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Maintainability of Writ petition against order as appealable under Section 107(1) of the Act of 2017
HELD THAT:- Taking into consideration that the order is appealable under Section 107(1) of the Act of 2017, we are not inclined to entertain the instant writ petitions.
Accordingly, the present writ petitions stand dismissed. However, the petitioners will be at liberty to raise all the questions before the appellate authority in appeal, which will be considered and decided expeditiously by the authority, in accordance with law.
Order under challenge appealable order under Section 107(1) of Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - HELD THAT:- The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to avail the statutory appellate remedy; the appellate authority was directed to consider the contentions in accordance with law within a reasonable period.
Issues: (i) Whether the cancelled GST registration and rejection of revocation could be restored; (ii) Whether the penalty order under Section 122(1)(vii) for the 2024-25 period should be remitted for fresh adjudication.
Issue (i): Whether the cancelled GST registration and rejection of revocation could be restored.
Analysis: The cancellation and revocation-rejection orders were governed by the applicable framework for restoration of GST registration. Restoration was made subject to compliance with the stipulated requirements under that framework.
Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the GST registration may be restored subject to compliance with the applicable stipulations.
Issue (ii): Whether the penalty order under Section 122(1)(vii) for the 2024-25 period should be remitted for fresh adjudication.
Analysis: No reply had been filed to the show-cause notice and the opportunities of personal hearing were not availed. Fresh adjudication was directed upon deposit of 10% of the disputed tax in cash and submission of a reply with supporting documents, with the existing penalty order to be treated as an addendum to the show-cause notice.
Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the penalty order was remitted for fresh adjudication, conditional upon the prescribed deposit and response.
Final Conclusion: Registration restoration remains subject to the applicable stipulations, and the penalty proceedings require a fresh merits determination after compliance with the directed requirements.
Restoration of cancelled GST registration
GST registration cancellation for non-response to show-cause notice - Restoration of GST registration cancelled, and revocation subsequently rejected, for failure to reply to the respective show-cause notices - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the controversy was covered by an earlier order of the Court and applied the stipulations prescribed therein for restoration of registration. [Paras 6, 7]
The GST registration was permitted to be restored subject to compliance with the applicable stipulations.
Conditional fresh adjudication of GST penalty for supplies without invoices and invoices without receipt of goods - Fresh consideration of the tax and penalty demand for the tax period 2024-25, where the petitioner had neither replied to the show-cause notice nor attended the personal hearings - HELD THAT: - Though the petitioner had not responded to the notice or availed the hearing opportunities, the Court remitted the matter for fresh consideration upon a cash-ledger deposit of 10% of the disputed tax and filing of a reply with supporting documents. The impugned order was directed to be treated as an addendum to the show-cause notice. [Paras 10, 12, 13, 14, 15]
On compliance, the respondent shall pass a fresh order on merits after notice; on default, recovery may proceed in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The registration was directed to be restored subject to the stipulated conditions, while the tax and penalty demand for 2024-25 was remitted for fresh adjudication subject to the prescribed deposit and reply.
Issues: Whether the demand concerning belated availment of input tax credit required reconsideration under the amended Section 16(4) of the GST enactments.
Analysis: The amendment to Section 16(4) of the GST enactments, brought into effect from 27.09.2024, statutorily regularised belated availment of input tax credit. Eligibility for such credit nevertheless remains dependent on fulfilment of the other conditions under the applicable Act and Rules. Fresh adjudication of demands unrelated to Section 16(4) was made conditional upon deposit of 50% of the disputed tax in cash and submission of a reply with supporting material.
Conclusion: The demand relating to belated availment of input tax credit must be freshly adjudicated under the amended provision, subject to satisfaction of the remaining statutory conditions.
Regularisation of belated input tax credit - Fresh consideration of GST demand - Reconsideration of the demand arising from belated availment of input tax credit in light of the statutory amendment regularising such availment
HELD THAT: - As the amendment to the GST enactments statutorily regularised belated availment of input tax credit, the impugned demand and rectification order required fresh consideration. The claim remains subject to fulfilment of the other conditions prescribed under the Act and the Rules. [Paras 4, 5, 6]
The impugned order and rectification order were quashed and the matter remitted for fresh adjudication, subject to deposit of half of the disputed tax relating to demands other than those under section 16(4), filing of a reply with supporting documents, and notice before a fresh order.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by remitting the matter for fresh consideration in light of the statutory regularisation of belated input tax credit, subject to the stipulated deposit and compliance conditions.
Issues: Whether the refund claims based on an alleged inverted duty structure required fresh examination of whether the outward supplies were manufactured cotton yarn or merely traded cotton yarn.
Analysis: The eligibility for refund depended on verification of the nature of the petitioner's activities and the supporting records, including whether cotton fibre, packing material and consumables were used to manufacture cotton yarn, or whether cotton yarn was traded simpliciter.
Outcome: The impugned orders were quashed and the refund claims were remitted for fresh determination.
Refund claims based on an alleged inverted duty structure - Factual determination of cotton yarn manufacture or trading for inverted duty structure refund
Inverted duty structure refund for cotton yarn-manufacture versus trading - Need for determination of whether cotton yarn was manufactured from cotton fibre, packing material and consumables or merely traded before deciding refund claims under the inverted duty structure - HELD THAT: - The eligibility of the refund claims depended upon verification of the factual basis of the claim. The authority was required to examine the documents to determine whether the petitioner had merely traded in cotton yarn or had manufactured and cleared cotton yarn after procuring the stated inputs. [Paras 13, 14]
The impugned orders were quashed and the refund claims were remitted to the second respondent for examination and fresh final orders.
Final Conclusion: The impugned refund-rejection and appellate orders were quashed, and the refund claims for the stated periods were remitted for factual verification and fresh orders.
Issues: Whether rejection of the refund claim under the inverted duty structure was sustainable and whether the claim required fresh determination.
Analysis: The refund claim arose from accumulation of input tax credit where cotton fibre, packing materials and consumables were used for manufacturing cotton yarn. The rejection was founded on Circular No. 135/05/2020-GST dated 30.03.2020, which had previously been quashed in relation to the same refund issue. The Department could not maintain a contrary position where refunds on comparable claims had been sanctioned. Fresh factual verification was nevertheless required to determine the nature of the inputs purchased, manufacture of cotton yarn, payment of output tax, and eligibility for refund under the inverted duty structure.
Conclusion: The petitioner is entitled to a fresh determination of refund eligibility, and refund must be granted if the requisite factual basis for the inverted-duty claim is established.
Inverted-duty refund claim-reliance on quashed GST circular - sustainability of rejection of an inverted-duty refund claim for cotton-yarn clearances on the basis of a departmental circular that had earlier been quashed
HELD THAT: - The impugned appellate order was founded on a circular which had previously been quashed. The actual nature of the inputs procured and the manufacture and clearance of cotton yarn required examination before entitlement to refund could be determined. [Paras 8]
The appellate order was quashed and the matter remitted for fresh examination; if the petitioner establishes eligibility, the refund shall be granted.
Final Conclusion: The writ petitions were disposed of by quashing the appellate order and remitting the refund claims for fresh examination of the inputs used in the manufacture and clearance of cotton yarn.
Issues: Whether an assessee is entitled to cross-examine persons whose statements are relied upon to deny input tax credit.
Analysis: The assessing authority extensively relied on the statements of two individuals to conclude that the transactions and input tax credit claim were fictitious. Although cross-examination is not an absolute right in every case, where statements are treated as credible and form the direct basis for an adverse assessment, the requirements of natural justice and fair hearing require that the assessee be afforded an effective opportunity to rebut them through cross-examination.
Conclusion: Denial of cross-examination in circumstances where the statements were materially relied upon vitiated the assessment; the assessee must be given a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the concerned individuals before fresh adjudication.
Cross-examination of third-party statements relied on in assessment - Principles of natural justice
Denial of cross-examination of persons whose statements were relied on to deny input tax credit - HELD THAT: - Although the right of cross-examination is not absolute in every case, fairness requires that an assessee be afforded an opportunity to cross-examine persons whose statements the Assessing Authority treats as credible and materially relies upon for conclusions adverse to the assessee. The statements were not eschewed but formed the direct basis of the adverse findings. [Paras 14, 15, 16, 17]
The assessment and the order under appeal were set aside, and the Assessing Authority was directed to afford reasonable opportunity for cross-examination and thereafter reframe the assessment in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The writ appeals were allowed, and the assessment was remitted for fresh consideration after affording the assessee an opportunity to cross-examine the relied-on persons.
Issues: Whether the relief permitting filing of Form GST TRAN-1 for claiming transitional input-tax credit warranted interference.
Analysis: The Supreme Court directions enabled aggrieved registered assessees to file or revise Form GST TRAN-1 and Form GST TRAN-2 for availing transitional credit. The relief granted corresponded to that concession, leaving no basis for interference.
Conclusion: The relief permitting filing of Form GST TRAN-1 for transitional credit was sustained, in favour of the assessee.
Transitional input tax credit through Form GST TRAN-1 and TRAN-2
Entitlement to file or revise Form GST TRAN-1 and TRAN-2 for claiming transitional input tax credit pursuant to the extended filing facility - HELD THAT: - The Supreme Court's directions [2022 (7) TMI 1232 - SC ORDER] permitted any aggrieved registered assessee to file or revise the relevant forms during the stipulated extended window, followed by verification of the claim on merits after reasonable opportunity. As that relief was the same as that granted in the impugned order, no interference was warranted. [Paras 5]
The relief granted to the dealer was sustained and the writ appeal was dismissed.
Final Conclusion: The writ appeal was dismissed, since the relief under the impugned order stood covered by the Supreme Court's directions permitting filing or revision of the transitional-credit forms.
Issues: (i) Whether the original adjudication was vitiated by denial of the requested personal hearing and absence of adequate reasons; (ii) Whether subsequent appellate hearings cured the original procedural defects; (iii) Whether the cancellation mechanism under Rule 138(9) created a new charge or had evidentiary significance; and (iv) Whether the disputed demand required final merits determination or limited fresh adjudication.
Issue (i): Whether the original adjudication was vitiated by denial of the requested personal hearing and absence of adequate reasons.
Analysis: Section 75(4) requires a meaningful hearing where it is requested in writing or where an adverse decision is contemplated. Section 75(6) requires the order to state relevant facts and the basis of decision. The requested post-reply hearing was not afforded, and the order merely treated the explanation as unsatisfactory without addressing the asserted single supply, duplicate generation, or evidentiary basis for an additional taxable transaction. The statutory audi alteram partem requirement and duty to give reasons were therefore not met.
Conclusion: The original adjudication was vitiated by breach of Sections 75(4) and 75(6), in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether subsequent appellate hearings cured the original procedural defects.
Analysis: A statutory hearing denied at the original adjudicatory stage is not automatically cured by hearings before appellate forums. The original-stage hearing was material because disputed factual questions required evaluation of the explanation, primary records, and departmental data by the proper officer in the first instance.
Conclusion: The subsequent hearings did not cure the original denial of statutory hearing, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether the cancellation mechanism under Rule 138(9) created a new charge or had evidentiary significance.
Analysis: The existing notice was founded on duplicate e-way bills against the same invoice and the alleged unpaid tax on an additional transaction. Rule 138(9) was relevant to assess the defence that one e-way bill did not represent actual movement; it did not introduce a new charge. Non-cancellation is a material circumstance, but does not alone establish an additional supply. The issue requires a cumulative assessment of evidence, including the burden of proof and any adverse inference arising from non-production of primary records.
Conclusion: Rule 138(9) does not create a new charge, and non-cancellation is relevant but not conclusive; the issue is partly against the assessee.
Issue (iv): Whether the disputed demand required final merits determination or limited fresh adjudication.
Analysis: Section 113(1) permits referral for fresh adjudication where necessary. The duplicate e-way bills, the unexplained invoice discrepancy, the asserted technical or clerical causes, and the absence of primary invoice, return, books, and transport records left disputed factual matters unresolved. The demand could neither be annulled solely on unsupported assertions nor sustained through appellate fact-finding in substitution of the denied original hearing.
Conclusion: Fresh adjudication confined to the existing notice, after production of relevant evidence, a meaningful personal hearing, and a reasoned speaking order, is required; this procedural relief is in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The impugned determination concerning the surviving transaction cannot stand without compliance with statutory hearing and reasoned-decision requirements; whether any additional taxable supply occurred remains open for determination on the evidence.
Ratio Decidendi: Denial of a requested statutory personal hearing and failure to give adequate reasons at the original adjudicatory stage are not automatically cured by later appellate hearings where disputed factual evidence requires first-instance determination.
Statutory personal hearing in GST adjudication - Reasoned GST adjudication order - Duplicate e-way bills - evidentiary effect of non-cancellation
Personal hearing u/s 75(4) - Validity of the GST adjudication based on duplicate e-way bills where the taxable person had expressly requested a personal hearing before an adverse order was passed - HELD THAT: - A written request for hearing coupled with a proposed adverse decision required a real and effective opportunity of hearing. The record did not establish that the original adjudicating authority afforded a post-reply hearing. Subsequent hearings before appellate forums did not automatically cure the denial of the statutory hearing at the original stage, particularly when the disputed factual basis of the alleged additional taxable movement required examination. [Paras 24, 47]
The denial of personal hearing vitiated the adjudication; the demand based on the duplicate e-way bills was set aside and remitted from the post-reply stage for fresh adjudication after a meaningful personal hearing.
Reasoned order u/s 75(6) - Adequacy of reasons in the original order sustaining GST demand from duplicate e-way bills - HELD THAT: - An adjudication order must state the relevant facts and the basis of the decision. Mere assertion that the taxpayer's reply was unsatisfactory, without examining the explanation of a single supply, the asserted cause of duplicate generation, the evidentiary consequence of the e-way bills, and the basis for inferring an additional taxable transaction, did not satisfy the requirement of a reasoned order. [Paras 28, 47]
The original order was independently vitiated by inadequate reasons, and the adjudicating authority was directed to pass a speaking order upon fresh consideration.
Duplicate e-way bills - non-cancellation under Rule 138(9) - Evidentiary relevance of failure to cancel one of two e-way bills generated for the same invoice and vehicle - HELD THAT: - The cancellation mechanism under Rule 138(9) was relevant to testing the explanation that one e-way bill was unintended and did not represent a separate movement; its consideration did not introduce a new charge where the show-cause notice itself alleged duplicate e-way bills and tax non-payment. Although the rule is permissive, non-cancellation is a material circumstance and is not rendered irrelevant; however, it cannot be treated in isolation as conclusive of an additional taxable movement or supply. Its effect must be assessed cumulatively with the primary evidence and surrounding circumstances. [Paras 35, 36, 37, 38]
The legal and evidentiary consequence of non-cancellation was left for determination in the fresh adjudication, without any final finding on whether the second e-way bill represented an additional taxable movement or supply.
Pre-show-cause intimation under Rule 142(1A) - Effect of non-issuance of pre-show-cause intimation before issuance of the GST show-cause notice - HELD THAT: - After the relevant amendment, Rule 142(1A) is enabling in character. Since the show-cause notice was issued after that amendment, non-issuance of the pre-show-cause intimation did not furnish an independent ground for remand. [Paras 39]
The fresh adjudication was not ordered on account of non-issuance of the pre-show-cause intimation.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was partly allowed by setting aside the demand concerning the duplicate e-way bills and remitting the matter for limited fresh adjudication under the existing show-cause notice. The relief already granted in respect of the other invoice remained undisturbed, and the merits of the alleged additional taxable movement or supply were left open.
Issues: (i) Whether the first appellate orders violated principles of natural justice by failing to consider and decide the appellants' grounds of appeal through reasoned orders; (ii) Whether the appeals should be remitted for fresh adjudication where the first appellate authority failed to decide the grounds on merits and the original proceedings are challenged for inadequate notice, document access and hearing.
Issue (i): Whether the first appellate orders violated principles of natural justice by failing to consider and decide the appellants' grounds of appeal through reasoned orders.
Analysis: The requirement that a quasi-judicial authority record cogent reasons is integral to principles of natural justice, fairness, and effective appellate review. The appellate orders merely stated that insufficient evidence had been produced and confirmed the original orders, without addressing the material grounds raised or the authorities relied upon. Identical and conclusory orders in matters involving distinct evidentiary foundations did not constitute reasoned or speaking decisions and reflected a failure to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
Conclusion: The first appellate orders violated principles of natural justice by failing to record reasons and decide the material grounds of appeal; the issue is decided in favour of the assessees.
Issue (ii): Whether the appeals should be remitted for fresh adjudication where the first appellate authority failed to decide the grounds on merits and the original proceedings are challenged for inadequate notice, document access and hearing.
Analysis: Although an appellate forum should ordinarily decide disputes on merits, a first appeal is a valuable right requiring adjudication of factual and legal grounds. Determination of the disputes directly at the second-appellate stage would deprive the aggrieved party of a statutory appellate level. The unresolved objections concerning the show-cause notices, identification and availability of relied-upon documents, and effective personal hearing in the original proceedings also required consideration at the original adjudicatory stage.
Conclusion: Fresh original adjudication is required after identification and availability of relied-upon documents, reasonable opportunity to respond, an effective personal hearing, and a reasoned determination; the issue is decided in favour of the assessees.
Final Conclusion: The demands cannot be sustained on unreasoned appellate affirmance, and the adjudicatory process must be undertaken afresh in compliance with procedural fairness and reasoned decision-making.
Ratio Decidendi: An appellate order that does not address material grounds and provide cogent reasons violates principles of natural justice; where such failure would deprive a party of an effective appellate level, fresh adjudication is warranted.
