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1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment include:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Nature and Scope of Section 129
Issue 2: Imposition of Penalties for Procedural Lapses
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The court's decision underscores the importance of interpreting statutory provisions in a manner that aligns with principles of fairness, moderation, and reasonableness, particularly in the context of procedural lapses under the CGST Act.
Interpretation of statute - Section 129 of the Central Goods & Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act) constitutes a statutory penalty provision that overrides other penalty provisions in the Act - It is submitted that Section 129 being a provision creating a statutory penalty and intended to override the scheme of Chapter XIX of the Act by virtue of the non-obstante clause that it incorporates, does not appear to be sound for reasons - incomplete E-way Bills (EWBs) without any fraudulent intent - applicability and interpretation of Sections 122, 125, and 126 concerning minor breaches and procedural errors - HELD THAT:- The non-obstante clause in Section 129 cannot possibly be interpreted as being intended to override what had been specifically provided in Section 126 or annihilate the rules of guidance which stood embodied therein.
Section 129 is principally concerned with the release of goods and conveyances which may have been detained or seized. That is clearly not a subject which is regulated or controlled by any of the other provisions contained in Chapter XIX of the Act. The use of the non-obstante clause is thus liable to be appreciated and construed in the aforesaid light. In our considered opinion, since the subject of levy of penalty in connection with goods being transported in contravention of the Act had not been previously dealt with, the Legislature thought it fit and appropriate to deploy the non-obstante in order to deal with that subject. The extent of the “notwithstanding” phrase which introduces Section 129 into the statute book is thus liable to be construed in that light and thus the limit of its essay acknowledged accordingly.
We also find ourselves unable to read Section 129 as embodying an intendment of the Legislature to either override or completely supersede and obliterate Section 126. Accepting such an interpretation would clearly amount to depriving a person of the benefit of the principles of moderation and modulation which Section 126 introduces and enjoins to be borne in consideration while considering the levy of a penalty. The provisions contained in sub-section (6) of Section 126 also cannot possibly be read as whittling down the application of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 126 when it ordains that it would not apply to cases where penalties stand specified either as a fixed sum or percentage.
Section 126 (6) of the Act provides that its provisions will not apply in cases where the penalty under the Act is specified as a fixed sum or as a fixed percentage. This is further reflective of the Legislature seeking to distinguish between discretionary penalties and those that are predetermined. By excluding fixed penalties from the scope of this section, the law ensures clarity and consistency in its application, underscoring the principle that certain penalties are non-negotiable and uniformly applicable irrespective of the circumstances of the breach.
It would also be pertinent to note that in Synergy Fertichem [2019 (12) TMI 1213 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT], the Gujarat High Court emphasized that authorities must distinguish between trivial breaches and serious contraventions under the Act. The High Court clarified that confiscation is penal in nature and should only apply in cases of a clear intent to evade tax as opposed to mere procedural lapses such as an incomplete EWB when other valid documents are present. Further, issuing confiscation notices under Section 130 at the initial stage, without proper grounds or evidence of an intent to evade tax, the High Court held would be unjustified and would render Section 129 ineffective. The Court ultimately came to conclude that a reasoned and fair approach is essential to avoid an unnecessary detention of goods and conveyances.
We are in complete agreement with the view expressed by the Gujarat High Court and which correctly explains the interplay between Sections 129 and 130 of the Act. The harsh consequences which would follow a confiscation clearly warrant the provisions of the Act being accorded an interpretation which would be fair, reasonable and in consonance with the requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution. In any event, Section 129 can neither be construed as envisaging an inevitable levy of tax nor the imposition of a penalty. As noticed hereinabove, the said provision is primarily concerned with the release of seized and detained goods.
Conclsuion - The levy of penalties under the Act must be guided by the salutary principles which stand embodied in Section 126. That statutory provision is undoubtedly an embodiment of the legislative intent of levy of penalties being guided by principles of moderation, restraint and reasonableness.
Petition disposed off.
Issues: Whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was maintainable to challenge a show cause notice raising disputed factual issues under the goods and services tax law.
Analysis: The petitioner challenged the notice on the ground that the relevant penal provision was brought into force later and that he was not a taxable person. The Court held that such objections could be raised before the adjudicating authority by filing a reply to the notice. It applied the settled principle that interference at the stage of a show cause notice is exceptional and that writ jurisdiction is not normally invoked where the controversy requires factual adjudication and an efficacious alternative remedy is available.
Conclusion: The writ petition was not entertained and the petitioner was relegated to pursue the objection and adjudication process under the statute.
Final Conclusion: The challenge to the show cause notice was declined at the threshold, leaving the statutory adjudication process open for the petitioner to contest the notice on merits.
Ratio Decidendi: A show cause notice involving disputed facts and statutory objections should ordinarily be answered in the statutory adjudication process, and writ interference is unwarranted in the absence of exceptional circumstances.
Challenge to SCN - issuance of fake invoices without any underlying supply of goods using the GST registration of another entity for monetary benefits - conspiracy between petitioner and two other persons to dupe the Government by issuing fake invoices and arranged fake Input Tax Credit for the purpose of evading tax at some stage - HELD THAT:- Since petitioner is assailing a show cause notice, he has a remedy of filing an objection and invite an adjudication on merits. Even though petitioner referred to the decision of the Bombay High Court in SHANTANU SANJAY HUNDEKARI, VIKAS AGARWAL, YOGESH AGARWAL, MAMTA GUPTA VERSUS UNION OF INDIA, THROUGH SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, NEW DELHI., STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, JOINT DIRECTOR, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF GOODS AND SERVICE TAX INTELLIGENCE, GUJARAT. THE ADDITIONAL/JOINT COMMISSIONER, THANE COMMISSIONERATE, [2024 (3) TMI 1277 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT], the facts of the said case were totally different. In the said case, an employee of a company was prosecuted against for the alleged mischief of the company. In such circumstances, the High Court of Bombay interfered with the show cause notice. However, facts and the instant circumstances of the present case are totally different.
The extraordinary remedy of Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked to challenge a show cause notice unless there are exceptional reasons. In the decision in UNION OF INDIA VERSUS VICCO LABORATORIES [2007 (11) TMI 21 - SUPREME COURT] it was held that interference at the stage of show cause notice should be rare and not in a routine manner. It was also held that mere assertion that notice is without jurisdiction or that it is an abuse of process of law would not suffice to exercise jurisdiction. When factual adjudication is necessary, interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is ruled out.
The reasons now stated by the petitioner are all matters which can be agitated before the adjudicating authority itself. The issue requires factual adjudication as well.
Conclusion - There are no reason to entertain this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and relegate the petitioner to pursue other remedies available under law by filing an objection and inviting an order of adjudication.
Petition dismissed.
Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging an order passed under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was maintainable in view of the statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Act, and whether the Court should examine the factual basis for invocation of Section 74 in writ jurisdiction.
Analysis: The impugned order recorded reasons for invoking Section 74, and the challenge was directed substantially to the correctness of those reasons. Such controversy involved disputed facts, which are not ordinarily examined in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The statutory scheme provides an appeal under Section 107 of the Act, and the objections based on fraud, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, and reliance on departmental instruction were matters better tested in the appellate forum.
Conclusion: The writ petition was not entertained, and the petitioner was relegated to the statutory appellate remedy.
Final Conclusion: The challenge to the Section 74 order did not warrant writ interference, and the petition stood rejected in favour of the statutory remedy under the Act.
Ratio Decidendi: Where an order under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is supported by stated factual reasons, disputed questions relating to the invocation of that provision should be pursued in the statutory appeal rather than under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Invocation of powers under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 for fraud, willful misstatement or suppression - appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution limited where disputed factual findings are involved - relevance of Instruction No. 05/2023 of the Central Board of Indirect Taxes & Customs to invocation of Section 74
Judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution limited where disputed factual findings are involved - appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - High Court will not exercise writ jurisdiction under Article 226 to adjudicate disputed factual findings motivating invocation of Section 74 and instead relegated the petitioner to the statutory remedy of appeal under Section 107. - HELD THAT: - The Court observed that the impugned order sets out specific reasons for invoking Section 74 and that the correctness of those factual findings could not be gone into in a writ petition under Article 226 because they are disputed facts. The Court noted that the normal and appropriate remedy against an order under Section 74 is an appeal under Section 107 of the Act and that questions regarding the existence of fraud, willful misstatement or suppression are matters to be agitated in that statutory appeal rather than in extraordinary constitutional writ proceedings. The Court therefore declined to entertain the petition on merits and chose not to supplant the statutory appellate forum. [Paras 5, 6, 7]
Writ petition dismissed insofar as it seeks adjudication of disputed factual findings underpinning invocation of Section 74; petitioner relegated to appeal under Section 107.
Invocation of powers under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 for fraud, willful misstatement or suppression - relevance of Instruction No. 05/2023 of the Central Board of Indirect Taxes & Customs to invocation of Section 74 - Contentions that Section 74 was wrongly invoked (including reliance on Instruction No. 05/2023 and allegations of absence of fraud, willful misstatement or suppression) were not decided on merits and must be raised in the statutory appeal. - HELD THAT: - Although the petitioner relied on Instruction No. 05/2023 and submitted that there was no fraud, willful misstatement or suppression warranting invocation of Section 74, the Court held that such contentions involve disputed factual and legal questions falling for consideration in the appellate forum provided by the Act. The Court expressly refrained from determining those contentions in the writ proceeding and directed that they be agitated before the appellate authority under Section 107. [Paras 3, 6]
Allegations challenging the correctness of invoking Section 74 (including reliance on Instruction No. 05/2023 and natural justice complaints) not adjudicated; to be pursued in an appeal under Section 107.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition dismissed; petitioner directed to pursue statutory remedy of appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 rather than seek adjudication of disputed factual findings in Article 226 proceedings.
Issues: Whether the impugned penalty order was liable to be interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for denial of cross-examination of third-party witnesses whose statements were relied upon in adjudication.
Analysis: The available statutory appeal did not bar writ intervention where the complaint was a breach of natural justice, since the appellate authority under section 107(11) of the GST enactments could not remand the matter. The adjudication relied on statements of about 20 persons, but the petitioner's repeated requests for cross-examination were refused. Cross-examination was treated as a necessary means to test the credibility and veracity of third-party statements when such statements form the basis of adverse findings. The adjudicating authority's assumption that cross-examination would not affect the evidentiary value of those statements was held to be impermissible, because it prejudged the matter and denied a fair opportunity of defence.
Conclusion: The refusal to permit cross-examination amounted to violation of the principles of natural justice, and the impugned order could not stand.
Final Conclusion: The order of penalty was set aside and the matter was sent back for fresh adjudication after granting cross-examination and proceeding in accordance with law.
Ratio Decidendi: Where adverse adjudication under the GST law rests materially on third-party statements, fairness requires a real opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses unless such opportunity is genuinely impracticable or unavailable, and denial of that opportunity vitiates the order for breach of natural justice.
Principles of natural justice - right to cross-examination of witnesses relied upon in quasi-judicial tax adjudication - opportunity of hearing under section 75(4) of the CGST Act - limits on appellate remand powers under section 107(11) of the CGST Act
Limits on appellate remand powers under section 107(11) of the CGST Act - Whether interference under Article 226 is permissible when an alternate remedy of appeal exists but the Appellate Authority lacks power to remand under section 107(11). - HELD THAT: - The Court observed that section 107(11) confines the Appellate Authority to confirming, modifying or annulling the impugned order and expressly removes the power to remand the matter for further adjudication. Because the appellate forum cannot remit the matter for fresh investigation or correction of procedural infirmities such as violation of natural justice, the availability of an appeal under the statute does not preclude exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 where principles of natural justice have been breached. The statutory curtailment of remand power thus renders equitable judicial review under Article 226 legally justified in cases where the adjudicatory process suffers from procedural unfairness that cannot be remedied by the appellate forum. [Paras 6, 7]
Recourse to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 was held to be legally justified despite the existence of an appeal under section 107 because the Appellate Authority is statutorily deprived of power to remand.
Principles of natural justice - right to cross-examination of witnesses relied upon in quasi-judicial tax adjudication - opportunity of hearing under section 75(4) of the CGST Act - Whether refusal to permit cross-examination of third-party witnesses whose statements were relied upon in the adjudication constituted a violation of natural justice requiring setting aside of the impugned order. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that when statements of third parties are made the basis of an adjudicatory order, the person adversely affected must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to test the veracity and credibility of those statements by cross-examination, unless the request is frivolous or the witness is unavailable for reasons such as death. Cross-examination is a basic mode of testing testimonial evidence and is integral to the opportunity of hearing mandated by section 75(4). The Adjudicating Authority's categorical conclusion that cross-examination would not affect the evidence, and its refusal to permit the requested cross-examination, reflected an impermissible foregone conclusion and predilection. Reliance upon authorities where denial of cross-examination was factually justified could not validate the impugned denial in the present circumstances where statements of about twenty witnesses were relied upon and the request to cross-examine was neither shown to be frivolous nor impracticable. On these grounds the Court found a breach of the principles of natural justice. [Paras 11, 12, 17, 18, 20]
The refusal to grant cross-examination was held to violate principles of natural justice; the impugned order was set aside and the matter remanded for fresh consideration after granting an opportunity for cross-examination, to be completed expeditiously.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed: the impugned adjudication order dated 29-05-2024 was set aside for violation of natural justice in refusing cross-examination of witnesses relied upon; the matter is remitted to the adjudicating authority to decide afresh after granting the requested opportunity for cross-examination and to pass appropriate orders within six months.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment include:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Dismissal of the Petitioner's Appeal Due to Notification No. 53 of 2023
Issue 2: Entitlement to Appeal Consideration on Merits
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Overall, the judgment emphasizes the importance of fair appellate consideration and the need to interpret procedural rules in a manner that facilitates justice rather than impedes it.
Extension of limitation for filing appeals - interpretation of cut-off date in beneficial notification - delay condonation under beneficial notification - reopening appellate file and decision on merits
Extension of limitation for filing appeals - interpretation of cut-off date in beneficial notification - reopening appellate file and decision on merits - Appellate order dismissing the appeal for assessment year 2017-18 on the ground that the assessment order was dated after 31.03.2023 was set aside and the appeal was directed to be restored and decided on merits. - HELD THAT: - Petitioner had filed an appeal within the window created by Notification No. 53 of 2023 (allowing filing of appeals in respect of orders passed prior to 31.03.2023 up to 31.01.2024 on payment of admitted tax plus 12.5%). The Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal on the basis that the assessment order was dated 23.06.2023, i.e., after 31.03.2023. This Court, following reasoning in a Division Bench decision (extracted at paras. 4-5 of Annexure-P/23) found no rationale for rigidly fixing 31.03.2023 as the cut-off date and considered that orders passed within a reasonable period prior to issuance of the notification ought to receive the beneficial treatment. Applying that reasoning, the Court held that the appellate dismissal was not tenable and directed that Annexure-P/1 be set aside and the appeal be taken on file and disposed of on merits after due hearing. [Paras 10]
Annexure-P/1 for assessment year 2017-18 is set aside; the Appellate Authority is directed to resume the appeal on its file and decide it on merits.
Extension of limitation for filing appeals - interpretation of cut-off date in beneficial notification - reopening appellate file and decision on merits - Appellate order dismissing the appeal for assessment year 2018-19 was set aside and the appeal was directed to be restored and decided on merits on the same reasoning as for 2017-18. - HELD THAT: - The facts and legal position for assessment year 2018-19 mirrored those in 2017-18. Applying the same principle that the cut-off date of 31.03.2023 in the notification could not be treated rigidly and that the beneficial window should be extended to permit consideration of appeals in appropriate cases, the Court directed that the appellate dismissal be set aside and the appeal be heard on merits. The petitioner was directed to appear before the Appellate Authority with a copy of the judgment so the appeals can be heard and disposed of on merits. [Paras 11]
Annexure-P/1 for assessment year 2018-19 is set aside; the Appellate Authority is directed to resume the appeal on its file and decide it on merits.
Final Conclusion: Writ petitions allowed; appellate orders dismissing the appeals for assessment years 2017-18 and 2018-19 set aside and the Appellate Authority directed to restore the appeals to its files and decide them on merits after hearing the petitioner (appearance fixed on 06.01.2025 or any other date fixed).
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Whether the appellant should be allowed to make submissions on two substantial questions of law.
Issue 2: Whether the orders dated 18.05.2023 and 05.09.2023 should be set aside.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The judgment emphasizes the necessity of ensuring that all substantial legal questions are thoroughly examined, especially when prior submissions may have inadvertently limited the scope of judicial consideration. The Court's decision to set aside previous orders reflects a commitment to upholding procedural justice and ensuring that parties have the opportunity to fully present their arguments.
Belated deposit of employees’ contribution towards the EPF and ESI - High Court proceeded to consider only one of the substantial questions of law and observed that the other two substantial questions of law were covered by the Judgment of this Court in Checkmates Services Pvt. Ltd. [2022 (10) TMI 617 - SUPREME COURT] - HELD THAT:- Appellant before the High Court erroneously contended that two substantial questions of law were covered by the Judgment of this Court in Checkmates Services Pvt. Ltd. (supra) against the Assessee, but that is not so.
We find that an opportunity must be given to the appellant herein to make submissions on those two substantial questions of law and for the purpose of reconsidering whether they were covered by the judgment of this Court in Checkmates Services Pvt. Ltd. (supra) against the Assessee or not.
For the aforesaid purpose, we have no option but to set aside the order [2023 (10) TMI 779 - DELHI HIGH COURT], although the said order has been accepted by both sides and there is no challenge to the same in the context of there being any error in the said order, but being assailed only for the purpose of seeking to assail the order [2023 (5) TMI 1418 - DELHI HIGH COURT] and for seeking restoration ITA on the file of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi on setting aside the order [2023 (10) TMI 779 - DELHI HIGH COURT] dated 05.09.2023.
We do not wish to consider this case on the merits of the order passed by the High Court of Delhi for the simple reason that the same has been accepted by both sides. However, the said order has to be set aside as it is a final order of the High Court, so as to enable ITA being restored on the file of the High court. Consequently, we also set aside the interim order [2023 (5) TMI 1418 - DELHI HIGH COURT].
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal issues considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Entitlement to Renewal of Tax Relief under Section 80-G
Issue 2: Alignment of Donations with Charitable Objectives
Issue 3: Activities Fulfilling Charitable Purposes
Issue 4: Justification of Denial of Renewal by Commissioner
Issue 5: Escaped Assessment under Section 147
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Denial of renewal benefit of tax relief u/s 80G - arrangement between the doctors and the petitioner-Trust amounted to take the premises of the Trust on rent and carrying private practice, thus, no charitable work was being carried out - Charitable activity or not?
