Insolvency professional is not a public servant under corruption law; FIR and remand order were quashed.

An insolvency professional was held not to fall within the definition of "public servant" under Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Court treated the professional's role under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 as facilitative and administrative, not adjudicatory or public in the statutory sense, and held that mere performance of duties with a public element does not attract the corruption statute. It further applied strict construction of penal law and the rule against casus omissus, noting that the Code expressly includes only specified Board officials while separately protecting insolvency professionals acting in good faith. The FIR and remand order were quashed.

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Issues: Whether an insolvency professional, including a resolution professional, falls within the definition of "public servant" under Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and whether the FIR and remand proceedings based on that premise are liable to be quashed.

Analysis: The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was examined as a complete code governing insolvency resolution, but the statutory role of an insolvency professional was found to be that of a facilitator rather than an adjudicator. The functions under the Code, including verification of claims, constitution of the committee of creditors, and conduct of the corporate insolvency resolution process, were treated as administrative in nature and not as functions having the public character required for inclusion within Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Court held that mere performance of duties with a public element does not automatically convert the office into a public office for the purposes of the corruption statute. It further held that Section 232 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 deliberately includes only the Board's chairperson, members, officers and employees, while Section 233 separately protects insolvency professionals acting in good faith, and this omission cannot be supplied by judicial interpretation. Applying the principle against casus omissus and the strict construction applicable to penal provisions, the Court concluded that an insolvency professional is not covered by clauses (v), (vi) or (viii) of Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Conclusion: The answer is in the negative. An insolvency professional is not a public servant under Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and the impugned FIR and remand order were quashed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special insolvency statute assigns an insolvency professional only facilitative and administrative functions and expressly omits such professional from the statutory deeming provision of public servants, courts cannot expand the penal definition by implication or supply a deliberate legislative omission.

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