Reasoned and speaking appellate orders - Remand where first appellate grounds remain undecided - Validity of the first appellate orders that did not address the appellants' grounds or cited authorities, and the appropriate course where the original adjudication was also challenged for lack of effective opportunity to respond to the notice and relied-upon documents
HELD THAT: - Recording cogent reasons is an indispensable requirement of quasi-judicial decision-making. The first appellate authority merely affirmed the original orders in identical terms, without considering any of the material grounds or authorities relied upon by the appellants; this amounted to failure to exercise the appellate jurisdiction vested in it. Although an appellate forum should ordinarily decide the merits, a merits determination in these circumstances would curtail the parties' effective appellate remedy. As the original orders were passed ex parte and the appellants' objections concerning the notice, relied-upon documents and personal hearing required consideration, remand to the original adjudicating authorities was necessary. [Paras 31, 32, 33, 34, 35]
The appellate and original orders were set aside and the matters were remitted for fresh adjudication after identification and availability of relied-upon documents, reasonable opportunity to reply and an effective personal hearing, followed by reasoned orders.
Final Conclusion: The appeals were allowed by remand, the impugned appellate and original orders being set aside for fresh adjudication in accordance with the prescribed procedural safeguards.
Issues: Whether delay in filing a GST appeal beyond the statutory limitation period could be condoned where the show-cause notice and adjudication order were not effectively served on the assessee through the designated GST portal tab.
Analysis: Section 107 of the Rajasthan Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 binds the appellate authority to the prescribed limitation. The show-cause notice had been uploaded under an additional, rather than the designated, notices-and-orders tab, and the assessee lacked effective knowledge of the proceedings and resulting demand. In these circumstances, refusal of adjudication on merits would cause substantial prejudice. The writ jurisdiction could therefore be invoked to grant relief notwithstanding the appellate authority's limited power to condone delay.
Conclusion: The delay of 121 days was condoned, the limitation-based appellate order was set aside, and the assessee was permitted to institute a fresh appeal within the stipulated period for adjudication on merits without objection as to limitation.
Service of GST notices through Common Portal - Condonation of delay in GST appeals under writ jurisdiction
Delayed GST appeal against an input tax credit demand where the proceedings were uploaded on the common portal without the assessee having effective knowledge thereof - HELD THAT: - The Court accepted the view that a show-cause notice cannot be deemed sufficiently served merely because it was uploaded on the Common Portal where its receipt was not acknowledged and no reply was filed. Though the appellate authority remained bound by the statutory limitation, the reasons preventing timely filing of the appeal were beyond the petitioner's control, and refusal to adjudicate the appeal on merits would cause grave injury and prejudice. [Paras 7, 9, 10, 11]
The delay was condoned, the appellate order dismissing the appeal as time-barred was set aside, and the appellate authority was directed to entertain the fresh appeal and decide it on merits without raising limitation.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by condoning the delay in filing the GST appeal, setting aside the limitation dismissal, and directing adjudication of the appeal on merits.
Issues: (i) Whether the parallel CGST proceedings were barred by Section 6(2)(b) because DGST had earlier initiated proceedings on the same subject matter; (ii) Whether the ex parte order was passed in breach of principles of natural justice; and (iii) Whether Section 16(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is unconstitutional.
Issue (i): Whether the parallel CGST proceedings were barred by Section 6(2)(b) because DGST had earlier initiated proceedings on the same subject matter.
Analysis: Section 6(2)(b) bars proceedings by a proper officer under the Central enactment only where proceedings under the State enactment were initiated earlier and both proceedings concern the same subject matter. The DGST proceedings arose from reconciliation of turnover declared in GSTR-3B returns, whereas the CGST proceedings were founded on search material concerning non-existent suppliers, wrongful availment of ITC, and issuance of invoices without corresponding supplies. The allegations, evidentiary material and defaults were therefore distinct.
Conclusion: Against the assessee: Section 6(2)(b) did not bar the CGST proceedings, and the show-cause notice and adjudication order were not non est.
Issue (ii): Whether the ex parte order was passed in breach of principles of natural justice.
Analysis: Multiple hearing notices were sent through speed post and registered e-mail. The assessee neither appeared on the notified dates nor filed a substantive response to the show-cause notice, having only sought additional time and a hearing.
Conclusion: Against the assessee: adequate opportunity of hearing was afforded, and the ex parte order was not vitiated by breach of natural justice.
Issue (iii): Whether Section 16(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is unconstitutional.
Analysis: The provision had been held intra vires by a High Court, and that view was affirmed by a speaking order of the Supreme Court. The constitutional position was consequently treated as settled.
Conclusion: Against the assessee: Section 16(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 remains intra vires and constitutionally valid.
Final Conclusion: The statutory bar was inapplicable, no denial of hearing was established, and the constitutional challenge could not be sustained; the merits of the ITC demand remain unadjudicated.
Ratio Decidendi: The statutory bar on parallel GST proceedings operates only when prior proceedings under the State enactment and the subsequent proceedings concern the identical subject matter; distinct allegations and evidentiary foundations preclude its application.
Bar on parallel GST proceedings on the same subject matter - Opportunity of hearing in ex parte GST adjudication - Constitutional validity of input tax credit conditional upon payment of tax by supplier
Bar on parallel GST proceedings on the same subject matter - Applicability of the statutory bar on parallel GST proceedings to demand proceedings concerning alleged wrongful availment and passing on of input tax credit - HELD THAT: - The statutory bar operates only where proceedings under the State enactment were initiated earlier and both proceedings concern the same subject matter. The State proceedings arose from reconciliation of turnover declared in GSTR-3B returns, whereas the impugned proceedings were founded on distinct allegations, material and defaults, including issuance of invoices without corresponding supply of goods and passing on of input tax credit. Since the subject matters were not the same, it was unnecessary to determine which proceedings were initiated first. [Paras 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]
The challenge that the show-cause notice and the order-in-original were non est on account of parallel proceedings was rejected.
Opportunity of hearing in ex parte GST adjudication - Alleged breach of natural justice in the ex parte adjudication of the GST show-cause notice - HELD THAT: - Repeated notices of hearing were sent by speed post and through the registered e-mail address. The petitioner neither appeared on the scheduled dates nor filed a detailed reply, its response merely seeking further time and a personal hearing. A person who failed to avail the opportunities afforded could not contend that it had been left unheard. [Paras 14]
No violation of the principles of natural justice was established.
Constitutional validity of input tax credit conditional upon payment of tax by supplier - Constitutional validity of the statutory condition requiring payment of tax by the supplier for entitlement to input tax credit - HELD THAT: - The provision had been upheld by a High Court, and that view had been affirmed by the Supreme Court in a speaking order. In view of the settled position, no ground existed to take a different view. [Paras 15]
The constitutional challenge to the statutory input tax credit condition was rejected.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was not entertained in view of the available statutory appellate remedy, with liberty to raise all objections before the Appellate Authority. No opinion was expressed on the merits of the demand in either proceeding.
Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration for non-disclosure of bank details and multiple registrations linked to a joint bank account should be quashed and reconsidered.
Analysis: Rules 10A and 21(d) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 require disclosure of bank-account particulars and permit cancellation for specified defaults. Non-disclosure of correct bank details was treated as a curable lapse. Cancellation of GST registration carries severe civil consequences by disabling the dealer from carrying on business; where no allegation of fraudulent transactions, fake invoices, circular trading, or tax evasion exists and the taxpayer expresses bona fide willingness to regularise returns and outstanding dues, a liberal and pragmatic approach is warranted. A fresh representation supported by relevant bank documents and a personal hearing were required before a decision on restoration.
Conclusion: The cancellation order was quashed, and the authority was directed to independently decide restoration of registration after considering the taxpayer's representation and granting a hearing, with restoration conditional on statutory compliance.
Cancellation of GST registration for non-disclosure of bank details - Curable procedural non-compliance under GST law - Opportunity to cure GST registration non-compliance -
HELD THAT: - The Court held that cancellation of GST registration has severe civil consequences and that the object of GST law is compliance rather than punishment. As the allegation was confined to non-disclosure of bank details and multiple registrations linked to a joint bank account, and not to fraud, fake invoices, circular trading or tax evasion, the lapse was capable of being cured by furnishing correct bank details and supporting documents. The petitioner's willingness to file returns and discharge statutory dues warranted an opportunity to establish bona fides before the competent authority.
When assessee expresses bonafide willingness to file return and pay outstanding dues with interest and penalty, a liberal and pragmatic approach is warranted as held in Kanaklal Sutradhar [2024 (7) TMI 672 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT] and Basudeb Karmakar [2026 (9) TMI 1995 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT]. It is not the case of respondent that petitioner is involved in any fraudulent transaction, creation of fake invoices, circular trading or any dubious means to evade tax. The allegation is confined to non-disclosure of bank details and multiple registrations on single Joint Bank Account, which according to petitioner was due to separation from his brother and failure to update record.[Paras 7, 8, 9]
The cancellation order was quashed and the question of restoration was remitted for a reasoned determination after hearing, without adjudication on the merits. On establishment of bona fides, registration was to be restored subject to filing pending returns and payment of outstanding statutory dues.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by quashing the cancellation order subject to compliance and directing fresh consideration of the petitioner's bona fides and eligibility for restoration.
Issues: Whether proceedings for mismatch between input tax credit claimed in GSTR-3B and the auto-populated GSTR-2A could be maintained under Section 74 when its statutory ingredients were not established.
Analysis: Section 74 is attracted only where fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts with intent to evade tax is established. The show-cause notice and impugned order did not disclose facts satisfying those ingredients in relation to the input tax credit mismatch, despite the invoices and supplier certificate placed on record.
Conclusion: Invocation of Section 74 was unsustainable; the tax determination was required to be reconsidered under Section 73.
Section 74 proceedings for input tax credit mismatch - Invocation of section 74 in respect of mismatch between input tax credit claimed in GSTR-3B returns and that reflected in GSTR-2A
HELD THAT: - On examining the show cause notice and the impugned order, the Court found that the ingredients for invoking section 74 were not satisfied. Reconsideration was consequently required under section 73. [Paras 4, 7]
The impugned order was set aside and the matter remanded for fresh proceedings under section 73, subject to remittance of half the tax demand and reasonable opportunity to contest the matter on merits.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the input tax credit mismatch matter remanded for reconsideration under section 73, subject to remittance of half the tax demand.
Issues: Whether the impugned assessment disclosed a procedural irregularity warranting interference in writ jurisdiction.
Analysis: The impugned assessment was found free from procedural irregularity. Although the period for statutory appeal had expired, liberty to invoke the appellate remedy was granted upon verification of the stated recovery of the requisite disputed tax amount, with a direction for disposal on merits without reference to limitation.
Conclusion: No procedural irregularity in the assessment was established, and writ interference was declined.
Validity of Assessment Order - petitioner has also been asked to pay interest and penalty under Sections 50 ad 73 of the respective GST enactments - case of the petitioner is that on zero rated supply, the petitioner is entitled to refund in terms of Section 16(2) of IGST r/w 54 of CGST/TNGST Act
HELD THAT:- No procedural irregularity committed by the respondent while passing the impugned order. Therefore, this Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed.
At this distant point of time, the time for filing the Appeal has also expired. Considering the fact that more than 25% of the disputed tax has already been recovered, we are inclined to give liberty to the petitioner to file a statutory Appeal within a period of thirty (30) days from today, subject to the petitioner satisfying that indeed, 33% of the disputed tax, namely, a sum of Rs. 1,10,233/-, has been recovered on 29.07.2026.
In case the petitioner files an Appeal together with a certificate from the respondent that the aforesaid sum has been recovered, the Appellate Authority shall dispose of the Appeal on merits, in accordance with law, without reference to limitation.
Issues: Whether rejection of the application for keeping tax-recovery proceedings in abeyance solely because an appeal was pending and 20% of the disputed demand had not been paid was sustainable.
Analysis: The CBDT stay-demand guidelines require the assessing authority to apply its discretion after considering the relevant facts and merits of the request. Payment of 20% of the disputed demand cannot be imposed as a per se precondition for considering a stay application. The impugned order relied only on pendency of the appeal and non-payment of 20%, without recording any assessment of the merits or other relevant circumstances.
Conclusion: The impugned refusal to keep recovery proceedings in abeyance was unsustainable and was set aside for fresh determination.
Stay of disputed income-tax demand - reasoned exercise of discretion
Rejection of the application for stay of recovery of disputed income-tax demand solely on pendency of appeal and non-payment of the prescribed percentage of demand - HELD THAT: - A stay application could not be rejected mechanically by merely referring to the pending appeal, absence of a stay order and non-payment under the applicable circular. The authority was required to record consideration of the merits relevant to grant or refusal of stay; the impugned order was non-speaking and unreasoned in that respect. [Paras 12, 13, 16, 17]
The rejection order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the competent authority for a fresh reasoned order within one month, without adjudication on the merits of the dispute.
Final Conclusion: The rejection of the stay application was set aside and the competent authority was directed to reconsider it afresh within one month, without any expression on the merits.
Issues: (i) Whether the Rs. 10 crore bank credit was properly treated as unexplained cash credit under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961; and (ii) whether the documents claimed to be newly discovered justified review of the earlier judgment.
Issue (i): Whether the Rs. 10 crore bank credit was properly treated as unexplained cash credit under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Analysis: Section 68 places the burden of proof on the assessee to establish the identity of the creditor, the creditor's creditworthiness, and the genuineness of the transaction. The receipt of Rs. 10 crore in the assessee's personal bank account was undisputed. The accommodation-entry explanation and the alleged onward transfer of Rs. 9.97 crore were unsupported and did not discharge that burden.
Conclusion: The Rs. 10 crore credit was validly treated as unexplained cash credit; decided against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the documents claimed to be newly discovered justified review of the earlier judgment.
Analysis: Review under Order XLVII Rule 1 read with Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 requires proof that new and important evidence could not, despite due diligence, have been produced earlier. The sale deeds of 2007 and tribunal order of 2015 were available in public records during the original proceedings, and due diligence was not established. Reconsideration of the factual explanation on those materials would amount to an impermissible rehearing in review jurisdiction. No error apparent on the face of the record was shown.
Conclusion: The asserted new material did not establish a valid ground for review; decided against the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The unexplained-credit addition remains legally sustainable, and review jurisdiction cannot be used to reopen settled factual findings on material that was available with due diligence.
Ratio Decidendi: A review based on newly discovered evidence is unavailable where the evidence was obtainable with due diligence in the original proceedings, and review cannot be used to rehear factual findings.
Review jurisdiction - discovery of new evidence and due diligence
Review of the dismissal of the assessee's appeal concerning an unexplained bank credit on the basis of purportedly new sale deeds and a Tribunal order - HELD THAT: - Discovery of new evidence can support review only where the applicant establishes that, despite due diligence, it was not within knowledge or could not have been produced earlier.
In Malleeswari [2025 (9) TMI 1806 - SUPREME COURT] the Supreme Court summarized the scope of review jurisdiction and emphatically held that a review proceeding is not an appeal in disguise and that rehearing of a matter on merits or substituting a view is impermissible.
The sale deeds and Tribunal order relied on were available in public records during the original proceedings, and no due diligence was shown. The attempt to reassess the factual explanation for the bank credit therefore amounted to an impermissible rehearing in review and disclosed no error apparent on the record. [Paras 9, 10, 11, 12]
The purported new material did not warrant review, and the review application was dismissed.
Final Conclusion: The review application was dismissed, no error apparent on the face of the record having been established.
Issues: Whether the reassessment notice issued after a search could be sustained where the seized cash had been disclosed by the petitioner as income and accepted as belonging to it in prior proceedings.
Analysis: For Assessment Year 2024-25, a search-related notice could be issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 without recourse to Section 153C or the procedure under Section 148A(1). However, the seized cash had been offered by the petitioner as cash sales, and adjustment thereof towards tax liability had been accepted in prior appellate proceedings. The same Assessing Officer had also accepted, while assessing the director, that the cash belonged to the petitioner. The notice did not refer to the seized cash or assert the jurisdictional facts supporting the inference of escaped income; treating the known cash as deemed information was therefore found to raise a serious jurisdictional question requiring consideration.
Outcome: Notice was issued and reassessment proceedings pursuant to the impugned notice were stayed pending final hearing.
Jurisdictional facts for reassessment following search - Interim stay of reassessment proceedings concerning cash disclosed by the petitioner as cash sales
HELD THAT: - Although, for the relevant assessment year, a notice under the reassessment provision could be issued following a search without recourse to the earlier search-assessment procedure or the preliminary procedure otherwise applicable, the Court noted that the seized cash had been disclosed by the petitioner in its return and its ownership had also been accepted in the director's assessment. The Tribunal had directed its adjustment as self-assessment tax after determination of the tax liability. The impugned notice neither referred to the seized cash nor asserted the jurisdictional fact for treating it as information evidencing income escaping assessment. The matter therefore required consideration. [Paras 15, 16, 17, 18, 21]
Proceedings pursuant to the reassessment notice were stayed pending final hearing. List this case for final hearing on 15.12.2026.
Final Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings were stayed pending final hearing of the writ petition.
Issues: Whether the reassessment proceedings complied with principles of natural justice when additional information was sought through a subsequent communication without adequate time to respond.
Analysis: The information concerning the source of funds was sought through a communication issued after the original show-cause notice. Considering that the communication was digitally signed shortly before intervening holidays and required a response by midday on the next working day, the effective time available was about three-and-a-half hours. The petitioner was therefore not afforded an adequate opportunity to furnish the requested particulars before the order under Section 148A(3) was made.
Conclusion: The denial of adequate opportunity violated principles of natural justice and vitiated the order made under Section 148A(3). The petitioner must be afforded a hearing after furnishing the requested details, with all merits kept open.
