed claim of deduction of unpaid interest and on the same alleged cessation of liability already made subject to reopening for earlier assessment years - HELD THAT: - The reopening proceeded merely on the presumption that the petitioner might have claimed deduction of unpaid interest, despite its clarification that no such deduction was claimed and the availability of the profit and loss account for verification. The same alleged cessation of interest arising from the self-same transaction could not be repeatedly brought to tax in different assessment years. The order under section 148A(3) also failed to address the clean-slate defence and binding precedents raised in the reply, while improperly placing the burden on the petitioner. [Paras 11, 12, 13, 14]
The reassessment notice and the order under section 148A(3) for Assessment Year 2021-22 were quashed.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed, and the reassessment notice and order for Assessment Year 2021-22 were quashed.
Issues: Whether an assessment order passed without considering the assessee's reply, despite a prior judicial direction requiring such consideration, is sustainable.
Analysis: The assessment was completed without considering the reply submitted pursuant to the show-cause notice, notwithstanding the earlier direction requiring the Assessing Officer to consider that reply. Completion of assessment to meet the limitation period did not justify non-compliance with the direction or denial of an effective consideration of the assessee's response, resulting in a breach of the principles of natural justice.
Conclusion: The assessment order was invalid for violation of the principles of natural justice, and the reply is required to be considered in fresh assessment proceedings.
Violation of principles of natural justice - Non-consideration of reply pursuant to judicial direction - Validity of the assessment order passed without considering the assessee's reply despite a prior direction to do so
HELD THAT: - The assessment order was passed without considering the reply which the Assessing Officer had been specifically directed to consider. Passing the order to meet the limitation for completion of assessment could not justify disregard of that reply; the order consequently suffered from a breach of the principles of natural justice. [Paras 4, 5]
The assessment order was quashed without examination on merits and the matter was remanded for fresh assessment after considering the reply, with all rights and contentions kept open.
Final Conclusion: The writ petitions were disposed of by quashing the assessment order for breach of natural justice and remanding the assessment for fresh consideration of the assessee's reply.
Issues: Whether the assessee remained eligible for deduction under Section 80-IB(10) after excluding part of the land initially earmarked for the housing project and constructing a personal residential house thereon.
Analysis: Section 80-IB(10) grants deduction for qualifying housing projects subject to conditions, including the minimum plot-area requirement and the prescribed maximum built-up area for residential units. Although the project was initially proposed over 117.5 cents in two phases, the assessee later withdrew 46.93 cents from the project and used it for a 4000 sq. ft. personal residence. That construction could not form part of an affordable housing project because it exceeded the stipulated residential-unit area. The effective project area was consequently reduced to 70.57 cents, below the statutory minimum.
Conclusion: The assessee was not entitled to deduction under Section 80-IB(10) for either assessment year; the issue is decided against the assessee.
Deduction u/s 80-IB(10) - Housing-project deduction - minimum plot area - Diversion of project land to personal residential use
Whether the assessee remained eligible for deduction under Section 80-IB(10) after excluding part of the land initially earmarked for the housing project and constructing a personal residential house thereon? - HELD THAT: - Though the project as initially proposed covered the entire extent of land and phases could ordinarily be considered as part of the project as a whole, the assessee subsequently excluded a substantial portion for constructing a personal residence.
That construction was neither part of the housing project nor an affordable residential unit within the prescribed built-up-area limit. Consequently, the land available for the housing project stood reduced below the minimum statutory extent, disentitling the assessee from the claimed deduction. The challenge to the earlier revisional intervention was rendered inconsequential because the fresh assessment was made after the personal residential construction had commenced. [Paras 18, 19, 20, 22, 23]
The disallowance of the claimed deduction for both assessment years was upheld.
Final Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose for consideration. The appeals were dismissed.
Issues: Whether approval under Section 80G(5) can be denied to a trust having charitable objects for the public at large merely because of religious objects, without determining whether its religious expenditure exceeded the statutory threshold.
Analysis: Section 80G(5B) deems an institution or fund incurring religious expenditure not exceeding five per cent of its total income to be one to which Section 80G applies. The material did not establish that the trust had incurred religious expenditure beyond that limit. Its objects were substantially charitable and directed towards the general public. The principles concerning Section 13(1)(b) also establish that the restriction is relevant while determining exemption under Section 11, rather than at the stage of registration under Section 12A.
Conclusion: Approval under Section 80G(5) cannot be refused on the stated basis; the application requires consideration after the necessary verification of the statutory conditions.
Approval u/s 80G for trusts with mixed charitable and religious objects - Applicability of section 13(1)(b) at the registration stage
Entitlement of a trust having objects charitable for the public at large, including an object concerning service to pilgrims and religious places, to consideration for approval under section 80G(5) - HELD THAT: - The Court accepted the Tribunal's factual finding that the Trust's objects were not wholly for the benefit of a particular religious community but were largely charitable in character for the public at large. The restriction in section 13(1)(b) operates while considering exemption under section 11 and not while granting registration under section 12A. The Tribunal had restored the matter for fresh consideration of approval under section 80G after necessary verification and opportunity of hearing; the Court found that this course disclosed no substantial question of law. [Paras 5, 6]
The Revenue's appeal was dismissed, leaving the Tribunal's direction for fresh consideration of approval under section 80G in accordance with law undisturbed.
Final Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose from the Tribunal's order. The Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
Issues: Whether the addition for alleged excess of stamp duty value over consideration under section 56(2)(x) could be computed by reference to the value on registration of the conveyance, rather than the value on the date of allotment and advance payment.
Analysis: The trust's existence before the PAN incorporation date was substantiated by its formation resolution, trustee affidavit and bank account opened in its name before that date. The booking advance was paid through banking channels and confirmed by the developer. The allotment letter, coupled with payment of consideration through banking channels, qualified for application of the provisos to section 56(2)(x), requiring adoption of stamp duty value as on the agreement/allotment date where that date differs from registration. The stamp duty value in financial year 2001-02 was lower than the actual consideration.
Conclusion: No addition under section 56(2)(x) was sustainable, as there was no excess of the relevant stamp duty value over the purchase consideration.
Excess of stamp duty value over consideration under section 56(2)(x) - Stamp duty valuation for immovable property under section 56(2)(x) - Date of agreement and banking-channel payment
Addition of deemed income on purchase of immovable property by adopting stamp duty value as on registration, despite prior allotment and payment through banking channel - HELD THAT: - The trust's existence before the date stated in its PAN was established by the resolution constituting it, the unrebutted affidavit and the bank account opened in its name. Its advance payment to the developer through banking channel was undisputed.
The first and second provisos to section 56(2)(x) consequently required adoption of the stamp duty value prevailing on the date of the agreement/allotment, rather than that prevailing on registration. As the stamp duty value for FY 2001-02 was lower than the purchase consideration, no positive difference survived for addition. [Paras 17, 18, 19, 21, 22]
The addition under section 56(2)(x), founded on the stamp duty value in the registered sale deed, was directed to be deleted.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed and the addition under section 56(2)(x) was deleted. The remaining grounds were left open as academic.
Issues: Whether late fee under Section 234E could be levied through an intimation under Section 200A for delayed quarterly TDS statements pertaining to financial year 2012-13.
Analysis: The power to compute and demand late fee under Section 234E through Section 200A was introduced with effect from 1 June 2015 and operates prospectively. For TDS statements relating to a period preceding that date, an intimation under Section 200A demanding such fee lacks statutory authority. In view of conflicting High Court decisions, the interpretation favourable to the assessee was applied.
Conclusion: Late fee under Section 234E was not chargeable for the relevant TDS statements pertaining to financial year 2012-13; the levy was directed to be deleted in favour of the assessee.
Levy of Late Fee u/sec 234E - delay in filling the quarterly TDS Statement - Prospective operation of power to compute TDS late fee pertaining to financial year 2012-13
HELD THAT: - The power under section 200A to compute and demand late fee under section 234E, being substantive in nature, operates prospectively from 1.06.2015. Consequently, no late fee could be charged through an intimation under section 200A for TDS statements relating to the financial year 2012-13. See SRI. FATHERAJ SINGHVI AND OTHERS [2016 (9) TMI 964 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] [Paras 5, 6]
The levy of late fee was deleted and the appeals were allowed.
Final Conclusion: The orders sustaining late fee under section 234E for the delayed TDS statements of the relevant period were set aside, and the appeals were allowed.
Issues: Whether the reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer for determining the existence of a permanent establishment and taxability of profits was within the scope of remand and the statutory jurisdiction under the transfer-pricing provisions.
Analysis: The remand directions required the Assessing Officer to freshly examine the existence of a permanent establishment after permitting cross-examination and considering the relevant material. A reference under Section 92CA(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is confined to determination of the arm's length price of a specific international transaction under Section 92C. The reference did not identify any such transaction, while the Transfer Pricing Officer determined the existence of a permanent establishment under Article 5 of the India-Singapore Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement and the consequent taxability and attribution of business profits under Article 7. Those treaty-taxability questions remained for the Assessing Officer and could not be transferred to the Transfer Pricing Officer. The assessment was founded solely on those jurisdictionally invalid findings without independent verification by the Assessing Officer.
Conclusion: The Transfer Pricing Officer's findings on the existence of a permanent establishment and taxability of profits were unsustainable, and the assessment founded solely upon those findings could not stand. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Transfer Pricing Officer's jurisdiction over permanent establishment - Transaction-specific reference for arm's length price determination - Scope of remand directions
Validity of the reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer for determination of the assessee's permanent establishment and taxability of profits during remand proceedings - HELD THAT: - The jurisdiction under section 92CA is confined to computation of the arm's length price of a specific international transaction referred by the Assessing Officer; it does not extend to deciding the existence of a permanent establishment under the India-Singapore DTAA or the consequent taxability and attribution of business profits. The reference neither identified any international transaction nor conformed to the remand directions, which required the Assessing Officer to conduct a fresh examination of the permanent establishment issue. The Assessing Officer could not transfer that responsibility to the Transfer Pricing Officer, and could not found the assessment solely on the latter's conclusions without independent examination.
As in Sava Healthcare Ltd. [2019 (7) TMI 173 - ITAT PUNE] principle emerging therefrom is that, the Ld.TPO cannot assume functions which are statutorily entrusted to the Ld.AO. The mere fact that an appeal against the said decision is stated to be pending would not, by itself, render the decision inapplicable, in the absence of any contrary decision of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court. [Paras 6, 7]
The Transfer Pricing Officer's findings on the existence of a permanent establishment and taxability of profits were unsustainable; the additional legal ground was allowed and the assessment founded solely on those findings could not survive.
Final Conclusion: The assessee's appeal was allowed on the jurisdictional ground, and the revenue's cross-objection was dismissed.
Issues: Whether the assessee's TNMM benchmarking based on software-distribution comparables could be rejected and the arm's length price of licence fees could instead be determined under the Other Method through an ad hoc revenue split based on functions, assets and risks.
