Penalty for failure to renew sales tax registration is discretionary and does not require mens rea under the provision.

Failure to renew a registration under section 15-A(1)(g) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 falls within the provision because renewal is treated as a continuation of the original registration for later years. Mens rea is not an essential ingredient for penalty under that clause, since the wording differs from other penal clauses in section 15-A(1) that expressly refer to deliberate or false conduct. Penalty is also not automatic on proof of default, because the use of the word "may" leaves discretion to the assessing authority and requires consideration of whether satisfactory justification exists. The Tribunal's view sustaining penalty was upheld.

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Issues: (i) Whether failure to renew registration under section 15-A(1)(g) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 is covered by the provision; (ii) whether mens rea is an essential ingredient for imposing penalty under section 15-A(1)(g); and (iii) whether penalty under the provision is automatic on proof of default.

Issue (i): Whether failure to renew registration under section 15-A(1)(g) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 is covered by the provision.

Analysis: The provision was construed in the setting of the registration scheme under the Act and the relevant Rules. Renewal was treated as the continuing operation of the original registration for subsequent years, and the difference in procedure for grant and renewal did not make renewal outside the expression used in clause (g).

Conclusion: The provision covers failure to obtain renewal of registration, and the objection to penalty on that ground failed.

Issue (ii): Whether mens rea is an essential ingredient for imposing penalty under section 15-A(1)(g).

Analysis: The language of clause (g) was contrasted with other clauses of section 15-A(1), which expressly used expressions indicating deliberate or false conduct. The absence of such words in clause (g), read with the nature of the provision and the distinction drawn from authorities on penal statutes, led to the view that the Legislature did not make mens rea a condition for liability under that clause.

Conclusion: Mens rea is not an essential ingredient for penalty under section 15-A(1)(g).

Issue (iii): Whether penalty under section 15-A(1)(g) is automatic on proof of default.

Analysis: The provision was held to confer discretion on the assessing authority because it uses the word "may" and contemplates inquiry and consideration of whether any satisfactory circumstance justifies the default. Penalty is therefore not mechanical and depends on the facts shown by the dealer.

Conclusion: Penalty under section 15-A(1)(g) is not automatic, but on the facts no sufficient justification for the default was shown.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal's order sustaining the penalty was upheld and the revision was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a taxing penalty provision is framed in materially different language from other clauses that expressly import deliberateness or falsity, the omission of such words indicates that mens rea is not an implied requirement, and the authority may impose penalty within its statutory discretion upon proof of the default.

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