Principles of natural justice in reassessment proceedings - Non Adequate opportunity to respond to a post-notice information request
Validity of the order under section 148A(3) and the consequential notice under section 148 where the petitioner was not afforded adequate opportunity to respond to the information sought by the Revenue - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the petitioner had not been given an adequate opportunity to respond to the Revenue's request for information. The resulting violation of the principles of natural justice rendered the order under section 148A(3) unsustainable. [Paras 6, 7, 8]
The order under section 148A(3) and the consequential notice under section 148 were quashed. The petitioner was directed to furnish the requested details within the stipulated time, following which it must be granted a hearing before any fresh order is passed.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by quashing the impugned order and consequential notice for breach of natural justice, while leaving all merits and legal contentions open in the fresh proceedings.
Issues: (i) Whether an objection filed before the Dispute Resolution Panel on the next working day after the thirtieth day, which fell on a Sunday, was within the period under Section 144C(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether a final assessment could be made without adjudication and directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel upon such timely objection.
Issue (i): Whether an objection filed before the Dispute Resolution Panel on the next working day after the thirtieth day, which fell on a Sunday, was within the period under Section 144C(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Analysis: Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 deems an act done on the next day on which the office is open to have been done in time where the last day of the prescribed period is a day on which the office is closed. Since the thirtieth day for filing the objection fell on a Sunday, the following working day was the valid last date.
Conclusion: The objection filed on 16 March 2026 was within limitation, and its rejection as time-barred was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether a final assessment could be made without adjudication and directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel upon such timely objection.
Analysis: The procedure under Section 144C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is mandatory. Where a timely objection is filed, a final assessment may be made only after the Dispute Resolution Panel adjudicates the objection and issues directions under Section 144C(5); such directions are binding under Section 144C(10). A final assessment made before that process is completed lacks jurisdictional foundation.
Conclusion: The final assessment made without Dispute Resolution Panel adjudication and directions was without jurisdiction and was set aside, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: A timely objection before the Dispute Resolution Panel must be adjudicated on merits before a final assessment can lawfully be made, and the statutory Dispute Resolution Panel process is required to continue.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the last day for filing a Dispute Resolution Panel objection falls on a day when the office is closed, Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 permits filing on the next working day; a timely objection precludes final assessment until binding Dispute Resolution Panel directions are issued.
Computation of limitation where the prescribed last day is a holiday - Mandatory Dispute Resolution Panel procedure
Timeliness of the assessee's objection to the Dispute Resolution Panel where the thirtieth day fell on a Sunday, and the validity of final assessment made without the Panel's directions - HELD THAT: - Where the last day of the statutory period for filing objections fell on a Sunday, the objection filed on the next working day was deemed to have been filed within time under the rule for computation of time. The procedure under section 144C is mandatory; upon a timely objection, the Assessing Officer could not make the final assessment without directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel, which are binding. [Paras 8, 9, 10]
The rejection of the objection as time-barred and the consequential final assessment were quashed; the Dispute Resolution Panel was directed to decide the objection on merits after hearing the assessee, and the penalty proceedings were stayed until disposal of those proceedings.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by quashing the final assessment and requiring adjudication of the timely objection by the Dispute Resolution Panel. Consequential penalty proceedings were not to continue pending such adjudication.
Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings for Assessment Year 2017-18, initiated more than three years after the end of that year, were valid where approval was granted by the Principal Commissioner instead of the authority specified under Section 151(ii).
Analysis: Section 151 prescribes the specified authority according to the elapsed period from the end of the relevant assessment year. Where more than three years have elapsed, approval must be granted by the Principal Chief Commissioner, Principal Director General, Chief Commissioner, or Director General, as applicable. The approval dated 28 July 2022 and the consequential notice dated 29 July 2022 were issued after expiry of three years from the end of Assessment Year 2017-18, but approval was obtained from the Principal Commissioner, who was not the competent authority for that period.
Conclusion: The approval was obtained from an incorrect specified authority; consequently, the order under Section 148A(d), the notice under Section 148, and consequential proceedings were invalid and liable to be quashed.
Sanction by specified authority for reassessment beyond three years - Validity of reassessment proceedings for A.Y. 2017-18 where sanction, after expiry of three years from the end of the assessment year, was granted by the Principal Commissioner instead of the authority specified for such cases
HELD THAT: - Under the amended reassessment regime, where more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, sanction must be granted by the higher specified authority under Section 151(ii), and not by an authority falling under Section 151(i). Since the sanction and consequential notice were issued after expiry of that period, approval by the Principal Commissioner was incompetent.
We are supported in our view by the decision in Rajeev Bansal [2024 (10) TMI 264 - SUPREME COURT (LB)] has clearly held that for A.Y. 2017-18 (which is also the relevant Assessment year in the present Writ Petition) the authority specified under Section 151(i) can grant sanction only upto 30th June 2021.[Paras 9, 10, 11]
The sanction was invalid; consequently, the order under Section 148A(d), the notice under Section 148, the order disposing of objections, and consequential proceedings were quashed.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed and the reassessment proceedings were set aside for want of sanction from the statutorily competent specified authority.
Issues: Whether the Revenue may retain recoveries exceeding 20% of the disputed demand, or adjust future refunds, during pendency of the first appeal without recorded reasons for departing from the CBDT norm.
Analysis: The CBDT Office Memoranda prescribe recovery of 20% of the disputed demand as the ordinary condition for stay pending first appeal. The stay order acknowledged that more than 20% had already been recovered, while no exceptional circumstances, lack of prima facie sustainability, or other recorded reasons justified recovery beyond that threshold. Continued retention of the excess, or further adjustment of refunds during the subsisting stay, would defeat the protection granted by the stay order.
Conclusion: The Revenue may retain only 20% of the disputed demand pending appeal; any amount recovered or adjusted beyond that level must be verified and refunded with applicable interest. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Recovery of disputed tax demand pending first appeal - Reasoned departure from CBDT 20% recovery norm - Refund adjustment exceeding CBDT 20% recovery norm
HELD THAT: - The CBDT instructions prescribe recovery of 20% of the disputed demand as the ordinary condition for stay during the first appeal. Departure is permissible only for recorded reasons, including lack of prima facie sustainability of the assessee's case or exceptional circumstances. As the stay order itself recorded recovery exceeding that threshold and no reasons for departure were recorded, continued retention of the excess, or further refund adjustment during the subsistence of stay, would defeat the protection granted by the stay. [Paras 6, 7]
The Revenue may retain 20% of the disputed demand as security; after verification of aggregate recoveries and adjustments, any excess shall be refunded with applicable interest within six weeks. The merits of the assessment and pending appeal were left open.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by directing verification of recoveries and refund, with applicable interest, of any amount recovered beyond 20% of the disputed demand during pendency of the first appeal.
Issues: (i) Whether the time limit for amendment of TDS statements barred an employer from filing an initial TDS statement or return for periods before Assessment Year 2023-24; (ii) Whether an employee may be prejudiced where the employer has deducted TDS but failed to deposit it or furnish the TDS returns.
Issue (i): Whether the time limit for amendment of TDS statements barred an employer from filing an initial TDS statement or return for periods before Assessment Year 2023-24.
Analysis: Section 200(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 concerns amendment or correction of a previously filed TDS statement. The employer had not filed any original TDS statement or return for the relevant years. The limitation applicable to corrections of an existing statement therefore did not apply to the initial filing obligation.
Conclusion: The limitation on amendment of TDS statements does not bar the employer from filing initial TDS statements or returns; the contrary stand was rejected in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether an employee may be prejudiced where the employer has deducted TDS but failed to deposit it or furnish the TDS returns.
Analysis: Under Sections 200, 200A and 201 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, an employer deducting TDS acts as the Department's agent for deduction, collection and remittance. An employer that fails to discharge these obligations is an assessee in default, and the unpaid tax with interest is recoverable as a charge upon its assets under Section 201(2). The statutory recovery mechanism operates against the defaulting employer and does not require a separate judicial direction for its invocation.
Conclusion: An employee cannot be penalised for the employer's failure to deposit deducted TDS or file TDS returns; liability and statutory enforcement lie against the defaulting employer, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The statutory scheme places the consequences and recovery of unremitted TDS upon defaulting employers, while the employee's grievance must be addressed through verification, filing of TDS statements and statutory compliance.
Ratio Decidendi: Where an employer deducts TDS but neither deposits it nor files the prescribed statement, the statutory default and recovery consequences apply to the employer and its omission cannot prejudice the employee.
Limitation for correction of TDS statements - Employer's default in remitting TDS - Employee's protection from employer's TDS default
Limitation for correction of TDS statements - Non-filing of TDS returns - Applicability of the limitation for amendment of TDS statements where the employer had not filed an original statement or return - HELD THAT: - The prescribed time limit for amendment or correction of a TDS statement could not justify refusal to file an original TDS statement or return. As no earlier statement or return was shown to have been filed, the employer's reliance on the limitation for correction was rejected. [Paras 11, 18]
The employer was directed to file the requisite TDS statements and returns in accordance with the statutory provisions.
Employer's default in remitting TDS - Employee's protection from employer's TDS default - Assessee in default - Consequences of an employer's deduction of TDS without depositing it or filing the requisite returns, for the employee and the defaulting employer - HELD THAT: - An employer deducting TDS acts as an agent of the Income Tax Department for deduction, collection and remittance. An employer who fails to deposit the deducted tax or file the returns is an assessee in default, and the statutory recovery mechanism, including the charge upon its assets, must be invoked by the competent authority. The employee cannot be penalised for that employer's default. [Paras 13, 15, 16, 17, 19]
The Commissioner was directed to verify the filed TDS statements and address the employee's grievance, while taking such action as necessary to secure compliance by defaulting employers.
Final Conclusion: The limitation plea founded on amendment of TDS statements was rejected where no original return had been filed, and statutory action was directed against employers who had defaulted in remitting deducted TDS.
Issues: Whether disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D could be directed in respect of exempt income where the bank had sufficient own funds and no expenditure was shown to have been incurred for earning that income.
Analysis: Expenditure may be disallowed only where it has a direct nexus with the earning of exempt income. The assessee's surplus own funds were sufficient to cover the investments yielding exempt income; consequently, no financial expenditure could be attributed to those investments. In the absence of such nexus, estimation of proportionate expenditure was unjustified.
Conclusion: The direction to apply Section 14A read with Rule 8D for a proportionate or estimated disallowance was unsustainable, and no disallowance was warranted.
Section 14A and Rule 8D disallowance where exempt-income investments are from own funds -
HELD THAT: - Following the earlier decision on identical questions [2026 (6) TMI 611 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] the Court held that, where the financials established availability of sufficient surplus funds and the investments were not made from interest-bearing borrowings, no expenditure could be disallowed or estimated on a proportionate basis for earning the exempt income. [Paras 3, 4]
The questions were answered in favour of the assessee, and the appeals were allowed.
Final Conclusion: Following the earlier decision on identical questions, the Court allowed the appeals and answered the questions in favour of the assessee.
Issues: Whether the Tribunal's order could be faulted by relying on the subsequent amendment to the proviso to Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Analysis: The amendment invoked by Revenue was introduced after the Tribunal had decided the matter. At the time of that decision, the applicable legal position was governed by jurisdictional High Court rulings. The Tribunal's finding was therefore neither contrary to the law then in force nor unsupported by the record, and no substantial question of law arose.
Conclusion: The subsequent amendment could not invalidate the Tribunal's decision; the issue is decided against Revenue.
Subsequent statutory amendment to the proviso to Section 147A - Validity of the Tribunal's order for assessment year 2016-2017 in the light of the subsequent amendment to the proviso to Section 147A
HELD THAT: - The Tribunal's order preceded the amendment, which had not even been placed before Parliament when the Tribunal decided the matter. The Tribunal had applied the legal position then governed by jurisdictional High Court decisions; its finding could therefore not be held contrary either to the law then prevailing or to the record. [Paras 3, 4, 5]
No substantial question of law arose from the Tribunal's order.
Final Conclusion: The Revenue's appeal was rejected for want of any substantial question of law.
Issues: (i) Whether a final assessment order that inadvertently omitted effect to DRP directions could be rectified under Section 154; (ii) Whether the Indian subsidiary constituted a permanent establishment of the assessee in India and whether business profits were attributable to it; (iii) Whether back-to-back reimbursements of expenses without mark-up were taxable as fees for included services; (iv) Whether the arm's length price of corporate guarantee commission could be fixed without evaluating the assessee's benchmarking.
Issue (i): Whether a final assessment order that inadvertently omitted effect to DRP directions could be rectified under Section 154.
Analysis: Section 144C(10) and Section 144C(13) require the Assessing Officer to comply with binding DRP directions while passing the final assessment order. Neither Section 144C nor Section 154 restricts rectification of a patent and obvious error in such an order. The directions had been reproduced in the assessment order, but their effect was inadvertently omitted from the computation; the error was therefore a mistake apparent on the face of the record. The rectification was also made within the limitation prescribed by Section 154(7).
Conclusion: Against the assessee: the final assessment order was validly rectified under Section 154 and was not rendered void for the inadvertent omission to implement the DRP directions.
Issue (ii): Whether the Indian subsidiary constituted a permanent establishment of the assessee in India and whether business profits were attributable to it.
Analysis: Under Article 5 of the India-USA Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement, the existence of a permanent establishment was not established on the facts. The issue had consistently been decided for the assessee in earlier assessment years on identical facts, and no distinguishing factual circumstance was identified for the relevant year. In the absence of a permanent establishment, no business profits could be attributed to India.
Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the Indian subsidiary was not a permanent establishment, and the addition of business profits attributed to it was directed to be deleted.
Issue (iii): Whether back-to-back reimbursements of expenses without mark-up were taxable as fees for included services.
Analysis: The evidence and remand report established that the assessee acted only as an intermediary between the service providers and its Indian associated enterprise, receiving reimbursement equal to the amounts paid, without profit or mark-up. Further, Article 12(4)(b) of the India-USA Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement requires technical knowledge, skill, know-how, process, plan, or design to be made available so that the recipient can independently apply it. Neither the nature of qualifying technical or consultancy services nor satisfaction of the make available test was established.
Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the reimbursements were not taxable as fees for included services, and the addition was directed to be deleted.
Issue (iv): Whether the arm's length price of corporate guarantee commission could be fixed without evaluating the assessee's benchmarking.
Analysis: The assessee had benchmarked the corporate-guarantee transaction in its transfer-pricing study, but the benchmarking was not evaluated. Fixing the commission rate on an estimated basis without examining the relevant facts and the assessee's benchmarking was not sustainable.
Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the corporate-guarantee arm's length price issue was restored for fresh adjudication after examining the assessee's benchmarking.
Final Conclusion: The permanent-establishment and fees-for-included-services additions do not survive; the corporate-guarantee adjustment requires fresh determination, while the challenge to rectification of the assessment order fails.
Rectification of final assessment order for non-implementation of DRP directions - Permanent establishment of non-resident through Indian subsidiary - Reimbursement of costs as fees for included services under India-USA DTAA
Rectification of final assessment order for non-implementation of DRP directions - Validity of rectification of the final assessment order which inadvertently omitted to give effect to the DRP's directions - HELD THAT: - The directions of the DRP are binding and the final assessment order must conform to them. However, neither the DRP mechanism nor the rectification provision bars correction of a patent and obvious mistake in such an order. Since the directions had been reproduced in the assessment order but were inadvertently not given effect in computation, the error was apparent from the record and was rectified within the statutory period. [Paras 9, 10, 11, 12]
The rectification was valid, and the final assessment order was not rendered invalid on account of the inadvertent omission.
Permanent establishment of non-resident through Indian subsidiary - Attribution of business profits to permanent establishment - Existence of a permanent establishment in India through the Indian subsidiary and consequent attribution of business profits - HELD THAT: - On identical facts, the co-ordinate benches in the assessee's earlier years had rejected the Department's stand that the Indian subsidiary constituted the assessee's permanent establishment. Following those determinations, the Tribunal held that no permanent establishment existed in India. [Paras 18]
No part of the business profits was taxable in India on this basis, and the related addition was deleted.
Reimbursement of third-party costs without mark-up - Make available test for fees for included services - Taxability of back-to-back reimbursement of third-party expenses received from the Indian associated enterprise as fees for technical or included services - HELD THAT: - The material, including the remand report, established that the assessee acted only as an intermediary between service providers and the Indian associated enterprise, receiving reimbursement equal to the costs incurred without any mark-up. Further, the Department did not establish either that the services were technical or consultancy services or that technical knowledge, skill, know-how, process, plan or design had been made available to the recipient as required under the India-USA DTAA. [Paras 26]
The cost reimbursement could not be treated as fees for included services, and the addition was deleted.
Arm's length price of corporate guarantee commission - Determination of the arm's length price of corporate guarantee commission without examining the assessee's benchmarking - HELD THAT: - The transfer pricing authorities had estimated the guarantee commission without evaluating the benchmarking undertaken by the assessee. A straightjacket formula cannot be adopted for determining the arm's length price of a corporate guarantee without examining the relevant facts and the taxpayer's benchmarking. [Paras 31, 32]
The issue was remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication after examining the assessee's benchmarking, without adjudication on the appropriate rate.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was partly allowed: the rectification of the final assessment order was sustained, the additions relating to permanent establishment profits and cost reimbursement were deleted, and the corporate guarantee issue was remanded for fresh adjudication.
Issues: (i) Whether scholarships remitted in India in Indian currency to Indian students pursuing education abroad constitute an application of income outside India or activity beyond the trust's charitable objects? (ii) Whether the CIT(E) may deny registration under section 12AB and approval under section 80G by examining alleged violations of sections 11(1)(c) and 13(1)(c)?
Issue (i): Whether scholarships remitted in India in Indian currency to Indian students pursuing education abroad constitute an application of income outside India or activity beyond the trust's charitable objects?
