This commentary provides doctrinal analysis and practical insights on the legal issue discussed below. The judgment is analysed in the context of its factual background, issues framed, and conclusions reached by the Court.

2026 (4) TMI 288 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT

Introduction

The jurisdiction of State tax officers over goods moving in inter-State transit presents a question distinct from the general proposition of cross-empowerment under the GST framework. The question is not merely whether an officer appointed under a State GST law may be treated as a proper officer under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 or the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. It is whether that authority extends to detention, seizure or confiscation of a consignment which originates outside the State of interception and is destined for another State.

The decision in 2026 (4) TMI 288 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT draws a principled distinction between administrative cross-empowerment and jurisdiction over a particular inter-State transaction. It holds that a State officer cannot invoke Sections 129 or 130 of the IGST Act in relation to an inter-State sale that both originates and culminates outside that State. The officer may verify documents at the point of interception and communicate discrepancies to the proper officers of the consignor and consignee, but cannot retain the consignment or commence coercive proceedings under those provisions merely because the goods are passing through the State.

The ruling is significant because it treats territorial nexus, statutory assignment of functions and the fiscal architecture for apportionment of integrated tax as cumulative constraints upon enforcement jurisdiction. It also separates a transit verification function from the power to adjudicate, penalise or confiscate.

Legal & Statutory Context

Constitutional allocation of taxing power

Article 246A of the Constitution of India establishes the dual GST legislative structure. While clause (1) confers power upon Parliament and, subject to clause (2), State Legislatures to make laws with respect to GST, clause (2) reserves to Parliament the exclusive power to legislate where the supply takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce.

This constitutional distinction is reinforced by Article 269A of the Constitution of India. Article 269A(1) provides that GST on supplies in the course of inter-State trade or commerce shall be levied and collected by the Government of India and apportioned between the Union and the States in the manner provided by Parliament. Thus, inter-State supplies are not merely transactions occurring across territorial boundaries; they are constitutionally placed within a distinct levy, collection and settlement mechanism.

Cross-empowerment and the proper officer

Section 6 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 authorises officers appointed under a State GST Act or Union Territory GST Act to be proper officers for CGST purposes, but makes that authorisation subject to conditions specified by notification on the recommendations of the Council. Section 6(2)(b) further protects against parallel proceedings by providing that, where a State or Union Territory proper officer has initiated proceedings on a subject matter, a CGST proper officer shall not initiate proceedings on the same subject matter.

For IGST purposes, Section 4 of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 similarly authorises State tax or Union Territory tax officers as proper officers, subject to notified exceptions and conditions. Further, Section 20 of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 applies the CGST provisions relating to, among other matters, inspection, search, seizure, offences and penalties, mutatis mutandis, to integrated tax.

The relevant State-law definition is equally material. Section 2(91) of the APGST Act defines a proper officer, in relation to a function under that Act, as the Chief Commissioner or an officer of State tax to whom the Chief Commissioner has assigned that function. Assignment under the APGST Act, by itself, therefore establishes authority under the State enactment; the cross-empowerment provisions must operate before a State officer can perform a corresponding CGST or IGST function.

Transit enforcement under Sections 129 and 130

Section 129 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 concerns goods and conveyances in transit. Its operative condition is that goods are transported or stored while in transit "in contravention of the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder." Detention or seizure must be preceded by service of an order of detention or seizure. The provision also requires the proper officer to issue notice and afford the affected person an opportunity of hearing before determination.

Section 130 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is confiscatory. Its principal triggers include supplying or receiving goods in contravention of the Act or rules "with intent to evade payment of tax", failure to account for goods liable to tax, supply without registration where registration is required, and use of a conveyance for carriage in contravention of the Act or rules. Confiscation results in vesting of title in the Government under Section 130(5). Section 130(4) preserves the requirement of hearing, while Section 130(2) requires that the owner be offered an option to pay fine in lieu of confiscation, subject to the statutory limits.

The proceedings in question therefore require not only a proper officer and a statutory contravention, but also jurisdiction over the relevant supply and, for confiscation, satisfaction of the more exacting statutory conditions.

Interpretative Issues

Three connected interpretative issues arise. First, whether Sections 6 of the CGST Act and 4 of the IGST Act confer an unrestricted and automatic authority upon every State officer to act under the Central or integrated tax enactments. Secondly, whether an officer assigned a general transit-checking function may use that function against every inter-State consignment physically located within the State. Thirdly, whether the fiscal entitlement arising from the inter-State supply bears upon the jurisdiction to invoke Sections 129 and 130.

