Statutory right to continue appeal after death cannot be defeated by importing civil procedure or limitation rules.

Section 72 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act permits the legal representative of a deceased appellant to continue the pending appeal, and the absence of any express substitution period means the application cannot be rejected for limitation alone. In a special statutory appeal, Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 120 of the Limitation Act are not automatically imported unless the statute or valid rules make them applicable. A tribunal must therefore preserve the appeal and decide it on merits, rather than treat it as abated on technical procedural grounds. The discussion emphasises that a liberal, fair procedure is required where the statute itself protects continuation of the appeal.

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Issues: (i) Whether the legal representative of a deceased appellant could continue the appeal under Section 72 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 without being defeated by a limitation period not expressly prescribed for such substitution; (ii) whether the Appellate Tribunal could apply Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to dismiss the legal representative petition and treat the appeal as abated; (iii) whether dismissal of the legal representative petition and the appeal was sustainable in the light of principles of natural justice.

Issue (i): Whether the legal representative of a deceased appellant could continue the appeal under Section 72 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 without being defeated by a limitation period not expressly prescribed for such substitution?

Analysis: Section 72 expressly provides for continuation of proceedings where an appellant dies during the pendency of an appeal, and permits the legal representatives to continue the appeal in the place of the deceased appellant. The provision does not prescribe any period of limitation for filing an application to come on record. The statutory scheme therefore indicates a legislative intent to preserve the appeal and not to terminate it merely because the appellant died during pendency.

Conclusion: The legal representative was entitled to continue the appeal, and the absence of an express limitation period prevented rejection of the application on that ground.

Issue (ii): Whether the Appellate Tribunal could apply Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to dismiss the legal representative petition and treat the appeal as abated?

Analysis: The Appellate Tribunal is not bound by the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and its powers are confined to regulating its own procedure subject to the Act. In the absence of rules or regulations making Order XXII applicable, and in view of the specific enabling provision under Section 72, importing Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and treating the application as barred was unwarranted. The general limitation framework applicable to civil court proceedings cannot be superimposed on a special statutory appeal where the statute itself provides for continuation of proceedings.

Conclusion: The Tribunal erred in applying Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and the finding of abatement was unsustainable.

Issue (iii): Whether dismissal of the legal representative petition and the appeal was sustainable in the light of principles of natural justice?

Analysis: Since the statute conferred a right to continue the appeal and no procedural rule or limitation provision barred the application, rejection of the substitution request on technical grounds defeated the statutory remedy. A liberal construction was required so that the appeal could be decided on merits after hearing the legal representative and the respondent. The impugned dismissal, therefore, did not accord with the statutory scheme or fair procedure.

Conclusion: The dismissal of the legal representative petition and the appeal was not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the order rejecting substitution and declaring the appeal abated was set aside, the legal representative was brought on record, and the matter was remitted for decision on merits after hearing both sides.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute expressly permits the legal representative of a deceased appellant to continue an appeal and does not prescribe a substitution period, a tribunal cannot import civil procedure or general limitation rules to defeat that statutory right.

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