Analysis: Section 11(1)(c) concerns income applied for purposes outside India. The scholarships were paid through Indian banks in Indian currency to Indian students, with no payment remitted to a foreign university or institution. A student's subsequent use of the scholarship for education abroad does not convert the domestic disbursement into an overseas application of income. The educational scholarships fell within the stated charitable objects, had been accepted under earlier registrations, and no material showed that the activity was non-genuine or outside those objects.
Conclusion: Scholarships paid in India to Indian students for overseas education do not violate section 11(1)(c) and remain charitable educational activity within the trust's objects. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the CIT(E) may deny registration under section 12AB and approval under section 80G by examining alleged violations of sections 11(1)(c) and 13(1)(c)?
Analysis: The inquiry at the registration stage is confined to the charitable objects, genuineness of activities, and compliance with laws material to achieving those objects. Questions concerning application or alleged misapplication of income, including benefits to specified persons under section 13(1)(c), concern computation of exemption and are to be examined in assessment proceedings. No material established that the trust's activities were non-genuine or that its objects were non-charitable. The prior grant of registration on the same objects and activities also supported continuity.
Conclusion: Alleged violations of sections 11(1)(c) and 13(1)(c) cannot be used at the registration stage to deny registration under section 12AB or consequential approval under section 80G. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The refusal of charitable registration and consequential donor-benefit approval was unsustainable; registration and consequential approval are required to be granted.
Ratio Decidendi: At the registration stage, the authority's inquiry is confined to the charitable objects and genuineness of activities; domestic scholarship payments to Indian students do not become an application of income outside India merely because the students pursue education abroad.
Application of charitable income for scholarships to Indian students pursuing overseas education - Scope of inquiry at registration of charitable institutions
Application of charitable income outside India - Scholarships to Indian students for overseas education - Scholarships disbursed in India in Indian currency to Indian students for higher education abroad as application of income outside India and as activity beyond the trust's educational objects - HELD THAT: - The scholarship amounts were admittedly remitted through banks in India in Indian currency to Indian students, and there was no material to show that the activity fell outside the trust's educational objects. A student's subsequent pursuit of studies abroad did not convert the domestic disbursement into application of income outside India under section 11(1)(c); the stated concerns regarding the scholarship-selection criteria also did not justify refusal of registration. [Paras 13]
The objection based on foreign application of income was rejected, and the scholarship activity was held to be within the trust's educational objects.
Scope of inquiry at registration under section 12AB - Commissioner's power at the stage of renewal of charitable registration and approval to examine alleged application of income outside India and payments to specified persons - HELD THAT: - At the registration stage, the inquiry is confined to the genuineness of the trust's activities and compliance with legal requirements material to achieving its objects. Invoking sections 11(1)(c) and 13(1)(c) to scrutinise utilisation of income entered the arena of assessment, where such matters may be examined. No material showed failure to satisfy the registration requirements, and the unchanged objects and activities warranted continuity of registration. [Paras 17, 18]
The rejection of registration and consequential approval was set aside, and registration under section 12A(1)(ac)(ii) with consequent approval under section 80G was directed to be granted.
Final Conclusion: Both appeals were allowed; the impugned refusals were set aside, and registration with consequential approval was directed to be granted within four weeks of receipt of the order.
Issues: (i) Whether the addition for alleged unexplained election expenditure based on the seized notebook was sustainable; (ii) Whether any alleged election expenditure was assessable in Assessment Year 2019-20.
Issue (i): Whether the addition for alleged unexplained election expenditure based on the seized notebook was sustainable.
Analysis: The notebook was seized from a shop licensed in the name of a trading concern whose income was declared by another person. Its entries did not identify the assessee, specify whether they represented payments made or received, or contain dates, signatures, or other endorsement linking them to the assessee. The statutory presumption under Sections 132(4A) and 292C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 did not establish attribution to the assessee in these circumstances. No independent inquiry was made from the persons or villages named in the notebook, no alleged recipients were examined, and no cogent material corroborated either the entries or their nexus with the assessee's alleged election expenditure. The burden to establish unexplained expenditure under Section 69C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was therefore not discharged.
Conclusion: The addition for alleged unexplained election expenditure was unsustainable and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether any alleged election expenditure was assessable in Assessment Year 2019-20.
Analysis: The election campaign and polling occurred in April and May 2019, while the notebook was seized in July 2019; both events fell in the financial year 2019-20 relevant to Assessment Year 2020-21. The entries relied upon for the addition were undated, and the few March 2019 dates in other pages related only to election schedules and did not establish that the alleged payments or receipts fell in the preceding financial year.
Conclusion: Any alleged election expenditure was not assessable in Assessment Year 2019-20, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The impugned unexplained-expenditure addition lacked a corroborated evidentiary basis and, independently, could not be brought to tax in the relevant assessment year.
Ratio Decidendi: An addition for unexplained expenditure cannot rest solely on entries in a seized notebook without credible evidence establishing the entries and their nexus with the assessee.
Unexplained election expenditure - corroboration of seized notebook entries - Statutory presumption regarding seized documents - Year of assessability of election-campaign expenditure
Unexplained election expenditure - corroboration of seized notebook entries - Statutory presumption regarding seized documents - Attribution to the assessee of alleged election expenditure reflected in a notebook seized from commission-agent business premises - HELD THAT: - The notebook neither named nor otherwise linked the assessee with the alleged payments and was seized from premises used for a separate commission-agent grain-trading business. The presumption concerning seized documents did not establish that the notebook belonged to the assessee. As no independent inquiry was made from the persons named in the notebook, or other verification undertaken to correlate its entries with the assessee, the entries remained unproved. An addition for unexplained expenditure could not rest on such uncorroborated material. [Paras 8, 9, 10, 16, 18]
The addition for alleged election expenditure under section 69C was deleted on merits.
Year of assessability of election-campaign expenditure - Assessment year in which the alleged election-campaign expenditure could be assessed - HELD THAT: - The relevant notebook entries recording alleged receipts or payments were undated. The election campaign and polling, as well as the search in which the notebook was found, fell in financial year 2019-2020; the few March 2019 dates in the notebook concerned meeting schedules and not the alleged payments or receipts. Thus, even if the entries represented election expenditure, they could fall only in Assessment Year 2020-21 and not in Assessment Year 2019-20. [Paras 19]
Independently, the addition was held not assessable in Assessment Year 2019-20 and was deleted.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed. The addition for alleged election expenses was deleted both on merits and, independently, because it was not assessable in Assessment Year 2019-20.
Issues: (i) Whether the assessee had a Supervisory PE in India under Article 5(4) of the India-Japan DTAA; (ii) Whether profits from offshore supplies were taxable in India; and (iii) Whether cost-to-cost reimbursement of salary of seconded expatriates was taxable as income.
Issue (i): Whether the assessee had a Supervisory PE in India under Article 5(4) of the India-Japan DTAA.
Analysis: Article 5(4) imposes cumulative requirements that supervisory activities must exceed six months and must be connected with a building site, construction, installation or assembly project. The duration test applies project-wise and cannot be determined by aggregating the presence of multiple employees. The projects other than the dealership arrangement did not cross the prescribed duration threshold. Although employees served the dealership entity for more than six months, no qualifying construction, installation, assembly or building-site project was established; the entity was engaged in automobile dealership activities.
Conclusion: No Supervisory PE existed in India under Article 5(4) of the India-Japan DTAA; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether profits from offshore supplies were taxable in India.
Analysis: The supply contracts were concluded outside India, title and property in the goods passed outside India, consideration was received outside India, and Indian buyers imported the goods in their own capacity under principal-to-principal transactions. No operations relating to the offshore supplies were carried out in India, and the supplies were not shown to form a composite arrangement with supervisory services. Accordingly, the receipts lacked the territorial nexus required for taxation under sections 5(2) and 9(1)(i).
Conclusion: Profits from the offshore supplies were not taxable in India; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether cost-to-cost reimbursement of salary of seconded expatriates was taxable as income.
Analysis: The expatriates were seconded to the Indian entity, their salary costs were reimbursed at cost without markup, and the cost-to-cost character of the reimbursement was undisputed. Such reimbursement represented salary costs of employees working for the Indian entity and not fees for technical services. An amount not taxable in law does not become taxable merely because it was erroneously offered in the return, as there is no estoppel against statute.
Conclusion: The expatriate salary reimbursement was not taxable income and must be excluded from taxable income; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The tax consequences founded on the alleged Supervisory PE were unsustainable, and the offshore-supply receipts and genuine salary reimbursements remained outside the assessee's taxable income for the relevant assessment years.
Ratio Decidendi: A Supervisory PE arises only when supervisory activities, assessed project-wise, both exceed the treaty duration threshold and are connected with a qualifying building, construction, installation or assembly project.
Supervisory permanent establishment under India-Japan DTAA - Taxability of offshore supplies completed outside India - Seconded-employee salary reimbursement - No estoppel against statute
Supervisory permanent establishment - Project-wise duration test - Existence of a Supervisory Permanent Establishment in respect of supervisory services rendered to Indian customers, including an automobile dealer - HELD THAT: - Article 5(4) requires cumulatively that supervisory activities in India exceed six months and be in connection with a building site, construction, installation or assembly project. The duration test must be applied project-wise, without aggregating the presence of different employees or counting overlapping days more than once. The material did not establish either the prescribed duration for the other customers or a qualifying project in the case of the automobile dealer; mere presence of expatriates or rendition of technical services was insufficient. [Paras 18, 19, 20, 21, 29]
No Supervisory Permanent Establishment arose in India, and no income, including loan agreement fee added solely on that footing, was attributable to such establishment.
Offshore supply profits - Territorial nexus of income - Taxability in India of offshore supplies of traded goods, capital goods, raw materials and spares completed outside India - HELD THAT: - The supply contracts were concluded outside India, title and property in the goods passed outside India, consideration was received outside India, and the Indian buyers imported the goods in their own capacity on a principal-to-principal basis. No material supported the Assessing Officer's view that the offshore supplies formed a composite arrangement with supervisory services. As no supply operations were carried out in India, the resulting profits did not accrue or arise in India. [Paras 23, 29]
Profits from the offshore supplies were not taxable in India, and the Revenue's challenge to the relief granted was dismissed.
Seconded-employee salary reimbursement - No estoppel against statute - Taxability of cost-to-cost reimbursement of salaries of expatriates seconded to an Indian entity - HELD THAT: - The expatriates had been seconded to the Indian entity, their salaries were recovered on a cost-to-cost basis without markup, and the transfer-pricing authorities did not dispute that character. Such reimbursement represented salary costs of employees working for the Indian entity and did not constitute fees for technical services or taxable income of the foreign entity. A receipt not chargeable under law cannot become taxable merely because it was erroneously offered in the return. [Paras 25, 26, 29]
The salary reimbursement was directed to be excluded from taxable income.
Final Conclusion: The assessee's appeals were partly allowed, and the Revenue's cross-appeals were dismissed for all the assessment years concerned.
Issues: Whether revision under section 263 to direct disallowance under section 40(a)(i) was valid where tax had been deducted on interest payments but was alleged to have been deducted at a lower rate.
Analysis: Disallowance under section 40(a)(i) applies where tax deductible at source has not been deducted or, after deduction, has not been deposited as required. Where tax has in fact been deducted and the dispute concerns only the applicable rate or a shortfall in deduction, the appropriate statutory recourse is proceedings under section 201. Accordingly, short deduction could not support a disallowance under section 40(a)(i), and the assessment order could not be regarded as erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue on that basis.
Conclusion: Revision under section 263 was invalid, and no disallowance under section 40(a)(i) could be directed merely for short deduction of tax at source. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Revision of assessment on an erroneous and prejudicial order - Interest disallowance for short deduction of tax at source
HELD THAT: - Following the jurisdictional High Court precedent FUTURE FIRST INFO. SERVICES PVT. LTD. [2022 (7) TMI 748 - DELHI HIGH COURT] the Tribunal held that where tax has been deducted, though allegedly at a lower rate, disallowance of the payment cannot be made under section 40(a)(i). The statutory recourse for a shortfall in deduction is proceedings under section 201. Consequently, the Assessing Officer's failure to disallow the interest could not render the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. [Paras 10, 11]
The revisionary direction to disallow the interest was dismissed, the consequential directions were treated as consequential, and the appeals were allowed.
Final Conclusion: The revisionary intervention, being founded on a legally unavailable disallowance for short deduction of tax at source, was unsustainable. Both appeals were allowed.
Issues: Whether the detained personal jewellery could be returned to the petitioners for re-export to Saudi Arabia.
Analysis: The jewellery was stated to be personal jewellery intended to be taken back to Saudi Arabia and not sold in India. The order directed adjudication of a representation or application seeking its return, while contemplating a minor penalty for the customs infraction upon the petitioners' consent. No final adjudication on return of the jewellery was made.
Outcome: The petitioners were permitted to submit a representation or application for adjudication of return of the seized jewellery.
Detention of person jewellery in excess of the quantity permissible under the Indian Customs Baggage Rules, 2026 - case of the petitioners that they had visited India in connection with a marriage function and that the jewels carried by them were not intended either to be smuggled into India or to be sold after being smuggled.
HELD THAT:- The writ petitions were disposed of permitting the petitioners to seek return of the seized jewellery from the customs authority, which was directed to adjudicate the application; a minor penalty for the admitted infraction could be imposed with their consent.
Issues: (i) Whether drawback could be denied and recovered where export proceeds were remitted by RBI under the rupee trade scheme and the goods allegedly did not reach the intended destination; (ii) Whether goods already exported were liable to confiscation under Section 113 of the Customs Act, 1962, and penalties under Section 114 of the Customs Act, 1962 could be imposed.
Issue (i): Whether drawback could be denied and recovered where export proceeds were remitted by RBI under the rupee trade scheme and the goods allegedly did not reach the intended destination
Analysis: Rule 16 of the Customs and Central Excise Duties Drawback Rules, 1995 concerns erroneous or excess drawback, whereas Rule 16A provides for recovery where export sale proceeds remain unrealised within the stipulated foreign-exchange period. The export proceeds were remitted through the RBI mechanism applicable to rupee exports to Russia, and no material showed that RBI had treated the remittances as unrelated to the exports or reversed them. Customs authorities could not disregard remittances made under that mechanism without an RBI determination.
Analysis: Drawback under Section 75 of the Customs Act, 1962 is linked to completion of export. Export stands completed when the goods leave Indian territorial waters and title passes to the buyer; subsequent non-arrival at the intended foreign destination does not, by itself, negate drawback entitlement. The destination of the goods does not determine the drawback rate or eligibility.
Conclusion: Drawback was admissible and its denial and recovery were unsustainable in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether goods already exported were liable to confiscation under Section 113 of the Customs Act, 1962, and penalties under Section 114 of the Customs Act, 1962 could be imposed
Analysis: Section 2(19) of the Customs Act, 1962 defines export goods as goods which are to be taken out of India. Section 113 applies to such export goods and not to goods that have already been exported. During the relevant period, the Customs Act did not have extra-territorial jurisdiction over goods outside India. Since the goods could not be treated as liable to confiscation under Section 113, the foundational requirement for penalties under Section 114 was absent.
Conclusion: The exported goods were not liable to confiscation, and the related penalties were unsustainable in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The drawback recovery, confiscation basis, interest demand, and associated personal penalties lacked legal foundation.
Ratio Decidendi: Duty drawback accrues upon completion of export when goods leave Indian territorial waters and title passes to the buyer, and is not defeated by subsequent non-arrival at the intended destination where export proceeds stand realised through the applicable RBI mechanism.
Customs scrutiny of RBI remittances under rupee export scheme - Duty drawback where exports do not reach intended destination - Confiscation of goods already exported
Recovery of drawback for non-realisation of export proceeds - RBI remittances under rupee export scheme - Recovery of drawback on the premise that RBI remittances received for exports to Russia under the rupee trade scheme were unrelated to the exports - HELD THAT: - The remittances were made by RBI through the exporter's bank under the special rupee export arrangement. In the absence of material showing that RBI had treated the remittances as erroneous or reversed them, Customs could not conclude that they were unrelated to the exports. Such a conclusion would necessarily impute an erroneous adjustment of the sovereign debt arrangement to RBI and its Russian counterpart; any doubt as to the remittances required examination by RBI. [Paras 23, 24, 25, 26, 27]
The finding that the remittances were unrelated to the exports was unsustainable, and recovery of drawback on that basis could not be sustained.
Duty drawback on completed exports - Export destination and drawback entitlement - Entitlement to drawback where goods had left India but were alleged not to have reached the intended destination in Russia - HELD THAT: - Drawback is determined by the nature of the exported goods and not by the country or port of destination. Recovery for non-realisation is governed by the specific conditions of the Drawback Rules. Export is complete when the goods leave the territorial waters of India and title passes to the buyer; subsequent diversion or landing at another destination does not defeat the exporter's entitlement to drawback.
Drawback is admissible for exports and export is complete once the goods leave the territorial waters of India and the title in the goods passes to the buyer as held by the Supreme Court in Sun Industries [1988 (4) TMI 49 - SUPREME COURT] [Paras 31, 32, 35, 36, 37]
The denial and recovery of drawback could not be sustained even on the assumption that the goods had been landed at intermediary ports rather than in Russia.
Confiscation of goods already exported - Penalty consequential upon confiscability - Liability of goods already exported to confiscation and the consequential penalties for alleged acts rendering them confiscable - HELD THAT: - Section 113 applies to export goods which are to be taken out of India, and not to goods which have already been exported. Such goods were no longer liable to confiscation, particularly as the Customs Act did not, during the relevant period, extend beyond India. Since penalties under section 114 were imposed for acts or omissions said to have rendered the goods liable to confiscation, they could not survive once confiscability failed. [Paras 41, 42]
The finding of confiscability and all consequential penalties were set aside.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and all appeals were allowed with consequential relief.
Issues: Whether continued detention of the seized machines and spare parts was lawful where no notice was issued within the period prescribed for seizure and no provisional-release order covered those goods.