Analysis: The assessee distributed licensed Hollywood content as a limited-risk distributor, while the associated enterprise owned or acquired the content and bore the significant entrepreneurial risks. Its assured distribution margin and entitlement to subvention supported that characterisation. Under TNMM, comparability depends upon broadly comparable functions, assets, risks, contractual arrangements and reliable financial data; differences in the products distributed do not, by themselves, make software or hardware distributors unsuitable comparables. The selected comparables had been examined and were rejected essentially because they did not operate in the film or entertainment industry, without establishing specific material functional or risk differences.
Analysis: The revenue split adopted under the Other Method rested on assigned weightages for functions, assets and risks, but no comparable uncontrolled transaction, reliable market evidence, or objective economic basis supported either the assigned percentages or the resulting revenue allocation. Identification of functions and risks is distinct from quantifying their economic value. A without-prejudice alternative FAR computation did not validate the ad hoc revenue-split approach.
Conclusion: The rejection of TNMM and the arm's length price determined through the ad hoc revenue split were unsustainable. TNMM, using the examined software-distribution comparables, was required to be adopted for recomputation of the arm's length price, and the consequential transfer-pricing adjustment was deleted.
TP Adjustment - functional comparability under TNMM - Other Method - ad hoc revenue split
Determination of the arm's length price of licence fees paid for distribution of licensed Hollywood television and film content, by TNMM using software and hardware distribution comparables or by a revenue split under the Other Method - HELD THAT: - The assessee's contractual entitlement to an assured distribution margin, coupled with the AE's ownership or acquisition of content and responsibility for intellectual-property risks, supported its characterisation as a limited-risk distributor. Under TNMM, product differences do not by themselves disqualify comparables; the material inquiry is into comparable functions, assets, risks, contractual arrangements and reliable financial data.
The software and hardware distribution comparables could not be rejected merely because they did not distribute film or entertainment content. Conversely, the revenue split adopted by the TPO rested upon assigned weightages for functions, assets and risks without identified comparable uncontrolled transactions, reliable market evidence, or an objective economic basis for quantifying the respective contributions. Identification of functions and risks could not, by itself, establish the economic value attributable to them or the arm's length price. [Paras 9]
The rejection of TNMM and the arm's length price determined through the ad hoc revenue split were unsustainable; the transfer-pricing adjustment was deleted, and the Assessing Officer was directed to determine the arm's length price under TNMM using the examined software distribution comparables and recompute the total income in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed on the transfer-pricing issue. The adjustment based on the ad hoc revenue split was deleted and the arm's length price was directed to be recomputed under TNMM.
Issues: Whether interest awarded under a foreign arbitral award and incorporated in an Indian court decree was taxable in India under the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the India-USA Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
Analysis: The foreign arbitral award, including the interest component, was declared enforceable under Section 49 of the Indian Arbitration Act and deemed to be a decree of the Court. Upon becoming part of the decretal amount, the interest assumed the character of a judgment debt and lost its independent character as interest. The amount also did not fall within the definition of interest under Section 2(28A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as it did not arise from money borrowed or debt incurred. Consequently, Article 11(2) of the India-USA Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement was inapplicable.
Conclusion: The decretal amount representing arbitral interest was not exigible to tax in India.
Taxability of interest forming part of a judgment debt - Enforcement of foreign arbitral award as decree
Taxability in India of interest included in a foreign arbitral award that was enforced as a decree of the Delhi High Court - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that, upon enforcement, the foreign arbitral award, including the amount described as interest, became a decree of the Court.
We next find the mandate of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Islamic Investment Company [2002 (3) TMI 3 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] wherein, they have stated that where the amount paid is interest, it becomes ‘judgement debt’
We are further inclined to agree with the assessee that though the nomenclature of "interest" has been used in the Arbitral Award, the same does not attract the definition of "interest" under section 2(28A) of IT Act. To our mind therefore, the damages, including the interest has assumed the character of a “judgement debt” and is beyond the purview of Indian Income Tax Act.
Thus, amount of Interest received, as part of the decree of the court, is not exigible to tax and accordingly the same is deleted. The grounds are disposed off in the aforesaid terms. [Paras 17, 18]
The interest received as part of the decretal amount was held not exigible to tax and the addition was deleted.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed, and the interest component included in the decretal award was deleted from taxation.
Issues: Whether prior approval for provisional attachment may be obtained before issuing notice to the alleged benamidar under Section 24(1) of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988.
Analysis: Section 24 requires the proceeding to commence with a written notice founded on reasons to believe that the person is a benamidar, with a copy to the beneficial owner. Provisional attachment under Section 24(3) may follow only upon formation of the prescribed opinion and prior approval of the Approving Authority. Approval obtained before issuance of the statutory notice lacks the material and reasons required for a lawful decision on attachment and renders the process mechanical and contrary to the prescribed sequence.
Conclusion: Prior approval obtained before issuance of notice under Section 24(1) is invalid; the provisional attachment and its confirmation cannot be sustained.
Provisional attachment of alleged benami property - mandatory statutory sequence - Prior approval for provisional attachment -notice to benamidar as condition precedent
Validity of provisional attachment of jewellery alleged to be benami where approval of the Approving Authority preceded the notice to the alleged benamidar - HELD THAT: - The statutory sequence under Section 24 requires issuance of notice to the alleged benamidar, disclosing the reasons to believe that the property is benami, before the Initiating Officer seeks prior approval for provisional attachment. The Approving Authority can consider approval only on the basis of that notice and other material; approval obtained before issuance of notice is therefore mechanical and contrary to the statutory scheme. [Paras 7, 8]
The confirmed provisional attachment was set aside and the appeals were allowed, with liberty to the respondent to initiate fresh action in accordance with law and to the appellants to raise all available grounds in such proceedings.
Final Conclusion: The order confirming the provisional attachment was set aside because the statutory requirement of issuing notice before obtaining approval for attachment was not followed. Fresh action in accordance with law was left open.
Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging a customs order was maintainable despite the statutory appellate remedy.
Analysis: Availability of an efficacious statutory appeal ordinarily warrants restraint in exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but does not create an absolute bar. The challenge raised a specific question whether goods could be treated as prohibited solely on the basis of their description and an asserted application of criminal law, without an identified statutory or notification-based prohibition. The asserted departure from objective legal standards and its effect on the right to trade warranted consideration in writ jurisdiction.
Conclusion: The preliminary objection based on alternative remedy was rejected, and the writ petition was held maintainable; the merits were left for hearing.
Writ jurisdiction despite alternative statutory remedy - Customs treatment of goods as prohibited goods
Maintainability of the writ petition challenging the customs treatment of adult sex toys as prohibited goods, despite the statutory appellate remedy - HELD THAT: - Availability of an alternative statutory remedy is ordinarily a ground for restraint in exercise of writ jurisdiction, but is not an absolute bar. The challenge raised a specific question whether the description of the goods as obscene adult sex toys and invocation of the penal provision, without identifying a statutory or notification-based prohibition, could render them prohibited goods. Where a statutory authority is alleged to have acted outside objective law on considerations of subjective morality, seriously affecting the right to trade, the writ jurisdiction need not be declined. [Paras 8, 9, 10, 11]
The preliminary objection was rejected and the writ petition was held maintainable; no opinion was expressed on the merits.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was held maintainable notwithstanding the alternative appellate remedy, with the merits kept open for consideration.
Issues: Whether the provisional freezing of a bank account under Section 110(5) of the Customs Act, 1962 could continue after expiry of the maximum statutory period notwithstanding issuance and pendency of a show cause notice under Section 124.
Analysis: Section 110(5) permits provisional attachment of a bank account for a period not exceeding six months, with a written extension by the competent Commissioner for a further period not exceeding six months, communicated before expiry of the original period. The statutory scheme consequently fixes twelve months as the outer limit for provisional attachment. Issuance of a show cause notice under Section 124 and pendency of adjudication do not enlarge or override that express temporal limit. An attachment that has expired by operation of the statute cannot be continued through administrative action.
Conclusion: The bank-account attachment had ceased to operate by efflux of the maximum statutory period and could not be continued merely because adjudication proceedings were pending.
Provisional attachment of bank account - statutory time-limit - Continuation of provisional freezing of a bank account after the maximum period under section 110(5) of the Customs Act, 1962 -
HELD THAT: - Section 110(5) permits provisional attachment for no more than six months, extendable by a further period not exceeding six months upon written reasons and communication before expiry of the original period. A show-cause notice and pendency of adjudication proceedings cannot, by themselves, extend an attachment beyond that express statutory maximum. The attachment consequently ceased to operate by efflux of time.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kesari Nandan Mobile [2025 (8) TMI 992 - Supreme Court] while considering the statutory scheme governing provisional attachment under Section 83 of the CGST Act, the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasised that an attachment which has ceased to operate by efflux of the statutory period cannot be continued by administrative action. [Paras 7, 9, 10, 12, 13]
The continued freezing was held without authority of law, and the bank account was directed to be defrozen, without precluding action otherwise permissible in law.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed and the provisional freezing of the bank account was treated as having ceased by efflux of the statutory period.
Issues: Whether import transactions backed by substantial advance payments made before the restriction on gold imports were entitled to transitional protection under Paragraph 1.05(b) of the Foreign Trade Policy, 2023.
Analysis: Paragraph 1.05(b) protects imports made before a policy restriction and extends protection to pre-existing commitments supported by irrevocable commercial letters of credit. The exception is intended to protect bona fide transactions concluded before the restrictive notification. An irrevocable commercial letter of credit provides payment security through banking arrangements; however, advance payments exceeding 90% of the invoice value provided greater security to the overseas seller. The petitioners established through their business records and prior transactions that they were regular bona fide traders in precious metals and that the impugned transactions were not devised to circumvent the changed import policy. While the restriction itself was a policy decision not warranting interference, its transitional application required a purposive rather than mechanical construction. Notifications issued as delegated legislation ordinarily operate prospectively unless retrospective operation is statutorily authorised.
Conclusion: The petitioners were entitled to the benefit of Paragraph 1.05(b) of the Foreign Trade Policy, 2023 for the identified pre-notification transactions supported by substantial advance payments.
Transitional arrangements for restricted gold imports - Advance payment vis-a -vis irrevocable commercial letter of credit
Entitlement of bona fide importers of gold jewellery to transitional protection where substantial advance payments were made under pre-notification contracts, but no irrevocable commercial letter of credit was established - HELD THAT: - The exception for irrevocable commercial letters of credit was intended to protect bona fide transactions entered into before the import restriction. An irrevocable commercial letter of credit secures payment through an independent banking mechanism upon production of shipping documents; however, advance payment exceeding 90% of the invoice value afforded the foreign seller higher security.
Having found the petitioners to be regular and bona fide traders in precious metals and the transactions to be genuine, the Court held that a mechanical application of the policy would defeat the object of the transitional arrangement. Notifications constituting delegated legislation ordinarily operate prospectively unless the statute authorises retrospective operation. [Paras 23, 25, 26, 27, 28]
The benefit of the transitional arrangement was directed to be extended to the petitioners' specified import transactions.
