Limitation for possession suits starts when the declaratory decree is obtained, and bona fide execution time may be excluded.

Under Article 2(b) of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920, limitation for a suit for possession starts when the declaratory decree is actually drawn and obtained, not merely when the declaratory judgment is pronounced. On that construction, a suit filed within three years of the prepared decree was in time. The Court also held that Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applied to exclude time spent in bona fide execution proceedings that failed because the relief could not be granted in that forum, since the special limitation law did not expressly exclude Sections 4 to 25 and Section 29(2) preserved their application. The High Court's view on limitation was set aside and the plaintiff's decree restored.

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Issues: (i) Whether, for a suit for possession governed by Article 2(b) of the Schedule to the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920, limitation commenced from the date of the declaratory judgment or from the date on which the formal declaratory decree was drawn and obtained; (ii) Whether the time spent in pursuing execution proceedings could be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in view of Section 5 of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920 and Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Issue (i): Whether, for a suit for possession governed by Article 2(b) of the Schedule to the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920, limitation commenced from the date of the declaratory judgment or from the date on which the formal declaratory decree was drawn and obtained.

Analysis: The phrase "the declaratory decree is obtained" was held to mean the point when the decree is actually drawn or prepared and made available, not merely the date of pronouncement of the declaratory judgment. The expression "obtained" was construed in a practical and purposive sense, consistent with the legislative choice of that wording and with the principle that limitation provisions should not be extended by implication to defeat a remedy. Since the decree sheet was prepared in 1972 and the suit for possession was filed in 1974, the suit was within three years from the date the declaratory decree was obtained.

Conclusion: Limitation under Article 2(b) commenced from the date the decree was obtained, and the suit was within time.

Issue (ii): Whether the time spent in pursuing execution proceedings could be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in view of Section 5 of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920 and Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Analysis: Section 14 was held applicable because the prior execution proceedings were civil proceedings prosecuted in good faith and failed for reasons treated as a defect of jurisdiction or a cause of like nature, namely, prematurity and the inability of the executing court to grant the relief sought. The special limitation statute did not expressly exclude Section 14, and Section 5 of the 1920 Act, read with Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act, permitted application of Sections 4 to 25 of the Limitation Act. The period spent in bona fide pursuit of execution was therefore liable to be excluded.

Conclusion: Section 14 applied, and the time spent in execution proceedings was excludable.

Final Conclusion: The High Court's view that the suit was time-barred was set aside, and the decree in favour of the plaintiff, as affirmed by the first appellate court, was restored.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special limitation provision uses the expression "declaratory decree is obtained", limitation begins when the decree is actually drawn and obtained, and Section 14 of the Limitation Act applies unless expressly excluded, permitting exclusion of time spent in bona fide proceedings that fail for a defect of jurisdiction or a cause of like nature.

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