The ruling rejects an interpretation that would permit unrestricted authority merely because a State officer has been appointed under the State Act. Such a construction would produce an incongruity: an officer with a State appointment would possess unconfined authority under the Central enactment despite the statutory requirement that functions of Central proper officers are assigned within the Central administrative framework. Cross-empowerment was therefore construed as facilitating a coordinated administration, not as eliminating statutory and territorial limits.

The decision also adopts a middle course on the question of notification. A contrary High Court approach, considered in the ruling, had treated the absence of a cross-empowerment notification as fatal to action by an authority other than the administratively assigned authority. The present ruling holds instead that cross-empowerment is not automatic in relation to every taxpayer and every function: it operates where the taxpayer has been administratively allotted to the State and the relevant State officer has been assigned the function of proper officer. This construction gives practical effect to the single-interface design without granting uncontrolled enforcement authority.

Detailed Commentary & Analysis

Administrative allocation is the first jurisdictional gate

The GST administrative arrangement contemplated allocation of taxpayers between Central and State administrations to ensure a single interface. The allocation guidelines referred to in the ruling distributed administrative control over taxpayers below the stated turnover threshold predominantly to State administration, while taxpayers above that threshold were to be divided equally between Central and State administration. The legal relevance of this arrangement lies in identifying the authority competent to administer a taxpayer through the cross-empowerment structure.

Accordingly, a State officer becomes competent under the CGST or IGST framework only where two conditions coexist: the taxpayer is administratively allotted to that State and the officer has been assigned the particular statutory function. The converse applies to Central officers. This is a functional and taxpayer-linked conception of cross-empowerment, rather than a geographically unlimited power arising from the mere location of goods.

Transit checking is not equivalent to adjudicatory jurisdiction

Sections 129 and 130 necessarily contemplate a proper officer. Yet the ruling recognises that an officer stationed at a check post cannot know the nature of a consignment before stopping the vehicle and verifying the records. A limited initial verification is therefore not impermissible. The legal consequence follows upon verification: when the documents show that the supply is inter-State and that its origin and destination are both outside the intercepting State, the vehicle must ordinarily be allowed to continue its journey.

This distinction preserves both enforcement capacity and territorial discipline. It permits the officer to identify the nature of the movement, verify statutory documents and record apparent discrepancies. It denies the officer power to convert a preliminary verification into a detention, confiscation or revenue-collection proceeding where the supply has no statutory fiscal connection with the intervening State.

Section 17 of the IGST Act supplies the fiscal nexus

Section 17 of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 governs apportionment of integrated tax and settlement of funds. Section 17(2) directs apportionment of the balance amount to the State "where such supply takes place." Section 17(3) applies the apportionment principles, mutatis mutandis, to interest, penalty and compounding amount realised in connection with the tax so apportioned.

The crucial conclusion is that a State which is merely an intermediate transit jurisdiction is not, by that fact alone, the State where the supply takes place or a State entitled to a share under Section 17. The ruling therefore treats entitlement to allocation as the necessary fiscal nexus for a State officer to use Sections 129 and 130 under the IGST Act. The mere passage of goods through a State cannot generate an entitlement to impose or appropriate penalties, fines or the proceeds of confiscated goods.

This reasoning is especially important because Section 130 is not confined to a temporary disruption of movement. Confiscation causes the goods or conveyance to vest in Government. The power must consequently be construed with close regard to the State or authority legally connected with the taxable transaction. An intermediary State cannot invoke confiscatory powers in a manner that permits it to obtain sums linked to a supply in which it has no statutory share.

Complementary functions do not erase the distinction between Sections 129 and 130

The ruling describes Sections 129 and 130 as complementary and intertwined for the purpose of assigning transit-checking functions to a proper officer. That observation concerns operational competence. It does not mean that the substantive requirements for detention and confiscation are identical.

Section 129 addresses contraventions found during transit. Section 130 requires satisfaction of the conditions in its clauses, including intent to evade payment of tax where that element is expressly stipulated. The distinction becomes decisive when action is proposed on allegations of undervaluation, valuation mismatch or broader assessment concerns. A transit officer cannot use detention or confiscation proceedings as a substitute for a detailed valuation assessment where the documents otherwise identify the goods and transaction.

Judicial / Administrative Perspective

The principal jurisdictional holding

In 2026 (4) TMI 288 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT, the Court set aside proceedings under Sections 129 and 130 initiated against consignments that originated outside the State and were destined outside the State. The Court held that a State proper officer assigned functions under Sections 129 and 130 may exercise those functions under the IGST Act only where the State is entitled to a share of tax under Section 17 in relation to that transaction. Where the State is solely an intervening transit State, the officer has no jurisdiction to detain, seize or confiscate under the IGST Act. Apparent discrepancies may instead be forwarded to the proper officers of the consignor and consignee.