As per revenue Trust has not provided facility of space to the Doctors of various specialties under one roof and Trust has given donations to various organizations - whether the petitioner – Trust is meeting out its charitable purpose or not ? - HELD THAT:- Recently, Hon’ble Apex Court while considering the requirement of continuing the registration for an Educational Trust, in the case of M/s New Noble Educational Society [2022 (10) TMI 855 - SUPREME COURT] proceeded to hold that the word ‘solely’ would also mean that the ancillary work, which may be carried out by the Society for the purpose of enhancing education, would also be treated as work for charitable purposes.
The order is based only on assumptions and there is not supportive evidence, collective or discussed in that regard.
For the impugned action, we are also unable to find that until some action is taken by the respondents by saying that it does not deserve any registration because of failure to meet out the objects mentioned in clause 8 of the registration, targeting the donations alleging the same to be against the object, would not satisfy us. There would not be any dispute to the effect that the petitioner – Trust runs only one “Chhuttani Medical Centre”. Therefore, the donations made to it cannot be doubted merely for the reason that the donations in other years are of smaller amount. Respondents have not taken note of the fact that the petitioner – Trust had been making donations to Sardarni Uttam Kaur Charitable Society, which is also registered u/s 12-A and had been granted exemption u/s 80-G. Neither from the record, nor anything pointed out by the respondents that their action is in pursuance to the complaint from any person/organization/society, to which the medical services are being provided by the petitioner – Trust.
Actually, the respondents were required to convince itself, as to whether the petitioner-Trust is meeting out its charitable purpose or not ? Once the foundation of registration u/s 12-A is not questioned, the ancillary expenses to achieve the object of the Trust, as enshrined in the Memorandum of Object and Terms, there is no point of raising mere suspicion on the donations, which many a times are ancillary in nature and though directly or indirectly meet out the object of its registration.
We find that the action of the respondents is not tenable, because same is not based upon any substantial evidence. Therefore, impugned orders are hereby set-aside and consequently, the writ petitions are allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Limitation on Notice under Section 148
Issue 2: Constitutional Validity of Explanation 2 to Section 148
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Validity of Notice issued for reassessment as barred by limitation - limitation period u/s153C - applicability of the timeframes prescribed under Sections 149, 153A, and 153C of the Income Tax Act - HELD THAT:- AO exercising jurisdiction in respect of the petitioner had prepared the satisfaction note (in terms of Clause (iv) of Explanation 2 to proviso to Section 148 of the Act). However, that cannot be construed as a satisfaction note by the AO of the searched person. The date of the said satisfaction note cannot be considered as the start point to consider the limitation period under Section 153C of the Act.
It is also material to note the satisfaction note was prepared on 23.08.2024 and was approved on 29.08.2024 by the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax. Thus, even if the limitation is computed on the basis of the aforesaid approval, the same would be required to be computed from the end of the assessment year relevant to the financial year in which such satisfaction note was prepared.
The petitioner has set out a tabular statement in support of his contention that the AY 2015-16 is beyond the period of ten years.
In view of the above, the present petition is allowed. The impugned notice and the proceedings pursuant thereto are set aside.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The legal judgment presented involves the following core legal questions:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Mistakes in Audit Report
Issue 2: Lapse in Providing Particulars
Issue 3: Object Clause (f) - Consultancy Activities
Issue 4: Object Clause (m) - Sponsoring Body's Approval
Issue 5: Alleged Illicit Activities - Previous High Court Decision
Issue 6: Justification of Activities Based on MCI Findings
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Admission of the appeal in High Court - substantial question of law or not? - Denial of registration u/s 12A/12AA - ITAT allowed claim - HELD THAT:- . From a bare reading of the Section, it is apparent that an appeal to the High Court from a decision of the Tribunal lies only when a substantial question of law is involved, and where the High Court comes to the conclusion that a substantial question of law arises from the said order, it is mandatory that such question(s) must be formulated. The expression "substantial question of law" is not defined in the Act. Nevertheless, it has acquired a definite connotation through various judicial pronouncements.
A finding of fact may give rise to a substantial question of law, inter alia, in the event the findings are based on no evidence and/or while arriving at the said finding, relevant admissible evidence has not been taken into consideration or inadmissible evidence has been taken into consideration or legal principles have not been applied in appreciating the evidence, or when the evidence has been misread.
As in the instant case no substantial question of law arises from the order of the Tribunal as the appellant has raised all the question of facts and have disputed the fact findings of the ITAT in the garb of substantial questions of law which is not permitted by the statute itself. This Court refrains from entertaining this appeal as there is no perversity in the order passed by the ITAT since the ITAT has dealt with all the grounds raised by the appellant in the order impugned and has passed a well reasoned and speaking order.
Appeal dismissed as No substantial question of law arises.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The judgment addresses several core legal questions:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Principle of Natural Justice
Issue 2: Contravention of Evidence Act
Issue 3: Justification of Illicit Activities
Issue 4: Commercial Intentions and Evidence
Issue 5: Market Value of Land Exchange
Issue 6: Tax Benefits Under Sections 11 and 12
Issue 7: Carry Forward of Losses
Issue 8: Adjudication of Financial Additions
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Substantial question of law - appellate jurisdiction under Section 260-A - concurrent findings of fact and perversity - finality of Tribunal as factfinding authority - scope of interference by High Court with ITAT orders
Substantial question of law - concurrent findings of fact and perversity - finality of Tribunal as factfinding authority - scope of interference by High Court with ITAT orders - No substantial question of law arises from the order of the Appellate Tribunal and the appeal is not admitable under Section 260A. - HELD THAT: - The High Court examined whether the Revenue raised any substantial question of law warranting admission of the appeal under Section 260A. Applying established principles, the Court held that an appeal to the High Court lies only where a debatable question of law of substantial import arises or where a finding of fact is shown to be perverse. The appellant's contentions were challenges to factual findings recorded by the ITAT and amounted to re-agitation of factual disputes in the guise of substantial questions of law. The ITAT had considered the grounds raised, rendered a reasoned and speaking order and, in the absence of demonstrated perversity or legal error in the Tribunal's factfinding, interference by the High Court was not justified. Reliance on authorities establishing that concurrent findings of fact cannot be disturbed unless perverse was applied to hold that no question of law for the High Court's adjudication was made out. [Paras 18, 19, 20]
Appeal dismissed in limine for lack of any substantial question of law; no interference with the ITAT's order.
Final Conclusion: The appeal is dismissed in limine as the Court finds no substantial question of law arising from the ITAT's order and no perversity in the Tribunal's factual findings to warrant interference under Section 260A.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions addressed in this judgment include:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Consideration of the Modified Return under the APA
Issue 2: Validity of the Final Assessment Order and Demand Notice
Issue 3: Adjustment of Refund Against Previous Demands
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Advance Pricing Agreement - arm's length price - remand for fresh consideration - rectification of intimation - adjustment of refund against demand
Advance Pricing Agreement - arm's length price - remand for fresh consideration - The impact of the Advance Pricing Agreement on the assessment and transfer-pricing adjustment in respect of international transactions disclosed for AY 2021-22. - HELD THAT: - The Court accepted the Revenue's concession that the petitioner's return required modification in view of the APA entered into by the petitioner and concluded that the determination of arm's length price and related transfer pricing adjustment could not be finalized without taking the APA into account. For that reason the Court set aside the DRP order dated 20.09.2024 and the final assessment order dated 24.10.2024, and remanded the matter to the Transfer Pricing Officer for fresh consideration in light of the APA so that the ALP and any consequential adjustments are reconsidered consistently with the APA.
Remanded to the TPO for fresh consideration of ALP and related adjustments in light of the APA; DRP order dated 20.09.2024 and final assessment dated 24.10.2024 set aside.
Rectification of intimation - remand for fresh consideration - Whether the petitioner's pending rectification application in respect of the intimation should be considered. - HELD THAT: - The Court directed that the petitioner's application for rectification dated 08.12.2023, which sought correction of the CPC intimation and was relevant in the context of the APA and modified return, be considered by the appropriate authority. The remand to the TPO and the setting aside of the impugned orders were ordered so that the rectification and the consequences of the APA can be addressed together on fresh consideration.
Directed that the rectification application dated 08.12.2023 be considered on fresh adjudication.
Adjustment of refund against demand - Whether any refund proposed to be adjusted against demands for AY 2020-21 and AY 2021-22 can be effected while the final assessment has been set aside. - HELD THAT: - Having set aside the final assessment order, the Court observed that there is presently no basis for adjusting any refund due to the petitioner for AY 2024-25 against demands raised for AY 2020-21 and AY 2021-22. The Court recorded that until fresh consideration and finalisation following the remand, such adjustment ought not to be carried out.
Recorded that no adjustment of the refund against outstanding demands for AY 2020-21 and AY 2021-22 is permissible at this stage.
Final Conclusion: The DRP order dated 20.09.2024 and the final assessment order dated 24.10.2024 are set aside; the matter is remanded to the Transfer Pricing Officer for fresh consideration in light of the Advance Pricing Agreement and the petitioner's rectification application dated 08.12.2023 is to be considered; no refund adjustment against earlier demands is to be made at present. Pending matters disposed of.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment include:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Limitation of Notice under Section 148A(b)
Issue 2: Reasonable Opportunity to Respond
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The judgment underscores the importance of procedural fairness and adherence to statutory timelines in tax reassessment proceedings, ensuring taxpayers are given a fair opportunity to present their case.
Reasonable opportunity to show cause under Section 148A(c) - Limitation for reopening under Section 149(1)(a) and (b) - Non-application of mind in limitation consideration - Quashing of order under Section 148A(d) and notice under Section 148
Reasonable opportunity to show cause under Section 148A(c) - Quashing of order under Section 148A(d) and notice under Section 148 - Validity of the order dated 31.03.2022 under Section 148A(d) and the notice dated 31.03.2022 under Section 148 in view of the opportunity afforded under the notice dated 15.03.2022. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the notice under Section 148A(b) dated 15.03.2022 was received on 19.03.2022 and the prescribed date to submit a reply (25.03.2022) left the petitioner effectively only six days to respond, including a Sunday, which the Court found not to be a reasonable opportunity in the circumstances of a reopening after several years. The Assessing Officer declined to grant further time on the stated ground that the limitation period was expiring on 31.03.2022; the Court found that such approach denied the petitioner the reasonable opportunity mandated by Section 148A(c) and amounted to a violation of that provision. For these reasons the Court concluded that the order under Section 148A(d) and the consequential notice under Section 148 could not stand and ordered them to be set aside so that the petitioner's reply may be considered and a fresh hearing be accorded before any further action is taken. [Paras 16, 17, 19]
Order dated 31.03.2022 under Section 148A(d) and notice dated 31.03.2022 under Section 148 are set aside for failure to afford a reasonable opportunity under Section 148A(c); the petitioner's reply filed on 20.05.2022 is to be considered and the petitioner given an opportunity of hearing before any fresh decision under Section 148A(d).
Limitation for reopening under Section 149(1)(a) and (b) - Non-application of mind in limitation consideration - Whether the Assessing Officer correctly applied the limitation provisions in deciding not to grant adjournment and in forming the opinion on escaped income for purposes of reopening. - HELD THAT: - The Court reviewed the limitation framework post amendment and observed that for AY 2015-16 the basic three-year period would end on 31.03.2019 but where escaped income amounts to or is likely to amount to Rs. 50,00,000 or more the extended ten-year period may apply. The Court noted that the order under Section 148A(d) recorded the Assessing Officer's opinion that escaped income was Rs. 78,59,057, which, if correctly arrived at, would attract the extended period. However, the Court found that the respondent's refusal to grant time on the ground that limitation was expiring on 31.03.2022 demonstrated a complete non-application of mind to the proper limitation analysis; this procedural lapse formed an independent reason to set aside the order and notice and to require reconsideration after affording the petitioner a hearing where limitation objections may be raised. [Paras 14, 15, 18, 19]
Assessing Officer's refusal to grant adjournment on the stated limitation ground amounted to non-application of mind; matter is remitted for fresh consideration with liberty to the petitioner to raise all permissible objections, including as to limitation.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition is allowed: the order dated 31.03.2022 under Section 148A(d) and the notice dated 31.03.2022 under Section 148 are quashed; the petitioner's reply filed on 20.05.2022 shall be taken into account, the petitioner shall be afforded a hearing (in person or through representative) before any fresh decision under Section 148A(d), and the petitioner may raise all permissible objections including on limitation during that hearing.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions addressed in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of Exemption Claim Under Section 10(23C)
Issue 2: Granting of Exemption Under Sections 11 and 12
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Exemption u/s.11 and 12 - assessee has not furnished the Audit report in Form No.10BB within the stipulated time in Rule 16CC - HELD THAT:- We find the CPC rejected the claim made by the assessee u/s.10(23C) only on technical issue, which is uncalled for CIT(A) has rightly considered all the aspects viz, registration u/s.12A and application of income for the charitable purposes while granting exemption u/s.11. We therefore find that the order passed by the CIT(A) is in conformity with the principles of natural justice. We therefore uphold the same and dismiss the grounds raised by the Revenue.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal issues considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of Approval under Section 153D
Issue 2: Validity of Assessment Order under Section 153A
Issue 3: Violation of Natural Justice
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The judgment emphasizes the importance of a thorough and thoughtful approval process under Section 153D, establishing that mechanical approvals undermine the validity of assessment orders. The court's focus on the approval process as a decisive factor highlights the judiciary's insistence on procedural compliance in tax assessments.
Approval under Section 153D of the Incometax Act - application of independent mind by the approving authority - mechanical approval / rubber stamping - separate approval for each assessment year - vitiation of assessment order due to defective approval
Approval under Section 153D of the Incometax Act - application of independent mind by the approving authority - mechanical approval / rubber stamping - separate approval for each assessment year - vitiation of assessment order due to defective approval - Validity of the approval accorded under Section 153D and its effect on the assessment order framed under Section 153A r.w.s. 143(3) for AY 201819. - HELD THAT: - The approving memo dated 17/18122019 was perused and found to be a perfunctory, proforma communication without any indication that the approving authority examined draft assessment orders, seized materials or applied independent mind to the issues for the relevant assessment year(s). A single omnibus approval was granted in respect of seven assessment years, and the memo contains no reference to perusal or reasoning. Reliance on precedents established that approval under Section 153D must be exercised for each assessment year and each assessee with an application of mind; mere rubberstamping or mechanical approval vitiates the consequent assessment. Applying those principles, the Tribunal held that the approval in the present case was mechanical and omnibus, thereby vitiating the assessment order passed under Section 153A r.w.s. 143(3). As the assessment was quashed on this ground, other contentions were left undecided. [Paras 6, 7, 11, 12, 13]
The approval under Section 153D was held to be mechanical and omnibus; the assessment order based on that approval is vitiated and is quashed, and the appeal is allowed.
Final Conclusion: The Tribunal quashed the assessment order for AY 201819 on the ground that the approval under Section 153D was accorded mechanically and without application of mind; the appeal is allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Rejection of Books of Accounts and Estimation of Net Profit
Issue 2: Addition of Rs. 59,78,000 as Unexplained Money
Issue 3: Restriction of Overall Additions to 5% of Gross Profit
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Rejection of books of accounts u/s 145(3) - estimating the Net Profit @ 5% without pointing out any major discrepancies in books of accounts - assessee contended that the complete details of sales including cash sales were filed before AO and also the details of purchases, sales and comparative chart was filed before the AO - HELD THAT:- Admittedly the assessee has produced bills and vouchers and from the summary of purchase and sales made and duly reflected in the VAT returns clearly shows that assessee purchases are duly reflected in the books of accounts and the bills and vouchers and without verifying the bills and vouchers, sales cannot be denied so lightly and so cannot be disbelieved.
This can be a good reason for rejection of books of accounts but sales cannot be disbelieved. Hence, we are of the view that the assessee’s sales as per bills and vouchers is at Rs. 1.24 Cr. and even cash sales during October, 2016 to December, 2016 quarter during demonetization period has to be accepted.
Accordingly, we assessed the sale at Rs. 1.24 Cr. and estimate the profit rate at 5%. We accept the rejection of books of accounts but rejection of the turnover is without any basis. Despite the fact that the assessee before AO and CIT(A) has filed complete details of sales as well as purchases and there is no reason not to accept this sale which has been disclosed by assessee. In term of the above ground of assessee’s appeal is partly allowed.
Cash deposit made during the demonetization period u/s 69A of the Act as unexplained money - As we accepted the cash sales carried out by assessee, the cash deposit to the extent of Rs. 57.25 lac is also accepted as explained. The addition of balance cash is sustained. In term of the above, this issue of assessee’s appeal is partly allowed.
Addition restricted to 5% of the gross profit - As we have adjudicated the first issue and restricted the overall additions to the extent of 5% of overall sales offered for a sum we refrain ourselves for adjudicating this ground being academic and without prejudice.
Appeal filed by Assessee is partly allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The legal judgment revolves around two primary issues:
Issue 1: Whether the invocation of Section 263 by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (PCIT) to revise the assessment order regarding revenue recognition was justified.
Issue 2: Whether the disallowance of proportionate depreciation claimed by the assessee was correctly handled by the Assessing Officer, and whether the PCIT's intervention under Section 263 was warranted.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Revenue Recognition
Relevant legal framework and precedents: The case involves the application of Section 263 of the Income Tax Act, which allows the PCIT to revise an assessment order if it is deemed erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. The assessee used the percentage completion method for revenue recognition, which is a recognized accounting practice.
Court's interpretation and reasoning: The court examined whether the Assessing Officer had conducted sufficient inquiries into the revenue recognition method used by the assessee. The court noted that the assessee had provided detailed responses to the Assessing Officer's inquiries during the assessment proceedings.
Key evidence and findings: The assessee had recognized a portion of the revenue in subsequent years, which was not disputed by the tax authorities. The court found that the Assessing Officer had made due inquiries and that the PCIT failed to consider the assessee's submissions about revenue recognized in subsequent years.
Application of law to facts: The court concluded that the assessment order was not erroneous or prejudicial to the interest of the revenue, as the Assessing Officer had conducted adequate inquiries and the revenue recognition method was consistent with previous years.
Treatment of competing arguments: The court considered the PCIT's argument that the differential revenue should have been taxed in the impugned year but found that the PCIT did not address the assessee's consistent accounting practice and subsequent revenue recognition.
Conclusions: The court allowed the assessee's appeal on this issue, ruling that the assessment order was not erroneous or prejudicial to the interest of the revenue.
Issue 2: Disallowance of Proportionate Depreciation
Relevant legal framework and precedents: The issue pertains to the disallowance of depreciation under the Income Tax Act, specifically concerning property let out and the corresponding claim for depreciation.
Court's interpretation and reasoning: The court examined whether the Assessing Officer had correctly computed the disallowance of depreciation and whether the PCIT's intervention was justified.
