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Issues: Whether an adverse GST order passed without affording the assessee a personal hearing is sustainable.
Analysis: A personal hearing is required where an adverse determination is contemplated. The Revenue could not establish that the assessee had been afforded such an opportunity. The absence of a hearing constituted a breach of the principles of natural justice.
Conclusion: The adverse order is unsustainable for denial of a personal hearing, and the assessee is entitled to a fresh determination after being heard.
Personal hearing before adverse GST order - Violation of principles of natural justice
Validity of the adverse GST order passed without affording the petitioner an opportunity of hearing - HELD THAT: - The State could not demonstrate that an opportunity of hearing had been granted. The petitioner's contention that the order was passed in breach of the principles of natural justice was therefore found sustainable. [Paras 3, 4]
The impugned order was quashed, with liberty to the Department to pass a fresh order after affording a proper opportunity of hearing.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed to the extent that the impugned GST order was quashed for want of a hearing, subject to liberty to the Department to make a fresh order after granting such opportunity.
Issues: Whether an order rejecting an application for revocation of cancellation of GST registration without recording reasons could be sustained.
Analysis: An order determining civil rights must be speaking and intelligible. The impugned rejection contained no reasons and was unsupported by any attached order disclosing the basis for rejection.
Conclusion: The unreasoned rejection order was unsustainable and required fresh determination in accordance with law.
Speaking orders in revocation of cancellation proceedings
Reasoned order for rejection of revocation of GST registration cancellation - Validity of rejection of the application for revocation of cancellation of GST registration without recording reasons. - HELD THAT: - An order determining civil rights must be speaking and intelligible. Unlike the related matter, the impugned order contained neither reasons for rejection nor any attached order disclosing such reasons; consequently, relegating the petitioner to the appellate remedy was not permissible. [Paras 4, 5, 6]
The rejection order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the competent respondent for a fresh order in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed; the unreasoned rejection of revocation of cancellation of registration was set aside and remitted for fresh adjudication.
Issues: Whether an assessment order under Section 74 could be sustained where the show-cause notice was uploaded only on the GST portal after cancellation of the registered person's registration.
Analysis: Following cancellation of registration, the registered person was not obliged to monitor the GST portal. Uploading the show-cause notice solely on that portal was not adequate service; the notice was required to be served through an alternative mode. The resulting denial of opportunity violated the principles of natural justice.
Conclusion: The assessment order was quashed for violation of principles of natural justice, with liberty to issue a proper notice and proceed in accordance with law.
Service of show-cause notice after cancellation of GST registration - Violation of principles of natural justice - Validity of an assessment order passed under the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act after cancellation of registration, where the show-cause notice was uploaded only on the GST portal - HELD THAT: - Upon cancellation of registration, the petitioner was not obliged to check the GST portal. A show-cause notice thereafter was required to be served through an alternative mode. The Court agreed with the principle stated in M/s Katyal Industries v. State of U.P. [2024 (2) TMI 1447 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] and others and held that portal-only service resulted in denial of natural justice. [Paras 4, 5, 6]
The impugned assessment order was quashed for violation of natural justice, with liberty to the department to issue a proper notice and proceed in accordance with law. Any amount recovered pursuant to the earlier assessment remains subject to the final outcome.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by quashing the assessment order for failure to serve the show-cause notice through an appropriate mode after cancellation of registration. The department may commence proceedings afresh upon proper notice.
Issues: Whether a rectification application filed within time could be rejected without merits solely because more than three months had elapsed from its filing under Notification No. 22/2024-CT dated 08.10.2024.
Analysis: Section 161 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Clause 4 of the notification prescribe that a decision on a timely rectification application should be made, as far as possible, within three months. The expression "as far as possible" makes the prescribed period directory and requires the competent authority to endeavour to decide the application within that period. Expiry of the period does not render the authority functus officio or extinguish its power to determine a timely application on merits.
Conclusion: The rejection of the timely rectification application as time-barred was unsustainable; the competent authority remained empowered to decide it on merits. This is in favour of the assessee.
Rectification application - directory timeline for decision - Functus officio - expiry of period for deciding rectification application
Authority's power to decide a timely rectification application after expiry of the three-month timeline prescribed for its disposal - HELD THAT: - Where the rectification application was filed within the prescribed period, the stipulation that it be decided as far as possible within three months required the competent authority to endeavour to adhere to that timeline. It was not mandatory and did not render the authority functus officio or deprive it of power to decide the application on merits after expiry of three months. [Paras 5, 6]
The rejection of the rectification application as time-barred was quashed, and the matter was remitted for decision on merits within three months.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed. The competent authority was directed to decide the timely filed rectification application on merits within three months.
Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration for continuous non-furnishing of returns should be revoked and the registration restored where the period for statutory revocation and return filing had expired.
Analysis: The GST registration was cancelled for non-furnishing of returns for a continuous period of six months. The petitioner could not respond to the portal-based notice or file the pending returns and, following expiry of the applicable periods, was unable to regularise the defaults through the portal. The matter was found to be covered by similar orders granting restoration upon clearance of statutory liabilities, and the revenue authorities did not oppose equivalent relief.
Conclusion: The cancellation is to be revoked and GST registration restored upon intimation and payment of all statutory dues, penalty or fine within the prescribed time. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Conditional restoration of GST registration - Restoration of GST registration cancelled for non-furnishing of returns - HELD THAT: - Upon considering the parties' submissions and the order in Rakhe Achi Vs. Union of India & Ors [2026 (5) TMI 161 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT] the Court held that the petitioner was entitled to similar relief. Restoration was made contingent upon intimation and payment of all statutory outstanding dues and any applicable penalty or fine. [Paras 11]
The cancellation order was directed to be revoked and the GST registration restored upon proof of payment of the intimated dues within the stipulated period.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed subject to payment of the statutory dues intimated by the competent authority, upon which the cancelled GST registration was to be restored.
Issues: Whether an ex parte GST adjudication could be sustained where, after cancellation of registration, the show-cause notice was served only through the common portal without physical service.
Analysis: The show-cause notice was issued more than four years after cancellation of registration and was uploaded only on the common portal. The binding departmental circular required physical service upon persons against whom adjudication proceedings were initiated after cancellation of registration. A person whose registration has been cancelled may not operate the portal and may consequently remain unaware of proceedings commenced through it.
Conclusion: Service solely through the common portal after cancellation of registration was insufficient in the circumstances, and the resulting ex parte adjudication was invalid.
Service of show-cause notice after cancellation of GST registration - Ex parte GST adjudication
Validity of ex parte adjudication where the show-cause notice was issued only on the Common Portal after cancellation of the petitioner's GST registration - HELD THAT: - After cancellation of registration, a person may not be obliged to access the Common Portal and may consequently remain unaware of proceedings initiated thereafter. The Commissioner's binding circular requiring physical service of notices in such cases was founded on this practical necessity, and the revenue did not dispute the position. [Paras 5, 6, 8]
The ex parte adjudication order was set aside and the matter was restored for a fresh adjudication after permitting a reply, applications for cross-examination or relied-upon documents, and adequate advance notice of personal hearing.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by setting aside the impugned adjudication order and directing fresh proceedings in accordance with the stipulated opportunity of hearing.
Son of the deceased was desirous of seeking a refund, amongst others lying in excess deposit - Refund application could not be filed for the reason of the registration having been cancelled and the Common Portal being not enabled to allow for e-KYC in favour of the surviving partner, to apply for refund.
HELD THAT:- The writ petition was disposed of as the e-KYC process was completed and the refund claim had been entertained and allowed; the Commissioner, State Tax was requested to issue administrative instructions for similarly situated claimants.
Issues: Whether the petitioner's access to furnish Form GSTR-1 on the GST common portal should be restored pending consideration of the departmental proceedings.
Analysis: The request for restoration required consideration of the petitioner's response and supporting documents in the pending departmental adjudication. No finding was rendered on the allegations concerning the registration or on the petitioner's entitlement to portal access.
Outcome: The petitioner was directed to submit a detailed representation to the issuing authority, which must decide it by a reasoned order after personal hearing; portal activation was directed only if the authority finds the petitioner to be a bona fide registered proprietor.
Blocking of GST portal and restoration of GSTR-1 filing facility - Restoration of access to furnish Form GSTR-1 after adjudication of the taxpayer's representation concerning the blocked GST portal -
HELD THAT: - The Court held that the relevant documents required consideration for an effective adjudication of the request to restore the filing facility. The taxpayer was directed to submit a comprehensive representation in response to the information notice, and the issuing authority was required to decide it by a reasoned and speaking order after granting personal hearing, independently of the Court's observations. [Paras 16, 17, 18]
The representation shall be adjudicated within the stipulated time; if the authority finds the taxpayer to be a bona fide registered proprietor on the material produced, the GST portal shall be activated within 48 hours to enable furnishing of Form GSTR-1.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of without adjudicating the merits, subject to a fresh reasoned determination by the competent authority and conditional restoration of the portal facility.
Issues: Whether an adjudication under the GST law could be sustained without affording a personal hearing where an adverse decision was contemplated.
Analysis: Section 75(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 mandates an opportunity of hearing where an adverse decision is contemplated. The show-cause notices did not provide the petitioner a personal hearing. The notices and adjudication order were uploaded only under the portal tab titled 'Additional Notice and Orders', which resulted in a delayed reply and supported the procedural challenge.
Conclusion: The adjudication was invalid for denial of the mandatory opportunity of personal hearing and required fresh determination after considering the reply.
Mandatory personal hearing under Section 75(4) of the GST Acts - GST portal communication of notices and adjudication orders -
Denial of personal hearing before adverse GST adjudication where the show cause notices and adjudication order were uploaded under the 'Additional Notice and Orders' tab - HELD THAT: - Section 75(4) envisages grant of a hearing where a written request is received from the person chargeable with tax or penalty or an adverse decision is contemplated. The summaries of the show cause notices showed that personal hearing had been denied. The Court also observed that uploading the notices and adjudication order only under the specified portal tab, without separate intimation, had compelled the petitioner to submit the reply belatedly. [Paras 7, 8, 9, 10]
The adjudication order was quashed, and the adjudicating authority was directed to consider the reply, afford a personal hearing and pass a fresh reasoned adjudication order in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by setting aside the adjudication order and directing fresh adjudication after consideration of the reply and grant of personal hearing.
Issues: Whether petitioner No. 1 was entitled to anticipatory bail.
Analysis: The allegations prima facie disclosed the petitioner's involvement in a conspiracy involving forged invoices issued in the names of non-existent firms, collection of tax amounts without their deposit, and resultant wrongful loss. The investigation was at a nascent stage, and custodial interrogation was necessary to ascertain the manner of commission of the offences and to obtain material establishing the petitioner's connection with the fictitious firm. Pre-arrest bail is an exceptional remedy to be exercised cautiously, and no exceptional circumstance was established.
Conclusion: Petitioner No. 1 was not entitled to anticipatory bail.
Anticipatory bail - cheating and forgery through fictitious firms - Custodial interrogation
Entitlement to anticipatory bail where the accused was alleged to have induced purchase of goods through non-existent firms and used forged invoices to evade deposit of collected tax - HELD THAT: - The accusations were grave and prima facie disclosed the accused's complicity in the alleged offences. As the investigation was at a nascent stage, custodial interrogation was necessary to ascertain the manner of commission of the offences and to obtain material connecting the accused with the fictitious firm. Pre-arrest bail is to be granted only in extraordinary and exceptional circumstances, which were not established. [Paras 7]
Anticipatory bail was refused and the petition was dismissed.
Final Conclusion: The petition for anticipatory bail was dismissed, without expression of opinion on the merits of the trial.
Issues: Whether cognizance of alleged offences for non-compliance with summons could be taken without proof that the summons had been duly served and received.
Analysis: Sections 206 and 208 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 required a sustainable basis for alleging deliberate or wilful non-compliance with summons issued under Section 70 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The available material contained only tracking records and did not establish due service or acknowledgment of the summons. Mere issuance of summons, without proof of service, could not establish deliberate disobedience or evasion, nor disclose a prima facie case for taking cognizance.
Conclusion: The refusal to take cognizance was sustained, as absence of proof of due service of summons precluded a prima facie allegation of wilful non-compliance.
Proof of service of summons - Non-compliance with statutory summons
Alleged deliberate or wilful non-compliance with summons issued during investigation, in the absence of proof that the summons were duly served and acknowledged - HELD THAT: - Mere issuance of summons, unsupported by material establishing due service upon and acknowledgment by the respondent, could not sustain an allegation of deliberate or wilful disobedience or evasion of appearance. The Magistrate therefore committed no jurisdictional error in declining cognizance on the material placed before it. [Paras 8]
The refusal to take cognizance was not interfered with; however, the concerned authority may issue fresh summons, if permissible in law, and proceed with the investigation, subject to due service and maintenance of proof thereof.
Final Conclusion: The criminal petition was disposed of without interference with the dismissal of the complaint. No opinion was expressed on the merits of the ongoing investigation or on the existence of any liability or offence.
GST on actionable claims arising from betting and gambling - Games of skill played with stakes as betting and gambling - Actionable claims as goods under the GST framework - Supply of actionable claims in online gaming and fantasy sports - Valuation of betting and gambling transactions - Validity of Rule 31A, Rule 31B and Rule 31C
The affidavit of reply of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in which Authority has stated that the Authority would proceed with the adjudication proceeding in respect of the Petitioner and conduct the same strictly in accordance with law and following judgment Gameskraft Technologies Private Ltd. [2026 (5) TMI 1822 - SUPREME COURT] upheld the GST levy on actionable claims arising from betting and gambling transactions, including online gaming and fantasy sports played with stakes, and sustained the constitutional and statutory validity of the relevant provisions and rules. The 2023 amendments and Rules 31B and 31C were held clarificatory and retrospective; pending show cause notices and proceedings were directed to be decided accordingly, with casino valuation to be recomputed under Rule 31C.