Final Conclusion: The writ petitions were disposed of with a direction to extend the benefit of the Foreign Trade Policy transitional arrangement to the petitioners' specified transactions.
Issues: Whether provisional release of seized betel nuts was warranted under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962 in writ jurisdiction.
Analysis: The initial test report identified the representative samples as resembling Indonesian areca nuts and recorded mould infestation. Although a subsequent re-sampled report indicated Indian origin, it did not address mould infestation. A further food laboratory report found the nuts damaged by mould and insects beyond prescribed limits and classified them as sub-standard and unsafe. The evidence therefore did not establish an unequivocal case of Indian origin, and an appellate statutory remedy was available.
Conclusion: Provisional release was not warranted; the petitioner was left to pursue the statutory remedy.
Provisional release of seized betel nuts - Exercise of writ jurisdiction despite statutory alternative remedy - Conflicting country-of-origin test reports - Unsafe food goods -
Whether seized betel nuts were entitled to provisional release despite conflicting test reports concerning their country of origin and findings of mould infestation and unsafe quality? - HELD THAT: - The seizure was founded on the goods being of foreign origin. While re-sampling later indicated that the representative samples mostly resembled Indian areca nuts, the earlier report indicated Indonesian origin and mould infestation; the subsequent report did not address mould infestation. The food laboratory report also found the nuts damaged by mould and insects, beyond the prescribed limit, and unsafe for consumption.
Thus, this was not a clear case of goods being of Indian origin, and the coordinate-bench decision relied Kumar Enterprise [2026 (7) TMI 2025 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT] upon was distinguishable. The petitioner had also bypassed the statutory remedy. [Paras 4, 5]
The Court declined to interfere with the seizure list or the rejection of provisional release and dismissed the writ petition, leaving the petitioner free to pursue the statutory remedy.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was dismissed, with liberty to the petitioner to avail the statutory remedy.
Issues: (i) Whether export obligation under Advance Authorisations was breached where imported Vetted Malt Scotch was physically incorporated in exported IMFL, while domestically procured bottles, caps and labels were obtained under Rule 19(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002; (ii) Whether the DRI lacked jurisdiction to issue the show-cause notice for recovery of customs duty under Section 28(4) of the Customs Act, 1962.
Issue (i): Whether export obligation under Advance Authorisations was breached where imported Vetted Malt Scotch was physically incorporated in exported IMFL, while domestically procured bottles, caps and labels were obtained under Rule 19(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002.
Analysis: Condition (viii) of Notification No. 96/2009-Cus requires export of resultant products manufactured from inputs imported under the Advance Authorisation without availing the specified rebate or duty-free procurement facilities. The notification distinguishes materials required for manufacture of the resultant product from packaging materials. The physical incorporation requirement under the Advance Authorisation applied to the imported Vetted Malt Scotch, which was incorporated in the exported IMFL. Bottles, caps and labels procured domestically under Annexure-45 were packaging materials and were not physically incorporated in IMFL.
Conclusion: Use of domestically procured duty-free packaging materials did not breach the export obligation or Condition (viii) of Notification No. 96/2009-Cus; the consequential duty demand, interest and penalties were unsustainable (in favour of the assessee).
Issue (ii): Whether the DRI lacked jurisdiction to issue the show-cause notice for recovery of customs duty under Section 28(4) of the Customs Act, 1962.
Analysis: Proper officer jurisdiction for recovery under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 is available to DRI officers when they are appointed as customs officers and assigned the relevant functions. The review decision reversing the earlier contrary position recognised that assessment under Section 17 and recovery of short-paid duty under Section 28 are distinct statutory functions.
Conclusion: The jurisdictional objection failed; the DRI was competent to issue the show-cause notice (against the assessee).
Final Conclusion: The exemption condition does not disqualify export-obligation fulfilment merely because duty-free domestically procured packaging material is used for packing the exported resultant product.
Ratio Decidendi: Under an Advance Authorisation, the restriction concerning duty-free inputs applies to materials physically incorporated in the resultant export product and does not extend to separately procured packaging materials merely used for packing that product.
Advance Authorisation - export obligation and packaging materials - DRI officers - jurisdiction to issue customs duty demand notices
Advance Authorisation - export obligation and packaging materials - Whether export of IMFL packed in bottles, caps and labels procured domestically under Annexure-45 could be treated as breach of the export-obligation condition attached to the Advance Authorisation for imported Vetted Malt Scotch? - HELD THAT: - The notification distinguishes raw materials and components required for manufacture of the resultant product from packaging materials required for packing it.
The difference between " inputs' under Duty Free Import Authorization in Para 4.2.1 and Advance Authorization in Para 4.1.3 has been explained in the case of R.P INTERNATIONAL Versus UNION OF INDIA [2017 (5) TMI 1008 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT] held that 'the difference is that whereas the DFIA Scheme permits duty free import of 'inputs' which are "required for production of export product", the "Advance Authorization' allows duty free import of 'inputs', which are "physically incorporated in the export product"'
Under the Advance Authorisation scheme, only inputs physically incorporated in the export product are relevant. Vetted Malt Scotch was the imported input incorporated in IMFL, whereas the bottles, caps and labels were domestically procured packing materials and were not physically incorporated in IMFL. Their procurement under Annexure-45 could not therefore be equated with the imported input or render the exports violative of the Advance Authorisation condition. [Paras 18, 20, 22]
The alleged breach of the Advance Authorisation condition was not established; the impugned order was set aside on merits.
DRI officers - jurisdiction to issue customs duty demand notices - Whether officers of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence lacked jurisdiction to issue the show-cause notice for recovery of customs duty? - HELD THAT: - The Supreme Court's later review decision [2024 (11) TMI 391 - SUPREME COURT (LB)] held that Directorate of Revenue Intelligence officers appointed as customs officers and assigned the functions of a proper officer are competent to issue notices for recovery of customs duty. Assessment and recovery of short-paid duty are distinct statutory functions; the earlier view to the contrary had been reversed. [Paras 21, 22]
The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence officers was rejected.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed, since the alleged violation of the Advance Authorisation condition was not made out. The jurisdictional objection to the show-cause notice was, however, rejected.
Issues: (i) Whether failure to allow cross-examination invalidated the adjudication under Section 138-B of the Customs Act, 1962 when no request for cross-examination was made; (ii) Whether gold seized during domestic transit without foreign markings could be confiscated by invoking Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 absent reasonable belief and proof of smuggling; (iii) Whether penalties were imposable for dealing with the seized gold.
Issue (i): Whether failure to allow cross-examination invalidated the adjudication under Section 138-B of the Customs Act, 1962 when no request for cross-examination was made.
Analysis: Cross-examination is required where the noticee seeks it in respect of witnesses whose statements are relied upon; if it cannot be afforded, reasons contemplated by Section 138-B must be recorded. The record and the appellants' admission established that no specific request for cross-examination had been made before the adjudicating authority.
Conclusion: The absence of cross-examination did not, in the absence of a request, constitute a breach of natural justice or independently invalidate the adjudication. This issue is against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether gold seized during domestic transit without foreign markings could be confiscated by invoking Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 absent reasonable belief and proof of smuggling.
Analysis: Section 110 requires the seizing officer to have reasonable belief, founded on definite and objective material, that the goods are liable to confiscation. The burden-shifting presumption under Section 123 arises only upon satisfaction of that precondition. The gold was seized away from a customs station or notified area, bore no foreign markings, and had varying purity levels. There was no evidence of foreign origin, border crossing, importation, a smuggling route, overseas contacts, or the manner in which the gold allegedly entered India. General and retracted statements, unsupported by independent corroboration, could not establish smuggling.
Analysis: Documentary material showed domestic procurement, banking-channel payments, stock records, GST-related records, vouchers accompanying the carriers, and a melting challan. The departmental inquiry did not conclusively disprove that material: the sellers did not deny business dealings, while further verification of disputed signatures and financial transactions was not undertaken. Once licit domestic procurement was asserted with supporting records, the Department had to disprove it through cogent evidence.
Conclusion: No reasonable belief existed at the time of seizure, Section 123 was inapplicable, and the Department failed to prove that the gold was smuggled; consequently, the gold was not liable to confiscation. This issue is in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether penalties were imposable for dealing with the seized gold.
Analysis: The penalties rested on the allegation that the persons concerned dealt with smuggled gold. As the smuggled character of the gold was not established and confiscation was unsustainable, the factual basis for penal liability failed.
Conclusion: No penalty was imposable on the persons concerned. This issue is in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The statutory presumption and the consequential customs liabilities could not operate because the seizure lacked an objectively supported foundation of reasonable belief and the Department did not establish illicit importation.
Ratio Decidendi: The burden under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 shifts only where seizure under Section 110 is founded on reasonable belief, based on objective material, that the goods are smuggled; absent that foundation, the Department must independently prove smuggling before confiscation or penalty can follow.
Seizure of the gold at first point - Reasonable belief and statutory burden in seizure of gold - Penalty for dealing with alleged smuggled gold
Validity of adjudication u/s 138-B - Failure to permit cross-examination of witnesses whose statements were relied upon - HELD THAT: - On de novo consideration pursuant to the High Court's direction, the Tribunal recorded the appellants' submission that no specific request for cross-examination had been made before the adjudicating authority. It consequently held that the earlier finding that the procedure under Section 138B had been violated could not be sustained as a ground to set aside the adjudication order. [Paras 2]
The appeals were considered afresh on merits, without treating non-compliance with Section 138B as a ground for setting aside the adjudication order.
Reasonable belief for seizure of gold - Burden of proving smuggled nature of gold - Confiscability of gold seized outside a Customs station in the absence of established reasonable belief that it was smuggled - HELD THAT: - A reasonable belief, founded on definite material and existing at the time of seizure, is a condition precedent to seizure and to shifting the statutory burden upon the person from whom the gold is seized. The absence of foreign markings, the purity of the gold, and the lack of evidence regarding its foreign origin, illicit importation or the manner of smuggling showed that the asserted belief was founded on presumption rather than corroborative material. The statutory burden therefore did not arise; in any event, the appellants' documentary claim of domestic procurement was not disproved by a completed investigation. [Paras 15, 18, 19, 20, 25]
The gold was held not liable to confiscation, and the confiscation was set aside.
Penalty for dealing with alleged smuggled gold - Penalties imposed for alleged involvement in dealing with smuggled gold - HELD THAT: - As the Department failed to establish that the gold was smuggled and the confiscation was not upheld, the foundational allegation for penal liability did not survive. [Paras 26]
All penalties imposed on the appellants were set aside.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and all six appeals were allowed with consequential relief in accordance with law.
Issues: (i) Whether Disc Brake Units and Pole Wheels (Wheel Slide Protection) qualify as Train Protection and Warning System and are eligible for concessional duty under Sl. No. 521 of Notification No. 50/2017-Customs dated 30.06.2017; (ii) Whether the differential-duty demand is sustainable beyond the normal period of limitation under Section 28(1) of the Customs Act, 1962.
