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Issues: Whether regular bail should be granted to the petitioner accused of offences under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
Analysis: The petitioner had remained in custody since 18.10.2023. The allegations were stated to relate primarily to documentary evidence. The investigation had been completed and the challan filed, while the trial was likely to take time. In these circumstances, and without expressing any opinion on the merits, release on bail was considered appropriate, subject to terms including bail bonds, sureties, surrender of passport, restriction on leaving India without leave, and regular attendance before the trial court.
Conclusion: Regular bail was granted to the petitioner on the specified conditions.
Regular bail - custody and period of incarceration - documentary evidence and challan filed - conditions of bail - surrender of passport - personal attendance at trial
Regular bail - custody and period of incarceration - documentary evidence and challan filed - conditions of bail - surrender of passport - personal attendance at trial - Grant of regular bail to the petitioner in connection with the offences under the Central Goods and Services Tax regime - HELD THAT: - The Court, having considered the submissions and noting the period of incarceration, the nature of the allegations as primarily relating to documentary evidence, and that the investigation was complete with the challan already filed, held that, without expressing any opinion on the merits, bail should be granted since the trial may take time. The Court exercised its discretion to release the petitioner on bail subject to furnishing bail bonds and sureties and on such further terms as the trial court may deem fit. As part of the bail conditions the petitioner is directed to surrender his passport to the concerned court and is prohibited from leaving India without leave of the Supreme Court. The petitioner must regularly attend the trial until exempted by the trial court, and any violation may invite such action as is permissible, with the trial court at liberty to take appropriate steps. [Paras 2, 3, 4]
Petitioner is released on bail on furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 1,00,000 and a surety of like amount, subject to surrender of passport, prohibition on leaving India without leave of this Court, and regular attendance at trial.
Final Conclusion: Special Leave Petition allowed; petitioner admitted to bail on the stated terms and conditions; pending applications disposed of.
Outcome: The Special Leave Petition was dismissed, with liberty to pursue an appeal against the adjudication order and to raise contentions not specifically decided by the High Court, and with protection against dismissal on the ground of limitation if such appeal is filed within the stipulated period.
Leave to appeal - preclusion of issues decided by High Court - condonation of delay / protection against dismissal on limitation - no adjudication on merits
Leave to appeal - preclusion of issues decided by High Court - condonation of delay / protection against dismissal on limitation - no adjudication on merits - Petitioner is permitted to prefer an appeal against the adjudication order raising contentions other than those specifically decided by the High Court, and any such appeal filed within four weeks shall not be dismissed on the ground of limitation; Special Leave Petition dismissed otherwise. - HELD THAT: - The Court declined to issue notice in the Special Leave Petition but, on the petitioner's statement that an appeal will be filed raising contentions not decided by the High Court, granted liberty to prefer such appeal. The Court explicitly limited the scope of permitted contentions to those not already decided by the High Court and protected any appeal preferred within four weeks from dismissal on limitation grounds. The Court made no comments on the merits of the contentions so permitted and recorded that the SLP is dismissed subject to the stated liberty to appeal.
SLP dismissed; petitioner permitted to prefer appeal within four weeks on contentions other than those decided by the High Court, and such appeal shall not be dismissed on limitation; no observation on merits.
Final Conclusion: The Special Leave Petition is dismissed; petitioner is granted liberty to file an appeal within four weeks raising only those contentions not decided by the High Court, and any such appeal shall not be rejected on limitation grounds; the Court refrained from expressing any view on the merits.
Issues: Whether the proceedings initiated under the impugned show-cause notice under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, warrant interim stay in view of the petitioner's objection regarding limitation under Section 73 and the absence of wilful suppression.
Analysis: The Court noticed the petitioner's challenge to the invocation of Section 74 on the ground that the limitation under Section 73 had expired and that the allegation of wilful suppression was disputed. The respondents sought time to file a counter and contended that the objections could be raised before the assessing authority. Pending further hearing, the Court granted protective relief.
Outcome: Further proceedings in relation to the impugned show-cause notice were stayed for six weeks.
Stay of proceedings - show-cause notice - limitation under Section 73 of the CGST Act, 2017 - invocation of Section 74 for willful suppression - rate of tax dispute (12% versus 18%) - jurisdictional facts for assuming penal jurisdiction
Stay of proceedings - show-cause notice - Interim relief in respect of the impugned show-cause notice dated 06.08.2024 - HELD THAT: - The writ petition challenges a show-cause notice dated 06.08.2024 on grounds including that limitation under Section 73 of the CGST Act, 2017 has expired, that the authorities impermissibly invoked Section 74 alleging willful suppression to circumvent limitation, and that the correct rate of tax is 12% and not 18%. The Court recorded that objections to the show-cause notice could be urged before the assessing authority and that the respondents sought time to file counter-affidavit. While no adjudication on merits was undertaken, the Court directed a temporary bar on further proceedings arising from the impugned notice and afforded the respondents time to obtain instructions and file their counter. The order preserves the parties' rights to contest the merits before the competent authority and does not decide the substantive questions of limitation, applicability of Section 74, or the correct rate of tax.
Further proceedings in relation to the show-cause notice dated 06.08.2024 are stayed for six weeks and respondents 3 and 4 granted time to file their counter.
Final Conclusion: The Court granted an interim stay of six weeks on all proceedings arising from the show-cause notice dated 06.08.2024 and permitted the respondents to file a counter; no decision was taken on the merits of limitation, applicability of Section 74, or the correct rate of tax.
Issues: Whether the rejection of the application to unblock input tax credit under rule 86A(2) of the Odisha Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, without considering the statutory redressal mechanism and without application of mind, was sustainable.
Analysis: Rule 86A(2) permits the Commissioner or the authorised officer to allow debit of the electronic credit ledger once satisfied that the conditions for disallowing debit no longer exist, while rule 86A(3) limits the restriction to one year. The impugned communication merely referred to an earlier writ order and disposed of the application without considering whether the blocking should continue or whether the applicant had shown that the reasons for blocking no longer survived. The statutory scheme contemplates a fresh consideration during the currency of the blocking period, and the authority was required to examine the request on its merits and pass a reasoned order.
Conclusion: The rejection was unsustainable and the petitioner was entitled to interference. The impugned communication was set aside and the application was restored to the authority for fresh decision.
Blocking of input tax credit - remedy under rule 86A(2) of the Odisha Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 - automatic cessation of restriction after one year - application of mind by authority - principles of natural justice - judicial interference where statutory redress not considered
Blocking of input tax credit - application of mind by authority - remedy under rule 86A(2) of the Odisha Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 - Validity of impugned communication rejecting the application under rule 86A(2) without reasons or consideration of the statutory redressal provision - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the impugned communication did not disclose any application of mind by the authority to the petition filed under sub rule (2) of rule 86A and merely disposed of the petition by reference to a prior dismissal of a writ petition without addressing the redressal sought. Rule 86A(2) contemplates that the Commissioner or an authorized officer may, if satisfied that the conditions for disallowing debit no longer exist, allow debit during the blocking period (which in any event ceases after one year). The statutory scheme therefore embeds an internal remedy; where an authority is required to consider a petition under sub rule (2), it must apply its mind to the factual and legal contentions raised rather than reject the application out of hand. Given that blocking causes commercial hardship, the Court directed that a fresh considered order be passed after affording due consideration to the application under sub rule (2). [Paras 5, 6, 7]
Impugned communication set aside and quashed; the application under rule 86A(2) restored for fresh and reasoned decision by the authority.
Principles of natural justice - judicial interference where statutory redress not considered - Whether writ petition challenging blocking on grounds of jurisdiction or violation of natural justice was maintainable in the facts - HELD THAT: - The Court noted that earlier coordinate Benches had rejected similar challenges on grounds of jurisdiction and breach of natural justice. However, the present petition was entertained because the grievance before the Court was not merely a repetition of those grounds but arose from the authority's failure to consider the statutory redress available under rule 86A(2). The Court emphasised that where a statutory remedy exists and the authority neglects to exercise the adjudicatory function mandated by the rule, judicial interference is appropriate to secure consideration of the remedy; the decision in this case turned on the absence of any reasoned consideration rather than on acceptance of the earlier grounds of jurisdiction or natural justice. [Paras 2, 3, 6, 7]
Writ petition entertained and disposed of by directing fresh consideration of the application under rule 86A(2); grant of relief was on the ground of failure to consider the statutory redress, not on a revisiting of previously rejected jurisdictional or natural justice contentions.
Automatic cessation of restriction after one year - Interpretation of temporal operation of blocking and the scope for unblocking under the rules - HELD THAT: - The Court construed sub rule (3) as providing that the restriction ceases automatically after one year from imposition, and that sub rule (2) permits the Commissioner or an authorized officer to allow debit earlier upon satisfaction that the conditions for disallowing no longer exist. The legislative scheme thus contemplates both an inbuilt time limit and an administrative mechanism for earlier redress at the instance of the affected dealer. [Paras 5, 7]
Blocking remains in effect for a maximum of one year unless the authority, on application under rule 86A(2), is satisfied to the contrary and unblocks earlier.
Final Conclusion: Impugned communication rejecting the petition under rule 86A(2) was quashed for want of application of mind; the application is restored for fresh, reasoned consideration by the authority (to be completed within three weeks), recognising the statutory remedy under rule 86A(2) and the automatic cessation after one year.
Transition of Cess (Education Cess, Secondary and Higher Education Cess, Krishi Kalyan Cess) to GST - utilisation of Cess credit under the CENVAT Credit Rules - exclusion of Cess from carry forward and set-off under Section 140 (Explanation 3) - refund under Section 142(3) of the CGST Act as applied to Service Tax regime - time-bar under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 - refund under Section 54 of the CGST Act - limited availability (zero-rated supplies or inverted duty structure)
Transition of Cess (Education Cess, Secondary and Higher Education Cess, Krishi Kalyan Cess) to GST - exclusion of Cess from carry forward and set-off under Section 140 (Explanation 3) - Transitioning of EC, SHEC and KKC credit to the GST regime is impermissible - HELD THAT: - The Court held that Cess amounts such as Education Cess, Secondary and Higher Education Cess and Krishi Kalyan Cess could not be carried forward or transitioned into the GST regime. The CENVAT Credit Rules restrict utilisation of these Cess credits only for payment of the same Cess, and Explanation 3 to Section 140 of the CGST Act excludes such Cess from Section 140 carry forward and set-off. The Court placed the matter in respectful agreement with the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Sutherland Global Services, observing that accounting entries in the electronic ledger do not create a vested right to transition such Cess as input credit where the levy itself ceased prior to 01.07.2017. Consequently, the petitioner's foundational premise that transitional credit of EC, SHEC and KKC was available was rejected. [Paras 5]
Claim for transition of EC, SHEC and KKC to GST denied
Utilisation of Cess credit under the CENVAT Credit Rules - refund under Section 142(3) of the CGST Act as applied to Service Tax regime - time-bar under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 - The petitioner's refund claim under Section 142(3) (Finance Act, 1994 as applied) is not maintainable because no statutory right to refund of these Cess amounts exists - HELD THAT: - Given that EC and SHEC were abolished before GST and that CENVAT Rules confined utilisation of such Cess credits only against the same Cess, there is no statutory provision enabling refund of unutilised EC, SHEC and KKC. The Court relied on the principle that a right to refund is circumscribed by statute and, absent provision permitting refund of those Cess amounts, an application under Section 142(3) could not be entertained on merits. Thus the administrative rejection of the refund claim as time-barred was upheld in substance because the underlying claim itself lacked statutory foundation. [Paras 5]
Refund claim under Section 142(3) cannot be entertained for EC, SHEC and KKC and the rejection is sustainable
Refund under Section 54 of the CGST Act - limited availability (zero-rated supplies or inverted duty structure) - Claim for refund under Section 54 of the CGST Act is not maintainable for unutilised Cess amounts - HELD THAT: - The Court construed Sub section (3) of Section 54 to mean cash refunds under the CGST Act are limited to (i) zero rated supplies and (ii) refunds arising from an inverted duty structure. Since the petitioner could not transition EC, SHEC and KKC and its claim did not arise under either of the two statutorily recognised circumstances, an application under Section 54 could not be entertained. The Court therefore declined to direct consideration of the pending Section 54 application as doing so would be futile in light of the statutory bar. [Paras 6, 8]
Section 54 refund claim not maintainable and no direction to decide Ext.P5
Final Conclusion: Writ petition dismissed: the Court denied transition of EC, SHEC and KKC credits to GST, held there is no statutory entitlement to refund of those Cess amounts under the pre GST regime or under Section 54 of the CGST Act, and declined to direct further consideration of the pending refund application as futile.
Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging cancellation of GST registration could be disposed of by granting liberty to seek revocation under the CGST Act.
Analysis: The cancellation of registration had been ordered for non-filing of GST returns for a continuous period of six months. The parties were in consensus that the controversy was covered by an earlier coordinate bench order. The petitioner was permitted to seek revocation of the cancellation order by moving an application under Section 30(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, along with the pending returns and outstanding tax dues. The competent authority was directed to consider such application and pass an appropriate order in accordance with law within the stipulated time.
Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to pursue revocation of cancellation in the manner directed.
Ratio Decidendi: Where cancellation of GST registration is challenged and the parties accept that the matter is covered by an earlier order, the Court may dispose of the writ petition by permitting revocation proceedings under Section 30(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, subject to filing of returns and payment of dues.
Cancellation of registration for non-filing of returns - revocation of cancellation under Section 30(2) of the CGST Act, 2017 - filing of outstanding returns and payment of outstanding tax, interest and penalty - direction to authority to consider revocation application within fixed time - precedent and judicial consistency
Revocation of cancellation under Section 30(2) of the CGST Act, 2017 - filing of outstanding returns and payment of outstanding tax, interest and penalty - direction to authority to consider revocation application within fixed time - precedent and judicial consistency - Petitioner permitted to seek revocation of cancellation of GST registration on compliance with specified conditions and the competent authority directed to consider the application within a fixed timeframe in accordance with the coordinate bench decision. - HELD THAT: - The Court, noting consensus between the parties and that the controversy is covered by the order in WPMS No. 75 of 2023, held that the petitioner whose registration was cancelled for continuous non-filing of returns may move an application under Section 30(2) of the CGST Act, 2017 for revocation of the cancellation. The petitioner is required to file all outstanding GST returns and deposit the outstanding tax and dues (including interest and penalties, if any) along with the application, to be filed within two weeks. Upon receipt of such application, the competent authority is directed to consider the claim and pass an appropriate order in accordance with law within four weeks thereafter. The Court disposed of the petition by directing compliance with the coordinate-bench order rather than adjudicating the merits of the cancellation itself. [Paras 7, 8]
Petitioner to file an application under Section 30(2) within two weeks with all outstanding returns and payments; competent authority to decide the application within four weeks; writ petition disposed accordingly.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition disposed by permitting the petitioner to apply for revocation of GST registration on filing outstanding returns and payment of dues; competent authority to consider and decide the application within the time directed, in terms of the coordinate-bench order.
Violation of principles of natural justice - Opportunity of personal hearing - Setting aside order and remand for fresh consideration - Remedial directions for filing reply and fixation of 14 days clear notice - Interim recovery by attachment of bank account and discharge on setting aside order
Violation of principles of natural justice - Opportunity of personal hearing - Setting aside order and remand for fresh consideration - Impugned assessment order dated 28.12.2023 was passed without affording personal hearing and therefore was liable to be set aside and remanded for fresh consideration. - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the show cause notice and the impugned order were uploaded on the GST portal and, according to the petitioner, the petitioner had not been made aware of the show cause notice nor furnished the original notice. In those circumstances the impugned order was passed without affording any opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner, amounting to a breach of the principles of natural justice. Accordingly the Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter to the first respondent for fresh consideration on merits. The Court directed that the petitioner may file a reply/objection with documents within two weeks and, upon filing, the respondents must issue a clear 14 days notice fixing the date of personal hearing and thereafter decide the matter on merits and in accordance with law, expeditiously. [Paras 8, 9]
Impugned order set aside and matter remanded to the first respondent for fresh consideration with directions to permit filing of reply and to provide a 14 days personal hearing before passing fresh orders.
Interim recovery by attachment of bank account and discharge on setting aside order - Attachment of the petitioner's bank account in consequence of recovery proceedings could not survive once the impugned order was set aside and was ordered to be lifted. - HELD THAT: - The Court observed that 20% of the disputed tax liability had already been collected by attachment of the petitioner's bank account. Given that the impugned order itself was set aside, the attachment could not continue. The Court therefore directed that the attachment be lifted and the Bank instructed to de-freeze the petitioner's account immediately upon production of a copy of this order. The Court noted no further condition was required since the 20% had been paid. [Paras 9]
Bank attachment lifted and respondents directed to de-freeze the petitioner's bank account on production of a copy of this order.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition is allowed in part: the assessment order dated 28.12.2023 is set aside and remanded for fresh consideration after permitting the petitioner to file a reply and after a 14 days personal hearing; the attachment on the petitioner's bank account is lifted and the account shall be de-frozen on production of this order; matter to be decided expeditiously. No costs.
Issues: Whether the assessment order demanding tax on alleged wrongful availment of input tax credit could be sustained when the petitioner claimed absence of a reasonable opportunity to contest the demand.
Analysis: The impugned order was preceded by notice and show cause proceedings, but the petitioner was permitted to contest the tax demand on merits after a fresh reply. The documents showed that part of the disputed demand had already been appropriated from the bank account, and the matter warranted reconsideration after affording a reasonable opportunity, including a personal hearing.
Conclusion: The assessment order was set aside and the matter was remanded for fresh adjudication after granting the petitioner an opportunity to file a reply and to be heard.
Final Conclusion: The petitioner obtained relief by way of setting aside of the impugned order, restoration of the attachment issue to the outcome of the remanded proceedings, and a direction for fresh decision on merits.
Ratio Decidendi: An assessment order founded on disputed tax liability should be set aside and remitted when the affected person has not been afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to contest the demand on merits.
Reasonable opportunity of hearing - wrongful availment of input tax credit - remand for fresh consideration - personal hearing - setting aside assessment order - provisional appropriation pending outcome - lifting of bank attachment
Reasonable opportunity of hearing - wrongful availment of input tax credit - remand for fresh consideration - personal hearing - setting aside assessment order - Impugned assessment order set aside and matter remanded for fresh adjudication with opportunity to the petitioner to defend the claim of input tax credit. - HELD THAT: - The Court found that although show cause proceedings had been initiated, the petitioner contended that he was unaware of the proceedings and did not have a reasonable opportunity to contest the tax demand alleging wrongful availment of input tax credit on purchase of a motor vehicle. Having regard to the petitioner's claim and the fact that a substantial portion of the disputed demand had already been appropriated, the Court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction to set aside the order dated 11.10.2023 and remand the matter for reconsideration on merits. The petitioner was permitted to file a reply to the show cause notice within two weeks of receipt of this order, and the first respondent was directed to afford a reasonable opportunity, including a personal hearing, before passing a fresh order. A time-limit of three months from receipt of the petitioner's reply was fixed for disposal of the remanded proceedings. [Paras 5, 6]
Assessment order dated 11.10.2023 set aside; matter remanded for fresh consideration with directions to accept petitioner's reply within two weeks, afford personal hearing and pass a fresh order within three months.
Provisional appropriation pending outcome - lifting of bank attachment - Appropriation of amounts from the petitioner's bank account to abide by the outcome of the remanded proceedings and the bank attachment raised. - HELD THAT: - The Court recorded that a sum appropriated from the petitioner's bank account represents a significant portion of the disputed demand. In the interest of justice, it directed that the appropriated sum shall abide by the result of the remanded proceedings. Consequent to setting aside the assessment order, the Court ordered that the bank attachment be lifted. [Paras 3, 7, 8]
Sum appropriated from the petitioner's bank account to abide by the outcome of the remanded proceedings; bank attachment lifted.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition allowed by setting aside the assessment order dated 11.10.2023; matter remanded for fresh adjudication after permitting the petitioner to file a reply and be heard; appropriated funds to abide the outcome and bank attachment lifted; order to be decided within three months of receipt of the petitioner's reply.
Issues: Whether the impugned tax assessment orders, passed without hearing the petitioner on the merits of the tax proposals, were liable to be set aside and the matter remitted for fresh consideration with an opportunity of hearing.
Analysis: The orders were found to have been issued without hearing the petitioner on the merits of the tax proposals. In view of the attachment of the petitioner's bank accounts and the need to afford an opportunity to contest the demand, the petitioner was required to make a preconditioned remittance of 10% of the disputed tax demand in respect of each order. The petitioner was also permitted to submit a reply to the show cause notice within the stipulated period, and the respondent was directed to consider the reply, grant a reasonable opportunity including a personal hearing, and then pass fresh orders.
Conclusion: The impugned orders were set aside, the matter was remitted for fresh adjudication after affording reasonable opportunity and personal hearing, and the bank attachment was raised.
Natural justice / right to be heard - Personal hearing - Quashing of administrative orders for lack of hearing - Interim relief subject to deposit - Remand for fresh consideration - Provisional bank attachment and its vacation - Forum allocation between Central and State GST authorities
Natural justice / right to be heard - Quashing of administrative orders for lack of hearing - Impugned orders issued without affording the petitioner a hearing were liable to be set aside. - HELD THAT: - The High Court found on perusal of the impugned orders that they were issued without hearing the petitioner on the merits of the tax proposals. In view of the absence of an opportunity to be heard and having regard to the hardship caused by attachment of the petitioner's bank accounts, the Court considered it just to set aside the orders and to put the petitioner on terms to enable a fair adjudication. The court recorded that the petitioner may submit a reply to the show cause notices and be afforded a reasonable opportunity, including a personal hearing, before fresh orders are passed. [Paras 4, 5]
Impugned orders set aside and petitioner granted opportunity to submit reply and obtain a personal hearing prior to fresh adjudication.
Interim relief subject to deposit - Remand for fresh consideration - Provisional bank attachment and its vacation - Relief by vacating bank attachment was made subject to the petitioner remitting 10% of the disputed tax demand and the matter was remanded for fresh decision on merits. - HELD THAT: - The Court allowed interim relief conditional upon the petitioner remitting 10% of the disputed tax demand in respect of each order within three weeks from receipt of this order. Upon receipt of the 10% deposit and the petitioner's reply to the show cause notices, the respondents were directed to provide a reasonable opportunity, including personal hearing, and to pass fresh orders within three months from receipt of the reply. Consequent to setting aside the assessment orders, the attachment of the bank accounts was directed to be lifted. [Paras 5]
Bank attachment raised; petitioner to remit 10% and respondents to reconsider and pass fresh orders within three months after hearing.
Final Conclusion: Writ petitions allowed on terms: impugned orders set aside for lack of hearing, attachment vacated subject to deposit of 10% of disputed demand and submission of reply; respondents to afford personal hearing and pass fresh orders within three months; no costs.