HELD THAT:- In view of this statement recorded at Petitioner of the aforementioned affidavit, on instructions seeks to withdraw this Petition and does not press for the reliefs therein.
Issues: Whether an assessment order passed pursuant to a show-cause notice contemplating an adverse decision is sustainable without affording the taxpayer an opportunity of hearing.
Analysis: Section 75(4) requires an opportunity of hearing where an adverse decision is contemplated. The undisputed absence of such hearing, despite the show-cause notice contemplating an adverse order, constituted non-compliance with the statutory requirement. The taxpayer must be permitted to respond to the notice, and the proper officer must thereafter decide the matter after hearing the taxpayer and by a reasoned order.
Conclusion: The assessment order is unsustainable for breach of the mandatory opportunity-of-hearing requirement; the taxpayer is entitled to fresh adjudication in accordance with law.
Opportunity of hearing before adverse GST adjudication - Validity of the adverse GST demand order passed without affording a hearing where the show-cause notice contemplated an adverse decision
HELD THAT: - The statutory scheme entitles a person chargeable with tax and penalty to an opportunity of hearing where an adverse decision is contemplated. Since it was undisputed that no such opportunity was afforded, the demand order could not be sustained. [Paras 5]
The demand order and consequential attachment were quashed, and the matter was remanded to the proper officer for fresh decision after permitting a response to the show-cause notice and granting a hearing; the amount already realised was made subject to that decision.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by setting aside the impugned demand and attachment and remanding the matter for fresh adjudication in accordance with the requirement of hearing.
Issues: Whether an appeal may be filed manually where the rectification order is unavailable on the common portal.
Analysis: The amended appellate procedure permits manual filing of an appeal in FORM GST APL-01 with relevant documents where the order challenged is unavailable on the common portal.
Outcome: The petitioner was permitted to file the appeal within four weeks, without a limitation objection, for decision on merits.
Manual filing of GST appeal where order is unavailable on common portal - Availability of manual filing of an appeal against a rectification order unavailable on the common portal - HELD THAT: - The amendment to the appellate-filing rule permits manual filing of an appeal in FORM GST APL-01 with relevant documents where electronic filing is not possible because the decision or order appealed against is unavailable on the common portal. [Paras 5, 7]
The petitioner was permitted to file the appeal within four weeks; no objection on limitation shall be raised if it is so filed, and the appeal shall be decided on merits.
Final Conclusion: The petition was disposed of with liberty to file a manual appeal within four weeks, without a limitation objection, while keeping all contentions open.
Issues: Whether the adjudication order founded on an analytics report could stand when that relied-upon report was not furnished to the petitioner.
Analysis: The analytics report formed the basis of the classification dispute concerning basic customs duty. Extracting its parameters, entries and core findings in the show-cause notice did not provide an adequate opportunity to meet the case. The relied-upon report and documents were required to be disclosed to comply with the principles of natural justice.
Conclusion: Non-supply of the analytics report vitiated the adjudication order; the matter requires fresh adjudication after disclosure of the relied-upon material.
Natural justice in customs classification adjudication - Supply of relied-upon material
Validity of a customs classification adjudication founded on an Analytics Report that was not supplied to the petitioner - HELD THAT: - The Analytics Report formed the basis of the impugned classification order. Extraction of its parameters, entries and core findings in the show cause notice could not substitute furnishing the report itself, particularly when the dispute concerned classification for basic customs duty under the competing tariff items. Non-supply of the relied-upon report failed to satisfy the requirements of natural justice. [Paras 4]
The impugned order was set aside and the matter remitted for fresh adjudication on merits in accordance with law, after furnishing the Analytics Report and the documents relied upon in the show cause notice.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by setting aside the classification order for breach of natural justice and remitting the matter for fresh adjudication after supply of the relied-upon material.
Issues: (i) Whether Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, retrospectively validating issuance of reassessment notices by jurisdictional Assessing Officers, is constitutionally valid; (ii) Whether notices under Section 148 issued by jurisdictional Assessing Officers without randomized automated allocation and faceless procedure are valid under Section 151A and the e-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022.
Issue (i): Whether Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, retrospectively validating issuance of reassessment notices by jurisdictional Assessing Officers, is constitutionally valid.
Analysis: A retrospective validating enactment may neutralise a judicial decision only by curing the defect or removing the statutory foundation on which that decision rests; it cannot merely declare a contrary legal position or directly override judicial determinations. Section 147A purported to exclude faceless assessment units from the meaning of Assessing Officer for Sections 148 and 148A, but left Section 151A, the scheme framed thereunder, and the scheme under Section 130 unamended. It neither addressed the mandatory randomized automated allocation requirement nor removed the basis of the decisions holding that reassessment notices could be issued only through the faceless mechanism. The provision consequently conflicted with the continuing statutory scheme and amounted to legislative encroachment upon judicial power, contrary to the rule of law and the constitutional principle of separation of powers.
Conclusion: Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is unconstitutional and struck down, in favour of the assessees.
Issue (ii): Whether notices under Section 148 issued by jurisdictional Assessing Officers without randomized automated allocation and faceless procedure are valid under Section 151A and the e-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022.
Analysis: Section 151A and Clause 3(b) of the e-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022 expressly cover issuance of notices under Section 148 and require issuance through randomized automated allocation and in a faceless manner. The qualification referring to Section 144B applies to assessment or reassessment under Section 147 and cannot exclude issuance of notices under Section 148; such an interpretation would render the scheme ineffective. Notifications or executive instructions conferring concurrent jurisdiction cannot override the statutory scheme. Where the law prescribes a particular mode, the prescribed mode alone must be followed.
Conclusion: Notices under Section 148 issued by jurisdictional Assessing Officers otherwise than through randomized automated allocation and the faceless mechanism are invalid and liable to be set aside, in favour of the assessees.
Final Conclusion: The statutory faceless reassessment regime mandates that reassessment notices be issued only through the automated and faceless process prescribed under Section 151A and the applicable scheme.
Ratio Decidendi: A retrospective validating law is unconstitutional where it merely negates judicial rulings without curing the statutory defect underlying them; a reassessment notice must be issued in the mandatory faceless and randomized automated-allocation manner prescribed by the governing statutory scheme.
Retrospective validating legislation and separation of powers - Faceless reassessment notices through automated allocation - Jurisdiction - JAO versus FAO
Retrospective validating legislation - Separation of powers - Constitutional validity of the retrospective clarification excluding faceless Assessing Officers from issuing reassessment notices - HELD THAT: - A retrospective validating enactment can neutralise a judicial decision only by curing the defect or removing the foundation on which that decision rested, so that the earlier decision could not have been rendered under the altered law. Section 147A neither amended Section 151A nor the scheme framed thereunder, and did not address the requirement of randomised automated allocation; it also left the scheme under Section 130 untouched. The enactment thus directly conflicted with the subsisting statutory scheme and sought to substitute the legislative view for conclusions reached by constitutional courts, without removing their basis. [Paras 59, 60, 61, 62, 63]
Section 147A was declared unconstitutional and struck down.
Faceless reassessment notices - Randomised automated allocation - Validity of reassessment notices issued by jurisdictional Assessing Officers without faceless randomised automated allocation - HELD THAT: - Clause 3(b) of the scheme framed under Section 151A expressly applies to issuance of notices under Section 148 and, read with the object of eliminating interface and introducing dynamic jurisdiction, mandates issuance through randomised automated allocation and in a faceless manner. The expression linking the scheme to Section 144B concerns assessment or reassessment under Section 147 and cannot exclude notices under Section 148; such a construction would render the scheme purposeless. Notifications conferring jurisdiction cannot prevail over Section 151A and the Parliamentary-approved scheme, and cannot create concurrent jurisdiction once randomised allocation is mandated. [Paras 75, 76, 77, 78, 79]
The impugned notices issued by jurisdictional Assessing Officers were set aside as having been issued otherwise than through the mandated faceless and randomised automated allocation process.
Final Conclusion: Section 147A was declared unconstitutional. The reassessment notices issued by jurisdictional Assessing Officers were set aside for non-compliance with the mandatory faceless randomised automated allocation regime.
Limitation for reassessment notice - Exclusion of time under fifth and sixth provisos to Section 149 - Deemed date of reply u/s 148A proceedings
HELD THAT:- Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and having gone through the materials on record, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment(s) and order(s) passed by the High Court.[2026 (6) TMI 47 - DELHI HIGH COURT]
The Special Leave Petitions are, accordingly, dismissed.
Outcome: The application for condonation of delay and the Special Leave Petition were dismissed on the ground of delay, with questions of law left open.
Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) requiring specification of limb
HELD THAT:- There is a gross delay of 201 days in filing the Special Leave Petition.
The reasons assigned for condonation of delay are neither satisfactory nor sufficient in law so as to condone the same. Hence, the application seeking condonation of delay is dismissed. Special Leave Petition is dismissed on the ground of delay leaving open the questions of law, if any.
Issues: Whether the petitioner could be treated as an assessee in default under Section 201 for non-deduction of tax on payments to its US parent, despite binding findings that the parent had no permanent establishment in India and the payments were not chargeable to tax in India.
Analysis: The facts for the relevant assessment year were identical to those for prior years in which Section 201 orders against the petitioner had been set aside. The Tribunal's finding, subsequently upheld by the High Court, was that the petitioner was an independent entity and did not constitute a fixed place, service, or agency permanent establishment of the US parent under Article 5 of the India-US DTAA. The Assessing Officer could not disregard those binding decisions merely because the Department intended to challenge them. Section 195 applies only where the payment to a non-resident is chargeable to tax in India; an application under Section 195(2) is required only where the payer accepts that part of the remittance is taxable but requires determination of the taxable portion or tax deductible.
Conclusion: The payments were not subject to tax deduction at source, and the petitioner could not be treated as an assessee in default under Section 201.
Assessee in default under Section 201 - Binding effect of Tribunal rulings on Assessing Officer that the parent had no permanent establishment in India - Tax deduction at source where payment to non-resident is not chargeable to tax - Section 201 default for payments to non-resident without permanent establishment
Validity of treating the payer as an assessee in default under Section 201 despite Tribunal rulings that the recipient had no permanent establishment in India - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal had consistently held that the recipient did not have a permanent establishment in India and that its grading and management-fee income was not chargeable to tax in India; that position had also been upheld by the High Court for the earlier years. As the facts for the relevant year were identical, the Assessing Officer (TDS) acted without authority of law in passing an order contrary to the Tribunal's decisions. [Paras 12, 13]
The order under Section 201 for A.Y. 2020-21 was quashed and set aside.
Section 195(2) where remittance is not chargeable to tax - Requirement of an application u/s 195(2) for payments made to the non-resident recipient - HELD THAT: - Section 195 applies only where the sum paid to a non-resident is chargeable to tax in India. An application under Section 195(2) is required where the payer accepts that a part of the remittance is taxable but is uncertain about the taxable portion or the tax deductible; it has no application where the payment is not chargeable to tax. Since the recipient's income was held not chargeable to tax in India, the payer had no liability to deduct tax at source.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in GE India Technology Cen. (P.) Ltd. [2010 (9) TMI 7 - SUPREME COURT] has held that Section 195(2) applies when the payer is in no doubt that tax is payable in respect of some part of the amount to be remitted but is not sure as to what should be the portion so taxable or is not sure as to the amount of tax to be deducted, and it is in such a situation that he is required to make an application to the ITO(TDS) for determining the amount. Therefore, there is no question of the Petitioner being liable to deduct tax at source from the payments made by it to GIA US or of treating the Petitioner to be an Assessee in default for failing to deduct tax at source from such payments in the instant case.[Paras 13]
The payer could not be treated as an assessee in default for not applying under Section 195(2) or for not deducting tax at source.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed and the order treating the petitioner as an assessee in default under Section 201 was quashed and set aside.
Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings under Sections 148A and 148 could be initiated against a person other than the searched person when their foundation was material seized during a third-party search.
Analysis: The seized electronic data, statements and alleged transaction details formed the sole foundation of the proposed reassessment. Sections 153A and 153C create a distinct and overriding statutory machinery for assessment where material found in a search relates to a person other than the searched person. Subsequent analysis or corroboration of search material does not alter its source or permit recourse to the general reassessment mechanism. Invocation of the extended limitation provision and obtaining approval could not cure an invalid assumption of jurisdiction.
Conclusion: The reassessment mechanism under Sections 148A and 148 was unavailable; the proceedings founded on third-party search material were without jurisdiction and invalid. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Assessment of a person other than the searched person on seized material - Special search-assessment procedure overriding general reassessment - Special assessment procedure under section 153C
Validity of reassessment proceedings under sections 148A and 148 founded on material seized during the search of a third party - HELD THAT: - The departmental record established that the alleged transactions, the identification of the petitioner and the inference of unaccounted income were all derived from material seized in the search of the Ramesh Manihar Group.
Subsequent analysis or corroboration of that material did not alter its character or source. Where seized material relating to a person other than the searched person forms the foundation of proceedings, the special machinery under section 153C applies; its non-obstante clause excludes recourse to the general reassessment mechanism under sections 147 and 148. The Revenue could not bypass that statutory route by characterising information derived from seized material as information suggesting escapement of income. [Paras 27, 29, 30, 31, 33]
The order under section 148A(d) and the consequential notice under section 148 were without jurisdiction and were quashed.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed and the reassessment order and consequential notice, having been initiated under the general reassessment provisions on the basis of third-party search material, were quashed.
Issues: Whether an order giving effect to an appellate order, passed beyond the limitation prescribed under the second proviso to Section 153(5) read with Section 153(3), was valid and whether the returned income was consequently required to be accepted.