Issue (i): Whether Disc Brake Units and Pole Wheels (Wheel Slide Protection) qualify as Train Protection and Warning System and are eligible for concessional duty under Sl. No. 521 of Notification No. 50/2017-Customs dated 30.06.2017.
Analysis: The expression Train Protection and Warning System, though undefined in the notification and tariff, has a specific technical meaning in railway engineering parlance. The applicable railway specification identifies track-side and on-board signalling equipment as TPWS and treats the interface to an existing brake-control system separately. Disc Brake Units and Pole Wheels are components of the axle-mounted disc braking system, intended to prevent wheel locking and derailment, whereas TPWS addresses signal-passed-at-danger events, speed restrictions and collision prevention. The official railway specification and technical material prevail over expert opinions seeking to extend the expression through dictionary meanings. Under strict interpretation of exemption notifications, the claimant bears the burden of establishing that the goods squarely fall within the exemption.
Conclusion: Disc Brake Units and Pole Wheels are not parts or components of TPWS and are not eligible for the concessional duty rate. This issue is decided against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the differential-duty demand is sustainable beyond the normal period of limitation under Section 28(1) of the Customs Act, 1962.
Analysis: The show-cause notice invoked Section 28(1) of the Customs Act, 1962. A demand beyond its normal limitation period would fall outside the scope of that notice and cannot be sustained without invoking the extended-period provision.
Conclusion: The differential-duty demand is sustainable only for Bills of Entry falling within the normal period of limitation. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The concessional exemption is unavailable, but the duty liability is restricted to the demand falling within the normal limitation period.
Ratio Decidendi: An undefined expression in an exemption notification must be construed in its recognised technical parlance, and the exemption claimant must strictly establish that the imported goods fall within its scope.
Customs exemption for Train Protection and Warning System - Limitation for customs duty demand under normal period
Classification of Disc Brake Units and Pole Wheels as Train Protection and Warning System - Strict interpretation of customs exemption notification - Eligibility of Disc Brake Units and Pole Wheels, imported as components of an axle-mounted disc brake system, for concessional duty as a Train Protection and Warning System - HELD THAT: - In the absence of a statutory definition, the expression Train Protection and Warning System was required to be understood in its recognised railway-engineering context. The Indian Railways specification treated the interface to the existing brake-control system separately from TPWS components; the imported goods formed part of the mechanical or pneumatic braking system and were neither specified as TPWS equipment nor shown to perform its signal-based functions. The official railway material prevailed over the technical opinions produced by the appellant. Applying the principle of strict construction of an exemption notification, the appellant failed to establish that the goods fell within the exemption entry.
We draw support from the Supreme Court's ruling in Dilip Kumar and Company [2018 (7) TMI 1826 - SUPREME COURT (LB)] which has held that exemption notifications are to be interpreted strictly. Any ambiguity in an exemption notification is to be resolved against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. [Paras 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]
The imported Disc Brake Units and Pole Wheels were held not to be parts or components of TPWS and were consequently denied the concessional rate of duty.
Limitation for differential customs duty under normal period - Demand beyond scope of show cause notice - Validity of the differential-duty demand for Bills of Entry falling outside the normal limitation period invoked in the show cause notice - HELD THAT: - Since the show cause notice invoked the normal period under section 28(1), a demand beyond that period could not be sustained by effectively invoking the extended-period provision under section 28(4), which was beyond the scope of the notice. [Paras 17]
The differential-duty demand was restricted to Bills of Entry falling within the normal period of limitation.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed in part. The exemption claim was rejected, while the differential-duty demand was confined to the normal limitation period.
Issues: Whether the Trial Court's direction requiring the accused to immediately vacate the residential quarters, in implementation of the Supreme Court's order, was liable to be interfered with while the review petition against that Supreme Court order remained pending.
Analysis: Article 141 of the Constitution of India makes the Supreme Court's declared law and unambiguous directions binding on all courts. The Supreme Court had expressly treated the undertaking as binding upon all accused and directed immediate delivery of vacant possession. Inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 cannot be used to sit in appeal over, reinterpret, or dilute that direction. The pendency of a review petition does not suspend the operative force of the Supreme Court's judgment unless the Supreme Court itself stays, modifies, or suspends it. The Trial Court was consequently bound to implement the direction and exercised no independent discretion beyond it.
Conclusion: The direction to vacate the quarters was valid and required no interference; the issue is decided against the petitioner.
Enforceability of the direction requiring the accused to surrender possession of employer-allotted residential quarters notwithstanding the pendency of a review petition before the Supreme Court - Binding force of Supreme Court directions -
HELD THAT: - A court exercising inherent jurisdiction cannot sit in appeal over, interpret or dilute an unambiguous direction of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court's finding that the undertaking operated for all the accused, and its consequential direction for immediate surrender of possession, remained binding under Article 141. Mere pendency of a review petition does not suspend the operation of that judgment unless the Supreme Court itself stays, modifies or suspends it. [Paras 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]
The Trial Court was bound to implement the Supreme Court's operative direction and rightly directed the petitioner to vacate the quarters; no interference was warranted.
Final Conclusion: The Criminal Miscellaneous Case was dismissed, as the impugned order merely implemented the binding direction of the Supreme Court and suffered from no illegality, impropriety or irrationality.
Issues: (i) Whether the respondent had locus standi to challenge the Way Leave Permission granted for revival of the appellant's water pipeline; (ii) Whether the retrospective renewal of an expired Way Leave Permission was lawful despite intervening rights, absence of a safety audit and the insolvency resolution process; (iii) Whether the findings of fraud and collusion against the appellant and Railway authorities were justified.
Issue (i): Whether the respondent had locus standi to challenge the Way Leave Permission granted for revival of the appellant's water pipeline.
Analysis: The respondent had constructed and operated railway underpasses under agreements with the Railway authorities. Its recorded safety concerns showed a real possibility that pipeline restoration and associated construction could adversely affect those underpasses and its adjoining property. A person facing possible adverse civil consequences has sufficient standing to challenge the administrative permission; the Railway authorities also owed a duty to ensure that later permissions did not impair existing authorised works.
Conclusion: The respondent had locus standi to maintain the writ petition. This issue is decided against the appellant.
Issue (ii): Whether the retrospective renewal of an expired Way Leave Permission was lawful despite intervening rights, absence of a safety audit and the insolvency resolution process.
Analysis: The original permission expired by efflux of time before commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process. An expired permission could not be retrospectively renewed, and the NCLT lacked jurisdiction under the insolvency framework to revive, renew or preserve a railway-land permission that had already lapsed; any fresh permission lay within the Railway authorities' competence. The proposed overhead structure was also inconsistent with Clause 1033(12) of the Indian Railway Code for Engineering Department. In view of the respondent's specific objections and the potential safety implications for existing underpasses and the surrounding industrial area, a comprehensive safety audit and an opportunity of hearing were necessary before grant of the permission.
Conclusion: The retrospective renewal or revival of the expired Way Leave Permission was illegal. This issue is decided against the appellant.
Issue (iii): Whether the findings of fraud and collusion against the appellant and Railway authorities were justified.
Analysis: Fraud and fraudulent collusion are serious charges requiring proof on proper material beyond reasonable doubt; suspicion cannot substitute proof. The illegality of the permission did not by itself establish fraud or collusion.
Conclusion: The findings and observations of fraud and collusion were unwarranted and stand expunged. This issue is decided in favour of the appellant.
Final Conclusion: The invalidity of the Way Leave grant and consequential actions remains undisturbed, but the adverse imputations of fraud and collusion are deleted.
Ratio Decidendi: An administrative authority cannot retrospectively renew an expired permission so as to affect intervening rights without jurisdiction, a proper safety assessment and compliance with natural justice; insolvency resolution proceedings do not revive rights that had lapsed before commencement of the process.
Locus standi of a third party affected by way leave permission - Renewal of expired Way Leave Permission - Natural justice and safety audit in grant of Way Leave Permission - Proof of fraud and collusion
Locus standi of a third party affected by way leave permission - Maintainability of the writ petition by the holder of railway underpass rights challenging revival of a water-pipeline Way Leave Permission - HELD THAT: - The respondent had constructed and operated two railway underpasses pursuant to agreements with the Railway Authorities. Its apprehension that the revived pipeline and consequential construction could adversely affect those underpasses and its adjoining infrastructure was neither fanciful nor baseless. A person likely to suffer adverse civil consequences from an authority's act has standing to challenge it; the Railway Authorities were correspondingly obliged to ensure that a subsequent permission did not adversely affect the underpasses. [Paras 20, 21]
The respondent had locus standi to maintain the writ petition.
Natural justice and safety audit in grant of Way Leave Permission - Overhead construction on railway land under Way Leave Permission - Validity of the revived Way Leave Permission granted without considering the safety implications for existing railway underpasses or hearing their holder - HELD THAT: - Despite the respondent's objections identifying possible safety consequences, the Railway Authorities neither responded to those objections nor afforded it an opportunity of hearing. No due safety audit addressing the effect of the proposed pipeline works on the underpasses and the surrounding industrial area was shown to have preceded the grant. The permitted overhead structure also appeared contrary to Clause 1033(12) of the Railway Engineering Code. [Paras 24, 25, 33]
The grant of permission without a due safety audit and opportunity of hearing was held irregular and illegal.
Renewal of expired Way Leave Permission - Jurisdiction of NCLT over rights dehors insolvency resolution - Whether an expired Way Leave Permission could be retrospectively renewed or preserved through the corporate insolvency resolution process and approval of a resolution plan? - HELD THAT: - The earlier Way Leave Permission had expired before the appellant was admitted to the corporate insolvency resolution process. Consequently, there was no subsisting permission capable of continuing by operation of law. Renewal or revival of a railway land permission was a dispute dehors the insolvency resolution process and lay outside the jurisdiction of the NCLT; approval of a resolution plan could neither renew the expired permission nor create a fresh right. An expired permission could only be replaced by a fresh permission from the competent authority. [Paras 26, 27, 28, 29, 33]
The purported retrospective renewal of the expired Way Leave Permission was invalid.
Proof of fraud and collusion - Sustainability of the findings that the appellant and Railway Authorities acted fraudulently and in collusion - HELD THAT: - A finding of fraud or fraudulent collusion cannot be lightly returned. Since fraud is a criminal charge, it must be established on proper material beyond reasonable doubt, rather than on the civil standard of balance of probabilities. [Paras 32]
The observations attributing fraud and collusion to the appellant and the Railway Authorities were expunged.
Final Conclusion: The invalidation of the retrospective Way Leave Permission and consequential reliefs was affirmed. The findings alleging fraud and collusion against the appellant and the Railway Authorities were expunged.
Issues: Whether an interim moratorium under Section 96 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 stays criminal proceedings for cheque dishonour under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
Analysis: Section 96 stays legal actions concerning debt during the interim-moratorium period. Its operation is confined to civil actions for recovery of debt and does not extend to criminal prosecution for cheque dishonour, which serves to maintain the credibility of negotiable instruments and enforce personal accountability.