Key evidence and findings: The PCIT observed that the Assessing Officer had only disallowed depreciation for the ground floor banquet hall, despite the rent agreement indicating additional rented areas. The court found that the Assessing Officer did not fully consider the rent agreement's terms.
Application of law to facts: The court found that the Assessing Officer's computation of disallowed depreciation was based on an incorrect understanding of the facts, as the entire rented area was not accounted for.
Treatment of competing arguments: The court considered the assessee's argument that the entire area was used for business purposes, but noted that this was not substantiated in the assessment records. The court agreed with the PCIT's observation of a lack of inquiry by the Assessing Officer.
Conclusions: The court dismissed the assessee's appeal on this issue, upholding the PCIT's revision of the assessment order due to the erroneous computation of disallowed depreciation.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve verbatim quotes of crucial legal reasoning:
"...the assessment order cannot be held to be erroneous, in so far as prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue."
"...the very basis of disallowance was on an incorrect understanding of facts by the Assessing Officer, which resulted from evident lack of enquiry on this aspect..."
Core principles established:
The judgment reinforces the principle that an assessment order can only be revised under Section 263 if it is both erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. Adequate inquiry by the Assessing Officer and consistent accounting practices are critical in determining the validity of an assessment order.
Final determinations on each issue:
On the issue of revenue recognition, the court ruled in favor of the assessee, finding no error or prejudice in the assessment order. On the issue of depreciation disallowance, the court upheld the PCIT's revision, citing an incorrect factual basis and lack of adequate inquiry by the Assessing Officer.
In conclusion, the appeal was partly allowed, with the court ruling in favor of the assessee on the first issue and against the assessee on the second issue.
Revision u/s 263 - Disallowance with regards to Revenue recognition - HELD THAT:- On going through the contents of the order passed u/s 263 and the submissions of the assessee, we observe that the assessee has specifically submitted that the balance revenue had been recognized by the assessee in subsequent years and hence no prejudice was caused to the Revenue.
While passing the 263 order, PCIT has not dealt with this aspect submitted by the assessee while holding the order to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue.
We observe from the records placed before us that the AO had made due enquiries with regards to the methodology of revenue recognition adopted by the assessee and there is apparently no lack of the enquiry on part of the AO, on this aspect. Decided in favour of assessee.
Disallowance of proportionate depreciation claim by the assessee - AO noted that assessee had let out some portion of the building and offered the income received as “income from house property” after claiming deduction @30% under Section 24 - HELD THAT:- From the assessment records, there is no discussion on this aspect as well that it was the assessee who was effectively using the rooms for it’s business purposes for the entire part of the year. Therefore, in our view, the PCIT has correctly observed that the very basis of disallowance was on an incorrect understanding of facts by the AO, which resulted from evident of lack of enquiry on this aspect, during the course of assessment proceedings.
The Counsel for the assessee cited various judicial precedents in it’s support. It is a well-established principle that each case is rendered on it’s own set of facts and cannot have general applicability to other cases, unless there is an absolute parity of facts. Decided against assessee.
Judicial precedents cited by the assessee have no applicability to the above set of facts, which are peculiar to the assessee only. Accordingly, the judicial precedents relied upon by the assessee would be of no assistance, looking into the assessee’s set of facts.
PCIT has correctly observed that the assessment order was framed on an incorrect presumption of facts and also there was a lack of enquiry on the correct amount of area which was let out and therefore, we find no infirmity in the observations made by Ld. PCIT on this issue, so as to call for any interference. Decided against assessee.
Appeal of the assessee is partly allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The legal judgment from the Appellate Tribunal ITAT Chennai addressed the following core legal issues:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Disallowance under Section 40(a)(i)
Issue 2: ALP Adjustment of Outstanding Receivables
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
TDS u/s 195 - Disallowance u/s 40(a)(i) - assessee paid software service charges to a foreign entity in Italy but did not deduct tax at source on the ground that such software payments do not require withholding tax u/s 195 - HELD THAT:- Upon perusal of order of Hon’ble High Court of Madras [2021 (12) TMI 1447 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] we find that the substantial question of law as raised by the revenue has been answered against the revenue as relying on ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PRIVATE LIMITED [2021 (3) TMI 138 - SUPREME COURT] held in assessee’s case that the assessee is not liable to deduct tax at source on payments made to non-resident towards software support charges and consequently, expenses could not be disallowed u/s. 40(a)(i) of the Act
Application of Arm’s Length interest rate - assessee had outstanding trade receivables from its AE - TPO proposed to benchmark the same. The assessee stated that the said transaction would not be an international transaction - CIT(A), substantially confirming the stand of TPO, held that average LIBOR rate would be the most appropriate rate of interest in the international market - HELD THAT:- We find that the adjudication of Ld. CIT(A) is in accordance with cited decision of this Tribunal in M/S. PLINTRON GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS, PRIVATE [2018 (3) TMI 1901 - ITAT CHENNAI] wherein held that while working out deemed notional interest on delay in repatriation of overdue receivables from foreign AEs, LIBOR rate will be most appropriate. Therefore, the adjudication of Ld. CIT(A) could not be faulted with. We order so.
Assessee appeal allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The judgment primarily revolves around the following core legal questions:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Entitlement to Stay of Demand
Issue 2: Computational Errors in Assessment
Issue 3: Time-barred Assessment Order
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Stay of demand - Partial payment already made - determination of 20% of the outstanding demand - HELD THAT:- As considered the challan placed before us of Rs. 4.4 crores paid by the assessee for AY 2021-22 on 31.3.2024 against the addition made in the above assessment order. Admittedly, though the amount outstanding is Rs. 20.34 crores had this information been provided to the AO, naturally the outstanding demand would have been less by the above sum and interest would have also gone down substantially.
We find that the assessee has paid tax of Rs. 4.4 crores for which credit has not been given to the assessee, therefore naturally this amount can be considered towards 20% of the outstanding demand.
Assessee has categorically shown that there is an error in the computation of margin with respect to trading & manufacturing segment which is accepted by the ld. TPO in the remand report, but as the ld. DRP did not comment on the same, TPO/AO continued with the computational error.
We are of the view that for such computational errors, the ld. TPO/ld. DRP has failed to do their duty to make such corrections when it is so obvious. No doubt, while computing interest on outstanding receivable from AE, assessee did not give the invoices-wise information, but that does not mean that the ld. TPO should have computed interest by taking figure for which there is no substantial evidence. The application made by the assessee u/s. 154 of the Act is also pending, which clearly shows that if such arithmetical inaccuracy is removed, the addition of Rs. 18 crores will come to half of that.
As the assessee has already deposited Rs. 4.4 crores, which is more than 20% of the outstanding demand, the assessee deserves stay of demand on this ground.
Accordingly, we direct the ld. AO to verify the payment of Rs. 4.4 crores by the assessee and then to keep the balance demand in abeyance, till disposal of the appeal or 180 days from the date of receipt of this order, whichever is earlier.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Protective Addition on Information & Technology Fees (AY 2010-11 and 2011-12)
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents:
The protective addition was made by the AO under the Income Tax Act, 1961, specifically concerning the payments made by the assessee to its Associated Enterprises (AE) under the head "information & technology fees." The addition was made on a protective basis, pending the final outcome of the transfer pricing adjustments.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning:
The court noted that the assessee had already settled the dispute with the competent authority under the MAP. The MAP proceedings culminated in the acceptance of the adjustments made by the TPO, which rendered the protective addition by the AO untenable.
Key Evidence and Findings:
The court referred to the communication from the competent authority, which indicated that the amount of Rs. 2,13,24,188/- for AY 2010-11 and Rs. 1,91,02,847/- for AY 2011-12 had been settled and accepted by the assessee under the MAP proceedings.
Application of Law to Facts:
The court applied the principle that when a substantial addition has been confirmed or settled, any protective addition has no legal standing. Since the amounts were settled under MAP, the protective additions were deemed unnecessary.
Treatment of Competing Arguments:
The court considered the arguments from both the assessee and the Departmental Representative (D.R.). The D.R. relied on the orders of the authorities below, but the court found the MAP settlement to be decisive.
Conclusions:
The court concluded that the protective additions for AY 2010-11 and 2011-12 should be deleted, as they were already covered by the MAP proceedings.
Issue 2: Addition on Commission on Sales (AY 2013-14)
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents:
The addition was made under the head "commission on sales" during the proceedings before the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP).
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning:
The court observed that the amount of Rs. 22,62,95,388/- had been accepted by the assessee under the MAP proceedings, indicating that the dispute was resolved.
Key Evidence and Findings:
The court referred to page A2 of the paper book, which contained communication from the competent authority showing the acceptance of the amount by the assessee.
Application of Law to Facts:
The court applied the same principle as in the previous issue, noting that the acceptance of the amount under MAP negated the need for a protective addition.
Treatment of Competing Arguments:
Similar to the previous issue, the court considered the D.R.'s reliance on lower authorities' orders but found the MAP settlement to be conclusive.
Conclusions:
The court concluded that the protective addition for AY 2013-14 should not be sustained, as the amount was already offered in the MAP proceedings.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning:
"It is settled position of law that when substantial addition has been confirmed/ settled as in this case, then protective addition has no legs to stand."
Core Principles Established:
Final Determinations on Each Issue:
In conclusion, the appeals of the assessee were allowed, and the court pronounced the order in the open court on 16th December 2024.
Protective addition made concerning the payments made under the head "information & technology fees" - HELD THAT:- Since the assessee has already settled its dispute with competent authority under MAP and has also accepted the adjustments made by the TPO on account of information technology fees protective addition made by the AO in the present year is not tenable and hence, deserves to be deleted. It is settled position of law that when substantial addition has been confirmed/ settled as in this case, then protective addition has no legs to stand.
In assessment year 2011-12 also, the amount has been paid by the assessee on account of information technology fees. This amount has also been accepted by the assessee in MAP proceedings before the competent authority. Therefore, in this year also no further disallowance u/s 37 of the Act, on protective basis is required to be sustained.
Addition made under the head "commission on sales" - For AY 2013-14 is concerned, the amount in dispute is payment on commission made by the assessee on sales. Perusal of page A2 of the paper book, which is the part of communication made by competent authority would show that amount as also been accepted by the assessee under the head “commission on sales”. It is relevant to mention here that this addition was in fact made by the ld. DRP during proceedings before the dispute resolution panel. Be that as it may, since the assessee has already offered this amount in MAP, no protective addition as made by the ld. DRP deserve to be sustained.
Appeals of the assessee are allowed.
Direction to decide pending proceedings within fixed time - interim restraint on coercive action pending adjudication - liberty to respondents to apply for recall of interim order
Direction to decide pending proceedings within fixed time - Authorities directed to decide the questions raised in the petition within five weeks from receipt of the order. - HELD THAT: - The Court examined the matter and considered it appropriate to require the concerned authorities to decide the questions raised in the petition within a period of five weeks from the date on which a copy of the order is received by them. The direction is a time-bound mandate to conclude the adjudicatory process at the administrative/departmental level within the stated period.
Authorities are directed to decide the questions raised within five weeks of receiving a copy of this order.
Interim restraint on coercive action pending adjudication - Respondents restrained from taking coercive steps for detention and/or arrest while the adjudication directed above is pending. - HELD THAT: - The Court recorded an expectation and trust that the authorities will refrain from instituting coercive measures, including detention or arrest, until the conclusion of the adjudication ordered to be completed within the five-week period. This constitutes an interim protective measure to preserve the status quo during the pendency of decision-making.
No coercive steps for detention or arrest to be taken while the adjudication remains pending.
Liberty to respondents to apply for recall of interim order - Special leave petition disposed of with liberty to respondents to file an application for recall of the order if necessary. - HELD THAT: - The Court disposed of the special leave petition subject to the directed adjudication and granted the respondents liberty to seek recall of the interim directions by filing an appropriate application, thereby keeping open the respondents' right to challenge or seek modification of the interim relief if circumstances warrant.
SLP disposed of with liberty to respondents to apply for recall of this order; pending applications disposed of.
Final Conclusion: The special leave petition is disposed of: the authorities are directed to decide the matters within five weeks; coercive action for detention or arrest is restrained pending that adjudication; respondents granted liberty to move for recall of the order if necessary.
Issues: (i) Whether the applicant was entitled to regular bail in view of the commercial quantity recovery and the mandatory restrictions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act; (ii) Whether alleged non-compliance with Sections 50 and 52A of the NDPS Act, absence of CCTV footage, and lack of independent public witnesses justified grant of bail.
Issue (i): Whether the applicant was entitled to regular bail in view of the commercial quantity recovery and the mandatory restrictions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
Analysis: The recovery from the applicant was of about 3.60 kg of heroin, which constituted commercial quantity. In such cases, bail could be granted only if the twin conditions under Section 37 were satisfied, namely, that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the accused was not guilty and that he was not likely to commit an offence while on bail. The material on record, including the recovery from the applicant's trolley bag and the prosecution version, was found sufficient to make out a prima facie case at the stage of bail.
Conclusion: The applicant was not entitled to regular bail on this ground.
Issue (ii): Whether alleged non-compliance with Sections 50 and 52A of the NDPS Act, absence of CCTV footage, and lack of independent public witnesses justified grant of bail.
Analysis: The Court held that the alleged procedural lapses did not by themselves dislodge the prosecution case at the bail stage. Reference was made to the settled position that procedural irregularity or illegality in search or seizure does not automatically render the evidence inadmissible, and that lapse in compliance with Section 52A does not by itself vitiate the trial or entitle the accused to bail. The complaint also recorded that photographs were taken and independent witnesses and an interpreter were present during the proceedings.
Conclusion: The alleged procedural objections did not justify grant of bail.
Final Conclusion: The Court found a prima facie case under the NDPS Act and held that the statutory bar on bail was not overcome, leading to refusal of regular bail.
Ratio Decidendi: In cases involving commercial quantity under the NDPS Act, bail cannot be granted unless the accused satisfies the mandatory twin conditions of Section 37, and alleged procedural irregularities in search or seizure do not, by themselves, entitle the accused to bail.
Seeking grant of regular bail - smuggling of commercial quantity of Heroin - Investigating Agency failed to comply with the mandate provided under Section 50 of the NDPS Act - satisfaction of provisions of Section 37 of NDPS Act or not - applicant's status as a foreign national - HELD THAT:- A perusal of the complaint, filed by the Customs authorities before the learned Trial Court, reveals that the present applicant Ghulam Hazrat Mirzale along with co-accused Abdul Khaliq Noorzai, both nationals of Afghanistan, were intercepted at the IGI Airport. Both the accused persons as well as the trolly bags carried by them were searched by the Customs officials. In their trolly bags, some shampoo/hair color bottles were found, containing black coloured-thick liquid having an unusual smell. The said liquid, upon testing, was found to be Heroin. Total 17 bottles, weighing about 4.02 kg (including the weight of bottles) were recovered from co-accused Abdul, and total 15 bottles, weighing about 3.60 kg (including the weight of bottle) were recovered from the present applicant.
Concededly, the quantity of narcotic substance recovered in this case from the present applicant is commercial quantity, i.e. about 3.60 kg of heroin. Therefore, the twin conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act will have to be satisfied by the applicant so as to be entitled to grant of bail.
When this Court considers the material placed on record by the respondent, specifically the fact that recovery of 15 bottles containing Heroin of about 3.60 kgs was made from the trolly bag of the present applicant at the IGI Airport, this Court is of the opinion that a prima facie case, at this stage, is made out against the applicant for commission of offences punishable under the provisions of NDPS Act. Notably, the applicant herein is a foreign national, and the trial is at a crucial stage i.e. the evidence of prosecution witnesses is being recorded. Considering the same, this Court finds no ground to grant regular bail to the applicant at this stage.
Conclusion - Bail denied based on the failure to meet Section 37 conditions, the lack of significant procedural prejudice, and the applicant's foreign nationality, which increased the risk of absconding.
Bail application dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The judgment considers the following core legal questions:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Imposition of Interest by the Settlement Commission
Issue 2: Constitutional Validity of the Notification
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Interest payable on CVD levied under Section 3 of the CT Act or on SAD levied under Section 3A of the CT Act - Constitutional validity of the Notification No. 18/2015-Cus dated 01.04.2015 - HELD THAT:- The expression “case” is defined in Section 127A (b) of the Act to mean proceedings under the Act or any other Act for the levy, assessment, and collection of customs duty, pending before an adjudicating authority on the date on which an application is made under Sub-section (1) of Section 127B of the Act. The proviso to Section 127A (b) of the Act also clarifies that any proceedings referred by any Court, Appellate Tribunal or any other authority for a fresh adjudication or decision, would not fall within the scope of proceedings within the meaning of the said Section and thus cannot be considered as a case.
Section 127C of the Act provides for procedure to be followed on receipt of an application under Section 127B of the Act. In terms of Section 127C(1) of the Act, the Settlement Commission is required to issue a notice to the applicant to explain why its application should be allowed. After taking into consideration the said explanation, the Settlement Commission is required to pass an order either to proceed with the application or reject the same. A copy of the said order is required to be sent to the Principal Commissioner of Customs or Commissioner of Customs having the jurisdiction. The Principal Commissioner of Customs or the Commissioner of Customs, as the case may be, is required to furnish a report within thirty days on receipt of communication from the Settlement Commission. Sub- section (4) of Section 127C of the Act empowers the Settlement Commission to direct further enquiry or investigation if it considers apposite and records the reasons in writing.
Sub-section (8) of Section 127C of the Act also expressly provides that an order passed under Sub-section (5) of Section 127C of the Act shall provide for terms of settlement including payment by way of duty, penalty or interest and the manner in which the sums shall be paid - In the present case, the impugned order expressly provides that the order would be void and immunities granted would be withdrawn if the petitioners fail to comply with the order.
Admittedly, the petitioners had not satisfied the conditions subject to which import of material had been permitted without payment of duties. Thus, interest on such duties was payable as was stipulated in terms of the Notification dated 01.04.2015 - Admittedly, the petitioners had bound themselves to the said conditions and had availed the benefit of the said Notification. In this view, it cannot be accepted that the impugned order imposing interest on delayed payment of duties is contrary to law.
Constitutional vires of the Notification dated 01.04.2015 - HELD THAT:- The petitioners’ challenge to the Notification is insubstantial. The exemption was granted subject to the importer satisfying its export obligations. The petitioners do not challenge the grant of advance authorizations and permission to import the goods in question without payment of duties on the condition of fulfilling the export obligations. Clearly, if the conditions were not satisfied, the petitioner would be liable to pay the duties on the material imported - Admittedly, such duties would be payable on the date of clearance of the goods and therefore stipulating that the interest would be payable on such dates if the conditions are not satisfied cannot by any stretch be stated to be arbitrary or unreasonable.