Analysis: The appellate order was received on 6 June 2019. Since giving effect required verification and an opportunity of hearing, the applicable limitation was that in Section 153(3), namely twelve months from the end of the financial year of receipt. Even after the extension under TOLA read with Notification No. 113/2021, the final date was 31 March 2022. The consequential order was made only on 29 December 2025. Where a fresh or consequential assessment cannot be made within limitation, the return must be accepted as furnished and no further demand may be raised; any excess tax paid must be refunded.
Conclusion: The consequential order and the demand notice were barred by limitation and invalid; the returned income for AY 2015-16 must be accepted, with refund of the amount deposited along with interest.
Limitation for giving effect to appellate orders requiring verification - Deemed acceptance of return on time-barred consequential assessment
Validity of the consequential assessment order passed to give effect to the appellate directions after expiry of the extended statutory period of limitation - HELD THAT: - As the appellate order requiring verification and opportunity to the assessee had been received by the Assessing Officer during FY 2019-20, the second proviso to section 153(5) attracted the time-limit under section 153(3). Even after allowing the extension under TOLA, the consequential order had to be passed by 31st March 2022. An order passed thereafter was barred by limitation. Where a fresh assessment cannot validly be made, the return must be accepted as furnished and no further demand can be raised.
Recently this court in the case of Laqshya Media Ltd. [2026 (4) TMI 274 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] has also applied the above principles and held that when the order giving effect is not passed within the limitation period, the Returned income of the Assessee ought to be accepted.[Paras 18, 19, 20, 21]
The consequential assessment order and the demand notice were quashed; the returned income was directed to be accepted and the amount deposited towards the demand was ordered to be refunded with interest.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed. The time-barred order giving effect to the appellate directions and the consequential demand notice were set aside, with acceptance of the returned income and refund of the amount deposited with interest.
Issues: (i) Whether exclusion of a functionally dissimilar comparable was justified; (ii) whether remand for examination of working-capital adjustment upon furnishing supporting details was justified; (iii) whether remand for reconsideration of the foreign-exchange revenue filter was justified; and (iv) whether transfer-pricing adjustment was rightly restricted to the relevant international transactions.
Issue (i): Whether exclusion of a functionally dissimilar comparable was justified.
Analysis: Under Rule 10B of the Income-tax Rules, comparability depends on the functions performed, products manufactured and material circumstances. The comparable's manufacture of non-pesticide products and its materially different functional profile supported its exclusion. In an appeal under Section 260-A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, factual comparability findings cannot be re-appreciated absent perversity, lack of evidence or inconsistency with the statutory scheme.
Conclusion: Exclusion of the functionally dissimilar comparable was upheld, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether remand for examination of working-capital adjustment upon furnishing supporting details was justified.
Analysis: No unconditional or quantified working-capital adjustment had been granted. The matter was left for determination by the Assessing Officer/Transfer Pricing Officer after the assessee supplies the necessary material, so that any adjustment is based on relevant evidence and can be computed with reasonable accuracy.
Conclusion: The remand for examination of working-capital adjustment was upheld, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether remand for reconsideration of the foreign-exchange revenue filter was justified.
Analysis: The adoption of a 40 per cent foreign-exchange revenue filter lacked a proper basis. The direction required a consistent and lawful reconsideration of the appropriate filter, while preserving both sides' opportunity to establish the applicable range on the available material.
Conclusion: The remand for reconsideration of the foreign-exchange revenue filter was upheld, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iv): Whether transfer-pricing adjustment was rightly restricted to the relevant international transactions.
Analysis: Transfer-pricing provisions govern determination of the arm's-length price of international transactions with associated enterprises. Restricting the adjustment to transactions concerning import of raw materials applied that principle, and no perversity or patently unsustainable interpretation was established.
Conclusion: Restriction of the transfer-pricing adjustment to the relevant international transactions was upheld, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The factual transfer-pricing determinations and the directed reconsideration processes remain governed by the Tribunal's order.
Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 260-A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, factual transfer-pricing determinations, including comparability and remand directions for evidence-based computation, do not give rise to a substantial question of law unless shown to be perverse or contrary to the statutory scheme.
TP comparability - functional dissimilarity - Working-capital adjustment - remand for factual verification - Foreign-exchange revenue filter-consistent comparability analysis - Transfer-pricing adjustment-restriction to international transactions - Appeal under section 260-A-interference with factual transfer-pricing findings
Transfer-pricing comparability-functional dissimilarity - Exclusion of Rallis India Ltd. from the manufacturing comparables on account of its materially different functional profile - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal compared the functions performed, products manufactured and raw materials used, and found that the assessee manufactured pesticides using imported chemical formulations whereas Rallis India Ltd. manufactured non-pesticide products, including products based on organic compost and other materials. The resulting conclusion on comparability was a factual finding founded on the record and was neither perverse nor amenable to fresh appraisal in an appeal under section 260-A. [Paras 12, 13]
The exclusion of Rallis India Ltd. as a comparable was upheld and no substantial question of law arose.
Working-capital adjustment-remand for factual verification - Working-capital adjustment in the manufacturing segment where the assessee had not initially furnished material showing the impact of working-capital differences on margins - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal did not grant a quantified or unconditional adjustment; it required the assessee to furnish relevant particulars and remitted the matter to the Assessing Officer/Transfer Pricing Officer to determine whether an adjustment was warranted and, if so, its reasonably accurate extent. The remand preserved the requirement that such adjustment be supported by relevant material. [Paras 16, 17]
The issue was remanded for fresh consideration upon furnishing of the requisite details, without final adjudication on entitlement or quantum.
Foreign-exchange revenue filter - consistent comparability analysis - Foreign-exchange revenue filter for selection of manufacturing comparables where the basis for the filter adopted by the appellate authority was not established - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal had not conclusively prescribed a particular foreign-exchange revenue threshold. Having found no proper basis for the filter adopted by the appellate authority, it directed reconsideration by the Assessing Officer/Transfer Pricing Officer through a consistent approach and after affording opportunity to the assessee. The direction was factual and procedural and did not give rise to a substantial question of law. [Paras 20, 21]
The issue was remanded for reconsideration of the appropriate filter in accordance with law.
Transfer-pricing adjustment-restriction to international transactions - Restriction of the transfer-pricing adjustment to international transactions concerning import of raw materials from Associated Enterprises - HELD THAT: - The transfer-pricing provisions concern determination of the arm's-length price of international transactions with Associated Enterprises. The Tribunal applied that principle to the transactions under examination and restricted the adjustment accordingly. The Revenue established neither perversity nor a patently unsustainable interpretation of the Act. [Paras 23, 24]
The direction to restrict the transfer-pricing adjustment to the relevant international transactions was upheld.
Final Conclusion: The Revenue appeals were dismissed, as the proposed questions sought reappreciation of factual transfer-pricing determinations or challenged remand directions that preserved examination by the competent authority. The Tribunal's common order was confirmed.
Issues: Whether reopening and reassessment founded on alleged unexplained bank credits could stand without consideration of the detailed explanation and supporting material concerning the source and purpose of those credits.
Analysis: The reopening order and reassessment proceeded on the premise that no explanation had been offered for the identified remittances. The explanations that the principal receipt arose from sale of jewellery and that the other transfers were made by overseas relatives for construction expenses required consideration before determining whether the amounts constituted undisclosed income. A detailed response supported by documents must be permitted, with all questions remaining open for determination.
Conclusion: The reopening order, notice, reassessment, and consequential actions could not be sustained without fresh consideration of the petitioner's detailed response; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Reassessment based on alleged undisclosed bank remittances - Opportunity to furnish detailed explanation of receipts
Validity of reassessment treating bank remittances as undisclosed income without first considering the petitioner's detailed explanation of their source - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the assertions regarding the source and purpose of the receipts required consideration before any conclusion could be reached that they constituted undisclosed income. The petitioner was therefore required to be afforded an opportunity to submit a detailed response with supporting documents; all questions on the merits were left open. [Paras 6]
The order under section 148A(d), notice under section 148, reassessment order and consequential penalty and recovery notices were quashed, and the proceedings were restored for fresh consideration after permitting a detailed response.
Final Conclusion: The petition was allowed in part. The reassessment proceedings and consequential orders were quashed and restored for fresh consideration, with all merits left open.
Issues: Whether an addition as unexplained money under Section 69A could be made where the show-cause notice proposed different variations and gave no notice of that addition.
Analysis: The assessment was founded on an addition under Section 69A, although the show-cause notice had proposed variations under different provisions. The revenue accepted that no prior notice was issued for the Section 69A addition, depriving the assessee of an opportunity to explain the amount.
Conclusion: An addition under Section 69A made without prior notice and opportunity is unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.
Assessment addition without prior show-cause notice - Opportunity of hearing in faceless assessment
Addition as unexplained money without notice - Violation of natural justice - Validity of an addition as unexplained money where the show-cause notice had not proposed that addition - HELD THAT: - The proposed variations notified to the petitioner were different from the addition ultimately made as unexplained money. As the revenue did not dispute that no notice had been issued on that proposition, the petitioner had no opportunity to respond, warranting interference with the assessment. [Paras 4]
The assessment order and consequential penalty notices were quashed, without prejudice to the revenue's entitlement to initiate fresh proceedings in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The petition was allowed and the impugned assessment order and penalty notices were quashed for want of prior notice and opportunity on the addition ultimately made.
Issues: Whether an assessee who filed a return in response to a reassessment notice while an advance-ruling application on the transaction's taxability was pending could be denied credit and refund of tax deducted at source and prepaid taxes.
Analysis: The pending advance-ruling application furnished a bona fide explanation for not filing the return by the ordinary due date. The reassessment return was accordingly required to be treated akin to a regular return under Section 139. Credit of verified TDS and prepaid taxes could not be confined to adjustment against the outstanding demand, since any excess remaining after discharge of the ultimately determined tax liability could not be retained as tax revenue. The cited precedent concerning concluded substantive computation items in reassessment did not govern credit for prepaid taxes.
Conclusion: The reassessment return must be treated as a return under Section 139, and verified TDS and prepaid-tax credit, including refund of any excess with applicable statutory interest, cannot be denied.
Credit and refund of prepaid taxes - Return filed in response to reassessment notice treated as regular return - advance-ruling application on the transaction's taxability was pending
Entitlement to credit and refund of tax deducted at source and other prepaid taxes where the return was filed in response to a reassessment notice while the assessee's application before the Authority for Advance Ruling was pending - HELD THAT: - The assessee's non-filing of the return by the due date was held bona fide, since the application before the Authority for Advance Ruling concerning taxability of the sole transaction was pending. A return filed pursuant to the reassessment notice was therefore directed to be treated as a regular return.
The Court held that, once prepaid taxes could be adjusted against the outstanding demand, there was no statutory basis or logical justification to deny refund of the excess amount. The precedent relied on by the Revenue was confined to substantive computation items concluded in an earlier assessment and did not concern credit of prepaid taxes. [Paras 11, 12, 13, 14, 17]
The Assessing Officer was directed to make a fresh assessment after treating the reassessment return as a return under Section 139 and, upon verification, to allow credit of tax deducted at source and refund any unutilised prepaid taxes with applicable interest.
Final Conclusion: The departmental appeal was allowed on the assessee's concession and the matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh assessment with credit and refund of prepaid taxes as directed. The penalty order was consequentially quashed, without prejudice to fresh penalty proceedings if warranted.
Issues: Whether revisional proceedings under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be continued and an order passed against a corporate debtor during the moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
Analysis: Admission of the corporate debtor into the corporate insolvency resolution process under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 triggered the statutory moratorium. Section 14 prohibits institution or continuation of proceedings against the corporate debtor during that period, and Section 238 gives the Code overriding effect over inconsistent enactments. The jurisdictional precedent applied establishes that income-tax proceedings cannot be initiated or continued while the moratorium operates, though proceedings may be revived after its cessation if permissible in law.
Conclusion: The revisional order passed during the subsistence of the moratorium was unsustainable; the revisional proceedings may be revived and reframed after cessation of the moratorium in accordance with law.
Insolvency moratorium - continuation of income-tax revisional proceedings - Overriding effect of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code
Validity of a revisional order under the Income-tax Act passed against a corporate debtor during the subsistence of the moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code - HELD THAT: - Section 14, read with the overriding provision in section 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, prohibits institution or continuation of proceedings against the corporate debtor during the moratorium. Following the jurisdictional High Court decision Smaaash Entertainment Pvt. Ltd [2025 (7) TMI 1241 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] the Tribunal held that income-tax proceedings cannot be initiated or continued during that period. Since the revisional order was passed after commencement of the moratorium, it could not be sustained; the merits of the proposed revision were not examined. [Paras 7, 8, 9]
The revisional order was set aside and the matter restored for revival and reframing after cessation of the moratorium, if permissible in law; all merits issues were kept open.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes. The revisional proceedings may be revived after the moratorium ceases, subject to applicable law and a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
Issues: (i) Whether the deletion of addition under Section 68 for share capital and share premium was justified; (ii) Whether the reassessment initiated under Sections 147 and 148 was valid.
Issue (i): Whether the deletion of addition under Section 68 for share capital and share premium was justified.
Analysis: The first proviso to Section 68 imposes the additional obligation to explain the source of the shareholder's funds only upon a company in which the public are not substantially interested. As the assessee was a listed public company, that additional source-of-source obligation did not apply; nevertheless, it remained required under the main provision to establish identity, creditworthiness and genuineness. The assessee furnished PAN and tax details, bank records, share application and allotment documents, demat records, shareholder responses and financial material. The shares were electronically credited to investors' demat accounts and were approved for listing. No specific defect in this evidence was identified, and no independent enquiry was conducted after the assessee discharged its initial onus.
Conclusion: The deletion of the Section 68 addition was justified, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the reassessment initiated under Sections 147 and 148 was valid.
Analysis: The recorded reasons relied on the assessee's balance sheet already furnished with the original return and did not disclose any new or fresh tangible material. The alleged short-term capital loss did not result in any disallowance in the reassessment. The allegation concerning excessive share premium under Section 56(2)(viib) was inapplicable to the listed company, while the eventual Section 68 addition was founded on a distinct allegation concerning shareholder creditworthiness and not on the stated reasons for reopening.