Conclusion: An interim moratorium under Section 96 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 does not bar or stay criminal proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
Interim moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code -criminal prosecution for dishonour of cheque
Whether the Trial Court was justified in staying the proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 by invoking the interim moratorium under Section 96 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016? - HELD THAT: - The interim moratorium postpones civil actions for recovery of debt and does not extend to criminal prosecution for dishonour of cheque. Such prosecution serves to preserve the credibility of negotiable instruments and commercial discipline; consequently, initiation of insolvency proceedings against the accused was no ground to stay the complaint. [Paras 20, 22]
The stay of the complaint proceedings was set aside and the complaint was restored for further proceedings in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The petition was allowed. The complaint proceedings were restored to the Trial Court for continuation in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether time spent in obtaining a certified copy could be excluded and the appeal treated as maintainable despite being filed beyond the maximum period prescribed for an appeal under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.
Analysis: The impugned order was pronounced and uploaded on the date of its pronouncement, followed by a public announcement. Knowledge of the order was not a ground for extending limitation under the insolvency regime. The material did not substantiate the asserted administrative impediments or diligent pursuit of the certified copy. Section 61(2) permits filing within thirty days and, upon sufficient cause, only a further period not exceeding fifteen days; insolvency proceedings are statutorily time-bound.
Conclusion: The appeal was filed beyond the non-extendable outer limit under Section 61(2), and no sufficient cause or basis for exclusion of time was established; it was therefore not maintainable.
Limitation for appeal under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code - Exclusion of time for obtaining certified copy
Maintainability of an appeal filed beyond the maximum condonable period prescribed for an appeal against an order reviving the corporate insolvency resolution process - HELD THAT: - The impugned order was pronounced and made available in the public domain on the same day, and the appellant's assertion of later upload was found factually incorrect. Knowledge of the order was held not to be a ground under the insolvency regime. The explanation concerning delayed receipt of a certified copy was unsupported by the material on record and did not establish sufficient cause. An appeal must be filed within the prescribed period of 30 days, with condonation permissible only for a further period not exceeding 15 days; the appellate forum has no jurisdiction beyond that limit. [Paras 23, 25]
The appeal, having been filed beyond the maximum condonable period and without sufficient cause, was held not maintainable and dismissed.
Final Conclusion: The appeal against revival of the corporate insolvency resolution process was dismissed as barred by the statutory limitation governing appeals under the Code.
Rejection of discharge and the subsequent framing of charge for the offence under Sections 3 and 4 - definition of “proceeds of crime” as provided under Section 2(1)(u) - Offence of money-laundering as an independent offence - Admissibility of statements under Section 50 of the PMLA - Requirement of Previous Sanction for prosecution of public servant - lack of evidence demonstrating any link or association between the petitioner and the proceeds of crime and no money trail.
HELD THAT:- We are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment(s) and order(s) of the High Court [2026 (5) TMI 648 - JHARKHAND HIGH COURT] hence, the special leave petitions are dismissed.
Issues: Whether the petitioners were entitled to discharge from the charge of money laundering for want of prima facie material connecting them with the transfer of proceeds of crime.
Analysis: At the stage of discharge, the material is to be assessed only to determine whether it raises a prima facie case or strong suspicion; a roving enquiry or trial-like weighing of evidence is impermissible. The bank records showed transfers aggregating to Rs. 1 crore from the concerned company to the partnership firm. The statements recorded under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, including the first petitioner's statement, indicated that the sums were arranged in cash at the request of a co-accused and delivered in New Delhi, rather than being supported as ordinary business transactions by contemporaneous supply documents. Statements of persons who arranged and delivered the cash provided corroborative material. Knowingly assisting or participating in a process connected with proceeds of crime falls within Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
Conclusion: The material raised strong suspicion of the petitioners' knowing involvement in facilitating transfer of proceeds of crime; discharge was therefore not warranted, against the petitioners.
Discharge at the stage of framing charge - Money-laundering by knowingly assisting transfer of proceeds of crime
Discharge of the accused charged with money-laundering for allegedly facilitating transfer and delivery of proceeds of crime - HELD THAT: - At the stage of discharge, the Court is required to ascertain whether the material raises a strong suspicion and reasonably connects the accused with the offence; it cannot conduct a roving enquiry or weigh the evidence as at trial.
The petitioners' statement indicated that the funds were arranged and delivered at the request of the co-accused rather than in the ordinary course of business, and no contemporaneous material substantiating the claimed supply of goods was produced.
The bank records and the statements of persons who arranged and delivered the cash constituted corroborative prima facie material showing that the petitioners knowingly assisted the process connected with proceeds of crime. [Paras 25, 26, 27, 28, 29]
The material raised a strong prima facie suspicion of the petitioners' involvement in the alleged money-laundering offence; dismissal of the discharge petition was upheld.
Final Conclusion: The Criminal Revision Case was dismissed, the Court finding no illegality in refusal to discharge the petitioners.
Rectification application - HELD THAT:- An application is filed by Directorate of Enforcement, Jaipur Zone for rectification of clerical mistake bonafidely crept in judgment dated 21.2.2019. No one is present on behalf of Directorate of Enforcement, to argue the matter.
Learned public prosecutor of State is directed to intimate office of the ED, Jaipur. List this case on 25.08.2026.
Issues: Whether the Designated Committee validly determined the amount payable under the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution Scheme), 2019 without verifying the assessee's disclosed payments and supporting records.
Analysis: Section 124(1)(ii) of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019 grants relief of 50% where tax dues exceed Rs. 50 lakh, while the proviso excludes a refund. Section 126 of that Act read with Rule 6 of the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution Scheme) Rules, 2019 requires the Designated Committee to verify departmental records, the declaration, and supporting material before determining the payable amount. Two Forms SVLDRS-3 issued on the same date determined materially different amounts, and the required verification of documentary evidence was absent.
Conclusion: The Forms SVLDRS-3 were invalid for want of the mandatory verification and were set aside; the Designated Committee must make a fresh determination after verifying the complete disclosure and documentary evidence.
Declaration under Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme - Determination of tax dues on documentary evidence - Determination of the amount payable under the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme without verification of the declarant's disclosure and supporting documentary evidence
HELD THAT: - The Designated Committee issued two Forms SVLDRS-3 determining different amounts and had not verified the departmental records, the complete disclosure or the documents produced by the declarant. Under the Scheme and the prescribed Rules, the Committee was required to undertake such verification before determining the amount payable; that statutory exercise was absent. [Paras 11, 12, 13, 14]
The Forms SVLDRS-3 were set aside and the Designated Committee was directed to verify the complete disclosure and supporting material and pass a fresh order in accordance with the Rules.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was partly allowed by setting aside the impugned Forms SVLDRS-3 and remitting the determination to the Designated Committee for fresh verification and decision.
Issues: (i) Whether amounts received from trading or sales and from renting property for hostel use constituted taxable services; (ii) Whether invocation of the extended period of limitation was valid; (iii) Whether Form 26AS and income-tax return information alone could sustain the service-tax demand.
Issue (i): Whether amounts received from trading or sales and from renting property for hostel use constituted taxable services.
Analysis: The trading receipts could not be connected to the assessee and, independently, transfer of title in goods by sale falls outside the definition of service under Section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994. Renting of the property for use as a hostel amounted to renting of a residential dwelling for use as residence. Such activity was covered by the negative-list exclusion under Section 66D(m) of the Finance Act, 1994.
Conclusion: The trading or sales receipts and the rental receipts were not taxable services. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether invocation of the extended period of limitation was valid.
Analysis: The assessee had disclosed and explained the nature of the receipts through written replies and supporting material. The activities were reasonably regarded as outside the taxable-service net, and the Department did not establish any positive act of deliberate suppression, fraud, or wilful misstatement intended to evade tax.
Conclusion: The extended period was wrongly invoked. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether Form 26AS and income-tax return information alone could sustain the service-tax demand.
Analysis: Third-party income-tax data did not identify a taxable service, its provider and recipient, or consideration paid as quid pro quo for such service. In the absence of evidence establishing the nature of the underlying activity, Form 26AS and income-tax returns could not by themselves justify confirmation of service tax.
Conclusion: Form 26AS and income-tax return information alone could not sustain the demand. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The impugned service-tax demand, together with its consequential liabilities, had no legal basis because both categories of receipts were non-taxable and the extended limitation was unavailable.
Trading receipts outside scope of taxable service - Renting of residential dwelling for hostel use - Extended limitation for suppression of facts - Service tax demand based solely on Form 26AS
Trading receipts outside scope of taxable service - Taxability of trading and sale receipts attributed to the appellant as consideration for services - HELD THAT: - No material connected the appellant with the concern in whose name the trading records were produced. Independently, trading or sale involving transfer of title in goods is expressly excluded from the definition of service and could not be treated as a taxable service. [Paras 10]
The service tax demand on receipts from trading or sale was held unsustainable.
Renting of residential dwelling for hostel use - Taxability of rent received from property let for use as a hostel - HELD THAT: - A hostel, being residential accommodation for students for a comparatively longer stay, was held to qualify as a residential dwelling. Renting of such dwelling for use as residence was outside the scope of taxable service during the post-negative-list period. [Paras 11, 12]
The rent received from the property let for hostel use was held not taxable.
Extended limitation for suppression of facts - Invocation of the extended period for non-payment of service tax and non-registration in respect of activities believed to be non-taxable - HELD THAT: - The appellant's belief that the activities were outside the ambit of taxable service was held bona fide. Mere non-payment of tax or failure to obtain registration did not establish intentional suppression; the department had not produced evidence of a positive act to evade tax. [Paras 13]
The extended period invoked for issuance of the show-cause notice was held to be unavailable.
Service tax demand based solely on Form 26AS - Confirmation of service tax demand solely on Form 26AS and income-tax-return information - HELD THAT: - Form 26AS or income-tax-return particulars alone could not establish service tax liability. The department was required to identify the service provider, recipient and consideration constituting quid pro quo for a taxable service, and no such evidence was established. [Paras 14]
The demand could not be confirmed merely on the basis of Form 26AS or income-tax-return information.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order confirming service tax demand, interest and penalties was set aside, and the appeal was allowed.
Issues: Whether the discrepancy between Form 26AS receipts and ST-3 returns, including the asserted payment through the corrected challan and advances subsequently invoiced, required verification.
Analysis: The record indicated that the cited challan number was stated to contain a clerical error and that the correct challan was available. The differential receipts were also asserted to comprise customer advances on which service tax was discharged in the succeeding period. Verification of the challan, payments and supporting reconciliation was therefore required after affording an opportunity to produce documents and to be heard.
Outcome: The matter was remanded to the original adjudicating authority for verification and fresh adjudication.
Discrepancy between Form 26AS receipts and ST-3 returns - Clerical error in challan particulars - Verification of the claimed service-tax payment and reconciliation of receipts reflected in Form 26AS and ST-3 returns - HELD THAT: - The appeal had been dismissed solely because the challan particulars did not tally with the payment claimed. In view of the assertion that the correct challan was available on record and that the differential receipts required reconciliation, verification by the original adjudicating authority was considered necessary. [Paras 6, 7]
The impugned order was set aside and the matter was remanded to the original adjudicating authority to verify the challan, payment and relevant reconciliation documents after granting opportunity of hearing, without adjudication on merits.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed by way of remand for verification of the claimed payment and reconciliation of the differential receipts.
Issues: Whether target- and non-target-based incentives, discounts and reimbursements received by an authorised vehicle dealer from the manufacturer constitute consideration for a taxable service, including a declared service under Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994.
Analysis: A service under Section 65B(44) requires an activity carried out by one person for another for consideration. A dealer purchasing vehicles and spare parts on a principal-to-principal basis and reselling them for its own profit acts for itself; any benefit accruing to the manufacturer from increased sales is merely incidental. Target achievement was only a condition for receiving a discount, not an enforceable obligation undertaken for the manufacturer or quid pro quo for an identified activity. Amounts characterised as incentives, support or reimbursements were, in substance, trade discounts or price adjustments, which do not lose that character merely because quantified or paid after sale. Section 66E(e) applies only where an agreement specifically creates an obligation to do, refrain from doing, or tolerate an act, with consideration specifically linked to that obligation. The dealership agreement contained no such obligation, and its target-related terms merely set out discount schemes. The applicable departmental circular also requires this express contractual nexus.
Conclusion: The impugned receipts are not consideration for taxable service or for a declared service under Section 66E(e); the service-tax demand and consequential penalties are unsustainable.
Service taxability of vehicle - dealer incentives and trade discounts - Declared service - agreement to do or tolerate an act
Vehicle-dealer incentives as trade discounts - Consideration for service - Taxability of incentives, discounts and support received by an authorised vehicle dealer from the manufacturer under target-based and non-target-based dealership schemes - HELD THAT: - A service requires an activity carried out by one person for another for consideration. The dealer purchased vehicles and spare parts on its own account and resold them for its own profit; any benefit accruing to the manufacturer from increased sales was merely incidental to trade and did not constitute a service rendered to it. Achievement targets were conditions for grant of discounts and not enforceable obligations constituting consideration for an identified service. Amounts representing price adjustments or discounts retained their character as trade discounts notwithstanding that their quantification or payment occurred after the sale, where known to the buyer at or before the sale.
The issue is otherwise no more res integra as stands decided by this Tribunal in the case of M/s Roshan Motors Pvt Ltd [2022 (8) TMI 1254 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] held that no service tax can be demanded or incentive which was in the form of trade discount extended to the party in terms of a declared policy for achieving sales target. [Paras 10, 11, 12, 14, 15]
The receipts were not consideration for taxable services, and the service-tax demand and consequential penalties on the dealer and its Director could not be sustained.
Declared service-agreement to do or tolerate an act - Applicability of declared-service provisions to target-linked incentives and discounts under the vehicle dealership agreement - HELD THAT: - The declared-service provision applies only where the agreement specifies an obligation to refrain from an act, tolerate an act or situation, or do an act, with consideration specifically flowing for that obligation. The dealership agreement contained no such obligation; its relevant clauses only provided discount schemes uniformly available to dealers. A penal consequence for non-fulfilment of targets was not consideration for tolerating an act or situation. [Paras 13, 15]
The receipts were not taxable as consideration for a declared service.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order dropping the service-tax demand and consequential penalties was upheld. The departmental appeals were dismissed.
Issues: (i) Whether the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was barred by limitation when the department relied only on dispatch of the order-in-original; (ii) Whether the ex parte adjudication without the assessee's knowledge violated principles of natural justice.
Issue (i): Whether the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was barred by limitation when the department relied only on dispatch of the order-in-original.
Analysis: Section 85(3A) of the Finance Act, 1994 makes the date of receipt of the adjudication order, rather than its date of dispatch, the starting point for limitation. Service under Section 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944, as applied through Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994, requires proof of service in the prescribed manner; dispatch alone does not establish delivery. The department produced no evidence of service before 19.10.2019, whereas the record established receipt of the certified copy on that date.
Conclusion: The appeal filed on 02.12.2019 was within limitation; the limitation finding was in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the ex parte adjudication without the assessee's knowledge violated principles of natural justice.
Analysis: The assessee had neither replied to the show-cause notice nor participated in the original proceedings, and the order-in-original was passed ex parte. In the absence of proof that the assessee had knowledge of the proceedings, denial of an effective opportunity to represent its case offended principles of natural justice.
Conclusion: The ex parte proceedings suffered from breach of principles of natural justice; this finding was in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The rejection on limitation could not be sustained, and the merits require adjudication after affording the assessee a reasonable opportunity of representation.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the limitation period runs from receipt of an adjudication order, mere proof of dispatch without proof of valid service cannot establish communication of that order.
Service of adjudication order - Limitation for statutory appeal - Ex parte adjudication and natural justice
Service of adjudication order - Limitation for statutory appeal - Computation of limitation for appeal against an adjudication order where the department proved only dispatch and not service of the order - HELD THAT: - The statutory period for filing an appeal runs from the date of receipt of the adjudication order. Mere dispatch does not establish service in accordance with the prescribed mode. As the department produced no evidence of service before the appellant received the certified copy, the dispatch date could not be treated as the date of communication.
Mere proof of dispatch cannot be the proof of service thereof, as has been observed by this Tribunal in the case of Dinesh Kumar Choudhary [2026 (7) TMI 369 - CESTAT NEW DELHI]. We also observe that the service has to be ascertain in terms of section 35 of the Central Excise Act which is applicable to service tax matter also by virtue of section 83 of the Finance Act, [Paras 9, 10, 11, 12]
The appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was within limitation; the order rejecting it as time-barred was set aside and the matter was remanded for decision on merits.
Ex parte adjudication and natural justice - Validity of the ex parte adjudication where the appellant had no knowledge of the proceedings and no opportunity to present its case - HELD THAT: - The appellant had neither responded to the show-cause notice nor participated in the original proceedings, which were decided ex parte. The Tribunal found that the appellant lacked knowledge of the proceedings and that its absence resulted in violation of the principles of natural justice, a circumstance not considered by the Commissioner (Appeals). [Paras 13, 14]
The matter was remanded to the Commissioner (Appeals) for fresh adjudication on merits after affording the appellant a reasonable opportunity of representation.
Final Conclusion: The limitation dismissal was set aside because service of the adjudication order was not established and the appeal was filed within time from receipt of its certified copy. The matter was remanded to the Commissioner (Appeals) for fresh decision on merits after granting a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
Issues: Whether service tax on ocean freight in CIF contracts could be demanded from an Indian importer under the reverse charge mechanism.
Analysis: The appellate order deleting the demand followed binding rulings which held that, in CIF contracts, the overseas seller is the recipient of the sea-transportation service and the Indian importer is neither the service provider nor the service recipient. In the absence of any stay of those rulings, judicial discipline required their application. Subsequent decisions, including dismissal of the Revenue's challenge in a similar matter, supported the same position.
Conclusion: Service tax on ocean freight under reverse charge cannot be demanded from the Indian importer in a CIF contract; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Service tax on ocean freight under reverse charge in CIF contracts - Judicial discipline and binding precedent
Sustainability of service-tax demand on ocean freight from an importer under reverse charge in CIF contracts when the notifications imposing such liability had been struck down and no stay was operating - HELD THAT: - In the absence of a stay by the Supreme Court on the Gujarat High Court ruling, the appellate order [2019 (9) TMI 1315 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] could not be faulted merely because the Revenue had disagreed with that ruling and filed a special leave petition. Judicial discipline required adherence to the ruling, and the subsequent decisions noted by the Tribunal supported the conclusion that the demand could not be sustained.
We also note that similar appeal filed by Revenue in case of Kiri Dyes and Chemical Ltd [2023 (3) TMI 1400 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD] was dismissed by the Ahmedabad bench observing "that the issue whether ocean freight/sea transportation service is liable to service tax or otherwise has been decided by jurisdictional High Court of Gujarat in the case of SAL Steel Limited and there is no stay against the said High Court judgment. No infirmity in the impugned order which was passed relying on the jurisdictional High Court judgment in the case of SAL Steel Limited - revenue's appeal is dismissed. Cross objection is also disposed of.” This order of Ahmedabad Bench has been upheld Hon'ble Supreme Court as reported as [2023 (9) TMI 305 - SC ORDER], after condoning the delay.[Paras 4]
The order setting aside the demand was upheld and the Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
Final Conclusion: The Revenue's appeal and stay application were dismissed, and the order setting aside the service-tax demand on ocean freight was sustained.
Issues: (i) Whether expenditure incurred directly by the service recipient for renovation and upgradation of a rented stadium formed part of the taxable value of renting of immovable property service; (ii) Whether service tax was confined to the actual lease consideration received and whether penalties could survive.
Issue (i): Whether expenditure incurred directly by the service recipient for renovation and upgradation of a rented stadium formed part of the taxable value of renting of immovable property service.
Analysis: Under Sections 66 and 67 of the Finance Act, 1994, service tax is chargeable only on the gross amount charged by the service provider for the taxable service. Rule 3(b) of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 cannot enlarge the statutory valuation base. The renovation expenditure was incurred and capitalised by the service recipient, paid directly to third parties, was not routed through or controlled by the service provider, and was not shown to be consideration or a pre-condition having nexus with the renting service.
Conclusion: The renovation and upgradation expenditure incurred by the service recipient cannot be included in the taxable value of the renting service. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether service tax was confined to the actual lease consideration received and whether penalties could survive.
Analysis: The actual lease consideration received for the relevant period was Rs. 12,00,000, on which service tax and interest had already been deposited before issuance of the show-cause notice. Since the additional renovation expenditure was excluded from valuation, there was no basis to sustain the penalties linked to the enhanced demand.
Conclusion: Service tax is limited to the actual lease consideration of Rs. 12,00,000 already paid with interest, and the penalties under Sections 77(2) and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 are set aside. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The taxable value of renting of immovable property service excludes expenditure independently incurred by the recipient where it is not consideration for, or sufficiently connected with, the service provided.
Ratio Decidendi: For service-tax valuation, only consideration charged by the service provider for the taxable service may be included; recipient-incurred expenditure without nexus to that service cannot be added through delegated valuation rules.
Valuation of renting of immovable property service - Additional consideration - nexus with taxable service - Penalty for failure to self-assess service tax
Valuation of renting of immovable property service - Additional consideration - nexus with taxable service - Inclusion of expenditure incurred by the service recipient for renovation and development of a rented stadium in the taxable value of renting of immovable property service - HELD THAT: - Service tax valuation is confined to the gross amount charged by the service provider as consideration for the taxable service. The recipient's expenditure on renovation was incurred on its own account, was not routed through or controlled by the appellant, and lacked the requisite nexus with the renting service. Such expenditure could not therefore be treated as additional consideration for renting the stadium. [Paras 4]
The expenditure incurred by the service recipient was excluded from taxable value, and the demand was confined to service tax on the actual rental consideration received and already paid with interest.
Penalty for failure to self-assess service tax - Penalties imposed after payment of service tax on the actual rental consideration before issuance of the show-cause notice - HELD THAT: - As the service tax on the actual consideration received had been deposited with interest before issuance of the show-cause notice, no basis remained to sustain the penalty under section 78. The penalty imposed for failure to self-assess was also not sustained. [Paras 4]
The penalties imposed under sections 77(2) and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 were set aside.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed to the extent that the recipient's renovation expenditure was excluded from taxable value. Service tax on the actual rental consideration already paid with interest was sustained, while the penalties were set aside.
Issues: Whether the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was filed within the condonable period under Section 85(3A) of the Finance Act, 1994.
Analysis: Limitation commenced from receipt of the Order-in-Original, not from its date. The order was received on 12.04.2024 and the appeal was dispatched on 18.06.2024, resulting in a delay of six days beyond the prescribed two-month period. Dispatch was treated as the filing date. The delay was within the additional one-month period capable of condonation, and the need to reset the old service-tax password and obtain old documents established bona fides and sufficient cause.
Conclusion: The delay was condonable and ought to have been condoned; the limitation dismissal was unsustainable. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Period of Limitation for service tax appeal - date of receipt of order - Condonation of delay within statutory period
HELD THAT: - Section 85(3A) makes the date of receipt of the adjudication order the starting point for limitation. As the receipt date was undisputed, the appeal dispatched six days after expiry of the normal period was within the further period which the Commissioner (Appeals) could condone. The date of dispatch was held relevant to filing; the prompt dispatch upon resetting the service tax password established bona fides and due diligence. [Paras 7, 9, 10]
The time-bar rejection was set aside and the matter was remanded to the Commissioner (Appeals) for fresh decision on merits after granting reasonable opportunity of hearing.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed by way of remand, as the delay in filing the first appeal was within the condonable period and ought to have been condoned.
Issues: Whether service tax could be sustained on receipts from hiring and operating lorries by treating the assessee as a provider of Goods Transport Agency or clearing and forwarding service.
Analysis: The applicable definition of Goods Transport Agency requires provision of transport-related service along with issuance of a consignment note. The records established that the receipts were from hiring lorries owned or operated by the assessee, and no consignment notes were issued. The precedent governing identical circumstances was applicable, under which a truck owner or operator undertaking transportation without issuing a consignment note is not a Goods Transport Agency. The demand raised under a service category not properly supported by the nature of receipts was consequently unsustainable.
Conclusion: The service tax demand under Goods Transport Agency or clearing and forwarding service, together with consequential liabilities, could not be sustained, in favour of the assessee.
Goods Transport Agency service - hiring of lorries - service-tax demand under Goods Transport Agency service on receipts from hiring of lorries
HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the controversy was squarely covered by its earlier decision M/s. Sivasakthi Engineering & Fabricators [2024 (5) TMI 995 - CESTAT BANGALORE] and in appellant's own case [2024 (12) TMI 671 - CESTAT BANGLORE] and held that there was no justification to depart from those decisions. [Paras 16, 17]
The impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: Following its earlier decisions, including the appellant's own case, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and allowed the appeal with consequential relief.
Issues: Whether registration fees collected from students and remitted to IATA were includible in the taxable value of commercial training and coaching services.
Analysis: Rule 5(1) of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 could not enlarge the scope of Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994 to include reimbursable expenditure in the value of taxable services for the relevant period. The subsequent amendment to Section 67 with effect from 14.05.2015, expressly including reimbursable expenditure or cost, was substantive and operated prospectively.
Conclusion: Registration fees collected and remitted to IATA were not includible in the taxable value for the disputed period; the demand, interest and penalties could not survive, in favour of the assessee.
Reimbursable registration charges in service-tax valuation - Inclusion of registration charges collected from students and deposited with IATA in the gross taxable value of commercial training and coaching services
HELD THAT: - The Supreme Court had held that reimbursable expenditure was not included in the valuation provision before its amendment, which brought about a substantive and prospective change. Applying that ruling of M/S. INTERCONTINENTAL CONSULTANTS AND TECHNOCRATS PVT. LTD. [2018 (3) TMI 357 - SUPREME COURT] the registration charges collected and deposited with IATA could not be included in the taxable value under Rule 5(1) of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 read with Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994. [Paras 6, 7]
The service-tax demand on the registration charges was unsustainable; the impugned order was set aside and the appeal allowed with consequential relief.
Final Conclusion: The demand on registration charges remitted to IATA was held unsustainable. The impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief.
Issues: Whether the adjudication and appellate orders, passed after remand, could disregard the Tribunal's directions to reconsider classification, valuation and extended-period demand with reference to the technical material and approved classifications.
Analysis: The adjudicating authority expressed a view contrary to the Tribunal's remand directions while dealing with the evidentiary role of technical reports, notwithstanding the specific requirement to consider such material for redetermination of classification. The appellate order reproduced and confirmed that approach, disclosing the same infirmity and non-application of mind. The remand directions of the statutory appellate forum were required to be followed in the fresh adjudication.
Conclusion: The orders passed in disregard of the Tribunal's remand directions were invalid; the matter must be freshly adjudicated in accordance with those directions after affording hearing to the assessee.
Judicial discipline in implementation of remand directions - Non-application of mind in appellate adjudication
Compliance with the Tribunal's remand directions concerning classification, valuation and demand of duty on the disputed central excise products - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal had required fresh consideration of the technical material and other specified aspects before determining classification and consequential valuation. The Adjudicating Authority, while professing to examine the matter afresh, recorded observations contrary to the Tribunal's directions and proceeded to determine duty and impose penalty on other evidence. Such comments were unwarranted and reflected disregard of the binding remand directions. The appellate order, having incorporated the adjudication order in its entirety, equally suffered from non-application of mind. [Paras 4, 7, 8]
The adjudication and appellate orders were quashed, and the matter was remanded for fresh decision in conformity with the Tribunal's observations after affording the petitioner an opportunity of hearing.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed and the impugned orders were quashed for failure to adhere to the Tribunal's remand directions. The matter was remanded for fresh adjudication in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether notices of personal hearing were served upon the appellant so as to afford a valid opportunity of hearing under Section 35A(3) of the Central Excise Act, 1944.
Analysis: Issuance of hearing notices, without any acknowledgement or other material proving their service, did not establish service upon the appellant. The appellant's appearance through counsel before the same appellate authority in another matter between the same parties on the same date corroborated that it had not received notice in this matter. The Tribunal decided the interest dispute on merits without addressing the appellant's challenge to the denial of hearing.
Conclusion: The hearing notices were not served and the appellant was denied an opportunity of hearing. The appellant's claim is to be reconsidered afresh by the Commissioner (Appeals).
Ex parte adjudication - proof of service of hearing notice - Natural justice - opportunity of personal hearing
Validity of the ex parte appellate adjudication where service of notices of personal hearing upon the appellant was not established - HELD THAT: - The respondents failed to produce any acknowledgement or other material establishing service of the hearing notices. The appellant's appearance through counsel in another matter between the same parties before the same appellate authority on the same day fortified its case that it had not deliberately abstained from the hearing. Tribunal was required to address this specific plea but instead decided the interest claim on merits, resulting in a further denial of opportunity. [Paras 27, 28, 29, 30, 31]
The notices of personal hearing were held not to have been served, and the Commissioner (Appeals) was directed to reconsider the appellant's claim afresh.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was partly allowed. The matter was remitted to the Commissioner (Appeals) for fresh consideration after affording the appellant an opportunity of hearing.
Issues: Whether processed milk, captively consumed or sent to job workers in the continuous manufacture of sugar-boiled confectionery, constitutes an exempted final product for the purposes of Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.
Analysis: Rules 3 and 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 operate in relation to inputs or input services used for manufacture of final products. An intermediate product arising as an integral part of an integrated manufacturing process, and used captively or through job workers for manufacture of the dutiable ultimate product, cannot be separately equated with an exempted final product merely because it is not independently cleared. The nature of the manufacturing operation must be assessed as a whole; technological or unavoidable intermediate products do not attract the Rule 6 obligation on the premise that they are exempted goods.
Conclusion: Processed milk is an intermediate product and not an exempted final product for Rule 6 purposes; the demand founded on the contrary premise is unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.
Processed milk, captively consumed or sent to job workers in the continuous manufacture of sugar-boiled confectionery - exempted final product for invoking Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 - Determination of Intermediate product not constituting exempted final product
HELD THAT: - Rule 6 applies where common inputs or input services are used for manufacture of dutiable and exempted final products. An intermediate product forming an integral part of the continuous manufacture of a dutiable final product cannot be treated as an exempted final product merely because it is captively consumed or sent to job workers for further manufacture.
Processed milk was not manufactured or cleared as an independent final product; its use in the integrated manufacture of sugar-boiled confectionery retained its character as an intermediate product.
In Collector of Central Excise Vs Eastend Paper Industries Ltd. [1989 (8) TMI 81 - SUPREME COURT] the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that where a process is so integrally connected with the ultimate production of goods that, but for such process, manufacture would be commercially inexpedient, articles required in that process fall within the expression “in the manufacture of goods”. The ratio supports consideration of the manufacturing operation as an integrated whole.[Paras 7, 9, 10, 11]
Processed milk could not be regarded as an exempted final product for invoking Rule 6; the demand founded on the contrary premise was unsustainable.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside with consequential relief, since processed milk used in the integrated manufacture of sugar-boiled confectionery was not an exempted final product attracting Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.
Issues: Whether clandestine manufacture and clearance of Pan Masala and Scented Chewing Tobacco could be established from an unverified third-party transport record, statements and estimated computations without independent corroborative evidence.
Analysis: An allegation of clandestine manufacture and removal requires cogent, positive and corroborative evidence establishing the complete chain of excess raw-material procurement, manufacture, capacity, consumption of inputs, transportation, buyers, consideration and financial flow-back. File No. 17 was a third-party private document of unproved authorship, origin and reliability; the Department did not establish that the alleged laminates were delivered to, received by or consumed at the assessee's factory. The document's entries were internally inconsistent and were selectively interpreted without verification from regular transport records or the persons responsible for the transporter's affairs.
Analysis: The conversion of box entries into laminate weight through selected average figures was arbitrary because uniformity of the boxes' contents and weight was not established. Manufacture and clearance of chewing tobacco were further presumed solely from an alleged market practice of paired sales with Pan Masala, without evidence of tobacco inputs, manufacture, transport, buyers or sale proceeds. Successive presumptions and mathematical estimates cannot replace proof of each taxable event.
Conclusion: The Department failed to prove clandestine manufacture or clearance by legally admissible and corroborative evidence; the excise-duty and NCCD demand was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.