Conclusion - The order of the Settlement Commission is a settlement that must be accepted in its entirety; interest can be imposed as a condition of duty exemption under a valid notification.
There are no merit in the petition, the same is, accordingly, dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Authority to Condon Delays Beyond Statutory Limit
Issue 2: Typographical Error in Memorandum of Appeal
Issue 3: Tribunal's Jurisdiction Over Time-Barred Appeals
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Dismissal of application on the sole ground of limitation (time barred) - satisfactory explanation for the delay or not - power of Commissioner (Appeals) to condone delay - HELD THAT:- The Commissioner (Appeals) has power to entertain appeal within 60 days from the date of communication of such decision or order and he may allow such appeal within further period of 30 days after giving finding on sufficient cause on which the appellant was prevented to file appeal within stipulated time period.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of SINGH ENTERPRISES VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF C. EX., JAMSHEDPUR [2007 (12) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT] has, inter alia, held that the Commissioner (Appeals) has no power to condone the delay beyond the condonable period of 30 days.
The Tribunal is a creature of statute and is bound to act within the four walls of the statute. Tribunal has no discretionary power to condone the delay beyond the time limit prescribed under the Act.
Thus, admittedly the appellants were served the OIOs dt.13.03.2023 & 14.03.2023 on 20.03.2023 and they have filed the appeals before the Commissioner (Appeals) on 03.10.2023. In the normal course, these appeals should have been filed by 19.05.2023, which is 60 days from the date of communication of OIOs and Commissioner (Appeals) has discretion to condone the delay up to 30 days only beyond this period. In the present case, the appellants have filed the appeals before the Commissioner (Appeals) after more than 6 months from the date of communication of OIOs. Therefore, Commissioner (Appeals) was correct in dismissing the appeals on time bar itself without going into merit.
There are no scope or reason to interfere with the Orders passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) - appeal dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Classification of Imported Goods
Issue 2: Applicability of Concessional Duty Rate
Issue 3: Justification of Penalty under Section 114A
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Classification of imported goods - Liquid Seaweed Concentrate (Crop Plus) - to be classified under Customs Tariff Item (CTI) 3101 0099 as claimed by the appellants or under CTI 3808 9340 as determined by the Department? - benefit of concessional rate of Basic Customs duty under Serial No. 196 of Notification No. 12/2012-Cus. dated 17.03.2012 - HELD THAT:- It is found that in the SCN, the Department has stated that “Seaweed extract” is used as Liquid Organic Bio Fertilizer because of its organic micro nutrient, NPK and Natural Growth Hormones content such as Cytokinins, Alginic Acid, Mannitol, Gibberellins, Seaweed is used as Plant Growth Promoter for all kinds of plants. However, the proceedings were initiated in the said SCN to change the classification of the imported goods as “Plant Growth Regulator” under CTI 3808 9340 as mentioned in paragraph 5 therein. In support of change in classification of the imported goods, the SCN had not specifically assigned any reason as to why the classification of the said product was changed from CTI 3101 00 99to CTI 3808 9340. Further, it is also found that in support of the classification of imported goods under CTI 3808 93 40,the authorities below have stated the reason that the said goods contains very negligible percentage of Nitrogen/Phosphorous/Potash (NPK) and micro nutrients and thus, the vital role played in respect of the imported goods is towards plant growth regulator and the same is appropriately be classified under CTI 3808 9340. However, on perusal of the certificate of analysis available in the case file, it is found that the said certificate had specifically stated the chemical composition of the goods as ‘organic components derived from Ascophyllum nodosum seaweed as 28.000%’ as also Nitrogen (N), Phosphorus (P2O5) and Soluble Potash (K2O)as 9.8%. Since the majority of the components of the said goods constitute Fertilizers, the same cannot be termed as ‘Plant Growth Regulator’, in order to classify the same under CTI 3808 9340.
The Larger Bench of the Tribunal in the case of M/S. P.I. INDUSTRIES LIMITED (FORMERLY M/S. ISAGRO (ASIA) AGROCHEMICALS PVT. LTD.) ; M/S. AGRO PACK; SHRI PARTH H. PATEL VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE & CUSTOMS, SURAT-II, SURAT [2024 (9) TMI 1655 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD (LB)] has made the distinctive features between the Fertilizer and Plant Growth Regulator where it was held that 'plant growth regulators are chemicals that influence plant growth and development by affecting physiological processes like cell division, elongation, and differentiation. They can regulate plant growth by promoting or inhibiting certain functions such as flowering, fruit setting, and root development. In a nutshell, fertilizers provide essential nutrients for plant growth, while plant growth regulators control specific aspects of plant growth and development.'
In the present case, since the chemical analysis report submitted by the Research and Development Unit of the manufacturer-exporter had confirmed that the composition would constitute as Fertilizer and as per the order of the Larger Bench of the Tribunal, the imported goods cannot be considered as Plant Growth Regulator for classification under CTI 3808 9340.
Conclsuion - Fertilizers provide essential nutrients for plant growth, while plant growth regulators control specific aspects of plant growth and development. There are no merits in the impugned order, insofar it has upheld the classification of the disputed product under CTI 3808 9340 and resultant confirmation of the adjudged demands on the appellants.
Appeal allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment include:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Justification of Penalty under Section 112(a) and 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962
Issue 2: Consideration of Appellant as a Habitual Offender
Issue 3: Reliance on the Retracted Statement of Co-accused
Issue 4: Significance of the Telephonic Call
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Confessional statement of co-accused - retracted confessional statement - reliance on telephonic contact as inference of guilt - habitual offender inference from pending penalties - penalty under Section 112 of the Customs Act - distinct application of Clause (a) and Clause (b) of Section 112 - requirement of prior knowledge or reason to believe
Confessional statement of co-accused - retracted confessional statement - Whether the appellant could be penalised on the basis of the confessional statement of a co-accused which was retracted during cross-examination. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the case against the appellant rested solely on the statement dated 24.05.18 of Shri Krishna Kumar Gupta and that there was no other evidence implicating the appellant. During cross-examination before the adjudicating authority, Krishna Kumar Gupta denied the earlier confessional statement and repudiated recovery from his possession. Given that the confession of a co-accused had been retracted and denied to be voluntary on cross-examination, no adverse conclusion could be drawn against the appellant solely on that basis. The Tribunal accordingly rejected reliance on the sole retracted statement as sufficient to impose penalty. [Paras 8]
Penalty could not be sustained on the basis of the retracted confessional statement of the co-accused.
Reliance on telephonic contact as inference of guilt - Whether a brief telephonic call between the appellant and the co-accused shortly before interception could be treated as evidence of the appellant's involvement in smuggling. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal observed that the appellant and Krishna Kumar Gupta were known to each other through joint activity in a community committee and that a phone call between two known persons shortly before interception, without more, cannot reasonably support an inference of involvement in smuggling. The mere existence of a 14 second call about half an hour before interception was held to be insufficient to implicate the appellant in the offence. [Paras 8]
The telephonic call could not be the basis to assume the appellant's involvement in smuggling.
Habitual offender inference from pending penalties - Whether earlier imposition of penalties, which were pending adjudication before the Tribunal, could be relied upon to treat the appellant as a habitual offender in the present case. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal accepted the appellant's submission that earlier penalties still pending before the Tribunal had not attained finality and therefore could not be used to conclude that the appellant was a habitual offender or to aggravate culpability in the present matter. Pending penalty orders do not establish habituality for purposes of sustaining a fresh penalty. [Paras 8]
Pending earlier penalty orders cannot be the basis to treat the appellant as a habitual offender in this case.
Penalty under Section 112 of the Customs Act - distinct application of Clause (a) and Clause (b) of Section 112 - requirement of prior knowledge or reason to believe - Whether penalty under Section 112(a) and 112(b) of the Customs Act could be imposed on the appellant on the facts of the case. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the material on record did not indicate that the appellant had played any role making the impugned goods liable for confiscation or that he had dealt with the goods with prior knowledge or reason to believe they were liable to confiscation. It further observed that Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 112 apply to different circumstances and cannot properly be applied together in the absence of facts supporting each limb. On these bases, the Tribunal concluded that Section 112 was not attracted and the penalty under that provision was not imposable. [Paras 9]
Penalty under Section 112(a) & 112(b) was not imposable and was set aside.
Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed; the penalty imposed on the appellant under Section 112 of the Customs Act is set aside because the sole retracted statement of a co-accused, an isolated telephonic call, and pending earlier penalties do not furnish sufficient basis to sustain the penalty, and the factual matrix did not satisfy the distinct requirements of Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 112.
Issues: (i) Whether a writ petition was maintainable against a private sector bank in proceedings arising from declaration of a borrower as a wilful defaulter; (ii) Whether the show cause notice and the orders declaring the petitioner a wilful defaulter were vitiated for breach of natural justice and non-disclosure of the material relied upon.
Issue (i): Whether a writ petition was maintainable against a private sector bank in proceedings arising from declaration of a borrower as a wilful defaulter.
Analysis: The declaration of wilful defaulter carries direct civil consequences, including restrictions on access to institutional finance, impact on business rights, and serious reputational consequences. The Court held that enforcement of fundamental rights is not confined to State instrumentalities in every case and that the writ petition could be entertained where the impugned action directly affected rights protected by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.
Conclusion: The writ petition was maintainable against the bank and the objection to maintainability was rejected.
Issue (ii): Whether the show cause notice and the orders declaring the petitioner a wilful defaulter were vitiated for breach of natural justice and non-disclosure of the material relied upon.
Analysis: The procedure under the RBI Master Circular required a meaningful opportunity to answer the allegations before punitive classification. The Court found that the notice and subsequent orders were founded substantially on a transaction audit report whose underlying material was not supplied, despite repeated requests. The petitioner was therefore unable to make an effective representation. The Court also noted that the audit report had earlier been viewed by the NCLT as based on assumptions and conjectures, which reinforced the need for fuller disclosure before adverse action was taken. A personal hearing without access to the material was held not to be an effective hearing. The Court confined its finding to procedural infirmity and did not adjudicate the merits of the alleged default.
Conclusion: The impugned show cause notice and the wilful defaulter orders were quashed for breach of natural justice and failure to furnish the material relied upon.
Final Conclusion: The petitioner succeeded, the adverse wilful defaulter action was set aside, and the bank was left free to initiate fresh proceedings in accordance with law after proper disclosure and compliance with natural justice.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a classification as wilful defaulter entails grave civil and reputational consequences, the affected person must be supplied the material relied upon and afforded a real opportunity to respond before any adverse determination is made; a hearing without disclosure is not meaningful.
Challenge to orders passed by the Respondent No. 1 declaring him as Wilful Defaulter on the basis of a Transaction Audit Report - procedural requirements under the Master Circular on Wilful Defaulters issued by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) complied with or not - substantial opportunity of being heard not provided - documents on the basis of which a decision to declare him as Wilful Defaulter was taken, were not provided - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- Clause 2.5 of the Master Circular provides for initiation of penal measures against the persons or entities declared as wilful defaulter under Clause 2.1.3 of the Master Circular, which includes non-grant of additional loan facility by any bank or financial institution in the future; debarring them from floating new venture for a period of five years from the date of removal of name as wilful defaulter; initiation of criminal proceedings; change of management of borrower unit; non-induction of the person in the Board of the company etc.
The object of the Master Circular is salutary. The Master Circular aims to protect the country’s banks and financial institutions from unscrupulous entities and individuals. It is intended to identify and punish those entities and individuals who have diverted or siphoned off borrowed funds for purposes other than for which the loan facility was availed leading to default in the repayment obligations. Such individuals and entities must be identified and their names be published in public domain so that they are barred from availing any further loan facility from any other bank. If such an exercise is not undertaken, the cycle of diversion/siphoning of borrowed funds; default and re-borrowing, leading to same situation may continue. Such a scenario may adversely affect the liquidity of the banking system and affect the overall financial health of the country. There is, thus, no doubt that the Master Circular aims to achieve a very laudable object. Notably, the scheme of the Master Circular indicates that it is both a punitive and preventive measure.
The Supreme Court in the case of Jah Developers [2019 (5) TMI 862 - SUPREME COURT], had an occasion to examine the consequences of a person being declared as wilful defaulter under the Master Circular. The Supreme Court held that a person declared as wilful defaulter affects the fundamental right of a person under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution as it directly affects the right to do business and thus, the Master Circular must be construed reasonably.
The graver the consequences of such civil action, the higher is the degree of proof required. If this principle of law is tested on the anvil of the Master Circular, it is clear that the Master Circular entails not only grave civil, but also penal consequences. Considering the subject matter and grave civil and penal consequences, the validity of an order declaring as wilful defaulter would require a closer scrutiny as to whether such an order falls within the four corners of the procedural mechanism prescribed in Master Circular or is it otherwise.
It is thus safe to accept that the basis of issuance of the SCN was primarily the findings in the TAR, which were observed by the NCLT to be mere assumptions. Considering the grave consequences that follow a finding by the WDC, the degree of proof required and expected to have been relied upon by the WDC should be much higher and not simply based on a TAR which itself was unacceptable to the NCLT.
Principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- It is not for the WDC to shrug away its responsibility under the pretext of such presumptions and assumptions. The statutory procedural mechanism laid down in the Master Circular, interpreted in various decisions of the Supreme Court must be followed by the Respondent No. 1 and its committees in letter and spirit. There are no hesitation in agreeing with the Petitioner that the personal hearing cannot be construed to be meaningful with the Petitioner having his hands tied behind in the context of the Respondent No. 1 withholding the necessary documents and expecting to offer his comments.
Maintainability of the present petition against the Respondent No. 1-Bank - HELD THAT:- The Supreme Court in the matter of Jah Developers [2019 (5) TMI 862 - SUPREME COURT] clearly expressed its view that Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India is attracted as the moment a person is declared as wilful defaulter there is a direct and immediate impact on his fundamental right to carry on business. It is settled law that a Fundamental right under Article 19 or 21 can be enforced even against persons other than State or its instrumentalities - there are no hesitation in holding the present petition to be maintainable against the present Respondent No. 1.
Conclusion - The statutory procedural mechanism laid down in the Master Circular, interpreted in various decisions of the Supreme Court must be followed by the Respondent No. 1 and its committees in letter and spirit. The necessity of adhering to procedural fairness and natural justice in proceedings that have severe consequences, such as being declared a wilful defaulter established. The SCN and related orders quashed due to procedural lapses and violations of natural justice, while affirming the maintainability of the Petition under Article 226.
Petition allowed.
Issues: (i) whether the applicants satisfied the twin conditions for bail under the Companies Act in a serious fraud prosecution; (ii) whether their release on regular bail could be considered while they were on interim bail and not required to surrender physically.
Issue (i): whether the applicants satisfied the twin conditions for bail under the Companies Act in a serious fraud prosecution
Analysis: The applications arose from a complaint alleging serious financial irregularities in a real estate company, but the record also showed continuing attempts by the applicants to revive the projects through compromise and revival schemes. The Court treated those efforts, along with the long period of custody, the nascent stage of trial, the absence of misuse of interim bail, and the investor-oriented nature of the relief sought, as relevant while considering the statutory restrictions on bail. In this context, the Court held that the applicants had made out reasonable grounds to believe they were not guilty and were not likely to commit any offence while on bail.
Conclusion: The twin conditions were held to be satisfied, and bail was found to be justified in favour of the applicants.
Issue (ii): whether their release on regular bail could be considered while they were on interim bail and not required to surrender physically
Analysis: The Court applied the doctrine of constructive custody and held that a person already on interim bail remains under judicial control for the purpose of deciding the regular bail plea. It rejected the contention that physical surrender was a prerequisite and held that requiring surrender would serve no useful purpose where the applicants had complied with interim bail conditions and were actively pursuing revival measures that could benefit the investors. The Court also balanced the gravity of the alleged economic offence against the settled principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception.
Conclusion: The applicants were treated as being in constructive custody and were held not to be required to surrender physically before the regular bail applications were decided.
Final Conclusion: The Court granted regular bail to both applicants on conditions, while emphasizing that the order was confined to bail and would not affect the merits of the pending criminal proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi: In a serious fraud prosecution under the Companies Act, where the accused have remained in prolonged custody, are already on interim bail, have not misused liberty, and are making bona fide efforts toward revival of the affected projects, the statutory twin conditions for bail may be treated as satisfied and constructive custody is sufficient for deciding the regular bail plea without insisting on fresh physical surrender.
Seeking grant of Regular bail - allegations of serious fraud and financial mismanagement under the Companies Act, 2013 and 1956 - twin conditions under Section 212(6) of the Companies Act, 2013, which pertain to the grant of bail in cases involving serious frauds investigated by the SFIO satisfied or not - HELD THAT:- It is observed by this Court that it is a common ground between the CSL and the investors that the liquidation of the Company is not in the interest of the investors as substantial amounts have been invested by them in residential/commercial projects proposed by the CSL and the said fact has been duly noted by the concerned Company Court in its order dated 24th August, 2023 (which is part of the record). It is pertinent to mention here that the said facts and circumstances were also taken into consideration by the Predecessor Bench of this Court while deciding the grant of interim bail to the applicants.
It would not be impermissible under the law to consider the aspect of grant of regular bail in order to allow the accused applicants to revive the CSL in furtherance to the completion of the pending projects - This Court is well cognizant of the fact that the Courts ought to bear in mind that in a matter of regular bail under Section 439 of the CrPC (now Section 483 of the BNSS), the larger interest of the State must be taken into consideration. Further, a sensitive approach is required to be acquired by the Courts while dealing with the offences constituting economic offences which are increasing plight of this nation as the same impacts the individual roots of the society which is a common man, ultimately leading to minimize the trust of the public in law.
Section 212(6) of the Companies Act imposes twin conditions for granting bail to accused persons in cases involving serious frauds investigated by the SFIO. These conditions are, that an offence covered under Section 447 of the Companies Act shall be cognizable and no person accused thereof shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release and where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he not likely to commit an offence while on bail.
In the present case, this Court, while refraining from adjudicating on the merits of the allegations, observes that the applicants have made bona fide efforts to revive the projects and safeguard the interests of the investors. The said actions not only reflect their intent to rectify the consequences of the alleged offences rather than perpetuating fraudulent activities, but also prima facie satisfies this Court that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the applicants might not be guilty of the offences and they are not likely to commit any offence while on bail as they have sought bail so that they may make efforts towards revival of the CSL and complete the pending projects.
This Court holds that the applicants meet the twin conditions under Section 212(6) of the Companies Act and their release on bail would serve the larger public interest without compromising the ongoing legal proceedings.
Conclusion - This Court is of the considered view that directing the applicant to first physically surrender and then proceeding with the adjudication of the instant regular bail applications would not serve any substantial purpose and accepting the argument of the respondent might hinder the applicants’ ongoing pending efforts to resolve the grievances of the investors by implementing the proposed revival schemes.