Interim stay of demand - administrative circular declared ultra vires - challenge to notification - notice and service of process - direction to file counter affidavits
Interim stay of demand - administrative circular declared ultra vires - Interim stay of demand raised pursuant to the circular dated 01.03.2018 (Annexure-7). - HELD THAT: - The Court observed that certain High Courts have declared the circular dated 01.03.2018 to be ultra vires and the Standing Counsel for the CT & GST Department admitted the factum of that declaration. In view of the pendency of challenges before other courts and the admitted status of the earlier circular, the Court considered it appropriate to preserve the position by granting an interim relief. Consequently, the demand raised pursuant to the circular under Annexure-7 is stayed for a limited period to protect the petitioner's position pending further adjudication. [Paras 12]
Demand raised pursuant to Annexure-7 shall remain stayed until 21.05.2024.
Notice and service of process - direction to file counter affidavits - Issuance of notice to the opposite parties and directions for service of extra copies to enable them to obtain instructions or file counter-affidavits. - HELD THAT: - The Court directed issuance of notice and ordered the petitioner to serve extra copies of the writ petition on the Standing Counsel for the CT & GST Department and on the counsels appearing for other opposite parties within specified short timelines so they could obtain instructions or file counter affidavits. The Court further directed the office to effect service on certain opposite parties by registered post with acknowledgment and listed the matter for an early returnable date, thereby ensuring procedural compliance and expeditious adjudication. [Paras 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]
Notice issued; petitioner to serve extra copies and office to effect service as directed so opposite parties may file their responses.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition admitted for consideration; notice issued to opposite parties with directions for service and filing of counter affidavits, and the demand arising from the circular dated 01.03.2018 (Annexure-7) is stayed until 21.05.2024, with the matter posted for further consideration.
Issues: Whether directions should be issued regarding disposal of the application for cancellation of GST registration and furnishing of the requisite details.
Outcome: The petitioner was permitted to furnish the details sought by the proper officer within one week, and the proper officer was directed to decide the cancellation application in accordance with law within four weeks.
Cancellation of registration - opportunity to furnish information - administrative duty to decide pending application within a specified time
Cancellation of registration - opportunity to furnish information - administrative duty to decide pending application within a specified time - Petitioner permitted to furnish information sought by the proper officer and the proper officer directed to decide the petitioner's application for cancellation of GST registration within a stipulated timeframe. - HELD THAT: - The Court noted that the petitioner applied for cancellation of registration and that the application remained undecided. The petitioner informed that the requested clarifications and address for future communication have been provided, and undertook (without prejudice) to furnish any further details within one week as sought by the proper officer. In view of these concessions and the need for finality, the Court permitted the petitioner to supply the details sought by the proper officer by the specified letter and directed the proper officer to decide the cancellation application in accordance with law within four weeks from the date of the order. The order preserves all rights and contentions of the parties. [Paras 6, 7]
Petitioner allowed to furnish the details within one week; proper officer directed to decide the cancellation application in accordance with law within four weeks.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition disposed of by permitting the petitioner to submit the requested details within one week and directing the proper officer to decide the application for cancellation of registration in accordance with law within four weeks; rights and contentions reserved.
Issues: Whether two adjudication orders arising from separate show cause notices for the same tax period and creating nearly identical demands could be sustained, and whether the proceedings were liable to be clubbed for fresh adjudication after granting an opportunity to respond.
Analysis: The notices and the resulting orders related to the same tax period and were issued by officers of the same jurisdictional office, while the demands were substantially identical. The petitioner also had not been able to file responses to the show cause notices. In these circumstances, continued separate adjudication on parallel notices for the same period was not , and the proceedings required consolidation before one proper officer. The petitioner was to be afforded an opportunity to file a reply, after which adjudication was to proceed within the statutory time contemplated for completion of proceedings.
Conclusion: The impugned orders were set aside, the show cause notice proceedings were clubbed, and the matter was directed to be re-adjudicated by one proper officer after receipt of the petitioner's reply.
Duplication of adjudication by different officers in the same jurisdiction - adjudication under Section 73 of the CGST Act, 2017 - right to be heard - clubbing of show cause notices for consolidated adjudication - remand for fresh adjudication by a proper officer - time-limit for adjudication under Section 75(3) of the Act - avoidance of issuance of nearly identical demands
Duplication of adjudication by different officers in the same jurisdiction - avoidance of issuance of nearly identical demands - clubbing of show cause notices for consolidated adjudication - Both orders passed on show cause notices dated 21.09.2023 and 24.09.2023 for the same tax period were set aside and the proceedings were ordered to be clubbed and re-adjudicated by one proper officer. - HELD THAT: - The Court observed that two different officers of the same jurisdictional office issued show cause notices and passed orders creating nearly identical demands for the identical tax period July 2017 to March 2018. In view of the duplication and the risk of inconsistent or overlapping adjudications, both orders were set aside and the two proceedings were directed to be clubbed. The remedial measure of consolidation was chosen to ensure a single dispositive adjudication by a proper officer and to avoid multiplicity and possible contradictions in demands. [Paras 3, 4]
Both orders set aside; proceedings on both show cause notices are clubbed for re-adjudication by one proper officer.
Right to be heard - remand for fresh adjudication by a proper officer - time-limit for adjudication under Section 75(3) of the Act - Petitioner permitted to file replies and the matter remanded for fresh adjudication within the statutory time-limit. - HELD THAT: - Noting the petitioner's submission that he was unaware of the notices and could not file responses, the Court granted an opportunity to file replies to both show cause notices within 30 days. Thereafter the consolidated matter was directed to be adjudicated by the proper officer within the period prescribed by Section 75(3) of the Act. The Court expressly refrained from commenting on the merits and reserved the parties' rights and contentions. [Paras 4, 5, 6]
Petitioner to file replies within 30 days; proper officer to re-adjudicate within the period under Section 75(3); merits left open.
Final Conclusion: Both impugned orders were set aside and the two show cause proceedings for July 2017 to March 2018 were ordered to be clubbed and re-adjudicated by a single proper officer; the petitioner granted 30 days to file replies and re-adjudication directed to be completed within the time prescribed by Section 75(3) of the Act, with merits reserved.
Issues: Whether the Court should interfere with show cause notices proposing cancellation of GST registration and tax liability, and whether interim protection against suspension of GST registration should be granted.
Analysis: The writ petitions challenged show cause notices relating to cancellation of GST registration and tax proposals for the relevant tax period. As the matters were at the notice stage, the Court declined to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction to interfere with the notices themselves. However, it granted limited interim protection by directing that the suspension of GST registration remain in abeyance until the petitioner replied to the notices, with a further direction to afford a reasonable opportunity of hearing and pass orders thereafter.
Conclusion: The challenge to the show cause notices was not entertained, but limited relief was granted by keeping the suspension of GST registration in abeyance and directing adjudication after reply.
Suspension of GST registration - challenge to show cause notice - limited exercise of writ jurisdiction against statutory proceedings - personal hearing
Suspension of GST registration - challenge to show cause notice - personal hearing - Extent to which writ jurisdiction is exercised to interfere with show cause notices and the suspension of GST registration - HELD THAT: - The High Court declined to entertain a substantive interdiction of the statutory show cause notices, observing that challenges to such notices ordinarily fall within the statutory adjudicatory process. However, the Court exercised its discretionary writ jurisdiction to the limited extent of directing that the suspension of the petitioner's GST registration be kept in abeyance. Procedurally, the petitioner was directed to file a reply to the show cause notices within three weeks of receiving a copy of the order. On receipt of that reply, the respondents were directed to afford the petitioner a reasonable opportunity, including a personal hearing, and to pass final orders on the notices within one month from receipt of the petitioner's reply. The Court emphasised that, save for keeping the suspension in abeyance and issuing these procedural directions, the petitioner remains free to respond to and seek adjudication of the show cause notices before the competent authority.
Writ jurisdiction exercised only to keep suspension of GST registration in abeyance and to direct timelines for filing reply, personal hearing and issuance of final orders; otherwise petitioner to avail statutory remedies.
Final Conclusion: The petitions are disposed of by keeping the suspension of the petitioner's GST registration in abeyance and directing the petitioner to reply within three weeks, the respondents to grant a hearing and decide the show cause notices within one month; no costs.
Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to pursue the remedy before the appropriate authority in accordance with law.
Quashing of demand-cum-show cause notice - challenge to demand under OGST Act/CGST Act - following precedent of an earlier High Court decision - pursuit of remedy before the appropriate authority in accordance with law
Quashing of demand-cum-show cause notice - following precedent of an earlier High Court decision - pursuit of remedy before the appropriate authority in accordance with law - Writ petition challenging the demand-cum-show cause notice was not entertained on merits and the petition was disposed of permitting the petitioner to pursue statutory remedies before the appropriate authority. - HELD THAT: - The Court noted that the controversy was covered by its earlier decision in Mitambini Mishra (W.P.(C) No.8492 of 2022 disposed of on 26.07.2022) in which a writ challenging a Demand-cum-Show Cause Notice issued under Section 63 of the OGST Act/CGST Act was not entertained; instead the earlier order directed the petitioner there to file reply/objection and participate in the proceedings before the Proper Officer. Applying that precedent, the Court declined to grant relief by way of quashing the demand letter and disposed of the writ petition by permitting the present petitioner to pursue his remedy before the appropriate authority and to raise all contentions in the pending proceedings to be dealt with in accordance with law. [Paras 4, 5]
Writ petition disposed; petitioner permitted to pursue remedy before the appropriate authority in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The petition for quashing the demand-cum-show cause notice is disposed of; the petitioner is permitted to contest the notice and avail remedies before the proper authority in accordance with the precedent of the Court.
Issues: Whether alleged non-compliance with the earlier payment direction disclosed a prima facie case of contempt and warranted issuance of notice to the alleged contemnors.
Analysis: The order records that the earlier judgment directing payment had attained finality for the time being, that the subsequent review petition did not justify withholding compliance, and that continued non-payment despite the direction could prima facie amount to contempt. Exercising contempt jurisdiction, notice was directed to be issued to the opposite parties requiring a show-cause reply within two weeks.
Outcome: Notice issued to the opposite parties in contempt proceedings and they were directed to file their show-cause reply.
Contempt of court for non-compliance - direction of payment under earlier judgment - prima facie contempt - show-cause notice for contempt - Article 215 of the Constitution - Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - effect of filing a review petition on compliance - statutory interest liability on delayed GST payment
Direction of payment under earlier judgment - effect of filing a review petition on compliance - Filing of a review petition by JBVNL does not excuse compliance with the payment directions contained in W.P.(T) Nos. 4885 of 2022 and analogous cases. - HELD THAT: - The court noted that the Special Leave Petition filed by JBVNL had been dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court after adjudication on facts, and that this Court had earlier indicated it could not reopen the concluded issue. Consequently, the subsequent filing of a review petition, particularly nearly nine months after the judgment, cannot be relied upon by JBVNL as a ground to withhold or delay payment ordered by this Court. The Court therefore treats the obligation to make payment as continuing and enforceable notwithstanding the pending review petition. [Paras 3, 4, 5]
JBVNL's review petition does not relieve it from the duty to comply with the earlier payment directions.
Contempt of court for non-compliance - prima facie contempt - show-cause notice for contempt - Article 215 of the Constitution - Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - statutory interest liability on delayed GST payment - Non-compliance with the Court's earlier payment directions shall prima facie constitute contempt and opposite parties 2 and 3 are to be issued show-cause notices to explain non-compliance. - HELD THAT: - Applying Article 215 of the Constitution read with the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and relevant High Court rules, the Court held that failure to obey its payment directions would prima facie amount to contempt. In light of the potential accrual of statutory interest liabilities on delayed GST payments, the Court directed prompt action: the Registry is to issue notices to the contemnors (opposite parties 2 and 3) requiring filing of show-cause replies within a limited timeframe. The Court limited the time to two weeks to mitigate further interest accrual on the GST component of indirect transactions. [Paras 6, 7, 8]
Issue show-cause notices to opposite parties 2 and 3 requiring show-cause replies within two weeks; non-compliance is prima facie contempt.
