Limitation and condonation under rent control law: appellate authority held not to have Section 5 power.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was held inapplicable to appeals before the appellate authority under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 because the special statute provided its own limitation scheme and did not expressly confer condonation power. The appellate authority was treated as a persona designata, not a court, so the general power to condone delay under Section 5 could not be exercised by it. The omission of an earlier express reference to Section 5, together with the structure of Section 18(1)(b), showed that the Rent Control Act was intended to operate as a self-contained code on limitation. The revision petitions therefore failed and the time-bar dismissal was upheld.

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Issues: (i) whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to an appeal before the appellate authority under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965; (ii) whether the appellate authority is a court so as to exercise the power of condonation of delay.

Issue (i): whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to an appeal before the appellate authority under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965.

Analysis: The majority held that although Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 makes Sections 4 to 24 applicable to special or local laws unless expressly excluded, that scheme operates only where the forum is a court. The appellate authority under the Rent Control Act is a special statutory authority and the Act itself provides a separate limitation scheme. The omission of the earlier express application of Section 5 in the 1965 Act, together with the express exclusionary structure of Section 18(1)(b), indicated that the special statute was intended to be self-contained on limitation.

Conclusion: Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to the appeal before the appellate authority under the 1965 Rent Control Act.

Issue (ii): whether the appellate authority is a court so as to exercise the power of condonation of delay.

Analysis: The majority treated the appellate authority as a persona designata and not a court. On that footing, even if the general provisions of the Limitation Act are attracted in principle to special laws, the power under Section 5 remains exercisable only by courts and not by tribunals or authorities of this kind. The special provision in Section 18(1)(b) excluding the time taken to obtain a certified copy reinforced the conclusion that the Act formed a complete code regarding limitation.

Conclusion: The appellate authority is not a court and has no power to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Final Conclusion: The revision petitions fail because the dismissal of the appeal as time-barred was upheld by the majority, notwithstanding the dissenting view that Section 5 was applicable and remand was required.

Ratio Decidendi: The general provisions of the Limitation Act apply to a special law only to the extent permitted by that law, and the power to condone delay under Section 5 is exercisable only by a court unless the special statute clearly confers that power on the deciding authority.

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