Both the applicants be released on regular bail subject to fulfilment of conditions imposed - bail application allowed.
Issues: Whether the company in liquidation deserved to be dissolved under Section 481 of the Companies Act, 1956 in view of the absence of assets and funds.
Analysis: The report showed that the company had no realizable assets or funds with the Official Liquidator and that further winding up proceedings could not be carried forward for want of money and assets. The record also showed compliance with the statutory process, including notice to concerned authorities and filing of accounts, with no objections received. In these circumstances, the Court found it just and reasonable to bring the liquidation proceedings to an end by ordering dissolution.
Conclusion: The company in liquidation was ordered to be dissolved under Section 481 of the Companies Act, 1956 and the Official Liquidator was discharged.
Dissolution of the company - Section 481 of the Companies Act, 1956 - HELD THAT:- Having heard the learned advocate for the Official Liquidator and on perusal of the record of this report and in the facts of the case the report deserves to be accepted.
The Official Liquidator is permitted to make payment towards professional fees of Rs. 1,500/- to M/s. P. C. Rathod & Co., Chartered Accountants towards preparation of Auditor’s Certificate from common pool account available with the Official Liquidator since there is no fund in the account of the company in liquidation.
Conclusion - M/s. Tirupati Foundry Private Limited (In Liquidation) is hereby dissolved under Section 481 of the Act and the Official Liquidator attached to this Court stands discharged and is relieved as liquidator of M/s. Tirupati Foundry Private Limited., (in Liquidation).
Issues: Whether the respondents, claiming under consent terms and as representatives of the deceased shareholder's estate, had locus to maintain a petition alleging oppression and mismanagement under the Companies Act, despite pending civil and testamentary proceedings concerning succession to the deceased's assets and shares.
Analysis: The respondents' authority was traced to consent terms recorded in earlier proceedings, under which the deceased shareholder's shares were to be dealt with by the persons named therein. The pending civil suit did not, on the material before the Tribunal, obtain any stay or declaration invalidating those consent terms in relation to the shares. The testamentary proceedings likewise had not produced any order displacing the arrangement under which the estate was being represented. The Tribunal also relied on the principle that, where a deceased member's estate is affected, legal representatives may maintain proceedings to protect the estate's interest and that succession should not be left in abeyance to the detriment of the estate. On the facts, the reduction in the deceased's shareholding after her death furnished sufficient cause for the estate to be represented in the company petition until the succession disputes were finally determined.
Conclusion: The respondents were held entitled to maintain the company petition and the objection to their locus was rejected.
Ratio Decidendi: A deceased shareholder's estate may be represented by persons authorised under subsisting consent terms, and pending succession litigation does not, without a stay or contrary adjudication, bar maintenance of a petition to protect the estate's company-law rights.
Maintainability of the company petition - non-compliance of Section 244(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 was wrongly rejected by Ld. NCLT - Petition filed by legal representatives of a deceased shareholder - locus standi of the respondents to file the petition - HELD THAT:- Admittedly the consent terms were taken on record in such Testamentary Suit No.883/2014 also. Admittedly all legal heirs who had entered the consent terms were Class II legal heirs of Late Smt Tanna and it was noted in the order dated 04.05.2017 in view of consent terms Probate was not required. Now the Probate was only required when all legal heirs had wished to act under the Will of Late Smt Tanna but, admittedly, they never acted under such Will. Thus to say the Respondents No.1 and 2 could not have acted under the consent terms is not correct.
A bare perusal of the impugned order, in the facts of this case pleaded before us depicts of no infirmity. Admittedly the shareholding of the deceased Smt Tanna have been brought from 66% to 6% after her death and the reason given is she could not invest more money after her death. Looking at the conduct of Respondent No.3 who was in control of appellant company after the death of Smt Tarla Tanna, it gives all the more reason that her Estate be represented by someone who could protect the interest of legal heirs either per Consent Terms and/or under a Will, if Respondent No.3 succeeds in any of the cases, but till such time her Estate and her shareholding needs to be protected and for this reason there must be someone to represent her estate/shareholding in the company.
Conclusion - The respondents have the locus standi to maintain the company petition under Section 241. The NCLT did not exceed its jurisdiction, and the pending legal proceedings do not preclude the petition's maintainability. The allegations of oppression and mismanagement warrant examination, and the respondents are justified in representing the deceased's estate.
Appeal dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The legal judgment presents the following core issues:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Condonation of Delay
Issue 2: Replacement of the Authorised Representative
Issue 3: Inherent Power of the Adjudicating Authority
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The judgment underscores the importance of procedural compliance in insolvency proceedings and the limited role of inherent powers in altering established processes. The decision reflects a balance between procedural rigor and fairness in adjudicating appeals and applications within the insolvency framework.
Seeking condonation of 1 day delay in filing the Appeal - applicant contends that the ground taken in the Application is that due to bulky and voluminous nature of documents delay was caused - HELD THAT:- The issue which is sought to be raised in the present Appeal by Learned Counsel for the Respondent was considered by this Tribunal in the matter of Innovators Cleantech Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Pasari Multi Projects Pvt. Ltd. [2024 (8) TMI 211 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL , PRINCIPAL BENCH , NEW DELHI]. This Tribunal in the aforesaid Judgment has held that as per Rule 22 of National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2016 and Orders issued by this Tribunal on 21.10.2022 and 24.12.2022, the date of e-filing has to be treated as date for calculation of the limitation. It was further noticed that the date of refiling after curing the defects cannot be treated to be date of filing of the Appeal for purposes of computation of limitation and date of e-filing cannot be treated to be fresh date of filing of the Appeal.
For purposes of computation of limitation, the date of e-filing of the Appeal which is 24.08.2024 has to be treated the date for purposes of computing the limitation. 30 days period after 24.07.2024, having expired on 23.08.2024, there is a delay of only 1 day in filing of the Appeal - there are sufficient cause in the grounds taken in the Application for condonation of 1 day delay. The delay of 1 day in filing the Appeal is condoned.
Replacement of the Authorised Representative of the homebuyers - HELD THAT:- When a procedure for replacement of the Authorised Representatives have been introduced in the Regulations by 16A(3A) inserted on 18.09.2023, the said statutory provision has to be followed for replacement of Authorised Representatives. Adjudicating Authority did not commit any error in relying on the Regulation 16A(3A) of the CIRP Regulations for not accepting the Application of the Appellant.
Conclusion - The delay in filing the appeal was condoned. The application for replacement of the Authorised Representative was dismissed. The court declined to exercise inherent powers absent compelling evidence.
Thus, no case has been made out to interfere with the impugned Order - appeal dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment include:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Admission of Section 7 Application
Issue 2: Sufficiency and Sale of Pledged Shares
Issue 3: Existence of Debt and Default
Issue 4: Subsequent Negotiations and Partial Payments
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Admission of Section 7 Application filed by the Financial Creditor against the Corporate Debtor (CD) - pledged shares were sufficient to cover the debt owed by the CD to the Financial Creditor or not - HELD THAT:- The findings recorded by Adjudicating Authority with regard to debt are not even questioned. The case setup by the Appellant before the Adjudicating Authority as well as before this Tribunal to settle the matter and discharge its liability, itself indicate that there was a debt and default. In paragraph 6.13, the Adjudicating Authority has noticed the amount released by sale of pledged shares and it was found that amount of Rs.2,05,54,296 is still due and payable.
The submission of the Appellant is that had the shares been transferred on the date when shares were pledged, the Financial Creditor would have obtained amount of Rs.6 crores, sufficient to clear the claim, cannot be accepted. Under the MoU, it was the sole discretion of Financial Creditor to invoke the shares and pledge invocation was noticed on 29.11.2022 and thereafter shares were realized and the amount, which was realized by the sale of shares have been noticed, which did not discharge the debt of the Financial Creditor. The fact that CD has taken steps to settle the dues before the Adjudicating Authority as well as this Tribunal, itself indicate that both, debt is there and default is an admitted fact.
Conclusion - The debt and default having been proved, there are no error in initiating the CIRP against the CD.
There are no ground to interfere with the impugned order in the present Appeal - appeal dismissed.
Issues: Whether the applications filed by the appellant challenging non-admission of its claim and exclusion from the Committee of Creditors could be disposed of by relying upon orders passed in unrelated matters, without adjudicating the appellant's specific reliefs and without passing a speaking order.
Analysis: The applications before the Tribunal sought a specific direction to admit and include the appellant's claim as a financial creditor and to reconstitute the Committee of Creditors. The earlier direction to the Resolution Professional to examine the claim had led to a rejection order, but the impugned order did not address the merits of the appellant's applications or the reasoning behind the rejection. Instead, the applications were disposed of by referring to orders passed in other proceedings concerning different factual situations and different reliefs. Such summary disposal did not reflect consideration of the issues actually raised by the appellant.
Conclusion: The impugned order, insofar as it disposed of the appellant's applications, was set aside and the matters were remanded for fresh consideration and disposal by a speaking order.
Final Conclusion: The appellant succeeded in obtaining setting aside of the impugned disposal order and remand of its applications for fresh adjudication on merits.
Ratio Decidendi: Applications raising distinct substantive reliefs cannot be finally disposed of by reference to orders in unrelated proceedings; the adjudicating forum must deal with the specific controversy by a reasoned speaking order.
Admission of appellant's claims as a financial creditor - inclusion in the Committee of Creditors (CoC) - HELD THAT:- Admittedly in the present IAs there was no such direction sought to refer the matter to RP to consider the claims of the appellants but a direction was sought from the Ld. NCLT to direct the RP to admit and include its claims in the capacity of Financial Creditor.
It is evident to note in its order dated 04.11.2022 the Ld. NCLT had kept IAs No.5284 and 5181 of 2022 pending and the RP was rather directed to place on record his decision before the Tribunal. Further on both these IAs viz. No.5181/2022 and 5284/2022 the arguments were finally heard on 1.11.2023 despite the decision dated 10.11.2022 of the RP on record, and parties were even given liberty to file written synopsis alongwith case laws. However, if one peruse the impugned order the arguments made in IA No.5284/2022 as well as in IA No.5181/2022 were never discussed and such applications were , disposed off in terms of orders passed on 13.09.2023 by the Ld. NCLT though such orders had nothing to do with issues involved in the present IAs filed by the appellant. The issue in those applications was to consider the belated claims or to hand over the possession of the flats to bona fide allottees (including RERA decree holders) irrespective of whether they (RERA decree holders) have filed their claims or not or filed their claims after 90 days from CIRP date but claims were not admitted due to late filing and the Ld. Counsel for RP rather submitted all bona fide allottees irrespective of whether they have filed claims or not or had filed belated claims will be given possession of the flats.
Conclusion - The necessity for a tribunal to provide a detailed and reasoned order addressing the specific issues and arguments presented by the parties involved. The NCLT was directed to reconsider the appellant's applications with a detailed hearing and a reasoned order.
Appeal allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment include:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity and Maintainability of Section 7 Application by PNB
Issue 2: Jurisdiction of Central Bank of India to File Section 7 Application
Issue 3: Section 7 Proceedings as a Recovery Measure
Issue 4: Impact of Auction Proceedings and Cancellation
Issue 5: Influence of OTS Proposal on CIRP
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Challenge to order admitting Section 7 Application - power of Central Bank to file Section 7 Application as it was only lead Bank, who as per inter-se Agreement, can take steps for enforcement of the securities - HELD THAT:- Section 7 Application, which was filed by the Oriental Bank of Commerce, was filed in the year 2020 claiming default of Rs.246,30,21,036/-, in which Section 7 Application, a reply was filed and after hearing the parties, the Adjudicating Authority after finding debt and default has admitted Section 7 Application. The proceeding for auction, which was initiated in pursuance of Decree passed by DRT on 02.03.2020 on the Application filed by Central Bank of India, where assets were auctioned on 05.11.2021 for an amount of Rs.37.60 crores, has now stand cancelled on 24.04.2023. The Writ Petition, which was filed by Central Bank of India being Writ Petition No.22367 of 2021 and Writ Petition No.11117 of 2022 filed by the CD were both heard and decided on 24.05.2024 by the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The High Court CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA AND M/S KAUR SAIN SPINNERS LTD. VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [2024 (6) TMI 714 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT] has noted the order PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK (SUCCESSOR OF ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE) THROUGH MR. ASHISH VERMA CHIEF MANAGER OVERSEAS BRANCH, INDUSTRIAL AREA-A, LUDHIANA VERSUS M/S. KAUR SAIN SPINNERS LTD. [2024 (5) TMI 1507 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL CHANDIGARH], by which Section 7 Application was admitted. The High Court has held in the judgment that by virtue of order of admission under Section 7 of IBC, both the Writ Petitions have become infructuous.
The Writ Petition was decided by the Punjab and Haryana High Court on 24.05.2024. The submission made on behalf of the CD before the Adjudicating Authority to defer the hearing of Section 7 Application, has become infructuous. The Adjudicating Authority having found the debt and default, there are no error admitting Section 7 Application. The submission of the Appellant that under inter-se Agreement it was only the lead Bank, who could have taken steps, is also without any substance, since lead Bank, i.e., Oriental Bank of Commerce has also filed Section 7 Application, which has been admitted by the impugned order. The submission of the Appellant that Section 7 Application was filed for recovery of dues and was not maintainable, also cannot be accepted. It is well settled law that the fact that Financial Creditor has initiated proceedings before the DRT does not preclude them to take remedy under Section 7, which is a special remedy provided under the IBC.
To the submission of the Appellant that OTS proposal if accepted by Financial Creditors, there can be no impediment in filing Section 12-A Application before the NCLT for withdrawal of the proceedings through IRP by giving Form-FA, in accordance with law, no exception can be taken.
Conclusion - No grounds have been made out by the Appellant to interfere with the impugned order admitting Section 7 Application by the Adjudicating Authority. However, in event the OTS proposal as submitted by the Appellant is accepted by Financial Creditors, it shall be open for the Financial Creditors to file Application under Section 12-A read with Regulation 30A of IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016 within two weeks from today.
Appeal dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The primary legal issues considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Whether the transaction constitutes a "Financial Debt" under Section 5(8)(e) of the IBC.
Issue 2: Whether there was a default on the part of the Respondent.
Issue 3: Whether the Adjudicating Authority erred in rejecting the application under Section 7 of the IBC.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Financial Debt - Section 5(8)(e) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - Application under Section 7 - date of default - sale proceeds of iron ore - acknowledgment of liability - share transfer agreement
Financial Debt - Section 5(8)(e) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - sale proceeds of iron ore - Transaction constituted a Financial Debt within the meaning of Section 5(8)(e) of the IBC. - HELD THAT: - The Share Transfer Agreement separately contemplated that existing stock of iron ore would be valued and either purchased by the buyer or sold and the proceeds remitted to the outgoing shareholders. The Tribunal treated the sale of iron ore as distinct from the share sale consideration and observed contemporaneous correspondence and emails showing the Appellants sought remittance of proceeds totaling Rs.2.65 Crores while only Rs.1 Crore was paid. On the material on record the Appellants proved that the amount receivable from sale of iron ore was due and payable and therefore fell within the definition of Financial Debt under Section 5(8)(e). The Adjudicating Authority's contrary conclusion, including its observation that there was "no time value of money", was rejected because it did not address the contractual arrangement and the correspondence evidencing the claim. [Paras 5, 6, 7, 9]
Transaction held to be a Financial Debt under Section 5(8)(e) of the IBC.
Application under Section 7 - date of default - acknowledgment of liability - Adjudicating Authority erred in rejecting the Section 7 application and the appeal is allowed with conditional directions. - HELD THAT: - The Adjudicating Authority had rejected the Section 7 petition noting absence of time value of money and insufficiency in fixing the date of default. The Tribunal found those conclusions unsustainable in view of the contract terms and the correspondence showing demand and partial payment. The Tribunal therefore set aside the impugned order and directed that if the respondent deposits the balance claimed amount before the Adjudicating Authority within two months and files proof, the proceedings shall be closed; failing which the Adjudicating Authority shall admit the Section 7 application and proceed consequentially. The Tribunal recorded conflicting stands by the respondent and noted denial of acknowledgment before the Adjudicating Authority, but directed a limited compliance route rather than remitting for fresh factual enquiry. [Paras 7, 8, 9, 10]
Impugned order set aside; Section 7 application to be admitted unless respondent deposits balance within the time directed, failing which Adjudicating Authority to admit the petition and proceed.
Final Conclusion: Appeal allowed; the Tribunal held that the claim for sale proceeds of iron ore constituted a Financial Debt under Section 5(8)(e) of the IBC, set aside the Adjudicating Authority's rejection of the Section 7 application and directed conditional payment of the balance within two months failing which the Section 7 petition shall be admitted.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The judgment primarily revolves around the following core legal issues:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
First Issue: Date of Claim Submission
Second Issue: Coverage under Resolution Plan Clauses
Third Issue: Entitlement to Full Amount or 50%
Fourth Issue: Execution of Conveyance Deed and Possession
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Seeking direction to Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) to decide the claim Form dated 11.01.2019 submitted by the Appellant for getting the Conveyance Deed of the Apartment GBD-00-001 (Block D) in “IREO RISE” (Gardenia Block) executed - Appellant's claim regarding the apartment was filed on 11.01.2019 or 07.02.2020 - what is the date, on which the Appellants can be said to have filed their claims? - HELD THAT:- The filing of the claim was not in accordance with public announcement. The claim was required to be filed at the address and email given at Item Sl. No.10 of the public announcement at the New Delhi address. It is further relevant to notice that Appellants itself has submitted that it has filed its claim on 29.10.2018 with regard to claim of Plot, which was well within time by email. Thus, the Appellants were well aware that claim has to be filed by email at the email address or at New Delhi address, mentioned above. Thus, the pleadings made by the Appellant itself prove that there was no claim filed as per public announcement. Hence, the plea of the RP has to be accepted that claim for the first time was filed on 07.02.2020. The Appellants’ case also is that on 07.02.2020 they have submitted their claim, after receiving the email from the RP. The Appellant never filed any claim on 11.01.2019 and the claim for the first time was filed on 07.02.2020.
The Resolution Plan, which is brought on the record as Annexure A-4, is dated 24.08.2019, which was finally approved on 04.09.2019. Thus, the Clause 18.4 (xi) has to be read with reference to the date when the Plan was approved. On the date, when Plan was approved, the Appellant has not filed the claim, admittedly. Their case of submitting claim on 11.01.2019 has not been accepted as noted above. The purpose and object of Clause 18.4 (xi) is to even protect those allottees, who have not filed the claim, so as to consider their claims on merits and the claims, which were not filed, were not extinguished for the purpose to mitigate the hardship of those, who have not filed their claims within the time. The Resolution Plan having been approved, all stakeholders, including allottees are clearly bound by the same.