Analysis: Section 110(2) mandates return of seized goods where notice under Section 124(a) is not issued within six months, subject only to a valid extension for a further period not exceeding six months. The statutory consequence remains operative notwithstanding provisional release under Section 110A. The machines and spare parts were not covered by the provisional-release order, and the notice issued on 21.02.2025 was beyond one year from their seizure on 15.09.2022.
Conclusion: Detention of the 14 machines and spare parts beyond 15.09.2023 was illegal and unsustainable. Their release was directed upon execution of a bond equivalent to their value.
Release of seized imported machines and spare parts - continued detention of the seized machines and spare parts - Statutory period for notice in respect of seized goods - Entitlement to release of seized imported machines and spare parts where no notice was issued within the statutory period and no provisional-release order existed for those goods
HELD THAT: - Section 110(2) requires return of seized goods if notice is not issued within the prescribed period, subject only to a timely extension under its first proviso. Provisional release does not suspend that consequence; moreover, the provisional-release order in the present case did not cover the machines and spare parts.
Since no notice concerning those goods was issued within one year of seizure, their continued detention was illegal and unsustainable. [Paras 7, 8]
The appellant was held eligible for release of the machines and spare parts; the lower authority was directed to release them, subject to execution of a bond equivalent to their value.
Final Conclusion: The continued detention of the seized machines and spare parts was held illegal for want of notice within the statutory period. Their release was directed subject to execution of a bond equivalent to their value.
Issues: Whether the penalty for alleged abetment of gold smuggling was sustainable on the statements, electronic communications, and the alleged failure to act at airport screening.
Analysis: A statement recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 could be relied upon in adjudication only after compliance with the procedure under Section 138B, including examination of the maker, a determination of admissibility, and an effective opportunity of cross-examination, unless a statutory exception applied. Those safeguards were not followed for the appellant's statement or the material witness statements. The call records and WhatsApp chats also lacked the certification required for electronic evidence. The DFMD was faulty, the appellant was not assigned screening duties as a proper officer, and no independent corroborative evidence connected the appellant with possession, handling, or dealing with the smuggled gold.
Conclusion: The statements and electronic material could not validly sustain the allegation, and the penalty under Section 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 was unsustainable.
Admissibility of Section 108 statements in customs adjudication - Admissibility of call-detail records and WhatsApp chats - Penalty for alleged abetment of gold smuggling by customs staff
Statements recorded u/s 108 - Cross-examination u/s 138B - Evidentiary use of the appellant's and witnesses' statements in penalty adjudication without compliance with the procedure under Section 138B of the Customs Act - HELD THAT: - A statement recorded during inquiry becomes relevant in adjudication only after its maker is examined, the adjudicating authority determines its admissibility in the interests of justice, and the affected person is afforded cross-examination.
Additional Director General (Adjudication) vs. Its My Name Pvt. Ltd. [2020 (6) TMI 72 - DELHI HIGH COURT] examined the provisions of Sections 108 and 138B of the Customs Act. The department placed reliance upon the statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act. The Hon’ble High Court held that the procedure contemplated under Section 138B(1)(b) has to be followed before the statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act can be considered as relevant.
As the crucial witnesses were neither examined nor made available for cross-examination despite request, the statutory procedure was not followed. [Paras 18, 19, 20, 21]
The statements were held inadmissible, rendering the penalty founded solely upon them unsustainable.
Call-detail records and WhatsApp chats - statutory certification - Reliance on uncertified call-detail records and WhatsApp chats to establish collusion in smuggling of foreign-origin gold - HELD THAT: - The call records disclosed no contents of any conversation and showed no calls between the appellant and the co-noticee during the material period; the number of calls alone could not warrant an adverse inference. The call records and WhatsApp chats also lacked the statutory certification required for their evidentiary use. [Paras 9, 10, 11]
The electronic material could not furnish reliable evidence of collusion against the appellant.
Penalty for abetment of gold smuggling - Duty of a customs Havildar at passenger screening - Penalty u/s 112(b) for alleged failure by a customs Havildar to act on a DFMD alert concerning a passenger carrying foreign-origin gold - HELD THAT: - The DFMD was found to have malfunctioned on the day in question. The appellant was neither a proper officer authorised for passenger screening nor assigned DFMD duty, and omission or negligence in duty could not by itself prove abetment. No nexus with the seized gold or any dealing with it of the nature contemplated by Section 112(b) was established. [Paras 12, 13, 15, 16]
The penalty could not be sustained on the alleged omission at the DFMD.
Final Conclusion: The impugned appellate order upholding the penalty was set aside, and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether alleged failure by a Customs Broker to verify the exporter's credentials, without evidence of knowledge, collusion, assistance or abetment in the attempted export of substituted prohibited goods, warranted penalties under Sections 114 and 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962.
Analysis: Penalty under Section 114 requires a positive act or omission connected with the attempted improper export, or abetment thereof; liability under Section 114AA requires knowing or intentional use of a materially false declaration, statement or document. The material showed that KYC and IEC documents had been obtained, bank-related details were verified, and cooperation was extended during investigation. There was no allegation in the show-cause notice, or evidence on record, establishing prior knowledge of the smuggling, active collusion, assistance in substitution of the goods, or any other positive act amounting to abetment. The alleged breach of Customs Broker verification obligations did not by itself establish the requisite knowledge or participation.
Conclusion: The penalty imposed under Section 114 was unsustainable, and no penalty under Section 114AA could be imposed in the absence of proof of knowing participation or abetment.
Penalty on Customs Broker for attempted export of Red Sanders - Abetment of smuggling - Penal liability of a Customs Broker for attempted export of Red Sanders where the charge rested on failure to verify the authenticity of the IEC holder
HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the allegation against the Customs Broker was confined to non-verification of the IEC holder under the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations. The original authority had found that the Broker obtained and verified KYC and IEC documents, co-operated with the investigation, and that no documentary or other evidence established prior knowledge, active collusion, or assistance in the attempted export of Red Sanders. Abetment requires a positive act, and no evidence showed that the Broker had assisted the attempted smuggling. [Paras 12, 13]
The penalty imposed under Section 114 was set aside; the Customs Broker's appeal was allowed and the Revenue's appeal seeking penalty under Section 114AA was dismissed.
Final Conclusion: The penalty on the Customs Broker was set aside for want of evidence of knowledge, collusion or abetment in the attempted export of Red Sanders. The Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
Issues: Whether the five formulated grades of natural astaxanthin are classifiable as non-synthetic food colours under Tariff Item 3203 00 20 or as food preparations under Tariff Item 2106 90 99.
Analysis: Rules 1 and 6 of the General Rules for the Interpretation require classification by the terms of the relevant headings, notes and subheadings. Heading 3203, read with Note 3 to Chapter 32 and the HSN Explanatory Notes, covers vegetable or animal colouring matter and preparations of a kind used for colouring materials or for making colouring preparations. The formulations, in their condition as imported, were standardised to specified astaxanthin concentrations and contained carriers, stabilisers and, for certain grades, emulsifying, micro-encapsulation or spray-drying features. Their product specifications and safety data sheets identified dietary-supplement, food, beverage and nutraceutical applications rather than a colouring function.
Analysis: The goods were not crude algal extracts or separately chemically defined compounds, nor were they shown to be preparations mainly used for colouring. Heading 2106 applied because the formulated astaxanthin products were not more specifically covered elsewhere and answered the description of food or dietary-supplement preparations under Supplementary Note 5 to Chapter 21 and the HSN Explanatory Notes, which include food-supplement preparations based on extracts or concentrates despite the presence of colours, carriers or stabilisers.
Conclusion: The five astaxanthin grades are not classifiable under Tariff Item 3203 00 20 and are classifiable under Tariff Item 2106 90 99 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.
Tariff classification of formulated natural Astaxanthin preparations - Dietary-supplement preparations versus vegetable-origin colouring matter
Classification of five formulated natural astaxanthin grades derived from Haematococcus pluvialis and intended for dietary supplements, foods and beverages, as vegetable-origin colouring matter under Tariff Item 3203 00 20 or as food preparations under Tariff Item 2106 90 99 - HELD THAT: - Under GRI 1, classification is governed by the terms of the headings and the relevant Notes. Heading 3203 covers products of vegetable or animal origin used mainly as colouring substances; Note 3 to Chapter 32 covers preparations of a kind used for colouring material or for making colouring preparations. The product specifications and Safety Data Sheets described the goods as formulated astaxanthin complexes for dietary supplements, foods and beverages, without identifying a colouring function. Their standardisation, stabilisation, emulsification, micro-encapsulation and dispersibility features established their nutritional and functional character, with colour being incidental. As the goods were not more specifically covered elsewhere and answered the description of formulated ingredients for human dietary supplements and food preparations, they fell within Heading 2106. [Paras 5]
The five grades were held not classifiable under Tariff Item 3203 00 20 and were classified under residual Tariff Item 2106 90 99; customs duty is payable at the rate applicable to that tariff item under the law in force.
Final Conclusion: The five formulated AstaReal natural astaxanthin grades were ruled to be food preparations under Tariff Item 2106 90 99, and not food colours or colouring matter under Tariff Item 3203 00 20.
Issues: Whether the directions for a forensic audit extended to a general examination of the affairs of 17 banks.
Analysis: The audit directions were construed as principally concerning commercial transactions and relationships involving the judgment debtors, FHL, FHHPL and the banks. The relevant clauses did not authorise an unrestricted inquiry into the banks' affairs beyond those transactions.
Conclusion: The forensic audit is confined to transactions involving the judgment debtors, FHL, FHHPL and the banks, and does not permit a fishing and roving enquiry into the banks' entire affairs.
Forensic audit of banks' transactions with judgment debtors - Scope of the forensic audit directed in relation to 17 banks and their transactions with FHL, FHHPL and the judgment debtors - HELD THAT: - The audit directions were to be construed in the context of commercial transactions and relationships between FHL, FHHPL, the judgment debtors and the banks. They did not authorise a fishing and roving inquiry into the banks' entire affairs. [Paras 2]
The forensic audit was clarified to be confined to the specified transactions and relationships.
Final Conclusion: The Special Leave Petitions were disposed of with clarification of the limited scope of the forensic audit directions.
Issues: (i) Whether an oral agreement between companies is legally barred under the Companies Act, 2013; (ii) Whether the pleaded authority of a company representative can be rejected for want of an authority letter at the Order VII Rule 11 stage.
Issue (i): Whether an oral agreement between companies is legally barred under the Companies Act, 2013.
Analysis: Section 46 of the Companies Act, 1956, which had been relied upon to require written execution, stood repealed and was not preserved by the savings provision. The Companies Act, 2013 contains no corresponding prohibition. Section 21 regulates authorization for signing written documents and does not impose a mandatory writing requirement for every corporate agreement. General contract law recognizes concluded reciprocal promises without requiring every agreement for sale to be written.
Conclusion: An oral agreement between companies is not barred by the Companies Act, 2013 and may be governed by general contract law.
Issue (ii): Whether the pleaded authority of a company representative can be rejected for want of an authority letter at the Order VII Rule 11 stage.
Analysis: The plaint specifically pleaded that the representative had been authorized to execute the agreement for the company. The correctness and validity of that pleaded authority require evidentiary determination and cannot be decided at the plaint-rejection stage.
Conclusion: Absence of an authority letter cannot defeat a specific pleading of authorization under Order VII Rule 11; the issue must be determined on evidence.
Final Conclusion: The objections based on an alleged mandatory writing requirement and lack of documentary proof of authority did not warrant rejection of the plaint, with the authority question remaining for evidentiary adjudication.
Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of a statutory bar or mandatory writing requirement, repeal of an earlier corporate-execution provision leaves oral agreements between companies governed by general contract law.
Oral agreements between companies - Rejection of plaint on disputed authority of company representative
Validity of oral agreements between companies - Effect of repeal of statutory requirement for written corporate contracts - Validity of an oral agreement between companies under the Companies Act, 2013 - HELD THAT: - The earlier statutory requirement concerning contracts by companies was repealed and was neither saved nor re-enacted in the Companies Act, 2013. Section 21 concerns the authority to sign a document on behalf of a company and cannot be construed as prohibiting an oral agreement. In the absence of a statutory bar, the general law of contract, which recognises oral agreements, applies. [Paras 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]
The plaint could not be rejected merely because the agreement pleaded between the companies was oral.
Order VII Rule 11-disputed authority of company representative - Rejection of a plaint on the alleged absence of written authority of a company representative to execute the agreement - HELD THAT: - Since the plaint specifically pleaded that the representative was authorised by the company, the correctness and validity of that assertion required adjudication upon evidence and could not be determined at the stage of considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. [Paras 13]
The ground based on the alleged absence of an authority letter was rightly rejected at the threshold.
Final Conclusion: The revision petition was dismissed, and the refusal to reject the plaint was upheld.
Consent terms in oppression and mismanagement proceedings - Binding effect of consent terms - Effect of the joint settlement upon the appeal challenging the findings of oppression concerning amendments to the articles of association and the rights issue
HELD THAT: - The parties jointly placed the settlement terms, supported by their respective affidavits, before the Appellate Tribunal. Accepting the settlement, the Appellate Tribunal treated the consent terms as part of its decision and disposed of the appeal on that basis, without independently adjudicating the merits of the challenged findings. [Paras 17, 18, 19, 20]
The appeal was allowed and the impugned order, insofar as it held the amendments to the articles of association and the rights issue to be oppressive, was quashed by consent; the parties were held bound by the settlement terms governing their inter se rights, liabilities and conduct.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed pursuant to the parties' consent terms, and the impugned order was quashed. The settlement terms govern the parties' inter se rights, liabilities and conduct.
Issues: Whether a successful liquidation-auction bidder who failed to pay the balance sale consideration within the stipulated period was entitled to refund of the deposited amount despite an express forfeiture clause in the auction notice and the ceiling on earnest money deposit under Schedule I.
Analysis: Schedule I of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 limited the earnest money deposit to 10% of the reserve price but did not displace an express auction condition permitting forfeiture of the entire amount deposited upon a successful bidder's failure to pay the balance consideration. The bidder accepted the sale on an as-is-where-is basis, with prior disclosure of the title-related issue, and voluntarily deposited the stipulated amount comprising the earnest money deposit and part of the sale consideration. The asserted need for prior title deeds arose only near the payment deadline and could not justify non-payment. The triple test did not assist the bidder: repeated assurances did not establish financial capacity, and the proceedings initiated by another entity did not constitute an extraneous impediment preventing payment. The allegation of unequal treatment was raised belatedly and without supporting material.
Conclusion: The forfeiture of the entire deposited amount, including the earnest money deposit and part sale consideration, was valid, and no refund was due.
Forfeiture of deposits under liquidation e-auction terms - Successful bidder's default in payment of balance sale consideration - Triple Test for forfeiture - Forfeiture of the earnest money deposit and other amounts paid by the successful bidder upon failure to pay the balance sale consideration under a liquidation e-auction
HELD THAT: - Though Schedule I capped the earnest money deposit at 10% of the reserve price and did not expressly provide for forfeiture, the e-auction notice, accepted without protest, expressly stipulated forfeiture of the entire amount paid, including the earnest money deposit, upon default in payment of the balance sale consideration. The bidder had participated on an 'as is where is' basis despite disclosure regarding the unavailable title deeds and could not rely on that circumstance after failing to make payment within the stipulated period. The Triple Test did not assist the bidder: there was no material substantiating financial capacity, and the asserted external impediment was an afterthought. Forfeiture was consequently the necessary result of cancellation of the bid for default. [Paras 16, 17, 19, 21, 22]
The forfeiture of the earnest money deposit and the other deposit made under the e-auction terms was upheld, and refund was declined.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed, and the forfeiture of the amounts deposited by the successful bidder under the liquidation e-auction was sustained.
Issues: (i) Whether an OTS between a personal guarantor and the sole financial creditor can bring the corporate debtor out of liquidation; (ii) Whether forfeited earnest money deposit previously received by the financial creditor must revert to the liquidation estate after its debt is settled; (iii) Whether payment of remuneration to the erstwhile liquidator from the liquidation estate is valid; and (iv) Whether the admitted operational creditor is entitled to distribution and the personal guarantor can claim priority as a financial creditor.
Issue (i): Whether an OTS between a personal guarantor and the sole financial creditor can bring the corporate debtor out of liquidation.
Analysis: A bilateral settlement with a financial creditor does not displace the statutory liquidation process. Exit from liquidation is available only through the legally recognised routes, including a scheme under Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013, or sale of the corporate debtor as a going concern. The separately ratified transfer of assets, treated as a private sale after unsuccessful auctions and on value-maximisation considerations, was left undisturbed.
Conclusion: The OTS did not terminate or alter the liquidation process, and no interference was warranted with the ratified asset transfer.
Issue (ii): Whether forfeited earnest money deposit previously received by the financial creditor must revert to the liquidation estate after its debt is settled.
Analysis: The forfeited earnest money deposit constituted an asset of the liquidation estate. Once the financial creditor accepted the OTS amount and issued an account-closure certificate, its claim stood satisfied and it retained no entitlement to the forfeited amount. The amount was consequently required to be restored to the liquidation estate for distribution under Section 53 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
Conclusion: The forfeited earnest money deposit was required to be returned to the liquidation estate and could not be retained by the financial creditor.
Issue (iii): Whether payment of remuneration to the erstwhile liquidator from the liquidation estate is valid.
Analysis: The erstwhile liquidator had undertaken claim processing, conducted auctions, pursued applications, and represented the corporate debtor in connected proceedings. The monthly remuneration had been fixed during the insolvency process and continued during liquidation; the reduced amount allowed was supported by the unchallenged computation and work performed.
Conclusion: Payment of the approved remuneration to the erstwhile liquidator from the liquidation estate was valid.