Conclusion: The recorded reasons were invalid and the reassessment proceedings and reassessment order were quashed ab initio, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The Section 68 addition cannot survive, and the reassessment founded on invalid recorded reasons has no legal effect.
Unexplained share capital and share premium u/s 68 - Reassessment on the basis of material already on record
Unexplained share capital and share premium u/s 68 - Discharge of initial onus by documentary evidence - Addition under section 68 in respect of share capital and share premium received by a listed company from share subscribers - HELD THAT: - The first proviso to section 68, imposing the additional obligation to explain the source of the shareholders' funds, did not apply to a company in which the public were substantially interested; nevertheless, the assessee remained obliged under the main provision to establish the identity and creditworthiness of the subscribers and the genuineness of the transactions. The assessee furnished supporting documents for the share subscriptions, allotment, banking and demat transactions, and the listing approvals. As the Assessing Officer neither identified any defect in that evidence nor conducted an independent enquiry after the assessee discharged its initial onus, the addition could not be sustained. [Paras 7, 9, 10, 11]
Deletion of the addition under section 68 was upheld and the Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
Validity of reassessment notice - Fresh tangible material for reopening - Validity of reassessment initiated on allegations concerning short-term capital loss and share premium - HELD THAT: - No disallowance was ultimately made in respect of the short-term capital loss forming one of the recorded reasons. The allegation regarding share premium arose solely from the balance sheet already filed with the original return, and no fresh tangible material was shown to exist. Further, the eventual addition under section 68, based on alleged non-establishment of certain subscribers' creditworthiness, rested on a footing different from the allegation in the recorded reasons. The recorded reasons were therefore invalid. [Paras 15]
The reassessment proceedings and the impugned reassessment order were quashed ab initio, and the assessee's appeal was allowed.
Final Conclusion: The Revenue's appeal challenging deletion of the addition under section 68 was dismissed. The assessee's appeal was allowed and the reassessment proceedings and reassessment order were quashed ab initio.
Issues: Whether the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (Central), Jodhpur had territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction to cancel the assessee's registration under sections 12AA(3) and 12AA(4).
Analysis: The power conferred on a Principal Commissioner or Commissioner to cancel charitable registration requires the particular authority to possess jurisdiction over the assessee under section 120 and the applicable jurisdictional orders or notifications. The exemption jurisdiction over persons in Gujarat claiming exemption under sections 11 and 12 was assigned to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption), Ahmedabad. Notification No. 70/2014 permits a Central Commissioner to exercise functions in cases assigned under section 127 to Assessing Officers subordinate to that Commissioner; proof of such assignment is a foundational jurisdictional fact.
Analysis: Mere centralisation of assessment proceedings with a Central Circle does not automatically transfer the distinct jurisdiction concerning registration and cancellation. Despite the specific challenge, the Revenue produced no order under section 127, jurisdictional notification, or other instrument establishing assignment of the assessee's registration proceedings to an Assessing Officer subordinate to the concerned Principal Commissioner. The impugned order's recital of centralisation could not establish the terms, scope, or legal effect of an unproduced transfer order.
Conclusion: The jurisdiction of the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (Central), Jodhpur to cancel the registration was not established; the cancellation order was without jurisdiction and was quashed, with restoration of the registration on its original terms.
Ratio Decidendi: A Central Commissioner may cancel charitable registration only upon demonstrable statutory and jurisdictional authority; centralisation of assessment proceedings, without proof of a valid jurisdictional assignment, does not confer independent cancellation jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction to cancel charitable registration - Centralisation of assessment jurisdiction - Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (Central), Jodhpur's territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction
Competence of the Principal Commissioner (Central) to cancel the assessee's charitable registration in the absence of proof that exemption and registration jurisdiction had been transferred - HELD THAT: - The expression "Principal Commissioner or Commissioner" identifies the rank of the authority empowered to cancel registration but does not dispense with the requirement of territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction. The exemption jurisdiction remained with the designated exemption authority unless lawfully transferred. Notification No. 70/2014 could operate only upon proof of assignment under section 127 to an Assessing Officer subordinate to the concerned Central Commissioner.
Mere recital that the group cases had been centralised for coordinated investigation could not establish the terms or effect of such transfer, particularly when the Revenue produced no transfer order, notification or other jurisdictional instrument. [Paras 67, 68, 69, 70, 71]
The cancellation order was without jurisdiction and was quashed; the original registration stood restored. The merits of the allegations and the challenge to retrospective cancellation were left open.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed. The cancellation of registration was quashed for want of jurisdiction, and the registration was restored in accordance with its original terms.
Issues: (i) Whether the addition of share capital and securities premium claimed to have been received in assessment year 2006-07 could be rectified under section 154 for assessment year 2011-12; (ii) Whether the addition of Rs.40 lakh as share application money received during the relevant year was rectifiable under section 154.
Issue (i): Whether the addition of share capital and securities premium claimed to have been received in assessment year 2006-07 could be rectified under section 154 for assessment year 2011-12.
Analysis: Section 154 permits correction of an obvious and patent mistake, not resolution of a debatable issue through extended reasoning. The record for rectification is not confined to the assessment order and may extend to the assessee's records for other assessment years. If the share capital and securities premium were in fact received in assessment year 2006-07, their addition in assessment year 2011-12 would constitute an error capable of rectification after verification of the supporting material. The issue required factual verification of the material filed by the assessee and coordinated consideration with the pending appeal against the original assessment.
Conclusion: In favour of the assessee; the rectification claim concerning share capital and securities premium was restored for fresh adjudication after verification of the evidence.
Issue (ii): Whether the addition of Rs.40 lakh as share application money received during the relevant year was rectifiable under section 154.
Analysis: The amount was received during the relevant assessment year. Its addition under section 68 rested on the absence of satisfactory evidence of the creditor's identity, source of credit, and genuineness of the transaction. Determining those matters required appreciation of evidence and a long-drawn inquiry, rather than correction of a prima facie mistake apparent from the record.
Conclusion: Against the assessee; the addition of Rs.40 lakh was not rectifiable under section 154.
Final Conclusion: The rectification claim relating to share capital and securities premium requires fresh, coordinated determination on the evidentiary record, while the claim relating to the in-year share application money remains outside the scope of rectification.
Ratio Decidendi: For rectification, the relevant record may include the assessee's connected assessment records, and an addition made in an incorrect assessment year may be corrected if the error becomes apparent on verification of that record; an issue requiring substantive proof and appreciation of evidence cannot be rectified under section 154.
Rectification of mistake apparent from record - Section 68 cash credit confined to year of credit
Rectification of prior-year share capital and securities premium - Scope of record in rectification proceedings - Rectification of the addition of share capital and securities premium claimed to have been received in an earlier assessment year - HELD THAT: - For an addition under section 68, the credit must have been received in the year concerned. The record for rectification is not confined to the assessment order and may extend to the assessee's records for other assessment years. If the claimed share capital and securities premium were received in the earlier assessment year, they could not be added in the impugned year; the claim, however, required verification of the evidence and the record. [Paras 10, 11]
The appellate order was set aside and the matter was restored for decision of the rectification appeal after considering the evidence, together with or in light of the outcome of the pending appeal against the assessment order.
Rectification of addition for current-year share application money - Rectification of the addition for share application money received during the impugned assessment year - HELD THAT: - The addition rested on the assessee's failure to furnish satisfactory evidence of the creditor's identity, source of credit and genuineness of the transaction during assessment. Its rectification would require a long-drawn process of reasoning and appreciation of evidence, and was not based on a prima facie mistake apparent from the record. [Paras 10]
The addition for share application money received during the year was held not rectifiable under section 154.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was partly allowed for statistical purposes. The rectification appeal was remanded for verification of the claim concerning prior-year share capital and securities premium, while the current-year share application money addition was held not amenable to rectification.
Issues: Whether a 30% ad hoc disallowance of commission expenditure was sustainable where the assessee furnished recipient-wise, PAN, TDS and payment details, but no specific commission payment was found to be non-genuine or non-business.
Analysis: Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 places the initial burden of establishing business expenditure on the assessee. That burden stood sufficiently discharged through documentary evidence comprising commission-recipient details, PAN particulars, TDS records, Form No. 26Q and payment details. The commission was integral to the referral-based business model, and the revenue authorities did not identify any particular recipient as non-existent or any identified payment as bogus, excessive or unrelated to business. The estimated benchmark of commission at 20% to 25% of turnover lacked comparable cases, market data or other cogent material. The commission ratio was also broadly consistent with the assessee's ratios in preceding years.
Conclusion: The 30% ad hoc disallowance of commission expenditure was unsustainable and the addition was deleted in favour of the assessee.
Ad hoc disallowance of referral-based commission expenditure - Non identification of non-genuine payments - Sustainability of an estimated disallowance from commission expenditure incurred under a referral-based business model - HELD THAT: - Although the initial burden to establish business expenditure rests on the assessee, the documentary material, including recipient details, PAN and TDS particulars, Form No. 26Q and payment details furnished before the Assessing Officer, had to be considered as a whole. No particular recipient was found non-existent and no identified payment was held bogus or non-business. An estimated disallowance founded on an assumed industry commission range, without comparable cases, market data or other cogent material, could not be sustained; nor could the commission-to-sales ratio alone justify the disallowance when comparable ratios existed in the assessee's own earlier years. [Paras 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]
The ad hoc disallowance of commission expenditure was deleted.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed and the estimated disallowance from commission expenditure was deleted.
Issues: (i) Whether gold is a prohibited item within the meaning of the Customs Act, 1962; (ii) Whether the adjudicating authority was correct in imposing penalty under Section 112(i) of the Customs Act, 1962.
Issue (i): Whether gold is a prohibited item within the meaning of the Customs Act, 1962.
Analysis: Section 2(33) includes goods whose import or export is subject to a prohibition under the Customs Act, 1962 or any other law in force; it is not confined to goods prohibited through a notification under Section 11. Import of gold was regulated by Reserve Bank of India notifications and circulars, and bulk import was restricted to authorised agencies, while passenger import was governed by the Baggage Rules. The persons concerned did not fall within either permitted category, and the gold was brought through an unauthorised land route.
Conclusion: Gold imported in contravention of applicable import restrictions is prohibited goods within Section 2(33) of the Customs Act, 1962, in favour of the Revenue.
Issue (ii): Whether the adjudicating authority was correct in imposing penalty under Section 112(i) of the Customs Act, 1962.
Analysis: Once the seized gold was prohibited goods, Section 112(i) governed the applicable penalty. The adjudicating order identified the goods as prohibited and imposed penalty on that basis. Failure to expressly specify the invoked clause does not invalidate an order where the authority possessed the statutory power and the order disclosed the basis for its exercise.
Conclusion: The adjudicating authority validly imposed penalty under Section 112(i) of the Customs Act, 1962, in favour of the Revenue.
Final Conclusion: The modification of the penalties was unsustainable, and the original confiscation and penalty adjudication remains operative.
Ratio Decidendi: Goods subject to import restrictions under any law in force are prohibited goods under Section 2(33) of the Customs Act, 1962, and their improper importation attracts the penalty regime under Section 112(i).
Prohibited goods - unauthorised import of gold - Penalty for improper importation of prohibited goods
Prohibited goods - unauthorised import of gold - Gold imported otherwise than through agencies authorised by Reserve Bank of India circulars or in accordance with the Baggage Rules constituted prohibited goods under the Customs Act, 1962. - HELD THAT: - The definition of prohibited goods includes goods whose import is subject to a prohibition under the Customs Act or any other law in force; it is not confined to a prohibition notified under Section 11. Since import of gold was subject to restrictions imposed through Reserve Bank of India notifications and circulars, and the writ petitioners did not fall within the authorised bulk-import agencies or the passenger-import regime, the seized gold fell within the statutory definition of prohibited goods. [Paras 44, 45, 48, 49, 55]
Gold was held to be a prohibited item within the meaning of the Customs Act, 1962.
Penalty for improper importation of prohibited goods - Jurisdictional error - incorrect statutory provision - The adjudicating authority was empowered to impose penalty applicable to prohibited goods under Section 112(i) of the Customs Act, 1962, notwithstanding the asserted non-specification of the particular clause. - HELD THAT: - Section 112 separately prescribes penalties for prohibited goods and for dutiable goods other than prohibited goods. Once the seized gold was held to be prohibited goods, Section 112(i) was attracted. An order is not rendered without jurisdiction merely because of an incorrect or unspecified statutory provision where the adjudicating authority possesses the power to make the order; moreover, the adjudication order was a speaking order treating the gold as prohibited goods and imposing penalty accordingly. [Paras 51, 52, 53, 54, 55]
The penalty imposed under Section 112(i) was upheld.
Final Conclusion: The writ petitioners' appeals were dismissed and the Customs appeals were allowed. The impugned judgment was set aside and the adjudicating authority's order was upheld.
Issues: (i) Whether exemption under the Target Plus Scheme required a strict product-to-product nexus between imported and exported goods, or whether a broad nexus with the relevant export product group was sufficient; (ii) Whether the extended limitation period for recovery of duty and consequential penalties was invocable.
Issue (i): Whether exemption under the Target Plus Scheme required a strict product-to-product nexus between imported and exported goods, or whether a broad nexus with the relevant export product group was sufficient.
Analysis: The Target Plus Scheme, read with the Handbook of Procedures and the exemption notification, permitted use of duty credit for imports having a broad nexus with goods within the defined product group specified in the duty credit certificate. The scheme did not require proof that imported goods were usable in the manufacture of the very item exported. The broad-nexus test nevertheless required a demonstrable connection with each relevant product group and could not validate imports against unrelated export groups.