Conclusion - The Appellant never filed any claim on 11.01.2019 and the claim for the first time was filed on 07.02.2020. The Appellant's claim was filed late and is covered by Clause 18.4 (xi), entitling them to 50% of the principal amount. The request for possession and execution of the Conveyance Deed was denied.
Appeal disposed off.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal question in this judgment revolves around whether the delay of 166 days in refiling the Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1913 of 2024 should be condoned. The Tribunal needed to determine if the reasons provided by the Applicant were sufficient and genuine to warrant such condonation.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Relevant legal framework and precedents:
The legal framework governing the condonation of delay in refiling appeals typically involves principles of justice and fairness, allowing for leniency in cases where the delay is justified by circumstances beyond the control of the applicant. The Tribunal considers whether the reasons for the delay are genuine and plausible, and whether the delay was caused by factors beyond the applicant's control.
Court's interpretation and reasoning:
The Tribunal acknowledged that applications for condonation of delay should be treated with a liberal and lenient approach. However, it emphasized that when the delay is unduly protracted, the Bench must be satisfied with the genuineness and plausibility of the explanation offered. The Tribunal analyzed the reasons provided by the Applicant to determine if they were beyond the Applicant's control.
Key evidence and findings:
The Applicant cited several reasons for the delay, including bereavement in the family of the counsel, summer vacations, limited staffing, and repeated corrections due to defects pointed out by the Registry. The Tribunal found that while the bereavement justified a delay of one month, the subsequent reasons were not convincing. The Tribunal noted that the Registry operates even during vacations, and the repeated corrections indicated negligence on the part of the Applicant.
Application of law to facts:
The Tribunal applied the principle that delay condonation requires genuine reasons that are beyond the control of the Applicant. It found that the reasons provided, such as vacations and repeated corrections, did not meet this standard. The Tribunal concluded that the delay was not caused by factors beyond the Applicant's control but rather by inaction and negligence.
Treatment of competing arguments:
The Respondent argued that the delay was inordinately long and due to a casual approach by the Applicant. The Tribunal agreed with the Respondent, finding that the Applicant's reasons lacked cogent basis and were insufficient to justify the delay. The Tribunal dismissed the Applicant's arguments as perfunctory and unconvincing.
Conclusions:
The Tribunal concluded that the Applicant failed to provide sufficient grounds for condonation of the 166-day delay. It found that the delay was primarily due to the Applicant's negligence and lack of thoroughness, rather than any external factors beyond their control.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve verbatim quotes of crucial legal reasoning:
"It goes without saying that it is normative that re-filing delay condonation application warrants a liberal and lenient treatment and is a matter which largely lies between the Court and the Applicant."
"We are therefore not impressed with vacations being made the scapegoat to cover up the Applicant's lethargy in curing the defects."
Core principles established:
The Tribunal established that while delay condonation applications should be treated leniently, the reasons provided must be genuine, plausible, and beyond the Applicant's control. The Tribunal emphasized the importance of diligence and vigilance in refiling appeals.
Final determinations on each issue:
The Tribunal rejected the application for condonation of the 166-day delay in refiling the Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1913 of 2024. Consequently, the Memo of Appeal was also rejected, as the Applicant failed to demonstrate sufficient grounds for the delay.
Condonation of 166 days delay in refiling of Company Appeal - sufficient reasons for delay or not - HELD THAT:- Coming to the first explanation offered which was bereavement in the family of the counsel and the need to perform attendant rituals, we are inclined to agree to the time lapse of a month as has been claimed by the Applicant to justify the delay. This period of one month admittedly came to an end in mid-May, which time this Tribunal was fully operational. However, there seems to have been total inertia and non-action on the part of the Applicant to take any steps towards removing the defects. Delay thereafter from June onwards has been conveniently attributed to the summer vacations of the court. This is a lame and hackneyed excuse which clearly has no legs to stand on since the Registry is always open and working even during vacation time. It is not impressed with vacations being made the scapegoat to cover up the Applicant’s lethargy in curing the defects.
Another ground cited by the Applicant is that a lot of time got consumed as they had to repeatedly make corrections because of defects being pointed out by the Registry on four different occasions. This argument is not convincing either as it only substantiates the contention of the Respondent that the Applicant was lackadaisical and negligent while making the corrections and removing the defects in a timely manner. Had the Applicant been more alert, careful and vigilant, they would not have been required to undergo the rigmarole of correcting defects four times.
Conclusion - Sufficient grounds have not been made out for condonation of 166 days in refiling of the Company Appeal.
The refiling delay condonation application is rejected.
Issues: Whether penalty under Section 18(2) read with Section 18(3) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 could be sustained against a person shown only as an export procedure agent who prepared export documents and was not shown to be part of the exporting company or responsible for realisation of export proceeds.
Analysis: The appellant's role, as reflected from the record and the impugned order, was limited to preparing export documents for consideration. The material did not show that he was an exporter, a person in control of the company, or otherwise connected with the default in realisation of export proceeds. In the absence of evidence establishing his involvement in the contravention alleged against the company, penal action against him could not be justified.
Conclusion: The penalty imposed on the appellant could not be sustained and was liable to be set aside.
Penalty for contravention of Section 18(2) read with Section 18(3) of the Foreign Exchange Regulatory Act, 1973 - export proceeds realisation within six months - liability of an export proceeds agent for nonrecovery of export dues - requirement of material to attribute statutory contravention to an individual
Penalty for contravention of Section 18(2) read with Section 18(3) of the Foreign Exchange Regulatory Act, 1973 - liability of an export proceeds agent for nonrecovery of export dues - requirement of material to attribute statutory contravention to an individual - Whether the penalty imposed on the appellant for alleged contravention of Section 18(2) read with Section 18(3) of the Act of 1973 was sustainable against him - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined the material relied upon to fasten liability on the appellant and found that he acted as an export proceeds agent who prepared export documents for a stated fee and was not shown to be a part of M/s Sparkle Gems Industries (P) Ltd. The impugned order itself (quoted at paragraph 22 of the order under challenge) records that the appellant admitted to being an export procedure agent and preparing documents for a fee; there is no material demonstrating that he had responsibility for or participated in the company's failure to realise export proceeds within six months. The authority failed to establish the requisite nexus between the appellant's role and the statutory contravention under Section 18(2) read with Section 18(3) of the Act of 1973. In those circumstances the penalty levied on the appellant was found to be a product of ignoring his actual position and lacking the necessary material to attribute the offence to him. [Paras 5, 6, 7, 8]
Penalty set aside as there is no material to sustain allegation of contravention of Section 18(2) r/w Section 18(3) of the Act of 1973 against the appellant
Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed insofar as it challenges the penalty imposed on the appellant; the impugned order is set aside against the appellant and the predeposit amount deposited by him shall be released.
Issues: Whether condition no. 4(i) of the bail order required modification to permit the respondent to leave the limits of the NCR Region only with the permission of the concerned Special PMLA Court at Patiala House.
Analysis: The prayer for modification of condition no. 4(ii) was not pressed. The only surviving request related to condition no. 4(i), and the Court accepted the request and substituted the condition so that the respondent shall not leave the limits of the NCR Region without the permission of the concerned Special PMLA Court at Patiala House.
Conclusion: The bail condition was modified only to the extent of condition no. 4(i), and the modification application was allowed in part.
Seeking modification of the bail conditions imposed by this Court - HELD THAT:- The condition no.4 (i) is modified and substituted to the extent that the respondent/ applicant shall not leave the limits of the NCR Region without the permission of the concerned Special PMLA Court at Patiala House.
Rest of the bail conditions imposed by this Court vide the Order dated 04.08.2023 passed in SLP(Crl.) No. 7409 of 2023, shall remain unchanged.
Application disposed off.
Issues: Whether the applicants were entitled to anticipatory bail in a prosecution under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 despite the restrictions under Section 45, and in the light of their non-arrest during investigation and the principles governing post-charge-sheet arrest.
Analysis: The application arose from allegations of money laundering and the Court considered the effect of the statutory bar and conditions under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. It noted that the applicants had not been arrested during the long course of investigation, the prosecution complaint had already been filed, and the case was comparable to other co-accused who had already obtained bail. The Court also relied on the principle that filing of the charge-sheet does not by itself require arrest, and that where custody is not required, the accused need not be compelled to surrender merely because proceedings have been forwarded to the trial court. In the facts of the case, the Court found that the balance of considerations and parity with similarly placed accused justified grant of anticipatory bail.
Conclusion: The applicants were entitled to anticipatory bail and the twin conditions under Section 45 did not preclude relief on the facts of this case.
Money Laundering - first anticipatory bail application under Section 482 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - applicability of Section 45 of the PMLA - HELD THAT:- The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Siddharth vs. State of U.P. [2021 (8) TMI 977 - SUPREME COURT] held that 'There is no force in argument advanced by the learned Special Counsel for the respondent that the applicants before grant of bail required to pass test of 45 of PMLA. The position would have been different, had the applicants arrested during investigation. The investigating agency as mentioned hereinabove consciously preferred not to arrest the applicants during investigation or post filing of charge sheet.'
It is not in dispute that the FIR was registered on 19.02.2010 whereas the respondent filed a complaint arraying the applicants as accused in ECIR on 04.01.2021 i.e. after 11 years. The judgments relied on by learned counsel for the respondent state that the twin conditions of Section 45 of the PMLA Act are to be satisfied but at the same time, the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Satender Kumar Antil [2022 (8) TMI 152 - SUPREME COURT] cannot be lost sight of and other co-accused persons against whom similar allegations were levelled, have already been granted anticipatory bail by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and by this Court, therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the present is a fit case to extend the benefit under Section 482 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, to the applicants.
It is directed that in the event of arrest of the applicants in connection with the aforesaid offence, they shall be released on anticipatory bail on their furnishing a personal bond for a sum of Rs. 50,000/- with one surety in the like sum to the satisfaction of the arresting officer and they shall abide by the conditions imposed.
Conclusion - The circumstances and legal precedents justified such relief despite the stringent conditions of Section 45 of the PMLA.
The anticipatory bail application is allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal question in this judgment is whether the High Court has the power to condone a delay in filing an appeal beyond the maximum period of 120 days as stipulated under Section 42 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA, 2002).
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents
Section 42 of the PMLA, 2002 provides a 60-day period to file an appeal against an Appellate Tribunal's decision, with a possible extension of an additional 60 days if sufficient cause is shown. The question is whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which allows for further extension of time, applies to appeals under Section 42 of the PMLA.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning
The court examined the language of Section 42, emphasizing the proviso, which permits an extension of the appeal period by no more than 60 days. The court reasoned that the explicit wording of the proviso-"not exceeding sixty days"-indicates a legislative intent to exclude the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Key Evidence and Findings
The court considered the statutory language of Section 42 and related provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963. It also reviewed previous judgments, including those interpreting similar statutory provisions, to determine legislative intent regarding the exclusion of Section 5.
Application of Law to Facts
The appellant filed the appeal beyond the 120-day limit (60 days plus a 60-day extension), arguing that Section 5 of the Limitation Act should apply. However, the court found that the statutory language of Section 42 clearly excluded further extensions beyond 120 days.
Treatment of Competing Arguments
The appellant argued that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not explicitly excluded by Section 42 of the PMLA, and cited a similar case under the NIA Act where the court allowed an extension. The court distinguished the NIA Act case, noting that it involved fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution, which were not at issue here.
Conclusions
The court concluded that it lacked the authority to condone a delay beyond the 120-day period stipulated in Section 42 of the PMLA, 2002, thereby dismissing the application for condonation of delay and the appeal itself.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning
"The words used in the proviso to Section 42 'within a further period not exceeding sixty days' clearly therefore exclude the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963."
Core Principles Established
The court established that when a statute provides a specific time frame with a limited extension period, the applicability of general provisions for extension under the Limitation Act is excluded unless explicitly stated otherwise.
Final Determinations on Each Issue
The court determined that the appeal was filed beyond the permissible period under Section 42 of the PMLA, 2002, and that it did not have the power to condone the delay. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay and the appeal were dismissed.
Money Laundering - Provisional Attachment Order - condonation of delay of 132 days in approaching this Court after the Appellant withdrew its Appeal from the Gujarat High Court - Section 42 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 - HELD THAT:- Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal on any question of law or fact arising out of such order. The proviso to Section 42, and which is important for our purposes, stipulates that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the Appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the initial period of sixty days, may allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. What can be discerned from these provisions is that an appeal has to be filed within sixty days [the initial period], and if not done so, then, on sufficient cause being shown, the High Court can condone the delay up to a further period of sixty days. The question that arises in the present case, is whether by virtue of the said proviso, the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is excluded.
This Court, in the case of MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER MUMBAI VERSUS ANUSAYA SITARAM DEVRUKHKAR & ORS. [2025 (1) TMI 783 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT], after reviewing the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Popular Construction Company [2001 (10) TMI 1044 - SUPREME COURT], Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board Vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and others [2010 (4) TMI 1031 - SUPREME COURT], Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. Gujrat Energy Transmission Corporation Ltd. and others [2017 (3) TMI 1628 - SUPREME COURT] and Bengal Chemist and Druggists Association Vs. Kalyan Chowdhary [2018 (2) TMI 487 - SUPREME COURT], came to the conclusion that beyond the stipulated period of 120 days, this Court would have no power to condone the delay.
The decision rendered by this Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai would apply with full force to the facts of the present case. There are no hesitation in holding that after the total period of 120 days as stipulated in Section 42 of the PMLA, 2002, read with its proviso, the High Court would have no power to condone the delay in preferring the Appeal.
There are no hesitation in holding that beyond the total period of 120 days as stipulated in Section 42 [read with its proviso] of the PMLA, 2002, this Court has no power to condone the delay. Since admittedly, in the facts of the present case, the application seeking a condonation of delay is beyond the total period of 120 days.
Application seeking condonation of delay is hereby dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal issues considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Prosecution in India after Conviction in the USA
Issue 2: Evidentiary Value of Statements
Issue 3: Jurisdiction Over Cryptocurrency Transactions
Issue 4: Presumptions Under Section 23 of the Act
Issue 5: Bail Consideration
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Seeking grant of bail - offences of drug trafficking and money laundering - applicant has already been tried and convicted by the US authorities for the offence - can applicant be prosecuted in India again? - HELD THAT:- In the case of PRABODH K. MEHTA VERSUS CHARUBEN K. MEHTA [2018 (3) TMI 2049 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT], the Full Bench of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court had considered the principles of law, as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jitendra Panchal [2009 (2) TMI 912 - SUPREME COURT] and answered the reference which has already been quoted hereinabove. According to the settled law now that judgment and order of conviction of a foreign court for the offence committed in that country can be noticed/looked into and recognized by judicial and quasi judicial authorities in India. But, it has been held in the case of Prabodh that if the judgment of the foreign court is held binding on the courts and authorities in India, it would amount to directly or indirectly enforcing the judgment of the foreign courts. It was held that the effect of such order of conviction would depend upon variety of facts. In the instant case also at some later stage those factors would fall for consideration in the trial of the applicant.
It is positive case of the ED that the applicant under Section 50 of the Act has stated that in the year 2017, he and his brother Parvinder Singh did split as they stopped the said business. In the said split Parvinder Singh got 4250 Bitcoins. Those Bitcoins according to the ED are still in the block chain, but they could not be accessed for the want of passwords or key phrases. Search has already been made to recover those passwords and key phrases - What is being argued is that the proffer and statement under Section 50 of the Act is not a substantive piece of evidence. There admissibility is not in dispute, but their evidentiary value depends on as to whether such statement finds independent corroboration or not?
Admittedly, the applicant had entered into a plea agreement in the United States. The BTC were surrendered and the applicant received the reduced sentence. The money was transmitted in the Indian accounts during that period only. In the request for assistance sought by the United States Department of Justice, the United States authorities have informed the Indian authorities that during investigation, the US authorities identified several Pay Pal, Money Gram and Western Union accounts (Collectively, the funnel accounts) used by the Singh DTO to receive proceeds on drug trafficking. The money was transferred accordingly in the India accounts. It is also true that under Section 60 (2) of the Act, such account have not been freezed.
Conclusion - Foreign convictions do not preclude domestic prosecution for distinct offenses. It also highlighted the need for corroborative evidence when relying on statements made under coercion.
This Court is of the view that there is no ground to enlarge the applicant on bail - bail application is rejected.
Issues: (i) whether the provisional attachment was without jurisdiction for want of a valid reason to believe that the appellant held proceeds of crime; (ii) whether the subject property, purchased in auction, lacked the necessary nexus with the scheduled offence and whether the argument based on the later inclusion of the predicate offences in the Schedule defeated the attachment; (iii) whether the notice and confirmation proceedings under Section 8 and the continued attachment of the property were legally sustainable.
Issue (i): whether the provisional attachment was without jurisdiction for want of a valid reason to believe that the appellant held proceeds of crime.
Analysis: The material before the authority, including the charge-sheet, investigation record and statements under the Act, was treated as sufficient to form the requisite belief. The attachment order recorded the basis for concluding that funds generated from the bank fraud had been routed through newly created group entities and used to acquire the property in the appellant's name. The challenge that the order lacked a real foundation for jurisdiction was rejected.
Conclusion: The challenge to jurisdiction for want of reason to believe failed and was decided against the appellant.
Issue (ii): whether the subject property, purchased in auction, lacked the necessary nexus with the scheduled offence and whether the argument based on the later inclusion of the predicate offences in the Schedule defeated the attachment.
Analysis: The property was found to be traceable, directly or indirectly, to the proceeds generated by the bank fraud, because the funds were routed through intermediary entities controlled by the principal accused and then used for the auction purchase. The Tribunal treated money laundering as a continuing offence and held that the relevant inquiry was the laundering activity and the use or projection of tainted value, not merely the date of the predicate offence or the auction purchase. The plea based on absence of retrospective effect to the Schedule and Article 20 of the Constitution of India was rejected.
Conclusion: The property was held to be linked to proceeds of crime and the retrospectivity challenge failed against the appellant.
Issue (iii): whether the notice and confirmation proceedings under Section 8 and the continued attachment of the property were legally sustainable.
Analysis: The Tribunal held that the notice and confirmation could validly proceed once the material showed the property to be proceeds of crime. It further held that attachment is a protective measure to secure confiscation proceedings and that, on the facts, continued attachment was justified. The objection to taking physical possession was not accepted as a ground to invalidate the attachment itself.
Conclusion: The confirmation and continuation of attachment were upheld and the objection to possession did not succeed.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was found to lack merit because the property was treated as connected with laundering activity and the statutory attachment mechanism was held to have been validly invoked and sustained.
Ratio Decidendi: Where material shows that funds derived from a scheduled-offence fraud were routed through controlled entities and used to acquire property, the property can be treated as proceeds of crime for attachment under the Act, and money laundering being a continuing offence, the date of the predicate offence does not by itself defeat attachment.
