Section 5 Limitation Act applies to special statute revisions unless expressly excluded, permitting condonation of delay.

Where a special statute prescribes its own limitation period but does not expressly exclude the Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 applies through Section 29(2). On that basis, revisions filed under Section 19 of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 can seek condonation of delay. The earlier view treating such revisions as automatically time-barred was found unsustainable because it overlooked the absence of an exclusionary clause and the general applicability of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act. The delay was therefore liable to be condoned, and the matter proceeded for consideration on merits.

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Issues: (i) Whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply to a revision under Section 19 of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983. (ii) Whether the delay in filing the revision could be condoned and the contrary view in the earlier line of cases was correct.

Issue (i): Whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply to a revision under Section 19 of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983.

Analysis: Section 19 of the 1983 Act prescribes a special period of limitation of three months for revision before the High Court. The provision does not expressly exclude the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, where a special law prescribes a different limitation period and does not expressly exclude the general limitation provisions, those provisions apply to the extent not excluded. The structure of Section 19 and the absence of an exclusionary clause showed no legislative intent to bar Section 5.

Conclusion: Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to revisions under Section 19 of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983.

Issue (ii): Whether the delay in filing the revision could be condoned and the contrary view in the earlier line of cases was correct.

Analysis: The earlier view treating the revision as time-barred proceeded on an erroneous understanding of the relationship between the special limitation in Section 19 and the Limitation Act. The authorities relied upon to deny condonation were distinguishable on their facts and legal setting. Since Section 5 was applicable and no express exclusion existed, the High Court could entertain the request for condonation and the earlier contrary view could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The delay was liable to be condoned and the earlier contrary view was held to be incorrect.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded, the impugned orders were set aside, the delay in filing the revisions was condoned, and the matters were sent back to the High Court for decision on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute prescribes a different limitation period but does not expressly exclude the Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 applies by virtue of Section 29(2) and delay may be condoned accordingly.

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