Limitation under special tax statute cannot be extended by analogy to exclude time spent in restoration proceedings.

Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act did not apply to proceedings before revisional and appellate authorities under the U.P. Sales Tax Act because those authorities were administrative tribunals, not courts. The statute also constituted a complete limitation code for revisions under section 10(3-B), permitting extension only up to a specified further period on sufficient cause. In that setting, the underlying principle of section 14 could not be imported directly or by analogy to exclude time spent in restoration proceedings. The time spent in prosecuting applications to set aside dismissal in default therefore could not save the revision from limitation.

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Issues: (i) Whether section 14(2) of the Limitation Act applied in terms to exclude the time spent in prosecuting applications under rule 68(6) of the U.P. Sales Tax Rules for setting aside dismissal of appeals in default; (ii) Whether, even if section 14(2) did not apply in terms, its underlying principle could be invoked in principle to extend the period for filing revision under section 10(3-B) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948.

Issue (i): Whether section 14(2) of the Limitation Act applied in terms to exclude the time spent in prosecuting applications under rule 68(6) of the U.P. Sales Tax Rules for setting aside dismissal of appeals in default.

Analysis: The revisional and appellate authorities under the Sales Tax Act were held to be administrative tribunals and not courts. Section 14(2) applies only to civil proceedings prosecuted in a court which is unable to entertain them because of defect of jurisdiction or a cause of like nature. Since the statutory authorities under the Sales Tax Act were not courts, the section could not apply in terms.

Conclusion: Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act did not apply in terms to the proceedings under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948.

Issue (ii): Whether, even if section 14(2) of the Limitation Act did not apply in terms, its underlying principle could be invoked in principle to extend the period for filing revision under section 10(3-B) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948.

Analysis: The scheme of section 10(3) and section 10(3-B) prescribed a specific limitation period, allowed extension only up to a further six months on sufficient cause, and thereby manifested a legislative intent to exclude the unrestricted operation of sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act. The statute was treated as a complete code on limitation for revision, and the court declined to import equitable principles by analogy where the legislature had deliberately limited the extension period.

Conclusion: The principle underlying section 14(2) of the Limitation Act could not be invoked to enlarge the limitation period under section 10(3-B) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948.

Final Conclusion: The answer to the referred question was in the negative, the High Court's view was set aside, and the revisions could not be saved from limitation by exclusion of the time spent in the restoration proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special taxing statute prescribes a fixed limitation period and permits extension only up to a specified maximum, the tribunal has no power to apply section 14 of the Limitation Act, either directly or by analogy, to exclude time spent in prior proceedings.

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