Money Laundering - proceeds of crime - no reasons to believe - scheduled offences - acquisition of property in a public auction conducted by the SBI - validity of notice - legality of provisional attachment of the property under Section 5 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA).
The first contention of the appellant in the appeal is that there was no reason to believe on the basis of information in possession that the appellant is in possession of proceeds of crime - HELD THAT:- In view of the detailed and very specific reasons which have been discussed in detail in the Provisional Attachment Order, and also considering the discussions in paragraphs 48-51 of the impugned order by the Ld. AA before whom this very issue had been raised by the defendants therein, there are no merit in the contention that there was no material in the possession of the officer passing the order to have reason to believe that the appellant was in possession of proceeds of crime. Accordingly, this contention of the appellant is hereby rejected.
It is next contended that the subject property was purchased by the appellant on 19.02.2009 and at that time, the relevant provision of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) were not scheduled offences and the Legislature has not given retrospective effect to the amendment to the Schedule which came into force w.e.f. 01.06.2009 - HELD THAT:- It is by now well-settled that the issue of retrospectivity or otherwise in so far as offence of money laundering is concerned has to be examined with reference to the act which constitutes „money laundering‟ under Act, regardless of the time of occurrence of the scheduled offence. Further, the offence of money laundering is a continuing offence. A continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from one which is committed once and for all. A continuing offence occurs and re-occurs, and each time, an offence is committed. It was so held by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in State of Bihar Vs. Deokaran Nenshi [1972 (8) TMI 133 - SUPREME COURT]. In Dyani Antony Paul and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. [2020 (12) TMI 1296 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT], the Hon‟ble Karnataka High Court has held that money laundering is a continuing offence and, as such, the issue of retrospective effect does not arise.
The decision of the Hon‟ble Delhi High Court in Prakash Industries Limited [2022 (7) TMI 877 - DELHI HIGH COURT] may also be referred to in this context, wherein, it was held that it is well settled relating to retroactive application of penal previous that merely because requisite or facet for initiation of action pertains to a period prior to the enforcement of the statute, that would not be sufficient to characterize statute as being retrospective. It must be borne in mind that the Act with which are concerned penalizes acts of money laundering. It does not create a separate punishment for a crime prescribed under the Penal Code. The Act does not penalize the predicate offence. That offence merely constitutes the substratum on which charge of money laundering is being raised.
The next contention of the appellant is that the appellant company had acquired the property in a public auction conducted by the SBI which was a perfectly legal activity and the consideration paid by the appellant for the same has absolutely no linkage to the alleged criminal activity - HELD THAT:- There is no merit in the appellant‟s contention that there is no linkage between the alleged „proceeds of crime‟ and the acquisition of the assets by the appellant company. It is to be noted that the definition of proceeds of crime under Section 2(1)(u) includes not only property derived or obtained directly as a result of criminal activity, but also property derived indirectly as a result criminal activity. Furthermore, it is also includes the „value of such property‟. In this regard, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in its landmark judgment in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary [2022 (7) TMI 1316 - SUPREME COURT (LB)] has held that the definition of „proceeds of crime‟ is vide enough to not only refer to property derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence, but also the value of such property. The definition of “property” as in Section 2(1)(v) is equality vide enough to encompass the value of property of proceeds of crime. The Hon‟ble Apex Court held that such interpretation of the term would further the legislative intent in recovery of the proceeds of crime and vesting it in the Central Government for effective prevention of money-laundering.
It is next contended that the notice issued by the Adjudicating Authority under Section 8(1) was not valid because the same is dependent on the requirement of the property being proceeds of crime - HELD THAT:- There was more than sufficient evidence to come to the conclusion at this stage of the proceedings that the subject property constituted „proceeds of crime‟ so as to place it under attachment until the outcome of criminal proceedings under the Act. It may be mentioned in this context that the legal position is well-settled that attachment of property is a balancing arrangement to secure the interests of the person, as also ensure that the proceeds of crime remain available to be dealt with in the manner provided by the Act. Mere attachment of property does not alter the position with regard to the ownership to even possession/use of the properties which are the subject matter of such attachment. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held in the aforesaid case of Vijay Mandanlal Choudhary, [2022 (7) TMI 1316 - SUPREME COURT (LB)] and further clarified in the case of Ganpati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd. [2022 (8) TMI 1047 - SUPREME COURT] that possession of properties attached under the PMLA, 2002 can only be taken under exceptional circumstances, such as crimes involving terrorist activities, drug cartels or organized criminal activities. Therefore, at this stage, when the criminal trial of the appellants herein is still pending before a court of competent jurisdiction, even the balance of interests lies in favour of continued attachment of the subject properties.
Conclusion - Money laundering is a continuing offence and that the procedural and substantive requirements of the PMLA must be strictly adhered to. The provisional attachment is upheld. The procedural validity of the actions taken under the PMLA confirmed.
The present appeal is hereby dismissed.
Issues: Whether the petitioner, having made bona fide attempts to pay the amount determined under the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019 but being prevented by technical difficulties in the electronic payment process during the Covid-19 period, was entitled to make payment manually and obtain the benefit of the Scheme.
Analysis: The declaration filed by the petitioner was accepted and Form SVLDRS-3 was issued determining the amount payable. The record showed that the petitioner attempted payment through RTGS within time, but the amount was returned by the receiving bank, and the challan could not be generated successfully on the portal. The Court held that the petitioner's efforts were bona fide and were made to comply with the Scheme in extreme pandemic conditions. As the object of the Scheme is to reduce legacy litigation and permit settlement of dues, the substantive benefit could not be denied merely on procedural or technical grounds. The Court therefore exercised writ jurisdiction to ensure implementation of the Scheme in the facts of the case.
Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to the benefit of the Scheme, and the authorities were directed to accept the payment with interest and grant the discharge under the Scheme.
Ratio Decidendi: A bona fide attempt to comply with a beneficial tax settlement scheme cannot be defeated by procedural or technological obstacles where the assessee has otherwise been found eligible and the amount payable has been determined.
Prayer for a direction to CGST and Central Excise Authorities to accept the declared amount manually as per the statements issued in Form SVLDRS-3 - entitlement for benefit of Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019 - HELD THAT:- It is not in dispute that the petitioner was required to make the payment as determined in Form SVLDRS-3 and the petitioner tried to make the payment through RTGS on 29.06.2020, however, the same was not accepted by the receiving bank and the payment was returned to the petitioner which is apparent from the bank statement produced on record.
It also appears from the record that the petitioner could not generate the challan successfully for making the payment and after the advice of its Chartered Accountant, tried making payment through NEFT/RTGS out of abundance caution and to demonstrate the bona fide of the petitioner to make the payment as determined under the Scheme by respondent No. 2 Designated Committee. In view of the bona fide attempt made by the petitioner to make the payment cannot be doubted and therefore, the substantive benefit of the Scheme cannot be denied to the petitioner on the ground of procedural technicalities more particularly, in time of Covid-19 Pandemic.
In the given facts and circumstances, the petitioner made bona fide attempt to make the payment as determined under the Scheme and is also prepared to pay the amount in question in accordance with the Scheme along with interest for the period for which the petitioner was not permitted to make payment by respondent authorities considering extreme Pandemic condition of Covid-19, it is opined that this is a fit case for invocation of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
This Court in similar circumstances in case of M/S LG CHAUDHARY VERSUS UNION OF INDIA [2022 (10) TMI 631 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] allowed the petition by directing the respondent authorities to accept the payment as specified in SVLDRS-3 along with interest and grant the benefit of SVLDRS to the petitioner therein.
The respondent authorities are directed to accept the payment as specified in SVLDRS-3 along with interest @ 9% per annum from 30.06.2020 till the date of payment and grant the benefit of the Scheme to the petitioner - Petition allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Eligibility under SVLDRS based on quantification of duty liability
Issue 2: Validity of the rejection of the application and issuance of a show cause notice
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Quantification of petitioner's duty liability on or before June 30, 2019, during the enquiry or investigation, making them eligible for the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019 (SVLDRS) - petitioner's admission of liability in their communication qualifies as "quantified" under the SVLDRS or not - It is the case of the petitioner that he having admitted the liability, is entitled for the benefit under the aforesaid scheme, which has been incorrectly rejected, thereby passing the aforesaid impugned order and issuance of show cause notice.
HELD THAT:- On considering the communication in the wake of the provisions of Section 121 of Chapter V, which provides for SVLDRS, 2019, the petitioner’s case is very much qualified to have the benefit, particularly having regard to the definition of ‘quantified’ under clause (r) thereunder and also Section 123, which provides for tax dues.
The petitioner was eligible to make a declaration under the aforesaid Scheme as on June 19, 2019. The petitioner has admitted the liability to pay the service tax in the communication dated June 19, 2019, which was duly acknowledged by the respondents - the stand taken by the respondents so as to claim that the petitioner was not eligible in terms of Section 123 of the Finance Act, 2019 cannot be accepted in view of the admission of liability already communicated.
The impugned communication dated February 11, 2020 issued to the petitioner, produced at Annexure-7, thereby rejecting the online application of the petitioner and consequently the impugned show cause notice dated June 25, 2020, produced at Annexure-10, are not sustainable and are liable to be quashed and set aside and are accordingly quashed and set aside.
Conclusion - The word 'quantified' under the scheme would mean a written communication of the amount of duty payable which will include a letter intimating duty demand or duty liability admitted by the person concerned during enquiry, investigation or audit.
Matter remanded back to the respondent No. 2-The Designated Committee of SVLDRS to consider the declaration of the petitioner dated December 05, 2019 in the wake of admission given by the petitioner in his communication dated June 19, 2019 afresh as a valid declaration in terms of the Scheme under the category of ‘investigation, enquiry and audit’ and may proceed to grant the consequential relief to the petitioner.
Petition allowed by way of remand.
ISSUES:
RULINGS / HOLDINGS:
RATIONALE:
Classification of service - supply of tug to MPT - to be classified under the category of Supply of Tangible Goods or not - deemed sale - taxable event - Extended period of limitation.
Whether in the given facts of the case and especially the contract dt.25.05.2007, the activities of the appellant in relation to MPT would be classifiable under Section 65(105)(zzzzj), as service under ‘Supply of tangible goods’ or it would be in the nature of ‘deemed sale’ and therefore, liable to VAT and not liable to Service Tax? - HELD THAT:- There are many conditions which would indicate that the transfer of right to use is not absolute and there are certain conditions and provisions which make the contract different than a pure legal transfer of right i.e., lease of goods. For example, the contract itself is for hiring of motor tug ‘sigma’ with all its complement of qualified and experienced master, officers and crew for a specified purpose of berthing and unberthing of vessels at Mormugao Port and the appellants are required to pay the wages and allowances of the master and crew as well as to pay for victualling, paints, repairs and survey costs for maintaining her classification certificates. Effectively, this would mean that during the period of contract, apart from providing skilled manpower to operate the tug, its repairs and other statutory compliances are with the appellant and not with the MPT. Further, there is a clear clause, whereby, the MPT will not be liable against third party claim for which the appellants are required to take appropriate insurance and provide copy of the said insurance to the MPT.
A holistic reading of all the clauses of the contract and the arguments made by both the sides, it would be apparent that the contract is not passing the ‘five tests’ stipulated in the BSNL case and therefore, on that count itself, cannot be treated as a contract, where there has been transfer of right to use as well as effective control - when the substantial control remains with the contractor/appellant and is not handed over to the MPT, there is no transfer of right to use. Therefore, it cannot be said that this ‘hire agreement’ is involving ‘deemed sale’ and therefore, liable to VAT.
Whether in the event of the activities being classifiable under ‘Supply of tangible goods’, the taxable event i.e., signing of contract, being prior to introduction of service would lead to non-levy of Service Tax on the considerations received post introduction of the service or otherwise? - HELD THAT:- The Service Tax up to 28.02.2011 was required to be paid by the 5th of the month immediately following the calendar month in which the payments are received, towards the value of the taxable services. Further, the rule also provides that “notwithstanding the time of receipt of the payment towards the value of services, no Service Tax shall be payable for the part or whole of the value of services, which is attributable to services provided during the period when such services were not taxable”. Therefore, for the period prior to 01.03.2011, Rule 6 will govern the payment of Service Tax and therefore, if any Service Tax is demanded for the period when the service itself was not leviable to Service Tax, the same cannot be sustained. On this count, the demand for Service Tax for the period prior to introduction of STG i.e., 01.03.2008 will not sustain on this count itself.
Therefore, it is evident that the payments are being received before 7th day of the succeeding month of hire on submission of certificate of satisfactory service from the Deputy Conservator of MPT and therefore, it means that it is only afte satisfactory compliance, the payments are being made and therefore, the argument of the appellants that service has been rendered when the tug is delivered is misplaced - the said ‘hire agreement’ is for providing services of berthing and unberthing and not for supply of tugs and that it is for continuous supply of said service, which is required to be assessed on monthly basis and only subject to satisfaction, the payments are released in the succeeding months.
Time limitation - Penalty - HELD THAT:- In the facts of the case, the department has not been able to produce any positive evidence about the appellant’s intent to evade payment of Service Tax or deliberately suppressing the relevant facts with intent to evade payment of Service Tax. Considering the complex nature of classification of STG without transfer of legal right to use and effective control vis-à-vis, provisions under the VAT Rules for deemed sale, there is some relevance in the arguments that they were under bonafide belief that the transaction would not be a transaction of supply of service rather it will be covered by deemed sale, more so when they got a clarification from the statutory authority under VAT laws, which may not be binding on Service Tax authority working under the provisions of the Finance Act, 1994.
There are force in the contention of the appellant that they were under bonafide belief, especially, when they had got clarification from the concerned commercial tax authorities and in fact, they started paying VAT also. Thus, merely because a copy of the contract was found in the course of audit, in the absence of any positive and cogent grounds for invoking extended period or for imposing penalty, etc., the extended period as well as imposition of penalty is not sustainable in the facts of the case.
Conclusion - i) The contract was classified as a service under STG, not a deemed sale, and thus subject to Service Tax. ii) Service Tax was applicable on payments received post-introduction of the STG service, regardless of the contract's signing date.
Appeal allowed in part by way of remand.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal issues considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Eligibility for Concessional Rate under Works Contract Service
Issue 2: Exemption from Service Tax under Notifications
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The judgment emphasizes the importance of interpreting statutory exemptions broadly to fulfill legislative intent, particularly in the context of public utility services like electricity transmission.
Concessional rate of duty under the Works Contract Service composition scheme - denial of benefit for the reason that erection/construction of the electricity distribution lines do not fall under the ambit of service in relation to transfer of electricity - HELD THAT:- The issue is no longer res integra having been decided by this Bench in their own case M/S. KEC INTERNATIONAL LTD. VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CGST, GURGAON AND COMMISSIONER OF S.T., DELHI [2022 (8) TMI 992 - CESTAT CHANDIGARH] where it was held that 'The appellant is, therefore, clearly entitled to the benefit of both the notifications dated 20.07.2010 and 27.02.2010.'
Conclusion - The appellant's services fall within this scope, qualifying for exemption.
The impugned orders cannot be sustained - Appeal allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Classification under "Supply of Tangible Goods Service"
Issue 2: Liability to Pay Service Tax
Issue 3: Justification of Demand and Penalties
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Classification of services - Supply of Tangible Goods Service or not - transfer of right to possession and effective control of the cranes to the Municipal Corporation Bhopal (MCB) - demand confirmed on the basis of presumptions - HELD THAT:- MCB had all legal rights to use the same exclusively during the period of agreement. Since the cranes were taken at instance of Traffic Police, those used to be parked in the premises of the jurisdictional police stations. The appellant had no control on the movement of the crane nor upon the driver thereof, except, that the cost of driver and cost of maintenance of the crane was being paid by the appellant. During the period of contract, the appellant was not supposed to give that crane to anybody else - the effective control and possession with respect to cranes given to MCB was not with the appellant. The appellant getting paid a fixed price per crane from MCB. Resultantly, we hold that the impunged activity was that of giving cranes on ‘Hire’ instead of it being wrongly classified as ‘Supply of Tangible Goods’.
The Commissioner (Appeals) has not given any reason on which basis the effective control and possession was held to be with the appellant. Apparently and admittedly, appellant has not collected any tax from Municipal Corporation Bhopal on the invoices raised to MCB. There are no reason to consider the invoice amount to be inclusive of service tax.
Conclusion - The effective control and possession with respect to cranes given to MCB was not with the appellant. The right to possession and effective control are crucial in determining service tax liability under "Supply of Tangible Goods Service.
The demand is held to have been wrongly confirmed - appeal allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions addressed in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Eligibility of Cenvat Credit on Advertising Services
Relevant legal framework and precedents:
The relevant legal framework involves the interpretation of Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, which defines "input service" and includes advertising services within its ambit. The precedents include previous Tribunal decisions such as those in the cases of M/s Allen Career Institute and M/s Bansal Classes Pvt. Ltd., which have established that advertising services are eligible for Cenvat credit.
Court's interpretation and reasoning:
The Tribunal emphasized that advertising services are explicitly included in the definition of input service under Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004. The court noted that the appellant engaged advertising agencies to promote its services, and the service tax paid on these services qualifies as input service credit.
Key evidence and findings:
The key evidence included invoices from advertising agencies showing service tax charged on services rendered. The Tribunal found that these invoices and the agreements between the appellant and the agencies demonstrated that the appellant was the recipient of the advertising services.
Application of law to facts:
The Tribunal applied Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, to the facts, concluding that the advertising services used by the appellant to promote its commercial coaching and training services are eligible for Cenvat credit. The Tribunal found that the appellant's actions were consistent with the law.
Treatment of competing arguments:
The Departmental Representative acknowledged that the issue had been previously decided in favor of the appellant and had attained finality. The Tribunal considered this acknowledgment and the consistent application of the law in similar cases as persuasive.
Conclusions:
The Tribunal concluded that the appellant is entitled to Cenvat Credit on the service tax paid for advertising services, as these services qualify as input services under the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.
Issue 2: Conformity of Cenvat Credit Utilization
Relevant legal framework and precedents:
The framework involves the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, particularly the definition of input service and the conditions for availing credit. The Tribunal referenced past decisions that upheld the appellant's right to utilize Cenvat credit for advertising services.
Court's interpretation and reasoning:
The Tribunal reasoned that the appellant's utilization of Cenvat credit for advertising services aligns with the inclusive definition of input service and the established trade practices in the industry.
Key evidence and findings:
The Tribunal relied on evidence such as the appellant's invoices and agreements with advertising agencies, which clearly indicated the nature of services received and the service tax paid.
Application of law to facts:
The Tribunal applied the law to the facts by affirming that the appellant's use of Cenvat credit for advertising services was appropriate and lawful, given that these services directly related to the appellant's output services.