Conclusion: A strict product-to-product nexus was not required, and a broad nexus with the relevant product group was sufficient, in favour of the assessee. However, GL's nexus was established only for exports falling within the Engineering Products group and not for the Chemicals and Allied Products group.
Issue (ii): Whether the extended limitation period for recovery of duty and consequential penalties was invocable.
Analysis: The policy language governing broad nexus was inherently ambiguous and capable of more than one interpretation. GL acted on an interpretation subsequently sustained by High Courts, while the duty credit certificates remained valid and had not been revoked, cancelled, or amended by the licensing authority. Shipping bills and export documents were already part of Customs records. These circumstances did not establish fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or intent to evade duty, which were essential for the extended period and penalty.
Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable, and the setting aside of duty demand and consequential penalties was sustained, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The product-group broad-nexus standard governs imports under the Target Plus Scheme, but recovery based on the extended limitation period cannot be sustained without proof of the requisite culpable conduct.
Ratio Decidendi: Where an exemption scheme contains an objectively ambiguous nexus requirement and the assessee acts on a bona fide interpretation under valid, unrevoked licences, such conduct does not by itself constitute wilful suppression or intent to evade duty for invoking extended limitation and penalty.
Target Plus Scheme - broad nexus between imported inputs and exported product groups - Extended limitation for customs duty demand-wilful suppression and intent to evade
Target Plus Scheme - broad nexus requirement - Eligibility for duty-free import of continuous cast copper rods under the Target Plus Scheme on the basis of broad nexus with the relevant exported product group - HELD THAT: - The Policy did not require a strict product-to-product nexus between imported goods and the very goods exported. The expression "broad nexus" was satisfied where the imported goods could be used as inputs in manufacture of goods falling within the defined product group specified in the duty credit certificate. However, the nexus had to be established separately with the relevant product group and could not justify duty-free imports against the entire certificate merely because nexus existed with one of several product groups. [Paras 19, 20, 21]
The Tribunal's construction was upheld: broad nexus existed between the imported copper rods and exports falling under the Engineering Products group, but not with the other product group; a strict one-to-one nexus was not required.
Extended limitation - absence of wilful suppression - Penalty for duty-free import-absence of intent to evade duty - Invocation of the extended limitation period and consequential customs penalties for duty-free import of continuous cast copper rods under the Target Plus Scheme - HELD THAT: - The ambiguity in the Policy concerning the required broad nexus, coupled with the interpretation subsequently upheld by the High Courts, supported the assessee's bona fide understanding of the exemption. Intent to evade duty is essential for invoking the extended period and for penalty under Section 114A; the alleged utilisation of the certificates did not by itself establish fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression. The certificates had neither been shown to be fraudulently obtained nor cancelled, revoked or amended, and the export documents formed part of the Customs records. [Paras 23, 24]
The extended period was not invocable, and the setting aside of the duty demand and consequential penalties was upheld.
Final Conclusion: The appeals of the Customs Department were dismissed. The order allowing the assessees' appeals was upheld.
Issues: (i) Whether breach of Condition No. 104 governing duty exemption for an imported aircraft justified recovery of duty, confiscation, and redemption fine; (ii) Whether the demand was barred by limitation under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962; (iii) Whether duty was required to be computed using actual transport and transit-insurance costs rather than notional values; (iv) Whether penalties for improper importation were sustainable.
Issue (i): Whether breach of Condition No. 104 governing duty exemption for an imported aircraft justified recovery of duty, confiscation, and redemption fine.
Analysis: Condition No. 104 required the aircraft to be used only for non-scheduled charter services, which required approval by the Directorate General of Civil Aviation. Although the aircraft was imported within the validity of the import approval, it was commercially operated for over 100 hours after the operating permission had expired and without any valid approval. Customs could determine compliance with the exemption condition because no subsisting licence or permit required interpretation by the aviation authorities. The deliberate unauthorised commercial operation was not a minor infraction capable of being sanctioned by the proper officer. Such breach rendered the aircraft liable to confiscation under Section 111(o), with duty payable under Section 125(2) upon redemption.
Conclusion: The exemption condition was breached; confiscation, redemption fine, and consequential customs-duty liability are sustainable against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the demand was barred by limitation under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962.
Analysis: The duty liability arose as a consequence of confiscation and redemption under Section 125(2), following breach of a post-import exemption condition, rather than as a demand for non-levy or short-levy under Section 28. The limitation periods in Section 28 therefore did not govern the recovery.
Conclusion: The recovery is not time-barred; this issue is decided against the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether duty was required to be computed using actual transport and transit-insurance costs rather than notional values.
Analysis: Actual ferry charges for bringing the aircraft into India and the actual transit-insurance premium were available. Notional additions under Rule 9(2) of the Customs Valuation Rules, 1988 could not be substituted for those actual figures. As the departmental proceedings had reopened the duty assessment, the resulting clerical and arithmetical error in valuation required correction.
Conclusion: Duty must be recalculated using the actual transport and transit-insurance costs; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iv): Whether penalties for improper importation were sustainable.
Analysis: The unauthorised commercial use of the duty-exempt aircraft rendered it liable to confiscation. The importer and its responsible managerial personnel were directly connected with the decisions resulting in that breach, and the penalties imposed were within the statutory limits and proportionate to the confirmed duty.
Conclusion: The penalties imposed under Section 112 are sustainable against the assessee and the responsible personnel.
Final Conclusion: Liability arising from the deliberate breach of the post-import exemption condition, including confiscation consequences, redemption fine, and penalties, remains enforceable, while the customs-duty quantum must reflect actual valuation costs.
Ratio Decidendi: Breach of a post-import condition of a customs exemption renders the goods confiscable and makes duty recoverable under Section 125(2), independently of the limitation regime under Section 28.
Conditional customs duty exemption for imported aircraft - Post-import breach of exemption conditions and customs duty recovery - Valuation based on actual freight and transit insurance - Penalty for unauthorised commercial operation of exempt aircraft
Conditional customs duty exemption for imported aircraft - Unauthorised non-scheduled charter operations - Confiscation for breach of exemption condition - Eligibility for duty exemption on an aircraft imported for non-scheduled charter services where it was commercially operated without a valid approval or permit - HELD THAT: - Condition 104 required the aircraft to be used only for non-scheduled charter services, which, under its Explanation, meant services provided by an operator registered with and approved by the DGCA. As no authorisation for the relevant period was produced, the commercial flights could not be treated as authorised non-scheduled charter services. Customs was competent to determine the availability of the exemption and its breach; only a dispute concerning the scope or validity of an existing DGCA or MCA permit would fall for consideration by the issuing authority. The conscious commercial operation without authorisation was not a minor infraction capable of being sanctioned by the proper officer. [Paras 24, 41, 42, 43, 44]
The breach of the exemption condition rendered the aircraft liable to confiscation; the confiscation and redemption fine were upheld.
Duty recovery upon redemption of confiscated goods - Inapplicability of limitation for post-import breach of exemption conditions - Applicability of the limitation prescribed for recovery of unpaid customs duty to duty recoverable after confiscation for post-import breach of an exemption condition - HELD THAT: - Where goods are confiscated for violation of a post-import condition of an exemption notification and are permitted to be redeemed on payment of fine, the liability to duty arises as a consequential liability under section 125(2), forming an integral part of the confiscation proceedings. Such recovery is not a demand for non-levy or short-levy under section 28; consequently, neither the normal nor the extended limitation under that provision applies. [Paras 25, 26, 27, 46]
The duty demand consequent upon confiscation was sustainable and was not barred by limitation.
Valuation of imported aircraft - Actual freight and transit insurance - Computation of duty on an imported aircraft by adopting notional freight and transit insurance despite availability of their actual costs - HELD THAT: - When the actual cost of transporting the aircraft into India and the actual transit-insurance cost were available, notional additions could not be adopted. Although an assessment is ordinarily modified only through the recognised statutory modes, the departmental proceedings had reopened the matter; adoption of notional amounts instead of actual costs was a clerical and arithmetical error requiring correction. [Paras 29, 30]
The duty was directed to be recomputed on the basis of the actual transport and transit-insurance costs, and the matter was remanded for that limited purpose.
Penalty for unauthorised commercial operation of exempt aircraft - Penalty on managing personnel for acts rendering goods confiscable - Sustainability of penalties on the importer and its managing personnel for commercial operation of the duty-exempt aircraft without the required authorisation - HELD THAT: - The importer's unauthorised commercial operation of the aircraft in breach of condition 104 rendered it liable to confiscation and attracted penalty. The Chief Executive Officer and Managing Director had taken the decisions resulting in the unauthorised use and were consequently liable to penalty for their role in the acts rendering the aircraft confiscable. [Paras 52, 53]
The penalties imposed on the importer and its managing personnel were upheld.
Final Conclusion: The importer's appeal was partly allowed only for recomputation of duty using actual transport and transit-insurance costs. The confiscation, redemption fine, duty liability and penalties were otherwise upheld, and the appeals of the managing personnel were dismissed.
Issues: Whether a penalty exceeding Rs. 50,000 could be imposed under Regulation 12(8) of the Handling of Cargo in Customs Areas Regulations, 2009.
Analysis: Regulation 12(8) expressly caps the penalty imposable thereunder at Rs. 50,000. The proposed penalties under other provisions of the Customs Act and cancellation of licence were not imposed, and no challenge was brought against that part of the adjudication. The statutory ceiling under Regulation 12(8) could not be exceeded; the cited earlier order did not alter the clear limit prescribed by the Regulation.
Conclusion: The penalty was liable to be restricted to the statutory maximum of Rs. 50,000, in favour of the assessee.
Statutory ceiling on penalty under Handling of Cargo in Customs Area Regulations - Penalty for acts of omission and commission by a cargo handling operator - whether it could exceed the maximum prescribed under Regulation 12(8) of the Handling of Cargo in Customs Area Regulations, 2009? - HELD THAT: - On a plain reading of Regulation 12(8), the Tribunal held that the provision fixes a maximum penalty of Rs. 50,000. The adjudicating authority could not impose a higher penalty under that Regulation. The earlier order cited by the Department was held inapplicable in view of the clear statutory provision. [Paras 5, 6]
The penalty was reduced to Rs. 50,000, being the maximum permissible under Regulation 12(8).
Final Conclusion: The appeal was partly allowed by modifying the impugned order and restricting the penalty to the statutory maximum under Regulation 12(8).
Issues: (i) Whether pre-03.06.2016 imports of newsprint by a warehousing importer not holding RNI registration violated the applicable import policy or the exemption under Serial No. 264 of Notification No. 12/2012-Cus.; (ii) Whether the Department established illicit import and clearance of newsprint through dummy actual users so as to sustain confiscation and penalties.
Issue (i): Whether pre-03.06.2016 imports of newsprint by a warehousing importer not holding RNI registration violated the applicable import policy or the exemption under Serial No. 264 of Notification No. 12/2012-Cus.
Analysis: Before the amendment of Policy Condition No. 2 of Chapter 48 effective from 03.06.2016, the RNI-registration requirement operated at the time of clearance, not at the time of import. The amendment substituting "at the time of clearance" with "at the time of import" specifically addressed warehoused goods and altered the earlier position prospectively. Serial No. 264 of Notification No. 12/2012-Cus. independently granted exemption for newsprint without prescribing an RNI-registration or Actual User condition. No determination of the disputed policy interpretation had been sought from the DGFT.
Conclusion: Pre-03.06.2016 imports and warehousing of newsprint could not be treated as contrary to the import policy or exemption notification merely because the warehousing importer was not RNI-registered. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the Department established illicit import and clearance of newsprint through dummy actual users so as to sustain confiscation and penalties.
Analysis: Newsprint was not notified under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962; therefore, the initial burden remained on the Department to establish foundational facts showing illicit import, diversion, or clearance to dummy units for illicit consideration. The Department did not place the show cause notice and relied-upon documents on record and produced no cogent evidence of excess goods, dummy actual users, local-market diversion, or illicit consideration. The goods were correlated with import and ex-bond documents, and the identified RNI-holders confirmed ownership and clearance of the goods. Serial-number discrepancies, without proof of unlawful import, were insufficient.
Conclusion: The alleged illicit import and diversion to dummy units were not proved; confiscation and penalties were consequently unsustainable. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The pre-amendment policy position, the unconditional customs exemption, and the absence of proof of unlawful import or diversion negated the customs liability asserted against the assessee.
Newsprint import policy - Actual User condition - Prospective operation of amended import condition - Burden of proving illicit import
Actual User condition for warehoused newsprint - Prospective application of import policy amendment - Customs exemption for newsprint - Validity of pre-amendment warehoused newsprint imports and availability of customs exemption in the absence of RNI registration of the importer - HELD THAT: - The policy was expressly amended only with effect from 03.06.2016 to require an importer seeking warehousing of newsprint to itself be an RNI-registered Actual User. That requirement could not be retrospectively applied to imports made earlier. Further, the applicable customs exemption for newsprint contained no RNI-registration or Actual User condition. In the absence of a reference to the DGFT on the disputed policy interpretation, Customs could not independently treat the imports as policy-violative. [Paras 10, 12]
The pre-amendment imports could not be held contrary to the Foreign Trade Policy or the customs exemption notification merely because the importer was not RNI-registered.
Burden of proving illicit import of newsprint - Confiscation for alleged clearance to dummy units - Confiscation of newsprint and penalties on the allegation of its clearance to dummy RNI units for illicit consideration - HELD THAT: - The initial burden lay on the Department to establish foundational facts showing illicit or improper import and clearance to dummy units, before any evidentiary burden could shift. The record did not disclose evidence of blameworthy conduct, duty-evasion intent, or clearance to dummy units for illicit consideration; the alleged procedural irregularities had been rebutted with admissible import and clearance documents. The absence of the show cause notice and relied-upon documents also left the allegations and their evidentiary basis unsubstantiated. [Paras 9, 11, 12]
The Department failed to prove illicit import or unlawful clearance; consequently, confiscation and the connected penalties did not survive.