Final Conclusion: The Court directed issuance of show-cause notices under Article 215/Contempt of Courts Act to opposite parties 2 and 3 for prima facie contempt for failure to comply with its earlier payment directions; the filing of a review petition does not excuse non-compliance, two weeks are granted for filing show-cause replies, and the matters are posted on 10th May 2024.
Reopening of assessment and change of opinion - Requirement of fresh tangible material to sustain reassessment - Disclosure of material facts on record - Proviso to Section 147 and quashing of reassessment
Reopening of assessment and change of opinion - Requirement of fresh tangible material to sustain reassessment - Disclosure of material facts on record - Validity of reassessment under Section 147 where reasons for reopening were based on documents already available on record - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal's conclusion that the reassessment was a case of mere change of opinion was upheld. The material relied upon by the Assessing Officer - the return of income, computation of total income, Form No. 3CD, directors' report, profit and loss schedules and notes - expressly disclosed prior-period write-offs and provisions and specifically identified the shortfall in general ledger balances claimed as deductions. Those documents, already before the AO at the original assessment, constituted no new tangible material capable of giving rise to a fresh 'reason to believe' that income had escaped assessment. In those circumstances the reopening under Section 147 could not be sustained and the reassessment was rightly quashed by the ITAT. [Paras 4, 5, 6, 7]
Reassessment quashed as based on documents already on record; change of opinion established and reassessment invalid.
Final Conclusion: Appeal dismissed. The High Court affirmed the ITAT's quashing of the reassessment for Assessment Year 2002-2003, holding that the AO relied only on material already on record and there was no fresh tangible material to justify reopening under Section 147; no substantial question of law arises.
Limitation under Section 144C(4) of the Income Tax Act - service of draft assessment order - objections before the Dispute Resolution Panel and intimation to Assessing Officer under Section 144C(2) - final assessment on basis of draft where no objections filed under Section 144C(3) - adverse inference for non-disclosure in official affidavit
Service of draft assessment order - objections before the Dispute Resolution Panel and intimation to Assessing Officer under Section 144C(2) - final assessment on basis of draft where no objections filed under Section 144C(3) - limitation under Section 144C(4) of the Income Tax Act - adverse inference for non-disclosure in official affidavit - Whether the final assessment order dated 27th December 2023 is barred by limitation in view of service of the draft assessment order on 23rd September 2023 and non-filing of objections under Section 144C(2). - HELD THAT: - The Court accepted the petitioner's evidence that the draft assessment order under Section 144C was served on 23rd September 2023. The statutory regime under Section 144C(2) afforded one month from receipt of the draft to file objections with the DRP and inform the Assessing Officer, which in the present case expired on 22nd October 2023. In terms of Section 144C(3)(b) read with Section 144C(4)(b) the Assessing Officer was required to pass the final assessment within one month from the end of the month in which the objection period expired, i.e., by 30th November 2023. The Assessing Officer passed the final order on 27th December 2023, after the limitation period. The affidavit-in-reply by the department failed to deny receipt on 23rd September 2023 and produced only a later ITBA snapshot for 16th October 2023; the Court drew an adverse inference against the department for non-disclosure and accordingly accepted the petitioner's chronology. Applying these findings to the statutory timeline, the final assessment was held to be time-barred and liable to be quashed. [Paras 5, 6, 7, 8]
Final assessment order dated 27th December 2023 was barred by limitation and quashed.
Final Conclusion: The petition is allowed; the final assessment order dated 27.12.2023, the notice of demand and the show cause notice for penalty are quashed as time-barred in accordance with the statutory timeline under Section 144C.
Re-opening of assessment - reason to believe - change of opinion - full and true disclosure of material facts - proviso to Section 147 - notice under Section 148 - assessment framed under section 143(3)
Re-opening of assessment - change of opinion - full and true disclosure of material facts - proviso to Section 147 - notice under Section 148 - Validity of the notice dated 27th March, 2021 under Section 148 seeking reopening of assessment for A.Y. 2013-14 in view of disclosure made in Form 29B and earlier assessment framed under Section 143(3). - HELD THAT: - The petitioner filed return for the year with Form 29B disclosing the deduction claimed under item (iii) to the proviso to section 115JB and produced the audit report during the scrutiny assessment, following which assessment was framed under section 143(3) and the book profit was determined. The reasons recorded for reopening relied only on verification of the existing record and the conclusion that the claimed reduction was wrongly allowed, which the Court found to be a mere change of opinion rather than fresh tangible material showing income escaped assessment. In these circumstances, and having regard to the proviso to Section 147 and the principle in Kelvinator that the concept of change of opinion operates as a check against arbitrary re-opening, the notice under Section 148 was held to be without jurisdiction. [Paras 8, 9, 11]
Impugned notice dated 27th March, 2021 under Section 148 for A.Y. 2013-14 is without jurisdiction and is quashed and set aside.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition allowed; the notice under Section 148 dated 27th March, 2021 for A.Y. 2013-14 is quashed as it amounts to re-opening based on a mere change of opinion despite full and true disclosure; no order as to costs.
Registration under Section 12AB - recognition under Section 80G(5) - non-consideration of assessee's submissions causing prejudice - remand for fresh consideration - condonation of delay - rectification under Section 154
Registration under Section 12AB - non-consideration of assessee's submissions causing prejudice - remand for fresh consideration - condonation of delay - rectification under Section 154 - Admission of the appeal against rejection of registration under Section 12AB and restoration of the matter to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration of the assessee's submissions - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal recorded that the assessee's application for registration was rejected by the CIT(E) by order dated 29.03.2023, while the assessee contends it had furnished material by letter dated 06.02.2023 which was not considered. Although the appeal was filed late and the rectification application under Section 154 was made only on 14.02.2024, the Tribunal found that non-consideration of the 06.02.2023 submission caused severe prejudice to the assessee. In view of these peculiar facts the Tribunal exercised discretion to admit the appeal despite the delay and restored the matter to the file of the CIT(E) with a direction to consider the explanation dated 06.02.2023, make any lawful enquiry for verification of genuineness of activities, and decide the registration claim afresh, while placing on the assessee the duty to produce details and proof of genuineness of activities. [Paras 7, 8, 9]
Appeal admitted; matter remitted to the CIT(E) to consider the 06.02.2023 submission and decide the registration claim under Section 12AB afresh after such verification as may be required.
Recognition under Section 80G(5) - non-consideration of assessee's submissions causing prejudice - remand for fresh consideration - condonation of delay - Admission of the appeal against refusal of recognition under Section 80G(5) and restoration of the matter to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration of the assessee's submissions - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted that the application for recognition under Section 80G(5) was rejected by the same order dated 29.03.2023 and that the assessee relies on the same unconsidered submission of 06.02.2023. For the same reasons applied to the registration matter-namely, the prejudice caused by non-consideration of the assessee's submission-the Tribunal allowed the appeal for statistical purposes and restored the matter to the CIT(E) to consider the explanation/submission and decide the recognition claim afresh in accordance with law. [Paras 10]
Appeal admitted; matter remitted to the CIT(E) to consider the 06.02.2023 submission and decide the claim for recognition under Section 80G(5) afresh.
Final Conclusion: Both appeals were admitted despite the delay and restored to the file of the learned CIT(E) for fresh consideration of the assessee's submission dated 06.02.2023; the CIT(E) is directed to verify genuineness of activities and decide the claims for registration under Section 12AB and recognition under Section 80G(5) afresh.
Payment for use of computer software not royalty - royalty under Section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act read with Article 12 of the Indo US DTAA - non exclusive licence / EULA does not transfer copyright - application of Supreme Court precedent in Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence Pvt. Ltd.
The appeals under Section 260A are dismissed [2022 (3) TMI 482 - DELHI HIGH COURT] as payments for licensing/distribution of computer software in the facts before the Court are not taxable as 'royalty' in India, in view of the Supreme Court's decision in Engineering Analysis Centre [2021 (3) TMI 138 - SUPREME COURT] and no substantial question of law remains for adjudication.
HELD THAT:- We are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. The special leave petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
Section 151A compliance - Faceless assessment scheme - Validity of notice under Section 148 - Prior enquiry under Section 148A - Central charges exclusion - Quashing action for lack of jurisdiction
Section 151A compliance - Faceless assessment scheme - Validity of notice under Section 148 - Prior enquiry under Section 148A - Quashing action for lack of jurisdiction - Impugned notices under Section 148A(b), order under Section 148A(d) and consequent notice under Section 148 issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer without following the faceless scheme are invalid. - HELD THAT: - The Court found on the record that the notice dated 20 March 2023 under Section 148A(b), the order dated 20 April 2023 under Section 148A(d) and the notice dated 20 April 2023 under Section 148 were issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer and not through the Faceless Assessing Officer as required by the scheme notified pursuant to Section 151A. Relying upon this Court's decision in Hexaware and subsequent decisions (including Kairos Properties), the scheme notified by the Central Government (notification dated 29 March 2022) and Section 151A apply to issuance of notices under Section 148 and to the prior enquiry under Section 148A. The scheme mandates automated allocation and faceless issuance; concurrent jurisdiction of JAO and FAO is rejected. Where an authority acts contrary to the statutory scheme, the action is vitiated and liable to be quashed without the assessee having to establish further prejudice. Applying these principles, the initiation of proceedings in the present case was held to be non-compliant with Section 151A and the notified scheme and therefore vitiated the reassessment proceedings. [Paras 5, 6, 8, 10, 11]
Notices and order issued without compliance with Section 151A and the notified faceless scheme are invalid and the impugned notices/orders are quashed.
Central charges exclusion - Faceless assessment scheme - Section 151A compliance - Contention that cases falling under central charge are excluded from applicability of the faceless scheme (and thus Section 151A) is rejected. - HELD THAT: - The Court examined the Revenue's submission that prior orders dated 31 March 2021 and 6 September 2021 exclude central-charge cases from the scheme. Relying on this Court's decisions (including Abhin Anilkumar Shah and CapitalG LP) and the scheme's language, the Court held that those prior orders relate to assessment orders and do not operate to exclude the scheme notified under Section 151A. Reading the scheme to incorporate the earlier orders would be to rewrite or import provisions not present in the notification; Section 151A and its scheme stand independent and are applicable to proceedings under Section 148A and Section 148 even for central and international charge matters. Consequently, the Revenue's exception based on central charge was not accepted. [Paras 7, 9]
The plea that central-charge cases fall outside the notified faceless scheme is rejected; the scheme under Section 151A applies.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition allowed: notices under Section 148A(b), order under Section 148A(d) and notice under Section 148 dated March/April 2023 (relating to Assessment Year 2019-20) are quashed for non-compliance with Section 151A and the faceless assessment scheme; no opinion expressed on other grounds raised in the petition.
Reason to believe - income escaping assessment - limitation under Section 149(1) - extended six year period - failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts - change of opinion test in reassessment - accumulation of income under Section 11(3A)
Limitation under Section 149(1) - extended six year period - failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts - income escaping assessment - Whether the notice under Section 148/147 issued in respect of assessment year 2009-10 was within the period of limitation - HELD THAT: - The Court held that extended limitation under the proviso to Section 147 (as reflected in Section 149(1)) is available only where the assessing officer has a 'reason to believe' both that income has escaped assessment and that such escapement is by reason of the assessee's failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts. The records show that the department had raised the specific query about the Rs.50 lakh accumulation during scrutiny proceedings by issuing Ext.P2 and the petitioner had replied by Ext.P3 in 2011, explaining the change in intended utilization and stating that a formal application for permission under Section 11(3A) had been filed. Thus the material facts concerning accumulation and subsequent utilization were before the department well within the six-year period and the department cannot now invoke the extended period merely because the assessing officer formed a different view later. In these circumstances there is no satisfaction of the proviso's twin conditions to invoke the extended six-year period and the notice under Section 148 cannot be said to be within limitation. [Paras 13, 14, 15, 16]
The notice under Section 148/147 is barred by limitation because the department had the relevant material facts on record and did not satisfy the proviso conditions permitting the extended six-year period.
Change of opinion test in reassessment - reason to believe - accumulation of income under Section 11(3A) - Whether the reassessment proceedings constitute an impermissible 'change of opinion' under the doctrine governing reopening of assessments - HELD THAT: - Applying the settled principle that reassessment must be founded on 'tangible material' and not a mere change of opinion, the Court found that the very issue (accumulation for construction and subsequent utilization for purchase of land) was specifically raised by the department in Ext.P2 and answered by the petitioner in Ext.P3 during the original scrutiny proceedings. The fact that the original assessment order (Ext.P4) does not expressly deal with the petitioner's explanation is not decisive where a query was raised and satisfactorily answered; the omission to refer to the matter in the assessment order is indicative that the assessing officer had applied mind and formed an opinion. On the material before it, the Court concluded that the proposed reassessment is based on no more than a change of opinion and therefore cannot sustain reopening under Section 147. [Paras 16, 20, 21]
Reassessment proceedings are vitiated as constituting an impermissible change of opinion and are therefore invalid.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition is allowed; Ext.P10 is quashed and the reassessment steps initiated by Ext.P5/Ext.P10 in respect of assessment year 2009-10 are held to be invalid - the reopening is barred by limitation and amounts to an impermissible change of opinion.
Faceless assessment scheme and mandatory compliance of Section 151A - Jurisdiction of Faceless Assessing Officer versus Jurisdictional Assessing Officer - Validity of notice for reassessment issued under Section 148 and notices under Section 148A - Applicability of the faceless Scheme to issuance of notices and Section 148A proceedings - Invalidity of action taken contrary to statutory scheme - Effect of non-compliance with procedural mandate-no requirement to prove prejudice
Validity of notice for reassessment issued under Section 148 and notices under Section 148A - Jurisdiction of Faceless Assessing Officer versus Jurisdictional Assessing Officer - Faceless assessment scheme and mandatory compliance of Section 151A - Invalidity of action taken contrary to statutory scheme - Notices issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer in place of a Faceless Assessing Officer, without compliance with the notified faceless Scheme under Section 151A, are invalid and vitiate the reassessment proceedings. - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the impugned prior notice under Section 148A(b), the order under Section 148A(d) and the consequent notice under Section 148 were all issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer and not by a Faceless Assessing Officer as mandated by the Scheme notified pursuant to Section 151A. Applying the reasoning in Hexaware Technologies Ltd., the Scheme mandates automated allocation and confers exclusive jurisdiction on the officer so allocated; concurrent jurisdiction of JAO and FAO is not permissible. The Scheme, having been framed under Section 151A and tabled in Parliament, governs issuance of notices under Section 148 and related Section 148A steps; departure from the Scheme renders the action contrary to law. Where an authority acts contrary to the statutory scheme, the act is to be quashed without requiring the assessee to prove further prejudice, since non-compliance with the prescribed procedure itself causes prejudice and vitiates the proceedings. On this basis the Court held that the proceedings initiated in the present case are unsustainable for want of compliance with Section 151A and the notified Scheme. [Paras 4, 6, 9, 11]
Impugned notices and related order are invalid for non-compliance with the faceless Scheme and the reassessment proceedings initiated thereby are vitiated.
Applicability of the faceless Scheme to issuance of notices and Section 148A proceedings - Faceless assessment scheme and mandatory compliance of Section 151A - Effect of non-compliance with procedural mandate-no requirement to prove prejudice - The Revenue's contention that cases falling under central charge (and related exceptions) are excluded from the Scheme is not accepted; the objections based on central charge and international tax charge are rejected and do not justify exclusion from the Scheme. - HELD THAT: - The Court considered the Revenue's submission that the present case relates to central charge and therefore falls within earlier orders under Sections 144B(2) and 119 and outside the Scheme framed under Section 151A. Having regard to recent decisions of this Court (including the contemporaneous Abhin Anilkumar Shah decision) and the decision in Kairos Properties, the Court rejected the revenue's objection that central charge or international tax charge exceptions remove a matter from the applicability of the notified Scheme. Consequently, the Scheme governs issuance of notices under Section 148A and Section 148 even where the Revenue invokes central-charge arguments, and such objections do not save notices issued otherwise than in compliance with the Scheme. [Paras 7, 9]
Objections based on central charge and international tax charge are rejected; such exceptions do not exempt the Revenue from complying with the faceless Scheme under Section 151A.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition allowed; the notices dated 01.03.2023 (under Section 148A(b)), the order dated 23.03.2023 (under Section 148A(d)) and the notice dated 23.03.2023 (under Section 148) are quashed for non-compliance with the faceless Scheme framed under Section 151A; no costs.
Validity of reassessment notice under Section 148 - Faceless assessment scheme under Section 151A - Jurisdiction of Jurisdictional Assessing Officer versus Faceless Assessing Officer - Mandatory compliance with Notification implementing the faceless scheme - Quashing of action for acting contrary to statutory scheme without requirement of proving prejudice
Validity of reassessment notice under Section 148 - Faceless assessment scheme under Section 151A - Jurisdiction of Jurisdictional Assessing Officer versus Faceless Assessing Officer - Impugned notice issued under Section 148 is invalid because it was issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer and not in compliance with the faceless scheme mandated by Section 151A and the Notification dated 29 March, 2022. - HELD THAT: - The Court examined the record and found that the notices and orders under Sections 148A(b), 148A(d) and the consequent notice under Section 148 were issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer instead of a Faceless Assessing Officer as required by the scheme notified under Section 151A. Reliance was placed on the Division Bench decision in Hexaware Technologies Limited which held that the Scheme dated 29 March, 2022 mandates automated allocation and that there is no concurrent jurisdiction between the JAO and FAO for issuance of notice under Section 148. The Scheme, having been issued pursuant to Section 151A(2) and tabled in Parliament, governs issuance of notice under Section 148 as well as subsequent proceedings; non-compliance with that Scheme renders the action contrary to law. Following Hexaware, the Court accepted that when an authority acts contrary to the statutory scheme, the action is liable to be quashed without the assessee having to prove separate prejudice. The Court rejected the submission that the proximity of dates (notice issued one day after the Notification) validates the JAO's action, holding that the purport of Section 151A and the implemented Scheme controls the validity of the proceedings. Consequently, the initiation of reassessment proceedings in the manner adopted vitiated the process. [Paras 3, 4, 5, 8]
Writ petition allowed; impugned notice under Section 148 (and underlying Section 148A proceedings) quashed for non-compliance with Section 151A and the faceless scheme.
Final Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings initiated for Assessment Year 2018-19 were vitiated because the notice and antecedent steps were not issued under the faceless scheme mandated by Section 151A; the writ petition is allowed and the impugned notices/orders are quashed. No costs.
Substantial question of law - appeal under Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act - tribunal as final fact finding authority - perversity - rejection of books of account under Section 145(3)
Substantial question of law - appeal under Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act - tribunal as final fact finding authority - perversity - Whether the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal raised any substantial question of law warranting admission of the Revenue's appeal under Section 260-A. - HELD THAT: - The High Court applied the established tests for a "substantial question of law", including whether the question is debatable, of general public importance, or directly and substantially affects the parties and is not settled by binding precedent. Reliance was placed on authoritative dicta that the Tribunal is the final fact-finding authority and that interference by the High Court is permissible only where the Tribunal's findings are perverse or unsupported by evidence. The Court examined the departmental grounds and found they amounted to challenges to factual findings of the Tribunal and CIT(A), not to questions of law. The ITAT had dealt with the grounds raised and rendered a reasoned, speaking order; no demonstration of perversity or lack of evidence was shown which would justify appellate intervention. Consequently, the matters urged by the Revenue did not, on the material before the Court, satisfy the statutory and judicial threshold for formulation of a substantial question of law under Section 260-A, and the appeal could not be entertained. [Paras 13, 14, 15]
No substantial question of law arises from the Tribunal's order; the appeal under Section 260-A is dismissed in limine.
Final Conclusion: The High Court held that the Revenue's contentions were factual challenges to the Tribunal's findings and not substantial questions of law; there was no perversity in the ITAT's reasoning and the Section 260-A appeal was dismissed.
Limitation for issuance of order under section 201(1) and 201(1A) - Reasonable time/four years rule for initiation of proceedings - Application of coordinate-bench precedents on time bar - Characterisation of payments as fees for technical services under section 9(1)(vii)
Limitation for issuance of order under section 201(1) and 201(1A) - Reasonable time/four years rule for initiation of proceedings - Application of coordinate-bench precedents on time bar - Order under Section 201(1) and 201(1A) in respect of payments for the financial years 2006-07 to 2008-09 is barred by limitation - HELD THAT: - The proceedings initiated by letter dated 31.1.2014 and the order dated 6.3.2014 under Section 201(1) and 201(1A) related to payments made in financial years 2006-07, 2007-08 and 2008-09. The initiation and passing of the order were clearly beyond four years from the end of the relevant financial year. Following the decisions of coordinate Benches of this Court which apply a four year or "reasonable time" rule for such actions, the Court concluded that the order under Section 201(1) and 201(1A) was time barred on the facts of the case and therefore liable to be set aside. Having answered the first substantial question in favour of the assessee, the Court did not proceed to decide the other substantial questions formulated on the characterisation of the payments or on permanent establishment. [Paras 7]
The order under Section 201(1) and 201(1A) in respect of the stated financial years is time barred; appeal allowed and the impugned orders set aside.
Final Conclusion: Appeal allowed. The orders dated 6.3.2014 (Income Tax Officer), 15.12.2014 (CIT(A)) and 12.8.2016 (ITAT) are set aside on the ground that the proceedings under Section 201(1) and 201(1A) were initiated beyond the four year period and are therefore barred by limitation.
Reopening of assessment - Reason to believe under section 147 - Quashing of notice under section 148 - Special audit report under section 142(2A) - Change of opinion - Information from third parties (NSEL) as basis for reassessment
Reopening of assessment - Reason to believe under section 147 - Special audit report under section 142(2A) - Information from third parties (NSEL) as basis for reassessment - Change of opinion - Quashing of notice under section 148 - Validity of the notice issued under section 148 read with section 147 for Assessment Year 2014-15 - HELD THAT: - The assessing officer issued the reopening notice after receiving information from NSEL alleging large outstanding payables and alleged bogus sales. The petitioner relied on the special audit conducted under section 142(2A) and the notes to accounts (note no.31 and the statutory auditor's report) which recorded that there were no purchase or sale transactions in the financial year relevant to AY 2014-15 and no opening stock related to NSEL; the special auditor expressly concluded that the question of impact on profit and loss did not arise. The Court found that the assessing officer, without applying his mind to these materials on record, formed a belief of escapement of income solely on the confidential information from NSEL and earlier-year liabilities determined for prior years. That formation of belief ignored the statutory audit findings and amounted to issuing the notice on a 'borrowed satisfaction' and effectively a change of opinion since the issue had been examined during the original assessment (including special audit) without any addition. In those circumstances the requirements for a valid reason to believe under section 147 were not satisfied and the reopening was held to be without jurisdiction. [Paras 19, 20, 21, 22, 23]
Impugned notice under section 148 and the order rejecting objections quashed and set aside
Final Conclusion: The petition is allowed; the notice for reopening assessment for AY 2014-15 and the consequent order rejecting objections are quashed and set aside. No order as to costs.
Faceless assessment - request for oral hearing - principles of natural justice - waiver by failure to opt for hearing - availability of alternative remedy by appeal - extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226
Faceless assessment - request for oral hearing - principles of natural justice - waiver by failure to opt for hearing - Whether an assessment order passed under the faceless assessment scheme without an oral hearing violates principles of natural justice requiring remand. - HELD THAT: - The Court examined the statutory scheme for faceless assessment and observed that Section 144B(vii) requires the assessee to file a response and provides an explicit option to request an oral hearing when uploading objections. Unlike the Full Bench decision in Commissioner of Wealth-Tax v. Sri Jagdish Prasad Choudhary which interpreted a different statutory provision to require an oral hearing even without a request, the scheme under the Income-tax Act contemplates conclusion of faceless assessment without oral hearing unless the assessee avails the specific option to request one. Hence absence of an oral hearing where the assessee did not tick the request option amounts to a waiver and does not, in the facts before the Court, constitute a breach of the principles of natural justice necessitating remand. [Paras 4, 5]
No remand on ground of absence of oral hearing; assessment under the faceless scheme is not vitiated where the option to request oral hearing was not exercised.
Availability of alternative remedy by appeal - extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 - principles of natural justice - Whether the High Court should exercise writ jurisdiction under Article 226 in lieu of the appellate remedy when the assessee has not availed the statutory appeal. - HELD THAT: - Relying on settled principles limiting exercise of writ jurisdiction where an adequate and efficacious alternative remedy exists, the Court noted that Article 226 is discretionary and should be exercised only in strong cases such as breach of natural justice, jurisdictional error, or violation of fundamental rights. Given the availability of the statutory appeal where facts can be argued in person and the appellate authority's power to obtain reports and afford hearings, the petitioner's failure to avail the appellate remedy militates against interfering by writ. The Court nonetheless preserved liberty to approach the appellate authority and directed that the period from filing of the writ petition to the date of the order would not be counted for delay. [Paras 6, 7]
Writ jurisdiction declined; petitioner directed to pursue the appellate remedy; period from 20.04.2024 to date excluded for computing delay.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition dismissed; no remand on ground of absence of oral hearing under the faceless assessment scheme where no request was made; petitioner granted liberty to prefer statutory appeal and the period from 20.04.2024 to the date of this order shall not be reckoned as delay.
Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of by leaving it open to the petitioner to file a statutory appeal, with a direction that if the appeal is filed within three weeks, the appellate authority shall receive and decide it on merits without raising limitation.
Writ jurisdiction - Availability of alternative statutory remedy - Discretionary relief in tax assessment - Opportunity of cross-examination - Admission of receipt of consideration in sale deed and plaint - Relaxation of limitation for filing appeal
Writ jurisdiction - Availability of alternative statutory remedy - Discretionary relief in tax assessment - High Court declined to exercise writ jurisdiction against the assessment order and directed the petitioner to pursue the statutory appeal remedy. - HELD THAT: - Having examined the record and the submissions, including prior proceedings in which the earlier assessment order was set aside and remitted, the Court concluded that it was not an appropriate case to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction to adjudicate the challenge to the assessment order. The Court observed that an alternative statutory remedy in the form of an appeal is available and, therefore, invoked the principle that extraordinary writ relief should not be granted where an efficacious statutory remedy exists. The Court did not undertake a determination on the merits of the assessment in exercise of its writ powers and instead left the matter to the appellate forum for adjudication on merits. [Paras 3, 5]
Writ petition disposed of; petitioner directed to file statutory appeal.
Relaxation of limitation for filing appeal - Admission of receipt of consideration in sale deed and plaint - Opportunity of cross-examination - The Court directed the appellate authority to receive and decide the statutory appeal on merits without going into the question of limitation, if filed within the prescribed short window. - HELD THAT: - Although the petitioner complained of not being supplied with the vendor's subsequent statement and of being denied cross-examination, the Court declined to adjudicate those contentions in writ jurisdiction. Noting on record that the receipt of the total consideration had been admitted in the sale deed and in the plaint filed by the parties in the civil suit, the Court nonetheless provided a limited remedy: if the petitioner files the statutory appeal within three weeks from receipt of the order, the appellate authority is directed to receive and dispose of the appeal on merits and to refrain from raising the issue of limitation. The direction is procedural and designed to preserve the petitioner's ability to challenge the assessment before the competent appellate forum. [Paras 4, 5]
Appellate authority to admit and decide the appeal on merits without considering limitation, if appeal filed within three weeks.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition dismissed in exercise of discretion; petitioner given leave to file statutory appeal within three weeks, and appellate authority directed to admit and decide the appeal on merits without regard to limitation.
Allowability of contribution to Compensatory Afforestation Fund as revenue expenditure - capital versus revenue expenditure - exercise of revisional powers under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act - precedential effect of tribunal and High Court decisions
Allowability of contribution to Compensatory Afforestation Fund as revenue expenditure - capital versus revenue expenditure - exercise of revisional powers under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act - Assessee's contribution to the Compensatory Afforestation Fund amounting to Rs. 212.52 crores is to be treated as revenue expenditure and not capital expenditure. - HELD THAT: - The High Court considered the single determinative question whether the contribution to the Compensatory Afforestation Fund was capital in nature or allowable as revenue expenditure. The court observed that the issue is no longer res integra in light of prior authoritative decisions, including the Bombay High Court (Goa Bench) in The Commissioner of Income Tax v. Dr. Prafulla R. Hede and Another, which held that contribution to the Compensatory Afforestation Fund is revenue expenditure. The court further noted that the Special Leave Petition against that High Court decision was dismissed, reinforcing the precedential position. Applying that settled position, the court concluded that there was no substantial question of law warranting interference with the Tribunal's order which had allowed the assessee's claim and held that the Commissioner was not justified in invoking revisional powers under Section 263 in respect of this issue. [Paras 7, 8, 9]
Appeal dismissed; contribution to the Compensatory Afforestation Fund held to be revenue expenditure and Tribunal's decision upheld.
Final Conclusion: The High Court dismissed the revenue's appeal, holding that the contribution to the Compensatory Afforestation Fund for AY 2006-2007 is revenue expenditure and that no substantial question of law arises to disturb the Tribunal's order.
Issues: (i) Whether the imported goods were liable to be released provisionally on payment of the enhanced duty amount and whether the Customs authorities were to quantify such duty expeditiously; (ii) Whether any request for waiver of demurrage charges was required to be considered objectively by the Customs authorities.
Issue (i): Whether the imported goods were liable to be released provisionally on payment of the enhanced duty amount and whether the Customs authorities were to quantify such duty expeditiously.
Analysis: The petitions concerned import of second hand digital multifunction printing and copying machines. The disposal was aligned with an earlier common order in similar matters, under which provisional release was directed on deposit of the enhanced duty amount. The Customs authorities were also required to quantify the duty within a short time and, on payment of the quantified amount, release the goods within the stipulated period. The order further preserved the department's right to proceed with adjudication in accordance with law.
Conclusion: Provisional release was directed on payment of the enhanced duty amount, with expeditious quantification by Customs and liberty to proceed with adjudication kept open.
Issue (ii): Whether any request for waiver of demurrage charges was required to be considered objectively by the Customs authorities.
Analysis: The order recorded that an earlier interim direction had contemplated consideration of waiver of demurrage charges. It was therefore clarified that, if the petitioners filed an application seeking such waiver, the respondents were to consider and decide it objectively.
Conclusion: Any application for waiver of demurrage charges was directed to be considered and decided objectively.
Final Conclusion: The writ petitions were disposed of on the same terms as the earlier batch, granting provisional release relief while keeping adjudication open and permitting consideration of demurrage waiver applications.
Provisional release of goods on deposit of enhanced duty - quantification of duty by Customs within a fixed time - consideration of reply to show cause notice and adjudication - consideration of waiver of demurrage charges on application
Provisional release of goods on deposit of enhanced duty - quantification of duty by Customs within a fixed time - Provisional release of imported second hand digital multifunction printing and copying machines on condition of payment of enhanced duty and time-bound quantification of such duty by Customs. - HELD THAT: - The writ petitions were disposed of on the same terms as an earlier batch order dated 23.11.2023. Petitioners were directed to file replies to the show cause notices and the respondent Customs were directed to consider those replies and pass necessary orders. For release of the goods, the Court directed provisional release conditioned upon deposit/payment of the enhanced duty. Customs was directed to complete quantification of the enhanced duty forthwith within one week from receipt of a copy of the order, and on receipt of such quantification the petitioners were to make immediate payment; the goods were to be released within three weeks thereafter at the outer limit.
Writ petitions allowed to the extent that goods are to be provisionally released on condition of payment of quantified enhanced duty, with Customs to quantify within one week and release within three weeks on payment.
Consideration of reply to show cause notice and adjudication - Continuation of departmental adjudicatory powers despite provisional release. - HELD THAT: - The Court made clear that the direction for provisional release does not preclude the Customs Department from proceeding with adjudication or other proceedings in accordance with law. The disposal therefore preserves the respondent's statutory authority to continue and conclude adjudicatory processes notwithstanding the interim relief granted.
Order for provisional release does not bar Customs from carrying on with adjudication or other lawful proceedings.
Consideration of waiver of demurrage charges on application - Consideration of any application by petitioners for waiver of demurrage charges. - HELD THAT: - Referring to an earlier interim order of a Division Bench, the Court directed that if petitioners file applications seeking waiver of demurrage charges, such applications shall be considered and decided by the respondents objectively. The direction confines the relief to consideration of any such applications by the department and does not itself grant a waiver.
If petitioners apply for waiver of demurrage charges, Customs shall consider and decide such applications objectively; no automatic waiver granted by this order.
Final Conclusion: The writ petitions were disposed of on the same terms as the earlier batch order: petitioners to reply to show cause notices, Customs to consider and adjudicate; provisional release of goods permitted on deposit of quantified enhanced duty (quantification within one week and release within three weeks on payment); and any application for waiver of demurrage charges to be considered objectively by the department. No costs.
Classification under Customs Tariff Heading 2522 versus 2825 - application of HSN explanatory notes to tariff classification - precedential effect of coordinate Benches and supervisory non-interference by the Supreme Court - amount deposited in the course of investigation - refund of customs duty and interest with interest at 12%
Classification under Customs Tariff Heading 2522 versus 2825 - application of HSN explanatory notes to tariff classification - precedential effect of coordinate Benches and supervisory non-interference by the Supreme Court - Quick Lime imported by the appellant is classifiable under CTH 2522 1000 and not under CTH 2825. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined prior decisions of coordinate Benches, notably the Delhi Bench decision in Jindal Stainless (Hisar) Ltd. which applied HSN explanatory notes excluding calcium oxide of purity less than 98% from Chapter 28 and held that such quicklime falls under Chapter 25. The Mumbai Bench in Viraj Profiles Ltd. reached a similar conclusion, and the Hon'ble Supreme Court declined to interfere with that Mumbai Bench decision. Respectfully following these decisions and the applicable HSN explanatory note reasoning, the Tribunal concluded that the imported quicklime in the present case is correctly classifiable under CTH 2522 1000 rather than under CTH 2825. [Paras 9]
Classification under CTH 2522 1000 confirmed and appeal allowed on merits.
Amount deposited in the course of investigation - refund of customs duty and interest with interest at 12% - Amounts of customs duty and interest paid by the appellant during the investigation are not to be retained by the Revenue and are to be refunded with interest at the rate of 12% from the date of deposit until refund. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted that the appellant deposited the duty and interest in April-May 2018, prior to issuance of the Show Cause Notice on 29.03.2019, and therefore these payments qualify as amounts deposited in the course of investigation. Relying on recent decisions of coordinate Benches which direct payment of interest at 12% on refunds of amounts deposited during investigation, the Tribunal held that, since classification is in the appellant's favour, the Revenue must refund the deposited amounts along with interest at 12% from the date of deposit up to the date of actual refund. [Paras 11]
Direct refund of deposited duty and interest ordered, with 12% interest from date of deposit until refund.
Final Conclusion: Appeal allowed on merits: imported quicklime classified under CTH 2522 1000; amounts deposited during investigation to be refunded with interest at 12% from date of deposit until actual refund.
Issues: Whether, in the facts of the case, the criminal proceedings initiated by the regulator should be permitted to continue or be brought to an end on terms.
Analysis: The appellants had already paid the amount due to the shareholders along with interest, and the respondent also acknowledged that the amount had in fact been paid. In these peculiar facts, the Court found that the interest of justice would be better served by putting the appellants to terms for the violation rather than allowing the trial to proceed.
Conclusion: The appeals were allowed to the extent of requiring payment of a fine of Rs. 25,00,000, and upon filing proof of deposit within the stipulated time, the criminal proceedings would stand closed; failing such deposit, the appeals would stand dismissed automatically.
Final Conclusion: The decision substituted further prosecution with a conditional monetary consequence, resulting in closure of the criminal proceedings upon compliance.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the underlying monetary obligation has been discharged and the surrounding circumstances so warrant, the Court may terminate continuation of prosecution by imposing payment terms instead of proceeding with trial.
Quashing of criminal proceedings - exercise of judicial discretion to impose a fine in lieu of prosecution - closure of proceedings upon compliance with court-imposed terms - statutory obligation to deposit and disburse amounts within prescribed period - judicially imposed settlement on peculiar facts not to operate as precedent
Quashing of criminal proceedings - statutory obligation to deposit and disburse amounts within prescribed period - Whether criminal proceedings could be brought to a close in view of payment having been made to shareholders and the statutory breach alleged. - HELD THAT: - The Court noted that there was a prima facie violation of the statutory provisions relating to non-deposit within five days and non-disbursement within thirty days, and that the amounts due to shareholders had, in substance, been paid along with interest. Having considered the competing contentions - appellants seeking quashing in light of repayment and SEBI asserting that statutory provisions afford no escape - the Court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction to avoid subjecting the parties to a full trial. In the exercise of that discretion and in the interest of justice, the Court directed that criminal proceedings shall stand closed if the appellants comply with the terms imposed by the Court (deposit of the fine and filing of proof of deposit within the stipulated time). The order is expressly confined to the peculiar facts of the case and is not to be treated as a precedent. [Paras 5, 6, 7, 9]
Criminal proceedings shall be closed upon compliance with the Court's terms; the Court declined to allow trial to proceed in light of repayment and imposed conditional closure.
Exercise of judicial discretion to impose a fine in lieu of prosecution - closure of proceedings upon compliance with court-imposed terms - Whether imposition of a monetary penalty as a term for closure of proceedings was appropriate and the consequences of non-compliance. - HELD THAT: - The Court considered that, in the facts and circumstances, it was appropriate to put the appellants to terms rather than permit the trial to proceed. The appellants were directed to deposit a specified fine into the designated welfare fund within eight weeks and to file proof of deposit within ten weeks. Upon filing of proof within the time fixed, the criminal proceedings initiated by the respondent would stand closed. The Court made clear that failure to file proof within ten weeks would result in automatic dismissal of the appeals without further reference to the Court. The order is made on the peculiar facts and is not to be cited as precedent. [Paras 5, 6, 7, 9]
A fine was imposed and conditional closure of proceedings granted upon timely deposit and filing of proof; non-compliance will lead to automatic dismissal of the appeals.
Final Conclusion: Appeals allowed to the extent that, in the peculiar facts, the appellants are directed to pay the prescribed fine and file proof of deposit within the time fixed, upon which the criminal proceedings initiated by SEBI shall stand closed; failure to comply will result in automatic dismissal of the appeals. The order is confined to the facts of the case and shall not operate as a precedent.
Issues: Whether the petitioners were entitled to discharge on the ground that the amended scope of Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 could not be applied retrospectively to cash allegedly derived from the scheduled offence and whether a prima facie case of money-laundering was made out.
Analysis: The pre-amended and amended forms of Section 3 were read in light of the Supreme Court's construction that the provision has a wide reach and covers every process or activity connected with proceeds of crime, including possession, acquisition, concealment, use, and projecting or claiming such property as untainted. The Court held that the offence of money-laundering is not confined to the final act of integration into the formal economy and that the relevant question is whether the accused was involved in dealing with proceeds of crime. It further held that the petitioners' reliance on retrospectivity was untenable because the alleged receipt and handling of bribe money itself brought the case within the ambit of the provision as understood even before the 2019 explanation. The trial court's refusal to discharge was found to be consistent with the governing legal principles.
Conclusion: The challenge to discharge was rejected and the finding that the complaint disclosed a prima facie offence under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was upheld.
Ratio Decidendi: Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 covers possession and other dealings with proceeds of crime as part of the offence, and a discharge is unwarranted where the complaint discloses prima facie involvement in such activity.
Money-laundering - proceeds of crime - possession as an offence under Section 3 of PMLA - pre-amended Section 3 of PMLA - acquisition, possession, use, projecting or claiming as activities under Section 3 - continuing offence - clarificatory amendment and non-retrospective effect
Pre-amended Section 3 of PMLA - possession as an offence under Section 3 of PMLA - Whether, as per the law in force at the relevant time, mere possession or deposit of seized cash in Court precluded prosecution under Section 3 of PMLA. - HELD THAT: - The Court examined the text and judicial precedents and held that the original (pre-amended) provision of Section 3 already captured a broad range of processes and activities connected with proceeds of crime, including possession, acquisition and use. The trial court correctly applied the law in concluding that mere depositing of seized cash in Court did not negate that the persons had been involved in activities connected with proceeds of crime for purposes of PMLA; therefore the petitioners could not be discharged at the threshold. The court relied on Supreme Court rulings which treat possession/acquisition of bribe money as falling within the definition of proceeds of crime and within Section 3's ambit. [Paras 11, 12, 16, 19, 22]
The contention that possession or deposit of the seized money in Court in 2009 precluded invocation of Section 3 of PMLA is rejected and the petitioners were not entitled to discharge on that ground.
Clarificatory amendment and non-retrospective effect - continuing offence - Whether the amendment to Section 3 of PMLA (including the Explanation) made after the events could be given retrospective effect so as to criminally penalise conduct antecedent to the amendment. - HELD THAT: - Relying on the Supreme Court's exposition, the Court held that the activities captured by Section 3 may be continuing in nature and that the Explanation inserted later was clarificatory of the original provision rather than expanding its scope. As such, where a person continued to indulge in processes or activities connected with proceeds of crime after the offence became triable under PMLA, prosecution is permissible; the mere fact that the predicate acts dated from an earlier time does not preclude application of Section 3 to continuing dealings with proceeds of crime. [Paras 17, 18, 22]
The plea that the 2013/2019 amendments could not be applied to the facts is unsustainable; the amendments are clarificatory and do not prevent prosecution for continuing activities connected with proceeds of crime.
Acquisition, possession, use, projecting or claiming as activities under Section 3 - proceeds of crime - Whether receipt/acquisition of bribe amounts by a public servant constitutes 'proceeds of crime' and falls within the scope of Section 3 so as to justify refusal of discharge. - HELD THAT: - The Court followed binding Supreme Court authority that bribe money constitutes 'proceeds of crime' under Section 2(1)(u) and that acts such as acquisition and use are expressly enumerated activities under Section 3. Given the material that the petitioners fixed and received illegal gratification for fraudulent clearances, the trial court rightly found a prima facie case under PMLA. The petitioners therefore bore no entitlement to discharge at the stage of consideration under the criminal miscellaneous petitions. [Paras 19, 20, 21, 23]
Receipt or acquisition of bribe money amounts to proceeds of crime and the trial court was justified in refusing discharge; the petitioners' discharge petitions rightly failed.
Final Conclusion: The High Court confirmed the trial court's order dismissing the discharge petitions, holding that the petitioners' involvement with illicitly received money fell within the ambit of Section 3 of PMLA and that the amendments relied upon are clarificatory; the criminal revision petitions are dismissed.
Issues: Whether the recovery proceedings should remain stayed pending the next returnable date, and whether the question of maintainability of the writ petition should be kept open.
Outcome: Notice was issued, the respondents waived service, the matter was directed to be listed after four weeks, the recovery demand was stayed till the next returnable date, and the question of maintainability was left open.
Interim stay of tax recovery - maintainability of writ petition in presence of alternative appellate remedy
Interim stay of tax recovery - Interim stay of demand for recovery of Service Tax and cesses was ordered until the next returnable date. - HELD THAT: - The Court, upon hearing counsel for the parties and noting the pendency of challenge to the demand and related appellate proceedings, directed that the demand for recovery shall remain stayed until the next returnable date. This order is interlocutory and limited to preservation of the subject matter pending further hearing; no adjudication on the merits of the liability or the claimed exemption under the Mega Exemption Notification was undertaken. [Paras 11]
Demand for recovery stayed until the next returnable date.
Maintainability of writ petition in presence of alternative appellate remedy - Maintainability of the writ petition was not finally determined and was left open for consideration on the returnable date. - HELD THAT: - The Court noted the contention of the respondent that an appeal before CSAT under Section 86 of the Finance Act was available and that the petitioner had not availed that remedy. Rather than deciding the contested question of maintainability at this stage, the Court left the question open for determination upon further hearing, thereby reserving the issue for final adjudication. [Paras 12]
Question of maintainability left open.
Final Conclusion: Notice issued and returnable; interim stay of recovery granted until the next date; maintainability of the writ petition not decided and left open for determination on the returnable date (matter listed for further hearing).
Inclusion of reimbursable expenses in taxable value - reverse charge mechanism - pure agent doctrine - Rule 5(1) of Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 - precedent of Intercontinental Consultants and Technocrats, Pvt Ltd
Inclusion of reimbursable expenses in taxable value - reverse charge mechanism - Rule 5(1) of Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 - precedent of Intercontinental Consultants and Technocrats, Pvt Ltd - Demand of service tax on reimbursable/incidentals paid to mutual fund distributors under reverse charge - HELD THAT: - The department issued a show cause alleging that incidental expenses incurred by distributors (auditorium rent, mailing, transport etc.), though billed by debit notes, formed part of the assessable value and the service receiver was liable to discharge service tax on those amounts under Rule 5(1). The Tribunal examined the factual position that such expenses were reimbursed to the service providers and that service tax on service charges (invoices) had been discharged on reverse charge where applicable. Applying the binding decision in Intercontinental Consultants and Technocrats, Pvt Ltd, the Tribunal held that reimbursable expenses of the service provider are not to be included in the taxable value for the purpose of charging service tax and therefore the demand based on inclusion of such reimbursed incidental expenses could not be sustained. The Tribunal noted the department's contention regarding non-fulfilment of pure agent conditions but proceeded on the authoritative Supreme Court precedent which excludes reimbursement items from the value charged to tax in the circumstances before it.