Treatment of competing arguments:
The Tribunal noted the Departmental Representative's concession that the issue had been resolved in favor of the appellant in previous cases, which supported the appellant's position.
Conclusions:
The Tribunal concluded that the appellant's utilization of Cenvat credit for advertising services was in conformity with the law and upheld the appellant's entitlement to such credit.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve verbatim quotes of crucial legal reasoning:
"The definition of input service under Rule 2(l) of the CCR, 2004 provides for credit on any service used for providing the output service. In addition, in the inclusive part of such definition, various activities have been included in which also the service tax is available as input credit. The inclusive portion specifically mentions advertising services."
Core principles established:
Final determinations on each issue:
CENVAT Credit - input services - advertising agency services - Commercial Training and Coaching Services - exemption vide mega N/N. 12/2012 - HELD THAT:- The decision in career Point Infosystems Pvt. Ltd. Vs. CCE, Udaipur [2019 (2) TMI 768 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] is also perused on which reliance has also been placed by the Commissioner (Appeals). The Tribunal observed 'impugned services are Business Auxiliary Service which are not taxable hence not eligible for taking audit are therefore held to be an erroneous finding, in the given facts and circumstances.'
The advertising agency service received by the appellant was the eligible input service for Cenvat credit and as such credit is held to have been rightly availed by the appellant. And finding no difference in facts of the present case, the order under challenge is set aside - Appeal allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions addressed in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Classification of Services
Issue 2: Exemption for Transmission and Distribution of Electricity
Issue 3: Extended Period of Limitation
Issue 4: Demand for Service Tax, Interest, and Penalty
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Classification of services - Works Contract Service or Maintenance or Repair Service? - services related to transmission and distribution of electricity - exemption from service tax under N/N. 45/2010-ST - interest - penalty.
Services related to transmission and distribution of electricity - exemption from service tax under N/N. 45/2010-ST - HELD THAT:- A perusal of the Notification reveals that the said notification exempts all services rendered in connection with transmission and distribution of electricity. A perusal of the work orders received by the appellant indicates that the appellant has received the work orders from the West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company Limited (WBSEDCL), Siliguri Zone, a state- owned electricity Distribution Company. Thus, the instant services rendered by the appellant which are in connection with the transmission and distribution of electricity are exempted from payment of service tax. Accordingly, the portion of the demand pertaining to transmission and distribution of electricity is not sustainable.
Classification of services - HELD THAT:- The appellant has rendered construction services to various Government Departments, Government undertakings, and local statutory bodies like CPWD, PWD, WBSEDCL, PHD and BSNL. The services provided by him included supply of goods/machineries, equipment, parts and installation thereof. Post installation maintenance was also included in the contract. With the introduction of Works Contract Service in the Finance Act, 1994, the said services rendered by them with material is appropriately classifiable under the category of ‘Works Contract Service’. The law is now settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Larsen & Toubro Ltd [2015 (8) TMI 749 - SUPREME COURT]. From the impugned order, it is observed that the Ld. Adjudicating authority has rejected this claim of the appellant on the ground that they have not produced any evidence regarding supply of materials. From the documents provided by the appellant, it is observed that the appellant has paid Sales Tax/Vat wherever applicable - the services rendered by the appellant are appropriately classifiable as ‘Works Contract Service’ for the purpose of levy of Service Tax.
Interest - penalty - HELD THAT:- Since, the demand itself is not sustainable, the question of demanding interest or imposing penalty does not arise.
Conclusion - The appellant's services were classified under 'Works Contract Service', and the services related to electricity distribution were exempt. The extended period of limitation was not applicable. The demand for service tax, interest, and penalties was set aside.
Appeal allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The judgment primarily revolves around the following core legal questions:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Chargeability of Incentives to Service Tax
Issue 2: Non-speaking Order and Traversing Beyond Show Cause Notice
Issue 3: Limitation and Suppression of Facts
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Levy of service tax - Business Auxiliary Services - incentives received by the appellant - if it is chargeable to service tax then whether the demand on the entire amount shown under the Heading Commission and Incentive is chargeable to service tax or otherwise? - HELD THAT:- It is an admitted fact that based on the Profit & Loss Account, the Department has raised the demand and this is based on the reflection of Commission and Incentive under the same Heading. There was no bifurcation given for the commission and incentive separately either in the Profit & Loss Account or in the course of adjudication - in view of the fact that there is no bifurcation of commission and incentive, therefore, the amount of incentive that would not be required to be subjected to service tax needs to be worked out. Moreover, as pointed out in the Order-in-Original the claim of the appellant that both the commission and incentives were reflected together in Profit & Loss Account, is not disputed but as no supporting documents could be adduced by them to clearly bifurcate the quantum of commission and incentive separately, the relief sought was denied.
Conclusion - Incentives are not liable to service tax under the category of Business Auxiliary Services unless clearly documented and bifurcated from commissions.
The matter is required to be remanded back to the Original Adjudicating Authority, who shall decide the total quantum of commission and total quantum of incentive separately to come to the final demand - Appeal is allowed by way of remand.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of the Show Cause Notice
Issue 2: Jurisdiction of Authorities at Jaipur
Issue 3: Maintainability of the Writ Petition
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Challenge to SCN issued u/s 11-A of the Central Excise Act - petitioners contended that petitioners are not the manufacturers and hence no notice could have been issued to them under Section 11-A of the Central Excise Act - HELD THAT:- The judgment of the Apex Court in Supermax Personal Care Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India, Commissioner CGST & CEX Audit-Thane, Commissioner CGST & CE Thane Commissionerate [2021 (4) TMI 368 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] has no applicability to the facts of the present case, for the very reason that suspicious material was found at the place of the petitioners and it was found that petitioners were clandestinely involved in manufacturing of Cigarettes and even goods were being supplied which were actually relating to the manufacturing of Cigarettes.
The law which emerges from the above judgment is that when an alternate efficacious remedy is available and there are disputed questions of facts, the High Court should decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition.
Present is a case where on search, it was revealed that petitioners were indulged in clandestine supply of goods to manufacturers of Cigarettes in Bihar. Therefore, in a manner petitioners were also involved in manufacturing of Cigarettes. Though this fact is disputed by the petitioners, but since petitioners have only been given a show cause notice, petitioners are free to raise all objections before the concerned Competent Authority in reply to the show cause notice.
It is not inclined to entertain the present Civil Writ Petition and the same is accordingly, dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Entitlement to Suo-Moto Re-Credit
Issue 2: Justification of Demand for Reversal, Interest, and Penalties
Issue 3: Invocation of Extended Period of Limitation
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
100% EOU - entitlement to take suo-moto re-credit of the Cenvat credit that was earlier reversed, without following the refund procedure under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 - HELD THAT:- Indisputably it is also evidence from the records that the cenvat credit taken and utilized by the appellant, stands fully recouped, consequent to the reversal entries and payments made, including interest thereon. By such reversal and payments, it is evident that the effect of such reversal is entirely borne by the appellant and the original credit taken stands expunged. Thereafter, as intimated by the appellant when it takes credit of the proportionate cenvat credit, out of the amount of cenvat credit on licit input services which it even otherwise was originally entitled to take credit of, there is no illegality attached to the said taking of credit. Moreover, such taking of credit stands reported in the ER-2 return filed by the appellant. This Tribunal is of the view that in such circumstances there is no necessity to put the appellant through the rigors of seeking refund by following the procedures of section 11B of the Act. The reliance placed by the adjudicating authority on the decision of Tribunal larger bench in BDH Industries [2008 (7) TMI 78 - CESTAT MUMBAI-LB] is misplaced. This tribunal in Sopariwala Exports Pvt Ltd v CCE, Vadodara [2013 (5) TMI 430 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD] has already held that when the High Court decision holds the field the larger bench decision does not have binding effect.
It is also pertinent that the jurisdictional officer has not raised any objection to the appellant’s intimation of its intent to avail the credit being reversed at a later date, when communicated vide appellant’s letter dated 21.07.2009. That apart, the appellant has also stated that they had intimated the availment of the credit in the ER 2 returns filed and further that to an audit objection against the availment during March 2011, they had, vide letter dated 27.04.2011, replied that the objection is unsustainable - Even otherwise, when the appellant has already communicated its intent to take the credit reversed at a later date upon completion of the work and when it reflects the credit taken in the ER-2 returns, the appellant cannot be held to have made any wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts with intent to evade payment of duty warranting invoking of the extended period of limitation. Therefore, given that the SCN in this case is dated 11.09.2013 and has been issued invoking the extended period of limitation for making demand of the credit taken in the month of December 2009, it is evidently beyond the normal period stipulated in Section 11A and thus the demand is also barred by limitation.
Conclusion - Suo-moto re-credit is permissible when the original credit is eligible, and the reversal is merely an accounting entry. The extended period of limitation cannot be invoked without evidence of willful misstatement or suppression. The demand made of Rs.40,64,459/- under Rule 14 of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 read with Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and the demand of appropriate interest thereon as well as the penalties imposed under the impugned order in original, are untenable.
Appeal allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal issues considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Liability for Interest and Penalty on Reversal of Cenvat Credit
Issue 2: Liability for Interest and Penalty on Differential Duty Payment
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The appeal was partially allowed, providing consequential relief as per the law.
Liability to pay interest - reversal of Cenvat credit - whether the appellant is liable to pay interest and can also be imposed with penalty, if the Cenvat credit is reversed even before utilising the Cenvat credit? - inclusion of the terminal charges in the assessable value - price revision of petroleum products with retrospective effect.
Interest on reversal of Cenvat credit and penalty - HELD THAT:- The Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka in the matter of COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE & SERVICE TAX LARGE TAXPAYER UNIT, BANGALORE VERSUS M/S BILL FORGE PVT LTD, BANGALORE [2011 (4) TMI 969 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT], held that if the Cenvat credit is reversed before utilization of credit, it amounts to not taking credit, no liability to pay interest. Hence, we find that against show-cause notice dated 04.12.2006, the appellant is not liable to pay interest on the reversal of unutilized Cenvat credit and thus no penalty under Rule 25 of Central Excise Rules, 2002 can be imposed for that reason.
Demand of interest in the other two show cause notices and imposition of penalty under Rule 25 of Central Excise Rules, 2002 in show cause notice dated 20.09.2006 - HELD THAT:- The inclusion of the terminal charges in the accessible value and the revision of petroleum products with retrospective effect has resulted in payment of differential duty, which the appellant has discharged and there is no dispute on these two issues. The appellant has paid the differential duties and is only contesting the payment of interest and imposition of penalty - since there is no limitation prescribed under the statute for payment of interest and there is no interest on the interest, the appellant is liable to pay interest for the period of delay in payment of differential duty, it is found that once the differential duty is paid, consequentially the interest for the delayed payment need to be paid, hence the interest on delayed payment of duties in these two show cause notices was rightly confirmed by the Adjudicating and the Appellate authorities and is tenable.
Conclusion - Reversal of unutilized Cenvat credit negates interest liability. Interest is payable on delayed differential duty payments. The penalty under Rules 25 of Central Excise Rules, 2002 is set aside.
Appeal allowed in part.
Issues: Whether the assessment completed beyond the four-year period prescribed under Section 17(6) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act could be sustained on the basis of an extension under Section 17(7) when the order extending time was not communicated to the assessee before expiry of the original limitation period.
Analysis: The assessment for the relevant year had to be completed within four years from the end of the assessment year. Although the revenue relied on an order of the Deputy Commissioner extending time by one year, the extension could operate only if the assessee was informed of it before expiry of the original period. In the absence of communication or notice of the extension order within the prescribed time, the statutory precondition for valid enlargement of the assessment period was not satisfied.
Conclusion: The assessment completed on 30.11.2018 was barred by limitation and could not be sustained.
Time limitation for completion of assessment - assessment completed on 30.11.2018 for the assessment year 2013-2014 was barred by the limitation period prescribed under Section 17 (6) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act (KGST Act) or not - notice not issued - HELD THAT:- It was imperative on the part of the revenue to issue a notice or communicate the order of the Deputy Commissioner to the assessee before the expiry of the original period of limitation contemplated under Section 17 (6) of the KGST Act, if it intended to extend the period of completion of assessment by a further period of one year as provided under Section 17 (7) of the KGST Act. This not having been done, the findings arrived at by the appellate tribunal agreed, that the assessment completed on 30.11.2018 was barred by limitation.
The S.T. Revision therefore fails and is accordingly dismissed.
Issues: Whether an appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is maintainable against an order passed in contempt proceedings that does not record a finding of guilt or impose punishment.
Analysis: Section 19 provides a limited right of appeal only against an order or decision passed in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt. An order that merely directs deposit or release of monies, or requires appearance on the event of non-compliance, is not itself an order imposing punishment. The impugned order did not hold the appellant guilty of contempt and did not award punishment; it only contained consequential directions in aid of compliance. On the settled interpretation of the provision, such an order falls outside the scope of an appeal under Section 19.
Conclusion: The appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and was dismissed.
Maintainability of appeal filed under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - appellant submitted that the impugned order has been passed by the learned Single Judge without taking into consideration the entirety of the matter - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- In order to understand the settled position of law regarding the appeals against the orders in contempt proceedings, it is pertinent for this Court to understand the interpretation of Section 19 of the Act. Therefore, it is apposite to mention the case of MIDNAPORE PEOPLES' CO-OP. BANK LTD. & ORS. VERSUS CHUNILAL NANDA & ORS. [2006 (5) TMI 537 - SUPREME COURT] wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically observed that the appeal under Section 19 of the Act is maintainable only against an order in which punishment has been awarded to the contemnor.
In view of the above case, the position of law pertaining to Section 19 of the Act is that the appeal against the orders passed in the contempt proceedings cannot be maintainable if such an order is devoid of any punishment or guilt imposed upon the contemnor. Therefore, in the instant case, the instant appeal under the said provision is maintainable before this Court only if the impugned order awarded punishment or held the appellant guilty of the contempt proceedings.
Taking into consideration the contents of Section 19 of the Act as well as the case-laws mentioned hereinabove, this Court is of the considered view that an appeal under Section 19 of the Act, challenging the order passed in the contempt proceedings, is maintainable only when such an order records or imposes any punishment or guilt of the contemnor. However, upon perusal of the impugned order, it is clear that the learned Single Judge has merely directed the appellant to release the amount already deposited along with the interest accrued thereupon @ 6% p.a. till date while making concession towards the statutorily prescribed grace period of 120 days in favour of the respondent and therefore, the same cannot be construed to be punitive in nature.
Conclusion - An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt.
Appeal dismissed.
Outcome: The writ petition and the pending application were disposed of after the Municipal Corporation of Delhi stated that it would issue a show cause notice regarding the alleged unauthorised construction and take further action in accordance with law.
Seeking action in respect of alleged unauthorised construction by respondent No. 3 - HELD THAT:- The rights and contentions of the owners/occupants of the subject property are expressly reserved. MCD is directed to take action strictly in accordance with law, and after complying with all statutory formalities and bearing in mind the Supreme Court judgment in IN RE: DIRECTIONS IN THE MATTER OF DEMOLITION OF STRUCTURES [2024 (11) TMI 1414 - SUPREME COURT].
The court disposed of the petition, reserving the rights and contentions of the property owners/occupants. MCD is instructed to act according to law and comply with all statutory formalities, referencing the Supreme Court judgment dated 13.11.2024 regarding demolition of structures.
Issues: Whether the trial court was justified in exercising inherent jurisdiction to set aside the court sale deed and restore the status quo ante after the ex parte decree had been set aside.
Analysis: The sale deed had been executed only pursuant to the ex parte decree in the specific performance suit. Once that decree was set aside and no stay operated against that order, the foundation for the court sale disappeared. The Court held that the petitioner could not claim any better title on the strength of a sale deed derived from a decree that no longer survived. Even if strict restitution under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was not attracted, the trial court could invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to prevent prejudice caused by an act of court and to correct the situation created by the execution sale.
Conclusion: The trial court was right in setting aside the sale deed and directing restoration of the prior position, and the challenge to that order failed.
Validity of sale executed pursuant to an ex parte decree - effect of setting aside an ex parte decree on subsequent sale - restitution - inherent jurisdiction of the trial court to prevent prejudice and restore status quo ante - protection of parties' interests by restraining alienation - bonafide purchaser without notice
Validity of sale executed pursuant to an ex parte decree - effect of setting aside an ex parte decree on subsequent sale - The sale deed executed in execution proceedings pursuant to an ex parte decree does not convey title once the ex parte decree is set aside. - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the sale deed was executed only because of the ex parte decree in O.S.No.21 of 2012. Since that ex parte decree has been set aside (I.A.No.102 of 2016) and there is no stay from a higher Court, the revision petitioner cannot rely on the sale deed to claim title. Mere registration of a sale deed effected under execution of an ex parte decree does not improve or validate title after the foundational decree has been set aside. [Paras 5]
The trial Court correctly treated the sale deed as ineffective to convey title after the ex parte decree was set aside.
Restitution - inherent jurisdiction of the trial court to prevent prejudice and restore status quo ante - The trial Court rightly exercised its inherent jurisdiction to set aside the sale deed and restore the status quo ante to prevent prejudice to the respondents, even if strict applicability of section 144 was in doubt. - HELD THAT: - Although the petitioner contended that restitution under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not permissible in the present facts, the High Court held that even if section 144 does not strictly apply, the trial Court retains inherent jurisdiction to rectify a mistake of the Court and to avert prejudice caused by recording and allowing use of the sale deed. The exercise of that inherent jurisdiction to restore status quo ante was appropriate because allowing the sale deed to remain on record and be used could prejudice the defendants/respondents. [Paras 6]
The order of the trial Court setting aside the sale deed and restoring status quo ante was justified and must be upheld.
Bonafide purchaser without notice - protection of parties' interests by restraining alienation - The question whether the subsequent purchaser (purchase in 2011) is a bonafide purchaser for value without notice is a matter of evidence to be decided at trial; interim restraint on alienation of the suit property is warranted until disposal of the main suit. - HELD THAT: - The Court observed that a subsequent purchase was made in 2011 and that whether that purchaser is bonafide without notice to the earlier agreement is an evidentiary matter. The High Court directed that this fact and the rival contentions be examined by the trial Court during the main suit. Meanwhile, to protect the parties' interests, both parties were restrained from effecting any alienation of the suit properties until the main suit is finally disposed of, and the trial Court was directed to proceed expeditiously. [Paras 7]
The issue of the status of the 2011 purchaser is remitted for trial; interim restraint on alienation is imposed until final disposal of the main suit.
Final Conclusion: The Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. The High Court upholds the trial Court's exercise of inherent jurisdiction in setting aside the sale deed executed pursuant to the ex parte decree and restoring status quo ante; the question as to the bonafide nature of the 2011 purchaser is left to be decided on evidence in the main suit, and interim restraint on alienation is continued.
TaxTMI