Issue (iv): Whether the admitted operational creditor is entitled to distribution and the personal guarantor can claim priority as a financial creditor.
Analysis: The operational creditor's claim had been lodged during the insolvency process, updated after liquidation commenced, admitted by the liquidator, and reported to the relevant authorities. Payment by the personal guarantor to settle the financial creditor's dues did not effect an assignment of debt or substitute the guarantor as a financial creditor. As purchaser of assets or promoter, the guarantor had no priority claim over the liquidation estate and could receive any surplus only after statutory claims were satisfied under Section 53 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
Conclusion: The admitted operational creditor was entitled to distribution under the statutory waterfall, and the personal guarantor had no priority entitlement as a financial creditor.
Final Conclusion: The liquidation estate, including forfeited earnest money deposit, remains available for settlement of liquidation costs and admitted stakeholder claims in accordance with the statutory waterfall.
Ratio Decidendi: A personal guarantor who settles the corporate debtor's financial debt under an OTS does not, absent assignment or substitution, become a financial creditor entitled to liquidation-estate proceeds, which must be distributed under the statutory waterfall after the financial creditor's claim is satisfied.
Effect of one-time settlement during liquidation - Forfeited earnest money deposit in liquidation estate - Liquidator's remuneration from liquidation estate - Waterfall distribution of liquidation proceeds - Financial creditor status of personal guarantor settling corporate debt
Effect of one-time settlement during liquidation - Effect of the personal guarantor's one-time settlement with the sole financial creditor on the continuing liquidation and transfer of the corporate debtor's assets - HELD THAT: - The prior unchallenged order had made clear that a bilateral settlement could not take the corporate debtor out of liquidation except through the statutorily recognised routes. The settlement, therefore, did not affect the liquidation proceedings. The asset transfer ratified by the Adjudicating Authority was nevertheless left undisturbed, since the auctions had failed, the consideration exceeded the reserve price and the highest bid, and no party had challenged that part of the order; although the transaction was not strictly in accordance with the Code and the Regulations, it furthered value maximisation. [Paras 13, 14]
The one-time settlement did not terminate or alter the liquidation process, and the ratified transfer of assets was not interfered with.
Forfeited earnest money deposit in liquidation estate - Entitlement of the financial creditor to retain the forfeited earnest money deposit received before settlement of its claim - HELD THAT: - The forfeited deposit, though previously distributed to the financial creditor and the erstwhile liquidator, remained an asset of the liquidation estate. Once the financial creditor accepted the settlement and issued an account-closure certificate, its claim stood fully satisfied and the amount received by it had to return to the liquidation estate for distribution among stakeholders. Its earlier recorded no-objection to such return had also attained finality. [Paras 15]
The financial creditor could not retain the forfeited deposit, which was required to be restored to the liquidation estate for distribution in accordance with law.
Liquidator's remuneration from liquidation estate - Entitlement of the erstwhile liquidator to remuneration and expenses from the liquidation estate - HELD THAT: - The record showed that the erstwhile liquidator had undertaken proceedings before the Adjudicating Authority, defended the corporate debtor before the High Court, conducted successive auctions, and processed claims. His fee had been fixed during the corporate insolvency resolution process and its continuation during liquidation had been directed in an earlier appellate order. The computation was not rebutted, and his continuance as liquidator had not been challenged. [Paras 16]
Payment of the reduced remuneration allowed to the erstwhile liquidator from the liquidation estate was upheld.
Waterfall distribution of liquidation proceeds - Financial creditor status of personal guarantor settling corporate debt - Distribution of the remaining forfeited deposit to the admitted operational creditor and the personal guarantor's asserted priority as a financial creditor - HELD THAT: - The operational creditor's claim had been filed during the corporate insolvency resolution process, updated after liquidation commenced, admitted by the liquidator, and reported to the Adjudicating Authority and the Board; it could not therefore be rejected as unverified. Settlement of the corporate debtor's debt by the personal guarantor did not make him a financial creditor in the absence of assignment of debt or substitution of the financial creditor. As purchaser of the assets, he had no claim against the liquidation estate, and as promoter he ranked last in distribution. The financial creditor's contention that the guarantor should separately meet liquidation expenses and the operational claim was also rejected, since the settlement was not in accordance with the Code and the financial creditor had declared its claim fully satisfied. [Paras 17, 18, 19]
The balance of the forfeited deposit was liable to be distributed to the admitted operational creditor under the statutory waterfall, and the personal guarantor could claim any residue only after satisfaction of all claims.
Final Conclusion: All appeals were dismissed. The transfer of assets was left undisturbed, while restoration and statutory distribution of the forfeited deposit from the liquidation estate, including payment of liquidation remuneration and the admitted operational claim, were sustained.
Issues: Whether outstanding Central Sales Tax dues could be treated as secured debt, and the State Tax Department as a secured creditor, by reading Section 9(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 with Section 48 of the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003.
Analysis: Section 9(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 is a machinery provision enabling State authorities to assess, collect and recover Central Sales Tax by using the procedural machinery of the applicable State sales-tax law. It does not create a statutory first charge over the dealer's property or impliedly incorporate the substantive first charge under Section 48 of the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003. A security interest cannot arise merely from the recovery machinery under Section 9(2).
Analysis: The Explanation to Section 3(31) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is clarificatory and operates retrospectively; it excludes a security interest created merely by operation of law unless it arises from an agreement or arrangement between parties. The absence of any contractual security interest independently precludes secured status for the Central Sales Tax claim.
Conclusion: The admitted Central Sales Tax dues cannot be treated as secured debt, and the State Tax Department cannot claim the status of a secured creditor or priority under Section 53(1)(b)(ii) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
Central Sales Tax dues - secured creditor status - Statutory first charge - scope of State tax-recovery machinery
Treatment of Central Sales Tax dues as secured debt on the basis of Section 9(2) of the CST Act read with the statutory first charge under Section 48 of the GVAT Act - HELD THAT: - Section 9(2) adopts the State sales-tax machinery for assessment, collection and enforcement of Central Sales Tax dues; it neither creates a charge on the dealer's assets nor imports the substantive first charge created under Section 48 of the GVAT Act. The Tribunal further regarded the 2026 Explanation to Section 3(31) of the Code as clarificatory and applicable to pending proceedings, excluding an interest arising merely by operation of law from the ambit of security interest. In any event, the claim failed independently because the CST Act contained no charge-creating provision. [Paras 41, 42, 43, 45, 46]
The admitted CST claim was not secured debt and was not entitled to secured-creditor treatment under the resolution-plan waterfall.
Final Conclusion: Both appeals were dismissed, the Central Sales Tax dues having been held not to be secured debt or entitled to secured-creditor treatment under the resolution plan.
Issues: (i) Whether the former resolution professional's claim for professional fees and CIRP expenses should be determined in these appeals; (ii) Whether adverse observations against the former resolution professional should be expunged; (iii) Whether replacement of the former resolution professional pursuant to the Committee of Creditors' decision was valid.
Issue (i): Whether the former resolution professional's claim for professional fees and CIRP expenses should be determined in these appeals.
Analysis: The fee and expense claim required factual assessment of the work performed, the scale of fees acceptable to the Committee of Creditors, relevant expenses, and the objections of concerned parties. Such determination required adjudication before the Adjudicating Authority.
Conclusion: The claim for professional fees and CIRP expenses is left for determination by the Adjudicating Authority.
Issue (ii): Whether adverse observations against the former resolution professional should be expunged.
Analysis: The observations arose in the context of alleged delay in acting upon the request to replace the resolution professional. Their potential bearing on professional reputation justified their removal in the circumstances.
Conclusion: The adverse observations are expunged in favour of the appellant.
Issue (iii): Whether replacement of the former resolution professional pursuant to the Committee of Creditors' decision was valid.
Analysis: The Committee of Creditors' decision to replace a resolution professional falls within its commercial wisdom, subject to compliance with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and applicable regulations. A resolution professional must act independently, but has no vested right to continue in office; the majority decision of the Committee of Creditors must be respected unless it requires conduct contrary to the Code or regulations.
Conclusion: The replacement of the appellant as resolution professional is upheld against the appellant.
Final Conclusion: The removal of the former resolution professional remains effective, the adverse remarks stand removed, and the monetary claim requires adjudication before the Adjudicating Authority.
Ratio Decidendi: A resolution professional has no vested right to continue in office, and the majority commercial decision of the Committee of Creditors to seek replacement must be respected unless it requires action contrary to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 or applicable regulations.
Commercial wisdom of Committee of Creditors in replacing resolution professional - Expunction of adverse remarks affecting professional reputation
Commercial wisdom of Committee of Creditors in replacing resolution professional - Replacement of the Resolution Professional pursuant to the Committee of Creditors' decision - HELD THAT: - A Resolution Professional has no vested right to continue in office. While the Resolution Professional must act independently and cannot be required to act contrary to the Code or the Regulations, the majority decision of the Committee of Creditors to seek replacement falls within its commercial wisdom, subject to statutory and procedural compliance. [Paras 19]
The direction replacing the appellant as Resolution Professional was upheld.
Resolution professional's remuneration and CIRP expenses - Claim of the former Resolution Professional for professional fees and CIRP expenses - HELD THAT: - The payable fees depended on the work performed and the Committee of Creditors' willingness regarding the applicable scale, while reimbursement of expenses required examination of relevant facts and objections. These matters required determination by the Adjudicating Authority after hearing the concerned parties. [Paras 19]
The claim was left open for adjudication by the NCLT in accordance with law.
Expunction of adverse remarks affecting professional reputation - Retention of adverse observations concerning the former Resolution Professional's alleged delay in acting on the request for replacement. - HELD THAT: - Although the observations were made in the context of the alleged delay, they bore upon the appellant's professional reputation. Having regard to the circumstances, their retention was held unnecessary. [Paras 19]
The adverse remarks in the impugned order were expunged.
Final Conclusion: Both appeals were disposed of by upholding the replacement of the Resolution Professional, expunging the adverse remarks, and leaving the claims for fees and CIRP expenses to the NCLT for adjudication.
Issues: (i) Whether publication of Form G under Regulation 36A(1) requires prior approval by the Committee of Creditors of eligibility criteria under Section 25(2)(h); (ii) Whether liquidation under Section 33(1)(a) may be declined after expiry of the CIRP period without a resolution plan because the delay was attributable to stakeholders; (iii) Whether the finding that the Corporate Debtor was not a going concern was sustainable; (iv) Whether a pending application under Section 65 barred liquidation under Section 33; (v) Whether non-impleadment of the suspended board vitiated the liquidation order; and (vi) Whether alternatives short of liquidation were inadequately considered.
Issue (i): Whether publication of Form G under Regulation 36A(1) requires prior approval by the Committee of Creditors of eligibility criteria under Section 25(2)(h).
Analysis: Section 25(2)(h) requires prospective resolution applicants to satisfy criteria formulated by the resolution professional with approval of the Committee of Creditors. Regulation 36A(1) mandates timely publication of Form G but does not dispense with that approval. Form G operationalises the invitation contemplated by Section 25(2)(h); therefore, publication cannot proceed without approved eligibility criteria. The 66% threshold under Section 33(2) applies to an affirmative decision to liquidate during CIRP and does not govern ordinary Committee of Creditors deliberations concerning publication of Form G.
Conclusion: Prior Committee of Creditors approval of eligibility criteria was necessary before publication of Form G. The issue was decided against the Appellant.
Issue (ii): Whether liquidation under Section 33(1)(a) may be declined after expiry of the CIRP period without a resolution plan because the delay was attributable to stakeholders.
Analysis: Section 33(1)(a) uses imperative language requiring liquidation where the CIRP period has expired without receipt of a resolution plan under Section 30(6). The exceptional flexibility recognised for extending insolvency timelines does not permit an indefinite suspension of liquidation merely because of Committee of Creditors deadlock or lack of diligence during CIRP. No timely application for extension or exclusion was made despite the CIRP having remained unresolved for more than five years.
Conclusion: Expiry of the CIRP period without a resolution plan required liquidation under Section 33(1)(a). The issue was decided against the Appellant.
Issue (iii): Whether the finding that the Corporate Debtor was not a going concern was sustainable.
Analysis: Going-concern status depends on continuing business operations, employees, revenue generation, and operational activity, rather than mere ownership of assets. The identified land, shops, vehicle, and sale proceeds were subject to litigation, attachment, sale, or third-party custody, while no material established continuing business operations, employees, income, or trading after commencement of CIRP.
Conclusion: The finding that the Corporate Debtor was not a going concern was sustainable. The issue was decided against the Appellant.
Issue (iv): Whether a pending application under Section 65 barred liquidation under Section 33.
Analysis: Section 65 provides for penal consequences for fraudulent or malicious initiation of insolvency proceedings; it does not automatically annul a final admission order or suspend an otherwise ripe liquidation proceeding. A belated Section 65 application challenging the basis of CIRP could not operate as an automatic bar where the admission order had not been directly challenged and had attained finality.
Conclusion: Pendency of the Section 65 application did not bar liquidation under Section 33. The issue was decided against the Appellant.
Issue (v): Whether non-impleadment of the suspended board vitiated the liquidation order.
Analysis: The suspended board's right to participate in Committee of Creditors meetings does not create an unqualified right to be impleaded in every CIRP application. The Section 33(1)(a) inquiry turned on the objective facts of expiry of CIRP and non-receipt of a resolution plan. Prolonged non-cooperation and delayed engagement with the process, coupled with a full appellate opportunity to address all contentions, established absence of prejudice sufficient to vitiate the order.
Conclusion: Non-impleadment of the suspended board did not vitiate the liquidation order. The issue was decided against the Appellant.
Issue (vi): Whether alternatives short of liquidation were inadequately considered.
Analysis: Publication of Form G and further resolution efforts were considered repeatedly by the Committee of Creditors but did not secure the requisite support. The prolonged deadlock, absence of a resolution plan, expiry of the CIRP period, and lack of an operating business brought the matter within the time-bound insolvency framework. Commercial wisdom concerning further resolution efforts could not be substituted by appellate assessment.
Conclusion: Alternatives short of liquidation were sufficiently considered and no infirmity was established. The issue was decided against the Appellant.
Final Conclusion: The statutory liquidation consequence upon expiry of CIRP without a resolution plan remained applicable notwithstanding the unresolved Committee of Creditors deadlock, the pending Section 65 application, and the suspended board's objections.
Ratio Decidendi: Publication of Form G requires Committee of Creditors-approved eligibility criteria under Section 25(2)(h), and expiry of CIRP without a resolution plan activates the mandatory liquidation consequence under Section 33(1)(a) absent a timely extension or exclusion.
Publication of Form G subject to CoC-approved eligibility criteria - Liquidation on expiry of CIRP without a resolution plan - Pending fraudulent-initiation application and liquidation - Suspended board's right to hearing in liquidation - Commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors
Form G publication and CoC-approved eligibility criteria - Publication of Form G for inviting prospective resolution applicants without prior CoC approval of the eligibility criteria - HELD THAT: - Section 25(2)(h) requires that the criteria for prospective resolution applicants be laid down with the approval of the Committee of Creditors. The commercial wisdom of the CoC has been repeatedly held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to occupy a position of primacy in matters of this kind including Essar Steel [2019 (11) TMI 731 - SUPREME COURT]
Since Form G operationalises the invitation governed by those criteria, publication cannot proceed without such approval. The mandatory language of Regulation 36A(1) governs the timing of publication and does not dispense with the antecedent approval requirement. [Paras 53, 54, 56]
The Adjudicating Authority rightly treated prior CoC approval as a precondition to publication of Form G.
Mandatory liquidation on expiry of CIRP - Discretion to decline liquidation under Section 33(1)(a) after expiry of the CIRP period without receipt of a resolution plan - HELD THAT: - Section 33(1)(a) employs imperative language and requires liquidation once the CIRP period has expired and no resolution plan has been received. The exceptional latitude concerning CIRP timelines cannot be converted into a general power to disregard the statutory consequence because of CoC disagreement or lack of diligence within the process, particularly where no stakeholder sought extension or exclusion of time. [Paras 58, 59, 60]
Liquidation under Section 33(1)(a) was rightly ordered, and the conduct of stakeholders did not justify withholding that consequence.
Going concern status and residual assets - Finding that the corporate debtor was not a going concern despite the existence of residual assets - HELD THAT: - The status of a going concern depends upon continuing business operations, personnel, revenue generation and trading activity, not merely upon retention of assets. Asset holdings, including assets subject to litigation, attachment or third-party custody, did not establish a functioning enterprise; no material showed that the corporate debtor continued operational activities after commencement of CIRP. [Paras 63, 64]
The finding that the corporate debtor was not a going concern was sustained.
Effect of pending Section 65 application on liquidation - Effect of a pending application alleging fraudulent or malicious initiation of CIRP on liquidation under Section 33(1)(a) - HELD THAT: - Section 65 is directed to penalising fraudulent or malicious initiation of insolvency proceedings and is not, by its terms, a mechanism for annulling an admission order that has attained finality. Although timely allegations of fraudulent initiation may bear upon continuation of CIRP, the mere pendency of a belated application does not automatically suspend the power to conclude proceedings independently ripe for liquidation under Section 33(1)(a). [Paras 67]
The pending application under Section 65 did not bar the liquidation order.
Suspended board's hearing rights in liquidation - Effect of non-impleadment of the suspended board in liquidation proceedings under Section 33(1)(a) - HELD THAT: - The suspended board's right to participate in CoC meetings does not confer an unqualified right to be impleaded in every CIRP application. A proceeding under Section 33(1)(a) turns on the objective facts of expiry of the CIRP period and non-receipt of a resolution plan. On the facts, the appellant's prolonged non-engagement and earlier non-cooperation, coupled with the full appellate hearing and absence of prejudice capable of affecting the result, excluded any ground for remand on natural justice. [Paras 69, 70, 71]
Non-impleadment of the suspended board did not vitiate the liquidation order.