Final Conclusion: The Revenue appeals were rejected, and the order setting aside confiscation of the newsprint and penalties was upheld.
Issues: Whether Social Welfare Surcharge is payable where basic customs duty is exempted through debit of a MEIS duty credit scrip under Notification No. 24/2015-Customs dated 08.04.2015.
Analysis: Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 authorises exemption from customs duty. The notification grants exemption from basic customs duty, while debit in the MEIS scrip merely records the quantum of exemption availed and does not constitute payment of duty. Since Social Welfare Surcharge is computed with reference to basic customs duty, no surcharge arises where the basic customs duty itself stands exempt.
Conclusion: Social Welfare Surcharge is not payable on the imported goods where basic customs duty is exempted through debit of a MEIS duty credit scrip; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Social Welfare Surcharge on imported PET coke where basic customs duty is exempt under the MEIS Scheme
Levy of Social Welfare Surcharge on imported PET coke where basic customs duty was exempt under Notification No. 24/2015-Cus. by debit of MEIS duty credit scrip - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal followed the decisions settling the identical controversy that, where basic customs duty is exempt under Notification No. 24/2015-Cus. issued under the MEIS Scheme, the importer is not liable to pay Social Welfare Surcharge.
Issue was also considered by the Tribunal in Appellant’s own case in Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. [2024 (5) TMI 632 - CESTAT HYDERABAD] wherein on the identical issue, it was held that the assessee is not liable to pay Social Welfare Surcharge (SWS) when BCD is exempted in terms of Notification No. 24/2015-Cus dated 08.04.2015 issued under the MEIS Scheme. The said decision also was followed in the case of M/s. Emami Agrotech Limited [2025 (3) TMI 788 - CESTAT KOLKATA][Paras 8]
The demand of Social Welfare Surcharge was unsustainable; the impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed, holding that no Social Welfare Surcharge was payable on the imported goods where basic customs duty stood exempt under the MEIS notification.
Issues: Whether, upon dissolution of a partnership at will, a partner's share in immovable partnership assets must be confined to their value on the date of dissolution or determined upon liquidation and final-decree proceedings.
Analysis: A partnership at will stood dissolved upon written notice under Section 43. Upon dissolution, Sections 46 and 48 require the firm's property to be applied towards its debts and liabilities and the surplus to be distributed among the partners according to their respective rights. The date of dissolution governs ascertainment of business profits and losses, but does not restrict a partner's entitlement in the residue of the firm's assets. The erstwhile partners' subsequent use or retention of partnership property through a new firm could not defeat the dissolved firm's obligation to liquidate assets or settle the outgoing partner's share. The assets may be retained only if the other partners pay the entitled partner's market-value share after adjustment of liabilities; otherwise, sale and distribution are required.
Conclusion: The respondent is entitled to 25% of the value realised from the partnership assets after discharge of firm liabilities, and that entitlement is not confined to the assets' value as on the date of dissolution.
Dissolution of partnership at will-settlement of partnership assets - Liquidation of immovable partnership property
Rights of partners on dissolution - Valuation and liquidation of partnership assets - Entitlement of a partner of a dissolved partnership at will to a proportionate share in the value of the immovable partnership asset, valued at the time of settlement rather than at its historical value on the date of dissolution - HELD THAT: - Upon dissolution, the partnership property must be applied towards discharge of its liabilities and the surplus distributed among the erstwhile partners according to their shares. The date of dissolution fixes the point up to which profits and losses of the business are to be ascertained; it does not confine a partner's entitlement in the residue of the partnership assets to their value on that date.
The reconstituted firm could not lawfully retain the land belonging to the dissolved firm without purchasing it. In the absence of a consensual settlement or payment of the partner's share, the asset is liable to be liquidated and the proceeds distributed after meeting partnership liabilities. [Paras 60, 61]
The direction for sale of the land through public auction and distribution of the sale proceeds in accordance with the partner's share, after discharge of liabilities, was upheld; the appeal was dismissed.
Final Conclusion: The civil appeal was dismissed, affirming the liquidation of the immovable asset of the dissolved firm and distribution of the net sale proceeds among the erstwhile partners according to their respective shares.
Issues: Whether a deposit made expressly without prejudice after a Section 7 insolvency petition was reserved for orders could justify closure of the proceeding without adjudicating objections concerning maintainability, financial debt and default.
Analysis: A deposit expressly made without prejudice to rights, remedies and contentions is not, by itself, an unconditional admission of liability or default. Although the deposit could be considered, it could not replace the determination required in a Section 7 proceeding where the corporate debtor had specifically disputed the petition's maintainability and the existence of financial debt and default. The subsequent demand asserting different components of interest, default interest and legal expenses could not independently establish a financial debt; each component required a contractual or statutory foundation and legal recoverability. Liberty to pursue legally maintainable claims did not amount to adjudication of those claims.
Conclusion: Closure of the Section 7 proceeding without deciding the appellant's objections to maintainability, financial debt and default was legally unsustainable.
Without-prejudice deposit in insolvency proceedings - Adjudication of debt, default and maintainability under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code
Closure of a Section 7 insolvency application solely on the basis of a without-prejudice deposit, without deciding objections to maintainability, debt and default - HELD THAT: - A deposit expressly made without prejudice to rights, remedies and contentions cannot, by itself, be treated as an unconditional admission of liability, particularly where objections to maintainability and to the existence of debt and default were already raised.
Though the deposit could be taken into account, it could not substitute the determination required in a Section 7 proceeding; at most, it indicated that the appellant was solvent. The subsequent demand, containing materially different components, could not by itself establish a financial debt, and the liberty to pursue legally maintainable claims did not amount to adjudication of those claims. [Paras 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]
The closure of the application without adjudicating the objections was unsustainable; the impugned order was set aside and the matter remanded for fresh consideration, subject to re-deposit of the released amount.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed and the Section 7 application was remanded for fresh consideration. No opinion was expressed on the merits of any subsequent claim that may otherwise be legally pursued.
Issues: (i) Whether death of an individual resolution applicant after CoC approval but before Adjudicating Authority approval makes the resolution plan unimplementable and permits liquidation under Section 33(1). (ii) Whether liquidation could be ordered and the Section 12A withdrawal application dismissed as infructuous while that application was pending.
Issue (i): Whether death of an individual resolution applicant after CoC approval but before Adjudicating Authority approval makes the resolution plan unimplementable and permits liquidation under Section 33(1).
Analysis: A resolution applicant is not an office-holder with non-heritable obligations, but occupies the position of a promisor within the statutory resolution process. Section 33(1) permits liquidation only where no plan is received within the CIRP period or where a CoC-approved plan is rejected under Section 31; death of the applicant is not an additional statutory ground. The objective of preserving the corporate debtor as a going concern requires examination of the continued viability of the plan rather than automatic liquidation. Where the request for resolution plan or the plan itself does not address the contingency, inherent powers may be used to require the CoC to assess whether the plan can be sustained, including whether an heir is eligible, qualified, free from Section 29A disqualification, and willing to implement it.
Conclusion: Death of the resolution applicant does not by itself render the plan unimplementable or authorise liquidation under Section 33(1); the liquidation order on that basis was unsustainable.
Issue (ii): Whether liquidation could be ordered and the Section 12A withdrawal application dismissed as infructuous while that application was pending.
Analysis: The withdrawal route under Section 12A remains available during the resolution process. Once the sole CoC member had resolved to withdraw the CIRP following settlement and the application was pending, liquidation could not be mechanically ordered without considering that statutory exit mechanism.
Conclusion: The pending Section 12A application must be considered in accordance with law, and its dismissal as infructuous could not be sustained.
Final Conclusion: The CIRP stands revived, with the statutory withdrawal request requiring adjudication before further steps are taken.
Ratio Decidendi: Death of a resolution applicant pending approval of a CoC-approved plan is not a statutory ground for liquidation under Section 33(1); the resolution process must instead explore continuation of the plan within the statutory framework before liquidation is resorted to.
Death of resolution applicant - continuance of corporate insolvency resolution process - Liquidation under corporate insolvency resolution-statutory preconditions - Withdrawal of corporate insolvency resolution process-pending settlement application
Death of resolution applicant-effect on approved resolution plan - Liquidation under corporate insolvency resolution-statutory preconditions - Death of a natural-person resolution applicant after approval of the resolution plan by the committee of creditors and before approval by the Adjudicating Authority-whether it renders the plan unimplementable and permits liquidation - HELD THAT: - A resolution applicant is not an office-holder with non-heritable obligations, but occupies the position of a promisor in the statutory resolution process. Section 33(1) permits liquidation only in the contingencies specified therein and does not contemplate liquidation merely because the resolution applicant has died. The plan must not be abandoned automatically: the request for resolution plan may govern, followed by the terms of the plan; where both are silent, inherent power may be exercised to require the committee of creditors to examine whether the plan can be sustained, including through an heir who satisfies the requisite eligibility, competence and willingness to implement it. Earlier submitted plans may also be reconsidered to avert forced liquidation. [Paras 7, 17, 18, 19]
The death of the resolution applicant did not by itself render the resolution plan unimplementable or justify liquidation under Section 33(1).
Withdrawal of corporate insolvency resolution process-pending settlement application - Pending application for withdrawal of the corporate insolvency resolution process pursuant to settlement with the sole-member committee of creditors-whether it could be dismissed as infructuous upon ordering liquidation - HELD THAT: - Even if rejection of the resolution plan were sustainable, liquidation could not have been ordered mechanically while an application for withdrawal of the corporate insolvency resolution process was awaiting consideration. The statutory exit route for withdrawal could not be denied to the parties without considering that application. [Paras 21]
The liquidation order was set aside, the corporate insolvency resolution process was revived, and the pending withdrawal application was directed to be considered in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The appeals challenging liquidation were allowed; the liquidation order was set aside and the corporate insolvency resolution process was revived. The pending withdrawal application was directed to be considered in accordance with law, while the remaining appeals were closed.
Issues: Whether a successful purchaser of a corporate debtor as a going concern in liquidation is entitled to immunity under Section 32A for pre-sale investigations, proceedings, non-compliances, and consequential liabilities.
Analysis: Section 32A protection and the clean slate principle apply where a corporate debtor is sold as a going concern during liquidation, as they do upon successful completion of CIRP. Past liabilities that do not survive the insolvency process cannot be fastened upon the purchaser merely because the sale occurred in liquidation. The statutory immunity remains conditional upon fulfilment of the requirements prescribed by Section 32A. Reliefs seeking waivers or concessions from statutory authorities must be pursued before those authorities.
Conclusion: The purchasers are entitled to Section 32A protection in respect of the declined reliefs concerning past investigations, proceedings, non-compliances, penalties, and liabilities, subject to fulfilment of the statutory conditions.
Section 32A immunity on liquidation sale of corporate debtor as a going concern - Clean slate theory in liquidation - Statutory waivers and concessions
Statutory waivers and concessions - Availability of waivers and concessions concerning the past liabilities of a corporate debtor sold as a going concern in liquidation - HELD THAT: - The Court held that, insofar as waivers and concessions are concerned, the purchaser must approach the respective statutory authorities. [Paras 5]
The claim for waivers and concessions was left to be pursued before the concerned statutory authorities.
Section 32A immunity on liquidation sale of corporate debtor as a going concern - Clean slate theory in liquidation - Entitlement of the purchaser of a corporate debtor as a going concern in liquidation to protection under Section 32A of the Code for past actions, proceedings and non-compliances - HELD THAT: - The clean slate theory applies not only upon approval of a resolution plan but also where the corporate debtor is sold as a going concern during liquidation. Past liabilities that remain unclaimed during CIRP or liquidation cannot survive after successful completion of CIRP or sale of the corporate debtor as a going concern; this is a legal consequence of such sale and not, strictly, a waiver or concession. Protection u/s 32A is consequently available during liquidation, subject to fulfilment of its prescribed conditions. [Paras 5, 6, 7]
The denial of protection for the claims relating to pending or future proceedings and pre-existing non-compliances was set aside, and the appellants were granted the benefit of Section 32A, subject to fulfilment of its conditions.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was partly allowed. The appellants were held entitled to Section 32A protection in respect of the declined reliefs concerning proceedings and pre-existing non-compliances, subject to statutory conditions, while waivers and concessions were left to the concerned statutory authorities.
Issues: (i) Whether the statutory preconditions for seizure of equivalent domestic assets under Section 37A(1) on suspicion of contravention of Section 4 were satisfied; (ii) Whether Section 37A could be invoked in respect of foreign-exchange profits arising from transactions undertaken before its commencement; (iii) Whether the deceased and the estate could be treated as persons resident in India for the alleged contravention.
Issue (i): Whether the statutory preconditions for seizure of equivalent domestic assets under Section 37A(1) on suspicion of contravention of Section 4 were satisfied.
Analysis: Information emerging from the Panama Papers investigation and the Singapore proceedings disclosed that five BVI entities, in which the deceased had predominant ownership and control, generated substantial profits through resale of iron ore sourced from India. The Singapore decree recognised the estate's acquisition of the relevant shares and profits, and the foreign exchange continued to be held abroad. These materials provided a prima facie basis to suspect a contravention of Section 4 and to record reasons to believe for seizure under Section 37A(1). A pending appeal against the Singapore decree did not negate the acquisition or ownership recorded by that decree. Section 37A(4) also characterises the seizure as a temporary protective measure pending adjudication.
Conclusion: The requirements for seizure under Section 37A(1) were satisfied; the issue is decided in favour of Revenue.
Issue (ii): Whether Section 37A could be invoked in respect of foreign-exchange profits arising from transactions undertaken before its commencement.
Analysis: Although the trading activities occurred between 2004 and 2012, the foreign exchange and assets were found to have remained held abroad when Section 37A came into force and continued to be held after the Singapore decree in 2023. The relevant conduct under Section 4 is the continuing acquisition, holding, ownership, possession or transfer of foreign exchange or foreign assets outside India. Application of Section 37A to an existing and continuing holding after its commencement is prospective and does not amount to retrospective operation.