Support for the transit-jurisdiction principle

The approach was subsequently applied in 2026 (9) TMI 1029 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT. That decision held that State GST authorities cannot detain or seize goods that are merely passing through the State and are destined for another State. It consequently confirms the practical reach of the principle: physical transit through a State does not, by itself, establish territorial enforcement jurisdiction over an inter-State consignment.

Limits on confiscation during transit

2025 (12) TMI 941 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT is relevant to the separate but allied question of when Section 130 may be invoked during transit. It treats Sections 129 and 130 as operating in distinct substantive fields and recognises that confiscation may be initiated at the threshold where there is concrete material establishing intent to evade tax. At the same time, it holds that minor documentary aberrations cannot warrant confiscation and that the transit officer cannot undertake an assessment or valuation exercise by relying upon portal entries and third-party discrepancies. The authority to invoke Section 130 must therefore be exercised by the competent jurisdictional proper officer and only upon material demonstrating the required statutory intent.

In 2024 (7) TMI 1512 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT, direct initiation under Section 130 was recognised in principle where the proper officer has a prima facie satisfaction, based on recorded material, that there is intent to evade tax. However, a conclusory allegation is insufficient. The show-cause notice must disclose the material and reasons so that the noticee receives a real opportunity to respond. This requirement assumes added importance where confiscation is proposed, given its severe proprietary consequences.

Administrative procedure

Circular No. 41/15/2018-GST provides the procedural framework for interception, inspection, detention, release and confiscation. It requires the jurisdictional Commissioner or an authorised officer to designate proper officers for interception and inspection in a specified jurisdictional area. It further directs that where, upon verification, no prima facie discrepancy is found, the conveyance shall be allowed to move further.

The Circular also states that the procedure applies mutatis mutandis to proceedings under the IGST Act. That procedural extension does not displace the substantive jurisdictional inquiry under Sections 4, 17 and 20 of the IGST Act. An officer may be assigned an interception function for an area, but the ultimate exercise of detention or confiscation jurisdiction over an IGST supply remains subject to the statutory nexus identified in the ruling.

Implications & Observations

• For a consignment moving between two States through a third State, the first question is whether the intercepting State has any entitlement to allocation under Section 17 of the IGST Act. If it is only a transit State, proceedings under Sections 129 and 130 of the IGST Act cannot be initiated by its State officers.

• Administrative allocation and assignment of the statutory function remain essential. Cross-empowerment is not a general warrant enabling every State officer to exercise every CGST or IGST power against every taxpayer.

• Transporters and taxpayers should maintain and promptly produce the prescribed invoice, bill of supply or delivery challan and e-way bill. Documentary compliance helps establish the inter-State character of the transaction at the initial verification stage.

• Where an officer identifies a discrepancy in a pure transit consignment, the appropriate statutory course is communication of the material to the proper officers of the consignor and consignee. The distinction between reporting information and initiating coercive proceedings should be carefully preserved.

• A challenge to detention or confiscation should address jurisdiction at the threshold: the nature of supply, origin, destination, the State's Section 17 nexus, taxpayer allocation, assignment of the officer's function and the statutory basis for treating the officer as a proper officer under the IGST Act.

• Even where jurisdiction exists, allegations concerning valuation or under-invoicing require careful scrutiny. The transit mechanism cannot be used to conduct a roving assessment. Confiscation requires a reasoned, material-based case satisfying Section 130, including intent to evade tax where applicable.

• Notices and orders must independently satisfy natural justice. The affected person must be informed of the factual material, discrepancies and statutory grounds relied upon, particularly where proceedings are escalated from detention to confiscation.

Concluding Remarks

The ruling confines cross-empowerment to its legitimate coordinating purpose. It enables a properly assigned State officer to function across the parallel GST enactments in relation to a taxpayer and transaction falling within the State's lawful administrative and fiscal sphere. It does not authorise an intervening State to treat the physical presence of goods on its roads as a sufficient basis to impose detention, penalty or confiscation under the IGST Act.

For inter-State transit, jurisdiction under Sections 129 and 130 is conditioned by more than interception. It depends upon proper-officer status, administrative allocation, the nature of the supply and the State's statutory entitlement under the IGST settlement framework. Where origin and destination are both outside the State of interception, the appropriate role of the State officer is verification and referral, not adjudication and confiscation.

Full Text:

2026 (4) TMI 288 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT