Court Dismisses Writ Petition Over Delay in Filing Reference Applications (1)

The court dismissed the writ petition seeking to quash an order rejecting reference applications under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act due to delay in filing beyond the specified period. The court held that the proviso to section 256(1) limits the tribunal's power to condone delays to only 30 days, emphasizing that the tribunal had no jurisdiction to extend the period further. The court distinguished cases applying section 5 of the Limitation Act, highlighting the specific restriction in section 256(1) proviso. Consequently, the petitioner's argument based on holidays and past precedents was rejected, leading to the dismissal of the petition.

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Issues:
Delay in filing reference applications under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act for condonation beyond the specified period.

Analysis:
The petitioner sought to quash an order rejecting their reference applications under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Income-tax Officer made additions to the petitioner's income tax return for unexplained investments, leading to appeals and subsequent tribunal orders. The petitioner then filed reference applications with respondent No. 2, which were rejected as being beyond the limitation period. The central issue was whether the delay in filing the applications could have been condoned beyond the period specified under the proviso to section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act. The proviso allows for a further period of not exceeding 30 days if the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the application within the initial 60-day period.

The petitioner argued that holidays on August 1 and 2, 1987, should be excluded while counting the 30-day period under the proviso, citing section 4 of the Limitation Act. However, the court noted that the last day for filing the application was July 31, 1987, which was not a holiday. The petitioner also relied on precedents like Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker to support extending the period under section 5 of the Limitation Act. However, the court emphasized that the proviso to section 256(1) specifically limits the tribunal's power to condone the delay to only 30 days.

Additionally, the court distinguished cases like Prem Chand Bansal and Sons v. ITO and U. P. State Road Transport Corporation v. ITAT, where section 5 of the Limitation Act was applied, as they did not consider the specific proviso in section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act. The court highlighted that the proviso restricts the tribunal's authority to condone delays beyond the specified period. Therefore, as the proviso limits the period within which the tribunal can condone the delay, the court concluded that the tribunal had no jurisdiction to condone the delay after the expiration of the specified period. Consequently, the writ petition seeking to quash the order was dismissed.

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