Conclusion: Section 37A was validly invoked for the continuing suspected contravention; the issue is decided in favour of Revenue.
Issue (iii): Whether the deceased and the estate could be treated as persons resident in India for the alleged contravention.
Analysis: Employment permits issued abroad, without evidence of the deceased's yearly stay in India or of departure with an intention to remain abroad for an uncertain period, did not displace the statutory test of residence under Section 2(v). The administratrix acted for the estate, whose status was material, and the administratrix's individual residential status was irrelevant. The estate could not be treated as a person resident outside India on the material available.
Conclusion: The deceased was not established to be a person resident outside India, and the estate could not claim that status; the issue is decided in favour of Revenue.
Final Conclusion: The confirmation of seizure of the estate's domestic shares as equivalent assets was legally sustained pending FEMA adjudication.
Ratio Decidendi: A seizure mechanism operating upon a continuing post-enactment holding of suspected foreign exchange or foreign assets is prospective, and may be invoked on recorded reasons to believe of a contravention of the prohibition on such holding by a person resident in India.
Seizure of equivalent assets for suspected foreign exchange held abroad - Prospective application of FEMA seizure provisions to continuing possession of foreign exchange - Person resident in India under FEMA
Seizure of equivalent assets for suspected foreign exchange held abroad - Confirmation of seizure of domestic shares equivalent to foreign exchange suspected to have been held abroad in contravention of FEMA - HELD THAT: - The information emerging from the foreign proceedings, coupled with the deceased's predominant ownership and control interests in the overseas entities, furnished reasons to believe that foreign exchange derived through the overseas iron-ore trading entities was held abroad in contravention of FEMA. The pending appeal against the foreign judgment did not displace the acquisition and ownership found in favour of the Estate. A confirmed seizure is an interim protective measure pending adjudication, and the foreign exchange had neither been disclosed as repatriated nor brought back to India. [Paras 12, 13, 14]
The statutory conditions for seizure of equivalent domestic assets under Section 37A(1) were satisfied.
Prospective application of FEMA seizure provisions to continuing possession of foreign exchange - Applicability of Section 37A to foreign exchange generated before its commencement but continuing to be held abroad thereafter - HELD THAT: - Although the profits arose from earlier trading activities, the foreign proceedings resulted in their acquisition by the Estate after Section 37A came into force, and the foreign exchange continued to be held abroad. The seizure provision was therefore invoked in respect of a continuing suspected contravention, not retrospectively for a concluded past event. [Paras 15, 16]
The objection that Section 37A had been applied retrospectively was rejected.
Person resident in India under FEMA - Residential status of the deceased and relevance of the administratrix's residential status for the alleged holding of foreign exchange abroad - HELD THAT: - Employment permits issued abroad, without evidence of the deceased's year-wise stay in India or of an intention to remain abroad for an uncertain period, did not establish that he was a person resident outside India during the relevant period. The administratrix acted for the Estate, whose alleged foreign holding could not be excluded by reference to her personal residential status. [Paras 17]
The challenge founded on non-residential status was rejected.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order confirming seizure and the underlying seizure order were upheld. The appeal was dismissed.
Issues: Whether bail could be granted despite the restriction under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
Analysis: The available materials did not permit the statutory restriction under Section 45 to be overcome on merits. However, prolonged custody may, in appropriate cases, outweigh that restriction. The petitioner had been in custody for nearly ten months, suffered from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease requiring repeated hospital treatment and outpatient visits during custody, and was not arraigned as an accused in the predicate-offence cases; at that stage, the admissible allegation against him appeared confined to parking tainted money.
Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to bail in view of his serious chronic medical condition and the period of incarceration notwithstanding the restriction under Section 45.
Bail under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act - prolonged incarceration and serious illness - Grant of bail under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act despite the statutory restrictions, on account of serious chronic illness and prolonged custody
HELD THAT: - Although the statutory restriction on bail could not be surmounted on merits, prolonged incarceration can, in appropriate cases, outweigh its rigour. The petitioner's chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder, repeated need for hospitalisation and medical consultations while in custody, nearly ten months of incarceration, and the fact that he had not been made an accused in the predicate-offence cases warranted grant of bail. [Paras 7, 8, 10, 11]
The bail application was allowed subject to the stipulated safeguards, including surrender of passport, restrictions on foreign travel, regular appearance, and non-interference with witnesses.
Final Conclusion: The petitioner was granted bail upon consideration of his serious chronic illness, prolonged custody and the circumstances concerning the predicate offences, subject to protective conditions.
Issues: (i) Whether the earlier setting aside of seizure/freezing orders and the quashing of proceedings against certain individuals precluded attachment proceedings against the firm and the present individual appellants; (ii) Whether confirmation of the provisional attachment of bank deposits, fixed deposits and term deposits as proceeds of crime or their equivalent value was sustainable despite payment of compensation for mining and environmental violations.
Issue (i): Whether the earlier setting aside of seizure/freezing orders and the quashing of proceedings against certain individuals precluded attachment proceedings against the firm and the present individual appellants.
Analysis: The earlier order setting aside the seizure/freezing was expressly not on merits and was based on failure to file a prosecution complaint within the then-applicable statutory period. It therefore neither barred a subsequent attachment nor invalidated the attachment solely because the earlier freezing had been set aside. The quashing of predicate-offence proceedings was confined to particular individuals, whereas proceedings against the firm continued. The present three individual appellants were not covered by those orders.
Conclusion: The earlier orders did not bar consideration or confirmation of the attachment against the firm and the present appellants. The issue is against the appellants.
Issue (ii): Whether confirmation of the provisional attachment of bank deposits, fixed deposits and term deposits as proceeds of crime or their equivalent value was sustainable despite payment of compensation for mining and environmental violations.
Analysis: The impugned confirmation order reflected consideration of the complaint, replies and estimate of proceeds of crime. The investigation indicated production beyond approved limits, and the deposits were linked by recorded statements to sale proceeds of iron ore and manganese ore. Compensation paid for environmental and forest-law violations did not compound or extinguish alleged money-laundering offences and could not be set off against proceeds of crime. Pending final determination in the PMLA trial, the identified available proceeds of crime or their equivalent value were required to remain secured for possible confiscation.
Conclusion: The provisional attachment and its confirmation were sustainable, and the attached properties were to continue under attachment pending final findings in the PMLA trial. The issue is against the appellants.
Final Conclusion: The firm and the present individual appellants remain subject to the confirmed attachment, without prejudice to the final adjudication of the money-laundering prosecution.
Ratio Decidendi: A prior setting aside of freezing on a non-merits procedural ground does not preclude a subsequent PMLA attachment, and compensation for underlying regulatory violations does not displace attachment of identified proceeds of crime or their equivalent value pending trial.
Effect of prior release of frozen property - Attachment of equivalent value of proceeds of crime
Effect of prior release of frozen property - Quashing of proceedings against individual accused - Effect of earlier orders setting aside freezing of the properties and quashing proceedings against other partners on the subsequent attachment and the present appeals - HELD THAT: - The earlier order setting aside the freezing and seizure had not adjudicated the matter on merits; it rested on the failure to file the prosecution complaint within the then stipulated period. It therefore did not preclude a subsequent attachment. The High Court orders quashing predicate-offence and money-laundering proceedings were confined to the concerned individuals, whereas proceedings against the firm were expressly permitted to continue. The earlier Tribunal order concerning another partner likewise did not bar adjudication of the firm's and the present individual appellants' appeals on merits. [Paras 12, 13, 14]
The prior orders did not invalidate or preclude consideration of the impugned attachment.
Attachment of equivalent value of proceeds of crime - Compensation for environmental violations - Continuation of attachment of bank deposits as the available proceeds of crime or their equivalent value arising from alleged illegal mining despite payment of compensation for environmental and forest-law violations - HELD THAT: - The Adjudicating Authority had considered the complaint, the appellants' submissions and the estimate of proceeds of crime, and had made the requisite finding on the available movable properties. Payment of compensation for violations of environmental clearances and forest law could not compound money-laundering offences or be set off against proceeds of crime arising from illegal mining. In view of the investigation material indicating production beyond approved quantities and deposits stated to represent sale proceeds of minerals, the available proceeds of crime or their equivalent value were required to remain secured pending final findings in the PMLA trial. [Paras 15, 16]
The attachment was upheld and directed to continue until the trial court's findings attain finality.
Final Conclusion: The appeals were dismissed. The attachment of the identified bank deposits and fixed deposits was sustained pending final adjudication in the PMLA trial.
Issues: Whether the provisional attachment of assets allegedly representing proceeds of crime routed through share transactions could be sustained under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
Analysis: The evidence, including statements recorded under Section 50 and banking and trading records, established a prima facie chain in which alleged bribe proceeds were channelled through cheque discounters and accounts of dummy purchasers to acquire shares from the appellant and his family at inflated prices. Investment in non-functioning companies followed by substantial price appreciation, coupled with the funding of purchasers from sources other than their own, supported the allegation of layering and projection of proceeds of crime as untainted long-term capital gains. The appellant's position as President of the trust running the university also rendered the claim of lack of influence over the university unacceptable. The statutory presumption concerning interconnected transactions and the continuing trials for the scheduled offence and money laundering supported preservation of the attached assets pending conclusion of trial.
Conclusion: The provisional attachment was validly sustained and could not be set aside at this stage.
Attachment of alleged proceeds of crime - Layering of bribe proceeds through share transactions
Continuation of attachment of alleged proceeds of crime represented as long-term capital gains from sale of shares - HELD THAT: - The material on record indicated that the purchasers of shares held by the appellant and family members were funded from sources other than their own, and that funds were routed through banking channels for purchase of shares of non-functioning companies at highly appreciated prices. The Tribunal found the claimed investment explanation unconvincing, particularly because the companies had no apparent basis for such appreciation and the appellant, as President of the trust running the university, could not disclaim influence over it. Since the scheduled-offence and money-laundering trials were pending, attachment was required to secure the alleged proceeds of crime until conclusion of trial. [Paras 10]
The attachment was not liable to be set aside and the appeal challenging its confirmation was dismissed.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed, leaving the confirmation of the provisional attachment undisturbed.
Issues: (i) Whether Group Insurance Services were eligible input services under the pre-01.04.2011 definition and refundable under Rule 5; (ii) Whether Club Services were eligible input services under the pre-01.04.2011 definition and refundable under Rule 5; (iii) Whether credit relating to services after 31.03.2010 could be included in the refund claim for January to March 2010.
Issue (i): Whether Group Insurance Services were eligible input services under the pre-01.04.2011 definition and refundable under Rule 5.
Analysis: Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, during the relevant period, included services used in activities relating to business and had a wider scope than the post-01.04.2011 definition. Group insurance for employees was not excludable merely as employee welfare or for want of direct nexus with exported output services.
Conclusion: Group Insurance Services were eligible input services and the related refund is admissible, subject to verification of the amount and remaining statutory requirements; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether Club Services were eligible input services under the pre-01.04.2011 definition and refundable under Rule 5.
Analysis: Club membership could qualify where its actual business use, such as customer entertainment or business meetings, was established. The material showed use for health, fitness and recreational activities by employees, without evidence of comparable business use.
Conclusion: The Club Service component was not established as an eligible input service; this issue is decided against the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether credit relating to services after 31.03.2010 could be included in the refund claim for January to March 2010.
Analysis: A refund under Rule 5 is confined to eligible accumulated credit available for the specific refund period. Credit relating to services after the close of that period was not shown to have formed part of the eligible accumulated balance for January to March 2010.
Conclusion: Credit of Rs.2,48,860 relating to services after 31.03.2010 cannot be included in the refund claim for January to March 2010; this issue is decided against the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The pre-01.04.2011 input-service definition covers employee group insurance as an activity relating to business, while club services require proof of actual business use and refund eligibility is confined to credit accumulated during the claimed period.
Ratio Decidendi: Under the pre-01.04.2011 definition of input service, services connected with activities relating to business need not have a direct nexus with output services, but their business character must be established and Rule 5 refund is limited to credit attributable to the relevant refund period.
CENVAT credit on group insurance services - CENVAT credit on club services - Rule 5 refund confined to the relevant refund period
Group Insurance as input service - Pre-01.04.2011 definition of input service - Eligibility of Group Insurance services for CENVAT credit and consequential refund for the pre-01.04.2011 period - HELD THAT: - The pre-amendment definition of input service, containing the expression "activities relating to business", had a wide ambit. Group Insurance could not be excluded merely because it covered employees or was characterised as employee welfare, nor was a direct nexus with the exported output service required. [Paras 8, 14]
The rejection of the Group Insurance component was set aside and the matter was remanded solely to verify the precise eligible amount and grant consequential refund, subject to the remaining statutory requirements.
Club services as input service - Proof of business use - Eligibility of Club Services for CENVAT credit where the services were stated to have been used for employee health, fitness and recreational activities - HELD THAT: - Club membership was not per se excluded under the pre-01.04.2011 definition; however, eligibility required evidence of actual business use. As no material established use for customer entertainment, business meetings, sales meetings or comparable business activities, the claimed credit was not established. [Paras 10, 14]
The rejection of the Club Service component was upheld.
Refund-period eligibility of accumulated CENVAT credit - Inclusion in the refund claim of credit relating to services pertaining to a period after 31.03.2010 - HELD THAT: - A refund claim for January 2010 to March 2010 could cover only eligible accumulated credit available for that refund period. The appellant did not establish that credit relating to subsequent services formed part of the eligible accumulated balance for the relevant period. [Paras 12, 14]
The rejection of credit relating to services after 31.03.2010 was upheld.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was partly allowed by remand for verification and consequential refund of the eligible Group Insurance credit. The rejection of the Club Service claim and credit relating to services after the refund period was sustained.