Clandestine manufacture and removal of Pan Masala and Scented Chewing Tobacco - burden of proof - Third-party private records - corroborative evidentiary value - Presumptive demand based on market practice Estimated laminate consumption and presumed tobacco production
Sustainability of the excise-duty and NCCD demand for alleged clandestine manufacture and clearance of Pan Masala and Scented Chewing Tobacco, founded on a third-party transport file, estimated laminate consumption and an assumed market practice of equal sale of tobacco pouches - HELD THAT: - Clandestine manufacture and removal must be established by cogent, positive and corroborative evidence proving the connected links of procurement, manufacture, receipt and consumption of inputs, clearance, buyers and consideration; suspicion, private third-party records and successive presumptions cannot substitute proof. File No.17 was neither recovered from nor maintained by the respondent, and its authorship, authenticity, lawful custody and connection with the respondent were not established. The Department also failed to prove delivery and receipt of the alleged laminates, their consumption in manufacture, or clandestine clearance of finished goods. The averaging method used to derive laminate weight from boxes was unsupported by proof that the sampled consignments were comparable.
Further, manufacture and clearance of Scented Chewing Tobacco could not be presumed merely from an alleged market practice of its sale with Pan Masala, absent independent evidence of its inputs, manufacture or clearance. [Paras 19, 20, 21, 23, 24]
The Department failed to discharge its burden of proving clandestine manufacture and removal; the demand relating to both Pan Masala and Scented Chewing Tobacco could not be sustained.
Final Conclusion: The Revenue's appeal was dismissed, and the orders dropping the proceedings were upheld.
Issues: (i) Whether interest on an amount deposited during investigation, subsequently refunded after the excise demand was set aside, is governed by Sections 11B and 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944; (ii) From what date and at what rate interest is payable on the refunded investigation deposits.
Issue (i): Whether interest on an amount deposited during investigation, subsequently refunded after the excise demand was set aside, is governed by Sections 11B and 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944.
Analysis: The deposits were made during investigation before issuance of the show-cause notice, and the demand was ultimately set aside with consequential benefit; that order was not challenged by Revenue. Once the demand failed, the deposits ceased to bear the character of excise duty and remained amounts held without a legal claim. A refund application in the prescribed form could not convert such investigation deposits into duty refunds. Sections 11B and 11BB govern refund of duty and delayed statutory duty refunds, not return of investigation-stage revenue deposits.
Conclusion: Sections 11B and 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944 do not govern interest on the refunded investigation deposits. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): From what date and at what rate interest is payable on the refunded investigation deposits.
Analysis: The amounts were retained from their respective dates of deposit despite Revenue having no sustainable entitlement to them. In the absence of a governing statutory interest provision for these pre-Section 35FF investigation deposits, the applicable authorities supported compensation by interest from the date of deposit until actual refund. The consistent applicable rate was 12% per annum.
Conclusion: Interest is payable at 12% per annum from the respective dates of deposit until the date of refund. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The refunded investigation deposits carry compensatory interest for the entire period of their unlawful retention, to be calculated and paid within eight weeks.
Ratio Decidendi: Where an investigation deposit is refunded because the underlying excise demand is finally unsustainable, it is not a duty refund governed by the statutory delayed-refund regime, and interest is payable from deposit to refund at the applicable compensatory rate.
Interest on refund of investigation deposits - Inapplicability of statutory delayed-refund interest to investigation deposits
Entitlement to interest on amounts deposited during investigation after the MODVAT credit demand - HELD THAT: - Once the demand was set aside and the appellant's entitlement to MODVAT credit stood accepted, the amounts collected during investigation ceased to bear the character of excise duty and remained deposits over which the Revenue had no legal claim.
The filing of a refund application could not alter that character so as to attract the three-month limitation for interest under Section 11BB. The absence of a specific statutory provision governing interest on such deposits could not justify denial of interest; the authorities cited were held applicable. [Paras 13, 14, 15]
The denial of interest was set aside, and interest at 12% per annum was directed to be paid from the respective dates of deposit until the date of refund, within eight weeks.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed and the impugned order was set aside. Interest at 12% per annum was directed on the investigation deposits from the dates of deposit until refund.
Issues: Whether recovery of CENVAT credit for March 2007 to November 2008 under a show-cause notice issued on 30.11.2010 was barred by limitation.
Analysis: The extended limitation period under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 required fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts with intent to evade duty. The department was aware of the receipt of left-over bulk cement in the factory and had issued permission for availment of credit on that quantity. No evidence established fraud, suppression of facts, or intent to evade duty. Consequently, the notice was required to be issued within the normal limitation period of one year.
Conclusion: The CENVAT credit demand was time-barred and the limitation issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Period of limitation for CENVAT credit recovery - Recovery of CENVAT credit availed on returned bulk cement - invocation of the extended period in the absence of fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression with intent to evade duty
HELD THAT: - The appellant's removal of cement in bulkers and receipt of left-over cement in the factory were within the department's knowledge, and permission had been issued for availment of credit on the quantity so received. No evidence established fraud or other statutory ingredients warranting the extended limitation period. The demand, raised beyond the normal period of one year, was therefore time-barred. [Paras 5]
The confirmed CENVAT credit demand, interest and penalty were unsustainable on limitation; the impugned order was set aside and the appeal allowed.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed solely on limitation, as the extended period for recovery of CENVAT credit could not be invoked.
Issues: Whether sales tax subsidy received under the Rajasthan Investment Promotion Scheme, 2010, through VAT/CST challans, is includible in the assessable value of excisable goods.
Analysis: The assessee paid the entire VAT/CST collected from customers to the State exchequer. The subsidy was subsequently sanctioned as VAT challans for discharge of future VAT/CST liability and did not reduce the sale price or amount to retention of tax collected. Such subsidy was not an additional consideration for the sale and could not form part of transaction value under Section 4(3)(d) of the Central Excise Act.
Conclusion: The sales tax subsidy is not includible in the assessable value; no excise duty or penalty is payable by the assessee.
Transaction value - sales tax subsidy under Rajasthan Investment Promotion Scheme, 2010 - Excise valuation of sales tax subsidy - Additional consideration
Whether the demand of excise duty on the amount of sales tax subsidy received from the State Government of Rajasthan under Rajasthan Industrial Promotion Scheme, 2010 is includible in the assessable value of the goods cleared during the relevant period or not? - HELD THAT: - We find that the issue has been dealt with by this Tribunal in the case of Harit Polytech Pvt. Ltd. [2023 (7) TMI 1547 - CESTAT, DELHI] wherein this Tribunal has held that the amount of subsidy under the promotion policy is not an additional consideration.
The entire VAT/CST collected from customers was paid to the State exchequer, while the subsidy was granted through VAT challans for discharge of subsequent tax liability. Such subsidy neither reduced the selling price nor constituted additional consideration; payment through the challans was actual payment of VAT/CST and could not be included in transaction value. [Paras 6, 7]
The sales tax subsidy was held not includible in assessable value; consequently, no excise duty or penalty was payable.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief.
Issues: Whether Cenvat credit is admissible on countervailing duty paid at the concessional rate under Notification No. 12/2012-Customs dated 17.03.2012.
Analysis: Rule 3(1)(vii) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 permits credit of additional duty levied under Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, where such duty is equivalent to the specified excise duty. The concessional rate of countervailing duty was prescribed through an exemption issued under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1962. The reduced 2% countervailing duty paid under the Customs notification remained duty equivalent to the applicable excise duty for purposes of Rule 3(1)(vii). The restriction associated with Notification No. 12/2012-Central Excise dated 17.03.2012 did not apply to credit of countervailing duty paid under the separate Customs notification.
Conclusion: Cenvat credit of the 2% countervailing duty paid under Notification No. 12/2012-Customs dated 17.03.2012 is admissible, in favour of the assessee.
CENVAT credit on concessional countervailing duty - Equivalence of exempted additional customs duty to excise duty
Entitlement to CENVAT credit of concessional countervailing duty paid on imported coal under Notification No. 12/2012-Cus - HELD THAT: - The reduced CVD rate prescribed under the Customs notification issued in exercise of the exemption power was required to be treated as equivalent to the excise duty payable for purposes of the additional-duty levy. Consequently, CVD paid at the concessional rate remained additional duty covered by Rule 3(1)(vii) of the Cenvat Credit Rules. The restriction attached to Notification No. 12/2012-C.E. had no application to credit of CVD paid under the distinct Customs notification. [Paras 8, 9]
The assessee was entitled to CENVAT credit of the concessional CVD paid on imported coal.
Final Conclusion: The substantial questions were answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The appeal was dismissed.
Inter-State sale occasioning movement under section 3(a) of the CST Act - branch transfer (stock transfer) as not amounting to inter-State sale - burden of proof under section 6A of the CST Act - Time Bound Supply Scheme (TBS) as scheme/framework vis-a-vis offer/contract - inextricable link between contract of sale and movement of goods - binding effect of findings of the Central Sales Tax Appellate Authority on remand
HELD THAT:- We are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment and order passed by the Custom Excise Service Tax Appellate Tribunal [2025 (9) TMI 1600 - CESTAT NEW DELHI]
The Special Leave Petitions are dismissed
Issues: Whether a dealer whose finally determined taxable turnover was below the prescribed threshold could be denied the composition-scheme rate solely because revised returns were filed belatedly.
Analysis: The finally determined total and taxable turnover was below the threshold prescribed for the composition scheme. Having accepted that turnover, the assessment could not simultaneously apply the higher rate meant for dealers outside the scheme without establishing a turnover exceeding the threshold by cogent evidence. The time limit for revising returns under Rule 7(9) was procedural and could not defeat the substantive benefit where the department's own determination established eligibility and the differential tax and interest had been paid.
Conclusion: The dealer remained entitled to taxation at the composition rate of 0.5%; denial of that benefit on account of belated revised returns was invalid, in favour of the assessee.
Composition scheme eligibility based on determined turnover - Procedural delay and substantive statutory benefit - Belated revised returns and compounding benefit
Entitlement of a dealer to the concessional composition rate where the turnover finally determined by the Assessing Authority was below the statutory eligibility limit, notwithstanding belated revised returns - HELD THAT: - Having redetermined the total and taxable turnover below the prescribed limit, the Assessing Authority could not simultaneously deny composition and levy tax at the rate applicable to non-composition dealers. The premise for disqualification, namely turnover exceeding the eligibility limit, ceased upon the Authority's own final determination.
Procedural delay in revising returns under Rule 7(9) could not override the substantive statutory benefit when the department-determined turnover remained within the composition limit and the differential tax with interest had been paid. [Paras 6, 7, 8, 9]
The dealer was entitled to tax under the 0.5% composition-rate framework; the Revenue could not seek remand to reopen its concluded turnover determination.
Final Conclusion: The writ appeal was dismissed and the order granting the benefit of composition taxation was affirmed. The department was left at liberty to recover any legitimate outstanding balance or statutory interest in accordance with law under the composition-rate framework.
TaxTMI