CoC commercial wisdom on further resolution efforts - Failure to pursue alternatives short of liquidation after recurring CoC deadlock concerning further resolution efforts - HELD THAT: - Publication of Form G and further resolution efforts were repeatedly considered by the CoC but did not secure the requisite support. The Appellate Tribunal could not substitute its assessment for the commercial judgment of the CoC. The prolonged unresolved deadlock, absence of a resolution plan and cessation of business operations supported recourse to liquidation under the time-bound statutory scheme. [Paras 73, 74]
No failure to consider viable alternatives short of liquidation was established.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed, and the order directing liquidation of the corporate debtor was sustained.
Issues: (i) Whether omission of Section 6(3) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 invalidated the 2018 complaint and show-cause notice; (ii) Whether a charitable trust qualifies as a person under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and whether loans in rupees from non-resident trustees outstanding beyond three years contravened Regulation 4 of the Foreign Exchange Management (Borrowing and Lending in Rupees) Regulations, 2000; (iii) Whether the claimed welfare purpose, technical nature of breach, or absence of mens rea precluded civil penalty; and (iv) Whether the penalty amount warranted reduction.
Issue (i): Whether omission of Section 6(3) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 invalidated the 2018 complaint and show-cause notice.
Analysis: The omission took effect only upon notification of the relevant Finance Act, 2015 provision on 15.10.2019. The complaint and show-cause notice were issued before that date; consequently, the later omission did not affect their validity.
Conclusion: The proceedings were maintainable. This issue is against the appellant.
Issue (ii): Whether a charitable trust qualifies as a person under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and whether loans in rupees from non-resident trustees outstanding beyond three years contravened Regulation 4 of the Foreign Exchange Management (Borrowing and Lending in Rupees) Regulations, 2000.
Analysis: Section 2(u) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 inclusively covers every artificial juridical person not otherwise specified. A trust is distinct from its trustees and falls within that expression. The sums received from non-resident trustees were recorded as borrowings in the accounts of the trust and its institutions. Although the borrowings were on a non-repatriation basis, repayment could have been made by credit to the lenders' permitted non-resident accounts. The loans were not repaid within the three-year period prescribed by Regulation 4, and the later certificate did not negate the contravention.
Conclusion: The trust was a person under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, and the borrowings contravened Section 6(3)(e) read with Regulations 3 and 4. This issue is against the appellant.
Issue (iii): Whether the claimed welfare purpose, technical nature of breach, or absence of mens rea precluded civil penalty.
Analysis: Section 13(1) provides a civil-penalty regime without requiring wilfulness, deliberateness, or intention. An established breach of the statutory and regulatory obligation attracts penalty irrespective of welfare purpose, claimed technicality, or absence of mens rea.
Conclusion: Mens rea was not a prerequisite for penalty, and liability for civil penalty remained established. This issue is against the appellant.
Issue (iv): Whether the penalty amount warranted reduction.
Analysis: While sustaining the contravention and the liability to penalty, the penalty quantum was reduced from Rs. 5,00,00,000 to Rs. 1,00,00,000.
Conclusion: The penalty is reduced to Rs. 1,00,00,000. This issue is in favour of the appellant.
Final Conclusion: The foreign-exchange contravention and civil penalty liability remain established, but the monetary penalty is confined to Rs. 1,00,00,000.
Ratio Decidendi: A contravention of a statutory or regulatory obligation under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 attracts civil penalty without proof of mens rea where the statute does not prescribe a mental element.
Trust as an artificial juridical person under FEMA - Three-year limit for rupee borrowings from non-resident Indians - Effect of omission of Section 6(3) of FEMA - Mens rea for civil penalties under FEMA
Effect of omission of Section 6(3) of FEMA - Effect of the omission of Section 6(3) of FEMA on proceedings initiated before the omission was notified - HELD THAT: - The complaint and show-cause notice had been issued before the notification bringing the omission into effect. The ruling cited by the appellant concerned proceedings initiated after that notification and was therefore inapplicable. [Paras 9]
The omission of Section 6(3) did not invalidate the proceedings.
Trust as an artificial juridical person under FEMA - Borrowings recorded in books of account - Applicability of FEMA to a charitable trust receiving funds from its non-resident trustees that were recorded as borrowings - HELD THAT: - The inclusive definition of "person" under FEMA encompasses every artificial juridical person not otherwise specified. A trust and its trustees are legally distinct, and the differing definition under the Consumer Protection Act could not govern FEMA. The transfers were recorded as borrowings in the books of the trust and its educational institutions, notwithstanding the asserted charitable purpose. [Paras 10]
The trust was held to be a person under FEMA and the amounts were treated as borrowings.
Three-year limit for rupee borrowings from non-resident Indians - Non-repatriable rupee loans - Contravention of Regulation 4 where rupee loans from non-resident trustees were not repaid within three years - HELD THAT: - The non-repatriable character of the loans did not dispense with the requirement of repayment within three years, since repayment could have been made by credit to the lender's NRO or NRSR account without repatriation. The subsequently produced accountant's certificate did not negate the contravention. [Paras 11]
The contravention of the borrowing restrictions under FEMA and the Regulations was affirmed.
Mens rea for civil penalties under FEMA - Penalty for contravention of FEMA borrowing restrictions - Whether absence of guilty intention and the charitable purpose of the funds rendered the contravention venial and precluded penalty? - HELD THAT: - A contravention of the statutory and regulatory obligations under FEMA constitutes a breach of civil obligation attracting penalty once established. Section 13(1) contains no requirement of willfulness, deliberateness or intention; consequently, mens rea was not an essential element. The authority relied upon by the appellant concerning criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings was held inapplicable. [Paras 13, 14, 15]
The plea that the breach was venial was rejected, but the appeal was partly allowed by reducing the penalty.
Final Conclusion: The Tribunal upheld the applicability of FEMA and the finding of contravention of the borrowing restrictions, rejected absence of intent as a defence, and partly allowed the appeal by reducing the penalty.
Issues: (i) Whether the Special Court's order directing restoration of attached properties to the insolvency professional on an association's application was legally sustainable; (ii) Whether a monitoring committee should be constituted to verify genuine homebuyers and maintain information concerning attached assets, and whether the insolvency professional could participate in that process; and (iii) Whether immediate liquidation or restoration of the attached assets should be directed.
Issue (i): Whether the Special Court's order directing restoration of attached properties to the insolvency professional on an association's application was legally sustainable.
Analysis: Section 8(8) of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 permits restoration only to a claimant having a legitimate interest and a quantifiable loss. Rule 2(b) and Rule 3A of the Prevention of Money-laundering (Restoration of Property) Rules, 2016 require a qualifying claimant, framing of charge before restoration during trial, and an opportunity of hearing to the owner. The association was not itself a homebuyer, had not suffered a quantifiable loss, and could not satisfy the statutory requirements of a claimant.
Analysis: The attached assets belonged to former promoters and other persons or entities, and not to the corporate debtor undergoing insolvency proceedings. An insolvency-regulator circular and the insolvency professional's undertaking could not displace the statutory scheme under the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 or confer a role upon the insolvency professional in relation to non-corporate-debtor assets. The undertaking recorded in proceedings concerning an individual homebuyer was not an undertaking in rem for all homebuyers.
Conclusion: The Special Court's restoration order was set aside. The related interim orders founded upon that order were recalled and vacated.
Issue (ii): Whether a monitoring committee should be constituted to verify genuine homebuyers and maintain information concerning attached assets, and whether the insolvency professional could participate in that process.
Analysis: The number of affected purchasers, competing claims over attached assets, and the need for an expeditious and transparent verification process warranted an independent supervisory mechanism. The insolvency and money-laundering regimes concern distinct asset pools. The committee's work cannot interfere with the ongoing corporate insolvency resolution process, and the insolvency professional has no role before it because the attached assets are not assets of the corporate debtor.
Conclusion: A monitoring committee was constituted to verify genuine homebuyers irrespective of whether payment was made to either developer, and to maintain updated particulars, attachment status, pending challenges, and valuations of attached assets. The insolvency professional was excluded from the committee's process.
Issue (iii): Whether immediate liquidation or restoration of the attached assets should be directed.
Analysis: Restoration of attached property during trial remains governed by section 8(8) of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 and Rule 3A of the Prevention of Money-laundering (Restoration of Property) Rules, 2016. Challenges to individual attachments and appellate remedies remained pending; the statutory scheme recognises a deemed embargo on restoration while such remedies are unresolved. Detailed directions on restitution were deferred until a comprehensive record regarding claimants and asset status becomes available.
Conclusion: No immediate liquidation or restoration of the attached properties was directed; further directions were reserved for a subsequent stage.
Final Conclusion: The statutory process for dealing with attached property is preserved, while an independent verification and asset-information mechanism is established to facilitate future consideration of relief for genuine homebuyers without affecting rights in the ongoing insolvency proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi: Restoration of attached property under the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 must conform to the statutory requirements for a qualifying claimant and the conditions prescribed for restoration during trial; an insolvency undertaking cannot substitute those requirements or extend to assets that do not belong to the corporate debtor.
Restoration of attached property during trial under the PMLA - Claimant status of a homebuyers' association - Distinct operation of PMLA restoration and IBC insolvency processes - Monitoring of Greenopolis homebuyer claims and attached assets
Restoration of attached property during trial under the PMLA - Claimant status of a homebuyers' association - PMLA restoration and IBC insolvency processes - Validity of the PMLA Court's restoration order made on an application by a homebuyers' association in relation to attached assets not belonging to the corporate debtor. - HELD THAT: - Restoration of attached property during trial is governed by the statutory conditions under the PMLA and the Restoration Rules. A homebuyers' association, being neither a purchaser nor a person that had itself suffered a quantifiable loss, could not qualify as a claimant with a legitimate interest in the attached properties. Restoration under the Rules could arise only after framing of charge, a stage not reached in the proceedings. The IBBI circular could apply only where assets of the corporate debtor had been attached; it could neither govern assets of former promoters and other persons nor override the PMLA scheme. The IRP consequently had no statutory role in restoration proceedings concerning such assets, and the undertaking furnished in proceedings concerning a single homebuyer could not operate in rem for all homebuyers. The previous interim directions, founded on the contrary understanding, were likewise misconceived. [Paras 117, 118, 122, 123, 124]
The impugned restoration order was set aside, and the related interim orders were recalled and vacated.
Monitoring of homebuyer claims and attached assets - Verification of genuine homebuyers - Non-interference with CIRP proceedings - Constitution and limited remit of a monitoring committee for verification of Greenopolis homebuyers and compilation of information concerning assets attached in the PMLA proceedings. - HELD THAT: - In view of the number of claimants and competing claims over the attached assets, a monitoring committee was required to streamline the process and provide tangible relief to victim homebuyers. The committee was directed to verify genuine homebuyers irrespective of whether payments had been made to either developer, and to maintain an updated list of attached assets, their claimed ownership, attachment status, pending challenges and valuation. The Court deferred detailed directions on restoration or liquidation, since the attachment status and competing proprietary claims required to be ascertained. The committee's work would not interfere with the CIRP, and the IRP was assigned no role in the committee's proceedings. [Paras 130, 132, 135, 136, 137]
A monitoring committee was constituted with a confined verification and information-gathering remit; liquidation or other disposal of attached assets was deferred pending further directions.
Final Conclusion: The impugned PMLA restoration order and the related interim orders were set aside. A monitoring committee was constituted to verify genuine homebuyers and compile information on attached assets, while liquidation was deferred and the CIRP was kept outside the committee's remit.
Outcome: Special leave petition dismissed; all relevant issues and contentions were left open for trial.
Money Laundering - cognizance of the offences u/s 3 and 4 of the PMLA, 2002 was taken without adhering to the mandatory requirement of sanction u/s 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 corresponding to Section 218 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
HELD THAT:- In view of the correct statement of law recorded by the High Court in paragraph 9 of the impugned judgment [2025 (12) TMI 1737 - JHARKHAND HIGH COURT], we see no ground to entertain this special leave petition. The same is, accordingly, dismissed.
However, it is clarified that all relevant issues and contentions from both sides are left open, and the trial shall proceed uninfluenced by any observations made in the impugned order, particularly those contained in paragraphs 7 and 8 thereof.
Issues: (i) Whether the appellants may place the respondent's relied-upon documents on record in the pending attachment appeals; (ii) Whether costs imposed for belatedly seeking to place those documents on record should stand.
Issue (i): Whether the appellants may place the respondent's relied-upon documents on record in the pending attachment appeals.
Analysis: The documents sought to be produced were relied-upon documents forming part of the respondent's prosecution complaint. Their consideration was material to determining whether the attachment of the properties should continue during pendency of the complaint.
Conclusion: The refusal to take the documents on record was set aside, and the documents were treated as having been taken on record, in favour of the appellants.
Issue (ii): Whether costs imposed for belatedly seeking to place those documents on record should stand.
Analysis: The appeals had remained pending since 2022, the documents were already within the appellants' knowledge and possession, and the applications were filed only when the appeals were listed for final hearing.
Conclusion: The costs imposed for the belated filing were sustained, against the appellants.
Final Conclusion: The relied-upon documents form part of the appellate record for consideration of the continuing attachment, while the monetary consequence for the delayed application remains enforceable.
Ratio Decidendi: Relied-upon documents forming part of the prosecuting authority's complaint should be received on record where they are material to deciding the continuation of property attachment, though belated production may warrant costs.
Relied-upon documents in property-attachment appeals - Costs for belated filing of documents
Relied-upon documents in property-attachment appeals - Taking on record the respondent's relied-upon documents in appeals concerning continuation of property attachment - HELD THAT: - The documents sought to be produced were those relied upon by the respondent in its complaint and were relevant to determining whether the attachment should continue during pendency of the complaint. [Paras 8, 9]
The refusal to take the documents on record was set aside, and the documents already filed were directed to be treated as taken on record.
Costs for belated filing of documents - Sustainability of costs imposed for belated applications to place documents on record - HELD THAT: - The documents were always within the appellants' knowledge and possession, but the applications to place them on record were moved only when the appeals were listed for final hearing. [Paras 10]
The costs imposed by the Tribunal were maintained.
Final Conclusion: The refusal to take the documents on record was set aside and the documents were treated as on record; the costs imposed for their belated production were maintained.
Issues: (i) Whether the search, seizure and retention of the jewellery and other articles under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 were justified on the ground that they had a nexus with proceeds of crime; (ii) Whether the alleged non-service of the show-cause notice vitiated the retention order for breach of principles of natural justice.
Issue (i): Whether the search, seizure and retention of the jewellery and other articles under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 were justified on the ground that they had a nexus with proceeds of crime.
Analysis: Section 17 permits search and seizure upon the requisite material, while retention and adjudication require a prima facie connection between the property and proceeds of crime. The material disclosed substantial movement of alleged tainted funds through accounts operated by or connected with the appellant and their utilisation for acquisition of assets, including jewellery. At the retention stage, a transaction-wise tracing of every item of jewellery was not essential where the material as a whole established a continuous flow and utilisation of funds. Recovery from a joint-family residence, or the assertion that some jewellery belonged to a person not accused in the scheduled offence, did not by itself invalidate the seizure; the relevant inquiry was whether the property was connected with, or required examination in relation to, proceeds of crime.
Conclusion: The search, seizure and retention were justified, and the seized jewellery was prima facie connected with proceeds of crime. The finding is against the appellant.
Issue (ii): Whether the alleged non-service of the show-cause notice vitiated the retention order for breach of principles of natural justice.
Analysis: The appellant participated in the adjudicatory proceedings and had an effective opportunity to place a defence. No specific prejudice resulting in a failure of natural justice was established. A procedural irregularity does not invalidate an adjudication unless it causes substantial prejudice.
Conclusion: The alleged non-service of the show-cause notice did not vitiate the retention order. The finding is against the appellant.
Final Conclusion: The confirmation of retention of the seized property remains legally sustainable under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
Ratio Decidendi: Retention of property under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 may be sustained on prima facie material connecting it with proceeds of crime, notwithstanding its recovery from a joint-family premises or a claim by a person not accused in the scheduled offence.
Seizure and retention of property prima facie connected with proceeds of crime - Natural justice-prejudice from defective service of notice
Seizure and retention of property connected with proceeds of crime - Property held by persons not accused of scheduled offence - Validity of retention of jewellery seized from a joint family residence in a money-laundering investigation, despite the claim that it belonged to a family member not accused in the scheduled offence and the absence of a transaction-wise trail - HELD THAT: - The relevant inquiry is whether the property is connected with, or requires examination in relation to, proceeds of crime; it is not confined to property held by a person named as an accused in the scheduled offence. The material regarding interlinked accounts, movement of funds and payments for jewellery supported the requisite prima facie nexus. Recovery from a joint family residence and absence of identification of individual payments for each item of jewellery did not displace that satisfaction at the stage of retention and adjudication. [Paras 11, 13, 15, 16]
Retention of the seized jewellery was upheld, the material being sufficient to sustain the prima facie satisfaction required under the PMLA.
Natural justice - prejudice from defective service of notice - Effect of alleged non-service of the show-cause notice in proceedings confirming retention of seized property - HELD THAT: - The appellant participated in the proceedings and had an opportunity to present a defence. As no specific prejudice resulting in failure of natural justice was established, the alleged irregularity in initial service did not vitiate the adjudication. [Paras 14]
The alleged defect in service of notice did not warrant setting aside the impugned order.
Final Conclusion: The appeal challenging confirmation of retention of the seized property was dismissed, no infirmity in the impugned order having been established.
Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation for recovery of service tax could be invoked for the period 2015-16.
Analysis: Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 permits invocation of the extended limitation period only where suppression, wilful misstatement, fraud or like conduct is established. The relevant receipts and taxable transactions had been disclosed through VAT returns and ST-3 returns, and the original adjudicating authority had evaluated those records while dropping the proposed demand. The material did not establish suppression of facts, wilful misstatement or fraud. Therefore, any demand could only fall within the normal limitation period. The show cause notice dated 24.12.2020 for the period 2015-16 was wholly time-barred.
Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable, and the service tax demand was barred by limitation.
Extended period of limitation for service tax demand - Suppression of facts for invocation of extended limitation
Validity of invoking the extended limitation period for service tax demand on construction and works contract activities for 2015-16 - HELD THAT: - Upon consideration of the original order and the documents on record, the Tribunal found that fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts could not be alleged against the appellant. The demand could therefore be raised only within the normal limitation period u/s 73 of the Finance Act, 1994; the notice issued for 2015-16 was wholly time-barred. [Paras 4]
The demand, consequential interest and penalty were set aside on limitation.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed and the impugned order was set aside solely on the ground that the service tax demand was barred by limitation.
Issues: (i) Whether the service-tax demand based on the departmental computation of the assessee's sales turnover was sustainable; (ii) Whether the threshold exemption was available for the residual taxable-service receipts of Rs. 9,32,999.
Issue (i): Whether the service-tax demand based on the departmental computation of the assessee's sales turnover was sustainable.
Analysis: The acknowledged VAT audit report in Form E-704 recorded sales turnover of Rs. 1,16,70,673 and payment of VAT attributable to those transactions. The lower authorities adopted a substantially lower sales figure of Rs. 85,89,993 without referring to documentary material supporting that computation. The service-tax demand resulting from the assumed taxable-service component was therefore unsupported by adequate evidence.
Conclusion: The service-tax demand founded on the unsubstantiated turnover computation is unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the threshold exemption was available for the residual taxable-service receipts of Rs. 9,32,999.
Analysis: Notification No. 33/2012-S.T. dated 20.06.2012 exempted taxable services within the threshold limit of Rs. 10 lakh from service tax leviable under Section 66B of the Finance Act, 1994. The residual receipts identified as taxable-service income were Rs. 9,32,999 and fell within that limit.
Conclusion: The threshold exemption is available for the taxable-service receipts of Rs. 9,32,999, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The adjudged service-tax liability lacks a sustainable basis, and no service tax is payable on the residual receipts within the notified threshold.
Service tax demand on unsubstantiated service turnover - Small service provider exemption for photography services
Service tax demand on unsubstantiated service turnover - Sustainability of service tax demand on photography business receipts after exclusion of sales turnover supported by VAT audit records - HELD THAT: - The acknowledged VAT audit report recorded turnover from sale of cameras and allied goods and payment of VAT thereon. In the absence of documentary material supporting the lower authorities' different figure for sales turnover, the computation of the taxable-service component from the income-tax return was held to be unsubstantiated. [Paras 4]
The service tax demand founded on that computation could not be sustained.
Small service provider exemption for photography services - Eligibility for the small service provider exemption in respect of the balance photography-service receipts - HELD THAT: - On the accepted sales turnover, the residual business income represented receipts from taxable services. Since, the appellant had availed the benefit of the Notification dated 20.06.2012 and did not pay any service tax on the remaining amount, claim of such benefit as per the Notification No. 33/2012 dated 20.06.2012 is proper and justified. [Paras 4]
The balance service receipts were held exempt from service tax.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order confirming the service tax demand was set aside and the appeal was allowed.
Issues: Whether the extended period under Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 could be invoked to recover interest where the recipient had discharged reverse-charge service tax through CENVAT credit.
Analysis: Section 66A of the Finance Act, 1994 fastened reverse-charge service-tax liability on the recipient of services received from abroad. Utilisation of CENVAT credit by such recipient for payment of the tax was permissible under the CENVAT framework. Consequently, the ingredients for invoking the extended limitation under the proviso to Section 73 were absent. The limitation applicable to recovery of the principal tax was also applicable to the consequential interest demand.
Conclusion: The interest demand was barred by limitation and was set aside, in favour of the assessee.
Utilisation of CENVAT credit under reverse charge - Limitation for service-tax interest demand
Utilisation of CENVAT credit under reverse charge - Extended limitation for service-tax demand - Entitlement of a service recipient to use CENVAT credit for discharging service tax under reverse charge and the consequent applicability of the extended period of limitation - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that utilisation of CENVAT credit by the recipient of taxable service for payment of service tax under reverse charge was permissible. Such utilisation could not justify invocation of the extended period under the proviso to section 73; consequently, the notice issued beyond the normal period of eighteen months was time-barred. [Paras 5]
The appellant was held entitled to the benefit of limitation.
Limitation for service-tax interest demand - Applicability of the limitation governing the principal service-tax demand to an interest demand for delayed payment - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal adopted the principle that recovery of interest must adhere to the same limitation period as recovery of the principal amount. Since the extended period was unavailable, the interest demand could not be sustained.
Co-ordinate Bench of this Tribunal in the case of Secure Hospitality and Insurance Service Pvt. Ltd. [2026 (3) TMI 1766 - CESTAT MUMBAI] by relying upon the judgement of T.V.S. Whirpool Ltd [1996 (4) TMI 232 - CEGAT, MADRAS] has held that the period of limitation for issuance of the show cause notice should also applicable in the case of the demand of interest.[Paras 5, 6]
The interest demand was set aside as barred by limitation.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was partly allowed, the interest demand having been set aside as time-barred, while the unpressed challenge to the penalty remained undisturbed.
Issues: (i) Whether fees paid to governmental authorities for licences, permissions, registrations, safety checks and certifications were exempt from service tax under Serial No. 58 of Notification No. 25/2012-Service Tax dated 20.06.2012; (ii) Whether the service-tax demand was barred by limitation where tax payable under the Reverse Charge Mechanism would have been immediately available as CENVAT credit.
Issue (i): Whether fees paid to governmental authorities for licences, permissions, registrations, safety checks and certifications were exempt from service tax under Serial No. 58 of Notification No. 25/2012-Service Tax dated 20.06.2012.
Analysis: The exemption covered registration, testing, calibration, safety check or certification required under law. The relevant test was whether the assessee could lawfully carry on its business without the licences and permissions for which the payments were made. The licences and permissions were indispensable for conducting the business, and no material established that the business could have continued without them. The governmental services therefore qualified for the service-tax exemption.
Conclusion: The fees were exempt from service tax; the demand on this account was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the service-tax demand was barred by limitation where tax payable under the Reverse Charge Mechanism would have been immediately available as CENVAT credit.
Analysis: Any service tax paid under the Reverse Charge Mechanism would have been immediately available to the assessee as CENVAT credit. This supported the finding that the demand could not be sustained on limitation.
Conclusion: The demand was barred by limitation, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The confirmed levy in respect of the governmental fees could not be maintained on either the exemption or limitation basis.
Ratio Decidendi: A licence, permit or registration is required under law for the governmental-service exemption where it is indispensable to lawfully carrying on the business.
Service tax exemption for statutory licences and permissions - Limitation of reverse-charge service tax demand where CENVAT credit is immediately available
Service tax exemption for statutory licences and permissions - Exemption of fees paid to governmental authorities for licences, permissions, registrations, safety checks and certifications required for carrying on the appellant's business - HELD THAT: - The requirement of registration, licence or permission had to be assessed in the context of whether the appellant could lawfully carry on its business without obtaining it. As the department produced no evidence that the business could have been conducted without making the payments to the governmental authorities, the services were covered by the exemption under Notification No. 25/2012-ST. [Paras 7]
The impugned service tax demand was unsustainable as the payments were exempt.
Limitation of reverse-charge service tax demand where CENVAT credit is immediately available - Limitation of the service tax demand under reverse charge where any tax paid would have been immediately available as CENVAT credit - HELD THAT: - Since service tax paid under the reverse charge mechanism would have been immediately available to the appellant as CENVAT credit, the demand could not sustain on limitation. [Paras 8]
The demand was independently held unsustainable on limitation.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief, the demand being unsustainable both on exemption and limitation.
Issues: Whether an appeal challenging the determination that services provided to an overseas entity are not intermediary services and qualify as export of services is maintainable before the High Court under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944.
Analysis: Sections 35G and 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944 create mutually exclusive appellate forums. Section 35G excludes matters relating to the rate of duty or value for assessment, while Section 35L channels such matters to the Supreme Court; taxability and excisability are included within that excluded category. The determination concerning the characterisation of the services as intermediary services and their qualification as export services concerns classification, excisability and value of the services for assessment.
Conclusion: The appeal under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was not maintainable; the challenge lies before the Supreme Court under Section 35L of that Act.
Appellate forum for intermediary and export-of-service classification - High Court appellate jurisdiction over intermediary and export-of-service classification
Maintainability of a High Court appeal against the Tribunal's determination, in a CENVAT credit refund claim, that marketing promotional and after-sales services supplied to an overseas entity were not intermediary services and qualified as export of services - HELD THAT: - The statutory appellate scheme bars a High Court appeal where the Tribunal's order determines a question related to the rate of duty or value for assessment, including taxability or excisability. Applying that principle, the Court held that the Tribunal's determination of the nature of the services as intermediary or export services concerned their classification, excisability and value, and therefore fell within the class of matters appealable to the Supreme Court. [Paras 13]
The appeal was dismissed as not maintainable before the High Court, with liberty to the appellant to approach the Supreme Court in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed as the Tribunal's determination was held to fall within the statutory appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court rather than that of the High Court.
Issues: Whether an appeal challenging the Tribunal's determination on intermediary status and export of services was maintainable before the High Court under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944.
Analysis: Section 35G excludes High Court appeals relating to questions having a relation to the rate of duty or value for assessment, while Section 35L(1)(b) assigns such matters to the Supreme Court. Section 35L(2) includes questions of taxability or excisability within that excluded category. The Tribunal's determination of whether the services were intermediary services and whether they qualified as export of services involved classification, excisability and valuation of the services for assessment; it therefore fell within the statutory exclusion from the High Court's jurisdiction.
Conclusion: The appeal was not maintainable before the High Court; the proper forum was the Supreme Court under Section 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944.
Statutory allocation of appellate jurisdiction in assessment-related service classification disputes
Jurisdictional bar on High Court appeals in rate or valuation matters - Intermediary services and export of services-appellate forum - Maintainability of a High Court appeal against the Tribunal's determination that marketing, promotional and after-sales services rendered to an overseas entity were not intermediary services and qualified as export of services - HELD THAT: - The statutory scheme makes the appellate jurisdictions mutually exclusive: questions relating to the rate of duty or value for assessment, including matters directly and proximately connected with classification, taxability or excisability, are excluded from the High Court's jurisdiction and lie before the Supreme Court.
Tribunal's determination of whether the services were intermediary services or export services was held to concern their classification, excisability and value for assessment and therefore fell within the statutory exclusion. [Paras 9, 10, 12, 13, 15]
The appeal was held not maintainable before the High Court and was dismissed, with liberty to the appellant to approach the Supreme Court in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed as not maintainable before the High Court, the dispute being held to fall within the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.
Issues: Whether the maximum packing speed of a pan masala packing machine could be reduced through alterations to the machine for determining duty liability when the same goods continued to be packed.
Analysis: The statutory scheme treats the number of packing machines and the maximum packing speed at which they can be operated as relevant factors for capacity determination, deemed production and duty. A fresh declaration may be filed upon subsequent changes, but the permissible changes do not authorise reduction of the maximum speed of a machine by alteration when packing the same goods at the same retail sale price. The records established that the machine had operated at 1000 pouches per minute and fell within the category of 751 pouches per minute and above; altered actual operating speed or a claimed reduction in speed could not displace that maximum-speed category.
Conclusion: The reduced speed declaration was not admissible. The machine was correctly classifiable in the category of 751 pouches per minute and above, with duty payable on that basis, against the assessee.
Maximum packing speed for pan masala packing machines for payment of centrale excise duty - Redetermination of capacity after alteration of packing machine
Permissibility of reducing the maximum packing speed of a pan masala packing machine by alteration for manufacture of the same goods at the same retail sale price - HELD THAT: - The Rules make the maximum speed at which a packing machine can be operated a relevant factor for capacity and duty determination. Rule 6(6) permits fresh declarations for specified changes, including maximum speed on commencement of manufacture at a new retail sale price; it does not permit reduction of the speed of the same machine for the same goods merely through alteration. As the machine's admitted maximum speed was above 751 pouches per minute, the altered operating speed could not govern its statutory capacity. [Paras 12, 13]
The machine was held classifiable in the category of 751 pouches per minute and above, and duty was payable accordingly.
Final Conclusion: The Revenue's appeal was allowed and the impugned appellate order was set aside. The machine's maximum packing speed was determined as 751 pouches per minute and above for duty purposes.
Issues: (i) Whether modifications and body-building undertaken on fully built motor vehicles amount to manufacture or result in excisable goods, and whether exemption under Notification No. 12/2012-CE dated 17.03.2012 is consequently available. (ii) Whether the extended limitation under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and penalty under Section 11AC of that Act are invocable. (iii) Whether individual penalty under Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 is sustainable.
Issue (i): Whether modifications and body-building undertaken on fully built motor vehicles amount to manufacture or result in excisable goods, and whether exemption under Notification No. 12/2012-CE dated 17.03.2012 is consequently available.
Analysis: Central excise duty is chargeable on goods in the form in which they are cleared. Modification of an already fully built vehicle or addition of value does not, by itself, establish manufacture. Section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and Chapter Note 5 of Chapter 87 of the First Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 require a determination whether the processes undertaken constitute manufacture, including whether they amount to building a body on a chassis falling under heading 8706. Classification and exemption liability cannot be resolved without this foundational determination.
Conclusion: The question of manufacture or excisability and the consequential eligibility for exemption requires fresh determination.
Issue (ii): Whether the extended limitation under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and penalty under Section 11AC of that Act are invocable.
Analysis: The assessee was registered, regularly filed statutory returns, disclosed its clearances and exemption claim, and was subjected to departmental scrutiny and audits. Section 11A extended limitation and Section 11AC penalty require fraud, wilful misstatement, suppression, or contravention with intent to evade duty. Mere non-payment, a mistaken legal position, or a subsequent change in the departmental view does not establish a positive and deliberate act of suppression.
Conclusion: The extended period of limitation and penalty under Section 11AC are not invocable, in favour of the assessee; any duty determination is confined to the normal period of limitation.
Issue (iii): Whether individual penalty under Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 is sustainable.
Analysis: Personal penalty under Rule 26 requires material showing the requisite knowledge and involvement in dealing with goods liable to confiscation. In the absence of fraud, collusion, wilful suppression, misstatement, or intent to evade duty, the record does not establish the basis for personal penal liability.
Conclusion: The penalty under Rule 26 is unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: Only a duty liability determined within the normal limitation period, after determining manufacture and exemption eligibility, may survive; the penal consequences founded on intentional evasion cannot be sustained on the present record.
Ratio Decidendi: Extended limitation and penalty for evasion apply only upon proof of a positive and deliberate act amounting to wilful suppression or other statutory deception with intent to evade duty.
Manufacture and excisability of modified motor vehicles - Extended limitation for excise duty demand - Penalty for wilful suppression of facts - Penalty on Executive Director for excise duty evasion
Manufacture of modified fully built motor vehicles - Chassis-based excise exemption - Excisability of body-building and modifications made to fully built passenger and cargo motor vehicles, and consequential eligibility for the claimed chassis-based exemption - HELD THAT: - Excise duty is chargeable on goods in the form in which they are cleared. Where fully built motor vehicles were received and subsequently modified, it was necessary first to determine whether the activities of refining or remaking the existing vehicles amounted to manufacture. If manufacture was claimed by virtue of the Chapter Note, it was also necessary to determine whether the activity involved building a body on the chassis in the form received. The impugned order did not determine these foundational questions of manufacture and excisability. [Paras 4]
The matter was remanded without adjudication on merits for fresh determination of manufacture, excisability and the admissibility of the claimed exemption.
Extended limitation for excise duty demand - Wilful suppression of facts - Invocation of the extended period for excise duty demand arising from the classification, exemption and valuation disputes - HELD THAT: - The appellant was registered, regularly filed prescribed returns, and its records were subjected to departmental assessment, scrutiny and audit. Similar clearances had been made in the past without objection. A subsequent change in the departmental view could not establish active suppression or a deliberate intent to evade duty, particularly when the appellant entertained a bona fide belief regarding exemption. The extended period requires a positive and deliberate act of suppression or misstatement with intent to evade duty. [Paras 4]
The extended period was held unavailable, and any duty determined on remand was confined to the normal period of limitation.
Penalty for wilful suppression of facts - Penalty for short-payment of excise duty - Penalty on the manufacturer for alleged misclassification, wrongful exemption and undervaluation with intent to evade excise duty - HELD THAT: - The conditions for penalty for short-payment of duty on account of fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression with intent to evade are the same conditions that permit recourse to the extended period. As no legally sustainable finding of such deliberate conduct could be maintained, the statutory foundation for the penalty failed. [Paras 4]
The penalty imposed on the manufacturer under Section 11AC was set aside.
Penalty on Executive Director for excise duty evasion - Penalty on the Executive Director under Rule 26 for the alleged evasion of excise duty by the manufacturer - HELD THAT: - In the absence of fraud, collusion, suppression or misstatement with intent to evade duty, no case for imposition of personal penalty was made out. [Paras 4]
The penalty imposed on the Executive Director under Rule 26 was set aside.
Final Conclusion: The appeal of the manufacturer was allowed, with remand for fresh adjudication of manufacture, excisability and exemption within the normal limitation period. The extended-period demand and the penalties on the manufacturer and its Executive Director were not sustained.
TaxTMI