Limitation Act exclusion and sufficient cause for delay were both rejected in a time-barred reference application.

The Limitation Act was stated to be inapplicable to proceedings before quasi-judicial tribunals unless the special statute expressly permits it, so the period spent in a High Court writ petition could not be excluded for a reference application under section 35G. The special limitation scheme allowed only a 60-day period with a further 30-day extension, and time beyond that could not be saved by section 14. The applicant also failed to establish sufficient cause for condonation because the later delay remained unexplained and unsupported by reliable affidavit or record evidence. The reference was therefore time-barred, and exclusion of time and condonation of delay were both refused.

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Issues: (i) whether the period spent in prosecuting a writ petition in the High Court could be excluded under the Limitation Act for a reference application under section 35G of the Central Excises and Salt Act; (ii) whether the applicant had shown sufficient cause for condonation of the delay in filing the reference application.

Issue (i): whether the period spent in prosecuting a writ petition in the High Court could be excluded under the Limitation Act for a reference application under section 35G of the Central Excises and Salt Act.

Analysis: The Tribunal held that the Limitation Act applies to proceedings before courts and not to proceedings before quasi-judicial authorities such as tribunals. It noted the consistent Supreme Court view that section 14 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked before such authorities, and that the earlier sales tax decision relied upon by the applicant did not decide that question in terms. The statutory scheme of section 35G itself provided a limited period of 60 days with a further extendable period of 30 days, and beyond that no reference could be entertained.

Conclusion: The exclusion of the writ period under section 14 of the Limitation Act was not permissible, and this issue was decided against the applicant.

Issue (ii): whether the applicant had shown sufficient cause for condonation of the delay in filing the reference application.

Analysis: Even on the assumption that exclusion of the writ period could be considered, the Tribunal found an unexplained further delay after disposal of the writ petition. There was no satisfactory or authenticated material showing when the certified copy was obtained, how it was lost, or why the reference was not filed within the available time. The explanation offered for the later delay was unsupported by proper affidavits or records, and the Tribunal was not satisfied that sufficient cause had been made out.

Conclusion: Sufficient cause was not established, and condonation of delay was refused.

Final Conclusion: The reference application was time-barred and was not entitled to exclusion of time or condonation of delay, so the proceeding ended in dismissal.

Ratio Decidendi: The Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings before quasi-judicial tribunals unless the statute expressly so provides, and where the special statute prescribes a limited period for filing with only a bounded extension, time beyond that limit cannot be excluded or condoned without a legally sustainable showing of sufficient cause.

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