Issues: (i) Whether interest earned on EMI-based loan transactions routed through credit card accounts, including penal interest, is liable to service tax; (ii) Whether the demand of service tax is sustainable on the ground of limitation and whether penalties are imposable in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
Issue (i): Whether interest earned on EMI-based loan transactions routed through credit card accounts, including penal interest, is liable to service tax.
Analysis: The EMI facilities involved quantified advances repayable over stipulated tenures with interest; use of the credit-card account for disbursal, accounting or recovery did not alter their substantive character as bilateral loan transactions. Interest was consideration for the use of money, rather than consideration for an independent credit-card service. The statutory scheme excluded interest on loans from taxable value before 1 July 2012 and placed lending by way of loans or advances, where consideration is interest, in the negative list thereafter. Transactions in money were also excluded from service. Additional or penal interest on delayed EMIs was compensatory for continued retention of money and could not be re-characterised as consideration for tolerating an act.
Conclusion: Interest and additional or penal interest on the EMI loan facilities are not liable to service tax. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the demand of service tax is sustainable on the ground of limitation and whether penalties are imposable in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
Analysis: The dispute was interpretational, and the transactions were recorded in financial and statutory records, subjected to departmental audits, and known to the Department through earlier proceedings. No evidence established fraud, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or intent to evade tax. Mere non-payment under self-assessment could not satisfy the requirements for invoking the extended limitation period or imposing penalty.
Conclusion: The extended period of limitation is not invocable and penalty is not imposable. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: Interest arising from genuine EMI loans, including compensatory interest for delayed instalments, remains outside the service-tax levy, and the absence of wilful suppression also defeats the extended demand and associated penalty.
Ratio Decidendi: Interest on a genuine loan or advance is consideration for the use of money and remains excluded from service tax, including where the loan is administered through a credit-card account or the interest is charged for delayed repayment.
Service tax on interest on EMI-based loans through credit-card accounts - Penal interest and declared service of tolerating an act - Extended limitation and penalty for suppression
Taxability of interest and additional or penal interest on EMI-based loans extended to credit-card holders - HELD THAT: - The EMI facilities involved disbursement of specified amounts repayable with interest and were, in substance, loans and advances; use of the credit-card account for disbursal, accounting or recovery did not convert them into credit-card services. Interest was the return for the use and time value of money and was excluded from service tax under the applicable pre-negative-list and negative-list provisions. Additional or penal interest upon delayed EMI payment was compensatory interest arising from the underlying loan and could not be re-characterised as consideration for tolerating an act.
We also find merit in the appellant’s reliance upon the decisions of the Tribunal in Bajaj Finance Ltd. [2023 (8) TMI 473 - CESTAT MUMBAI], Ashiana Housing Ltd. [2024 (5) TMI 795 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] and Balajee Loha Pvt. Ltd [2025 (6) TMI 186 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] wherein it has been consistently held that penal or additional interest charged on delayed payments retains the character of interest and cannot be treated as consideration for any taxable service.[Paras 17, 18, 19, 20, 22]
Interest, including additional or penal interest, on the EMI-based loan facilities was not liable to service tax, and the demand founded on its treatment as consideration for credit-card services or for tolerating an act was unsustainable.
Extended limitation and penalty for suppression - Invocation of the extended period and imposition of penalty for non-payment of service tax on interest from EMI-based loan transactions - HELD THAT: - Mere non-payment in a self-assessment regime does not establish suppression; invocation of the extended period requires wilful suppression or misstatement with intent to evade tax. The dispute was interpretational, the transactions were recorded in the appellant's books and statutory records, and the Department had knowledge of the activities through prior proceedings and audits. No fraud, wilful misstatement, suppression or intent to evade was established. [Paras 23, 24, 25, 26, 27]
The extended period was not invocable, and the penalty imposed under Section 78 was liable to be set aside.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside in toto and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether the High Court had jurisdiction under Section 35G to entertain the Department's appeal concerning liability to Clean Environment Cess on closing stock.
Analysis: Section 35G excludes appeals involving determination of a question relating to the rate of excise duty or value for assessment. Section 35L(2) expressly includes within determination relating to the rate of duty a determination concerning taxability or excisability. The cess-liability question therefore falls within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Conclusion: The appeal was required to be preferred before the Supreme Court under Section 35L(2) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, and was not maintainable before the High Court.
Appellate jurisdiction over questions relating to rate of duty and taxability - Maintainability before the High Court of the Department's appeal concerning liability to cess on coal held in closing stock
HELD THAT: - The proposed questions concerned the liability to cess, which related to the determination of taxability or excisability of goods for assessment. Such determination falls within the scope of appeals directly maintainable before the Supreme Court under the statutory appellate scheme, and not an appeal to the High Court. [Paras 6]
The appeal and connected application were dismissed, with the Court holding that the appeal ought to be preferred before the Supreme Court.
Final Conclusion: The Department's appeal was dismissed as the controversy relating to cess liability involved a question falling within the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.
Issues: Whether central excise duty and penalty for alleged clandestine clearances could be sustained where the seized records forming the basis of the demand were unreliable and the remaining turnover fell within the small scale industry exemption limit.
Analysis: The panchnama and the documents allegedly seized under it were not reliable because the material records were not produced, their contents were not established, and the evidence of the panch witness and the officer preparing the panchnama was contradictory regarding the timing of its execution. The Neel Gagan Ledger and other documents relied upon for quantification were neither supplied nor established as recovered records. The proprietor's statement was not inculpatory, as it recorded that the entries were rough, their author was unknown, and copies were not furnished. On excluding clearance values based on the unreliable ledger and documents, the turnover for both 2008-09 and 2009-10 remained within the exemption threshold under the notification.
Conclusion: The alleged clandestine clearances were not proved by reliable evidence; no duty or penalty was payable, as the turnover for both years was within the small scale industry exemption limit.
Clandestine removal - reliability of seized records - SSI exemption - turnover based on reliable evidence - central excise duty and penalty
Central excise duty demand for alleged clandestine clearances of evaporating air coolers founded on seized records, and the consequential availability of SSI exemption - HELD THAT: - The Panchnama was rendered unreliable by the material contradiction between the Panch witness and the officer who prepared it regarding the time at which it was concluded. The documents allegedly seized under that Panchnama were neither made available nor their contents established. The proprietor's statement was not inculpatory, since the underlying documents had not been shown to him and the Revenue did not rebut his explanation with cogent evidence.
On exclusion of the unreliable clearance values based on the Neel Gagan Ledger and the dispatch record, the turnover for both periods remained within the SSI exemption limit. [Paras 13, 15, 17, 18]
No duty was payable for either period; consequently, the interest and penalty could not survive, and the impugned order was set aside.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed with consequential relief after the seized records supporting the alleged clandestine clearances were held unreliable and the turnover was found to fall within the SSI exemption limit.
Issues: Whether a delay of 483 days beyond the prescribed limitation period in filing the revision petition should be condoned.
Analysis: The statutory period of 180 days was considered sufficient for challenging the Tribunal's order. The medical circumstances relied upon did not satisfactorily account for the prolonged delay. Since the challenged order arose from an appeal instituted by the petitioner, diligence in pursuing the available statutory remedy was required; the aggregate delay would result in the challenge being brought more than two years after the Tribunal's order.
Conclusion: The delay was not condoned and the application for condonation was rejected.
Condonation of delay - delay of 483 days beyond the prescribed limitation period - HELD THAT:- As rightly submitted by the learned AGA, the period of limitation prescribed is 180 days which is quite sufficient for preferring this petition raising a challenge to the impugned order passed by the Tribunal.
Moreover, the impugned order is passed in an appeal filed by the petitioner and, therefore, the petitioner should have been more prudent and alert in pursuing the remedy within the time prescribed. We are also of the considered opinion that the huge delay of 483 days not including the 180 days prescribed in the statute, will make the appeal delayed by more than two years. That being the position, we are unable to accept the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
Issues: Whether an assessee can obtain refund of tax legitimately due during assessment or reassessment despite expiry of the six-month period prescribed for claiming refund.
Analysis: The six-month period under Section 35(4)(b) does not absolve the assessing authority, while conducting assessment or reassessment, from rectifying an error that has resulted in the assessee claiming a deduction or exemption lesser than that legally available. The statutory duty to correctly determine tax liability and rectify such mistakes applies even where rectification benefits the assessee; a restrictive interpretation founded on retention of funds by the State is legally impermissible.
Conclusion: Amounts legitimately due to the assessee must be refunded notwithstanding the expiry of the six-month claim period.
Refund of excess tax retained by State-duty to rectify assessment - Claim for refund of excess tax retained by the State-whether the six-month period prescribed for a dealer's refund claim precludes refund where the Assessing Authority, during assessment or reassessment, discovers that the dealer was entitled to a larger deduction or exemption
HELD THAT: - The Court held that, upon discovery during assessment or reassessment that a dealer has claimed a lesser deduction than lawfully available, the Assessing Authority has a duty to determine and refund the dealer's rightful dues. That duty is not avoided by the six-month period applicable to a refund claim, particularly where deductions and exemptions arise under statutory notifications. A construction enabling the State to retain money legitimately due to the dealer was held legally impermissible. [Paras 5, 6]
The appeal was dismissed, and the State authorities were directed to refund the amount due to the respondent within three months.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed on the basis that the assessing authority must refund tax rightfully due to the dealer when the entitlement is discovered in assessment or reassessment.
Issues: Whether an SEZ unit was entitled to exemption and refund of stamp duty and registration fee on a lease deed executed before promulgation of the Gujarat Special Economic Zone Ordinance, 2004, where the State's SEZ policy had already promised those fiscal benefits.
Analysis: The State policy dated 19.07.2002 extended complete exemption from stamp duty and registration fee to SEZ units and induced investment for industrial development. The Ordinance promulgated on 10.02.2004 gave formal statutory shape to that pre-existing policy. Denial of the promised fiscal benefit solely because the lease deed pre-dated the Ordinance would defeat the policy's object and differentiate without justification between similarly placed SEZ units based only on the date of execution. A lease transfers an interest in land and falls within the policy's intended fiscal benefit.
Conclusion: The exemption and consequential refund of stamp duty and registration fee were rightly available to the SEZ unit notwithstanding that the lease deed was executed before 10.02.2004.
Leasehold transfer of land for SEZ fiscal incentives - Promissory estoppel in enforcement of SEZ policy incentives
Leasehold transfer of land for SEZ fiscal incentives - Availability of exemption from stamp duty and registration fee for a leasehold transfer of land to an approved unit in a Special Economic Zone - HELD THAT: - The fiscal incentives under the SEZ policy and the Ordinance were intended to promote industrial establishment in the SEZ. A lease transfers an interest in land for its enjoyment for the stipulated duration and cannot be excluded from the expression "transfer of land" by confining that expression to an outright sale. [Paras 9]
The lease deed was held covered by the promised fiscal benefits, and exemption could not be denied merely because the land was transferred by lease.
Promissory estoppel in enforcement of SEZ policy incentives - Entitlement to SEZ fiscal benefits where the lease deed was executed after the State policy promising the incentives but before promulgation of the Ordinance giving effect to that policy - HELD THAT: - The State's SEZ policy had already held out fiscal incentives to attract industrial investment, and the subsequent Ordinance merely gave statutory shape to that policy. Denial of the benefit solely because the lease pre-dated the Ordinance would defeat the governmental promise and create hostile discrimination between similarly situated units established immediately before and after the Ordinance. [Paras 13, 14]
The pre-Ordinance execution of the lease deed did not disentitle the petitioners from the promised exemption.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed. The directed refund of stamp duty and registration fee was required to be processed and paid within the stipulated further period.
Issues: Whether a contractor executing an ongoing contract awarded before the introduction of GST was entitled to reimbursement of the additional GST burden notwithstanding tender clauses requiring quoted rates to be inclusive of applicable taxes and a contrary pre-bid clarification concerning future taxes.
Analysis: The tender clauses required rates to include taxes applicable when the bid was submitted and did not extend to GST, which was not in existence when the work order was issued. The governmental circular and resolution concerning ongoing works recognised compensation of the net additional GST burden and contemplated a supplementary agreement. The respondents had also referred the reimbursement claim for chartered-accountant verification, making its subsequent rejection arbitrary. A pre-bid clarification inconsistent with the tender conditions could not supersede those conditions. Denial of reimbursement to the petitioner while similarly placed contractors received reimbursement would be arbitrary and offend the requirement of equal treatment under Article 14.
Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to GST reimbursement to the extent verified by the respondents' chartered accountant, and the communication rejecting that claim was quashed.
GST reimbursement under ongoing works contract - Pre-bid clarification inconsistent with tender conditions
Entitlement to reimbursement of GST arising during execution of a construction contract awarded before GST came into force, notwithstanding tender clauses requiring quoted rates to include applicable taxes and a pre-bid clarification concerning future taxes - HELD THAT: - The tender clauses required rates to be inclusive of taxes applicable at the time of bidding and did not extend to a tax subsequently imposed during the subsistence of the contract. The Government circular and resolution contemplated compensation of the net additional GST burden on ongoing works, and the respondents had themselves caused the claim to be verified. A pre-bid clarification contrary to the tender conditions could not override them.
The judgment in the case of B. Rugmini Amma and anr. [2013 (5) TMI 1084 - SUPREME COURT] is helpful which says that effect of a clarification would not surpass the main order and cannot, by any means, supersede or override the terms of the main order.
Denial of reimbursement after verification was arbitrary; differential treatment of similarly situated contractors would also offend Article 14. [Paras 25, 27, 29, 30, 31]
The petitioner was held entitled to GST reimbursement to the extent verified by the respondents' Chartered Accountant, and the denial communication was quashed.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed, the denial of GST reimbursement was set aside, and payment of the verified reimbursement was directed within the stipulated period.
TaxTMI