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Issues: (i) Whether the appellate authority under Section 18 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 is a persona designata or a court; (ii) whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to an appeal under Section 18 by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Issue (i): Whether the appellate authority under Section 18 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 is a persona designata or a court.
Analysis: The appellate authority is constituted by designation of the District Judge and is required to adjudicate disputes between landlord and tenant in a judicial manner. The authority has finality in its decision subject to revision and the office, not the individual incumbent, is the repository of the power, so the successor District Judge continues the proceedings. These features are inconsistent with a persona designata and satisfy the attributes of a court.
Conclusion: The appellate authority is not a persona designata and functions as a court.
Issue (ii): Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to an appeal under Section 18 by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Analysis: Section 18 of the Rent Act prescribes a special period of limitation for appeal, which is different from the Limitation Act schedule. Once a special or local law prescribes such a period and does not expressly exclude the operation of Sections 4 to 24, Section 29(2) applies and carries Section 5 into the special regime. The appellate authority, acting as a court, can therefore examine whether delay is supported by sufficient cause. The contrary view that Section 29(2) applies only to ordinary civil courts was rejected.
Conclusion: Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to appeals under Section 18 through Section 29(2), and delay may be condoned on sufficient cause being shown.
Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeds, the contrary orders are set aside, and the matter is sent back to the appellate authority to decide the delay-condonation application on merits and proceed further according to law.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a special or local law prescribes a limitation period for an appeal and does not expressly exclude Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963, Section 29(2) applies and makes Section 5 available even before a statutory appellate authority that functions as a court.