The demand of service tax, interest and penalties insofar as based on inclusion of reimbursable incidental expenses in the taxable value for 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 is set aside and the appeal is allowed.
Final Conclusion: Following the Supreme Court precedent in Intercontinental Consultants and Technocrats, the Tribunal quashed the demand, interest and penalties to the extent they arose from inclusion of reimbursable expenses in the taxable value for the periods 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 and allowed the appeal with consequential reliefs.
Issues: (i) Whether the services rendered to foreign educational institutions constituted intermediary services liable to service tax or export of services; and (ii) whether the remand by the Commissioner (Appeals) to await the outcome of another pending matter was justified.
Issue (i): Whether the services rendered to foreign educational institutions constituted intermediary services liable to service tax or export of services.
Analysis: The assessee's activity had already been examined in earlier tribunal decisions on the same statutory definition of intermediary service under Rule 2(f) of the Place of Provision of Service Rules, 2012. The services were found to be rendered to foreign clients on their own account and not as an arranger or facilitator between two parties. On that reasoning, such services were held to fall outside intermediary service and to qualify as export of services. The same legal position was reiterated in subsequent tribunal orders covering an identical dispute.
Conclusion: The services were not intermediary services and were to be treated as export of services; the demand could not be sustained on that basis.
Issue (ii): Whether the remand by the Commissioner (Appeals) to await the outcome of another pending matter was justified.
Analysis: The Commissioner (Appeals) had already accepted that the dispute stood covered in favour of the assessee on merits, and the departmental appeal on that issue was not pursued further. In those circumstances, remand solely to await a future decision in another matter was inconsistent with the binding effect of the existing tribunal rulings and served no legitimate adjudicatory purpose.
Conclusion: The remand order was unjustified and was set aside.
Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the remand was annulled, and the assessee obtained final relief in the service tax dispute.
Ratio Decidendi: Where an issue is already covered by binding precedent on identical facts, and the lower appellate authority has accepted that position on merits, it cannot remand the matter merely to await the outcome of another pending case; services rendered on own account to foreign clients are not intermediary services and may constitute export of services.
Intermediary service under Rule 2(f) of the Place of Provision of Service Rules, 2012 - Export of services - Extended period of limitation in service tax proceedings - Binding effect of Tribunal decisions on lower authorities - Remand pending outcome of Supreme Court decision
Remand pending outcome of Supreme Court decision - Binding effect of Tribunal decisions on lower authorities - Validity of the Commissioner (Appeals)'s remand to the Adjudicating Authority to await the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s Microsoft Corporation (I) Pvt Ltd despite adverse Tribunal precedent. - HELD THAT: - The Commissioner (Appeals) accepted that the Tribunal decision in M/s Sunrise Immigration Consultants (cited) favoured the appellant but nonetheless remanded the matter to the Adjudicating Authority to await the outcome of the Supreme Court proceedings in M/s Microsoft Corporation (I) Pvt Ltd. The Tribunal held that once the Commissioner (Appeals) recorded that the issue was covered in favour of the appellant and the Revenue did not challenge that finding, there was no justification to remit the matter for reconsideration pending the apex court's decision. The remand thus ran counter to the binding effect of existing Tribunal precedent and was set aside. [Paras 7, 8]
Impugned remand order set aside; Commissioner (Appeals) erred in remanding the matter to await the Supreme Court decision when the issue was already covered by Tribunal precedent.
Intermediary service under Rule 2(f) of the Place of Provision of Service Rules, 2012 - Export of services - Extended period of limitation in service tax proceedings - Whether the services rendered by the appellant amount to 'Intermediary Service' or qualify as 'Export of Services', and whether extended period of limitation is invokable. - HELD THAT: - The Adjudicating Authority had held, on analysis of agreements and relying on Tribunal precedent in M/s Sunrise Immigration Consultants and related decisions, that the appellant did not arrange or facilitate the main service between two or more persons and thus was not an 'intermediary' under Rule 2(f) of the POPS Rules, 2012. The services were held to be promotional/business auxiliary in nature and supplied to clients located outside India, thereby qualifying as export of services. The Tribunal noted that this position has been consistently followed by subsequent decisions, and that interpretation of the POPS Rules precluded invocation of the extended period of limitation. On that basis the demands were unsustainable. [Paras 6, 8, 9]
Services held to be 'Export of Services' and not 'Intermediary Services'; demands (including those under extended limitation) unsustainable and relief granted to appellant.
Final Conclusion: The Tribunal set aside the Commissioner (Appeals)'s remand and allowed the appeal, holding that the appellant's services are export of services and not intermediary services under the POPS Rules, with consequent relief and rejection of demands made under the extended period of limitation.
Refund of service tax on input services used for export of goods - Rebate under Notification No.41/2012 ST - registration with Export Promotion Council as condition for rebate - service tax registration and amendment of registered address (ST 2) - procedural irregularity not to defeat substantive right to refund - CENVAT credit/refund eligibility despite invoice address mismatch
Refund of service tax on input services used for export of goods - Rebate under Notification No.41/2012 ST - CENVAT credit/refund eligibility despite invoice address mismatch - procedural irregularity not to defeat substantive right to refund - Refund of service tax paid on input services used for export of cut and polished diamonds for October, 2015 to March, 2016 is allowable despite invoices bearing a different office address - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined Notification No.41/2012 ST and noted that the statutory scheme grants rebate of service tax paid on specified services used for export of goods subject to fulfillment of conditions including registration requirements. The original authority had found that the appellant satisfied the procedural and substantive conditions of the notification and had sanctioned the refund. The Principal ADG set aside that sanction solely because supporting invoices showed the Bandra Kurla Complex address while the service tax registration earlier reflected a different address, without addressing that the appellant had applied for and secured amendment of address in the ST 2 certificate and had declared registration with the Export Promotion Council. The Tribunal held that the statutory requirement is registration as exporter with the Export Promotion Council and service tax registration; where the appellant had duly notified and obtained incorporation of the changed address in the ST 2 and the use of input services for export was otherwise established, denial of refund on the ground of invoice address mismatch was a curable procedural irregularity which cannot defeat the substantive right to rebate. The Tribunal also relied on the authority that location correlation for fixation of jurisdiction does not extinguish the exporter's right to refund. Given that the original authority had already applied the notification's substantive tests and allowed the refund, the Revenue's appeal which challenged only the procedural address discrepancy was unsustainable. [Paras 8, 9, 10, 11]
Impugned order rejecting the refund was set aside and the refund sanctioned by the original authority restored, with consequential relief payable to the appellants
Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed: the Tribunal set aside the Principal ADG's order refusing the refund on the ground of invoice/registered address discrepancy, held that the appellant had fulfilled the registration and amendment requirements under Notification No.41/2012 ST and restored the refund as sanctioned by the original authority.
Refund of service tax on input services used in export - Applicability of a superseding notification to exports made prior to its issuance - Temporal limitation for filing refund claims - Refund admissibility subject to fulfillment of conditions in the later notification - Nexus of commission agent services with export of goods
Refund of service tax on input services used in export - Applicability of a superseding notification to exports made prior to its issuance - Refund admissibility subject to fulfillment of conditions in the later notification - Nexus of commission agent services with export of goods - Refund claim filed on 31.03.2010 in respect of service tax paid on services of a commission agent located outside India for the period April, 2009 to June, 2009 is admissible. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined whether the superseding Notifications (No.17/2009-S.T. and No.18/2009-S.T. dated 07.07.2009) precluded allowance of refund claims in respect of exports that took place prior to their issuance. The Board's instruction dated 01.01.2010 clarified that Notification No.17/2009-S.T. would apply to exports prior to 07.07.2009 provided (a) refund claims are filed within one year from date of export and (b) no earlier refund claim had been filed under the previous notification. The impugned order denied refund on the ground that certain conditions in Notification No.18/2009-S.T. (relating to ceiling, half-yearly returns and canalized items) were not met; however, those conditions were irrelevant where exports had already taken place before 07.07.2009. The appellant had declared that no earlier refund was claimed and had filed the claim on 31.03.2010 within one year of the quarter ending 30.06.2009. The Tribunal also accepted that services of an overseas commission agent are attributable to export of goods and satisfy the nexus requirement. In consequence, the claim satisfied the material conditions prescribed by the Board's instruction and the later notification, and therefore the refund was admissible. [Paras 6, 7, 8]
Allow refund claim for the period April, 2009 to June, 2009 as admissible under the applicable notifications and Board instructions.
Temporal limitation for filing refund claims - Refund admissibility subject to fulfillment of conditions in the later notification - The refund claim filed on 31.03.2010 is not time-barred. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal considered the time-limit issue in light of the Board's instruction dated 01.01.2010 which interpreted Notification No.17/2009-S.T. to be applicable to exports prior to 07.07.2009 if claims are filed within one year of export. The appellants filed the refund application on 31.03.2010 for the quarter ending 30.06.2009, which is within the one-year period stipulated by the superseding notification as clarified by the Board. The authorities below did not find that the appellant had earlier claimed the refund. Consequently, the claim met the temporal requirement and could not be rejected as time-barred. [Paras 6, 8]
Hold that the refund claim filed on 31.03.2010 is within the permitted time and is not barred.
Final Conclusion: Impugned appellate order set aside; appeal allowed and refund in respect of service tax paid on commission-agent services for April, 2009 to June, 2009 is sanctioned.
Input service - Cenvat credit - outward transportation up to the place of removal - place of removal - legislative amendment w.e.f. 1-4-2008 substituting "from" with "upto"
Input service - Cenvat credit - outward transportation up to the place of removal - place of removal - Entitlement to Cenvat credit on outward transportation (container) services used for clearance of final products during the impugned period. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the question is governed by the interpretation accepted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Central Excise, Belgaum v. Vasavadatta Cements Ltd., which affirmed the view that services used for clearance of final products from the place of removal (including transportation to the first point such as depot or directly to the customer) fall within the definition of input service and are eligible for Cenvat credit. The Supreme Court's reasoning-adopting the Full Bench/High Court approach-records that tax paid on transportation of the final product from the place of removal up to the first point (depot or customer) must be allowed as credit. The Tribunal noted the subsequent rule amendment w.e.f. 1-4-2008 which altered the statutory phraseology, but held that for the period prior to that amendment the earlier interpretation applies. Applying this settled law to the appellant's claim for container/outward transportation services during the period in question, the Tribunal concluded that Cenvat credit was admissible. [Paras 7, 8, 9]
Appellant entitled to take Cenvat credit on outward transportation service for the impugned period; demand and penalty set aside.
Final Conclusion: Appeal allowed: the impugned demand and penalty are set aside and the appellant is entitled to Cenvat credit on outward transportation services for the period 1st April, 2006 to 31st October, 2007 in accordance with the law prevailing prior to the amendment effective 1-4-2008.
Clubbing of clearances for SSI exemption - dummy units / effective control test - financial flow-back - principal-to-principal transactions - marketability and manufacture - Note 6 to Section XVI
Clubbing of clearances for SSI exemption - dummy units / effective control test - financial flow-back - principal-to-principal transactions - Whether clearances of the Decentralised Mother Units (DMUs) should be clubbed with Sepack for denial of SSI exemption on the basis that the DMUs were dummy units controlled by Sepack. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that clubbing cannot be sustained on the facts. The legal position is that clubbing/dummy-unit determination is fact-sensitive and requires proof of pervasive financial and managerial control or flow-back; no universal rule applies. On the record the Tribunal found that (a) many DMUs existed before Sepack and had independent existence; (b) shared negotiations, supplier identification, periodic meetings and mutual cost-reduction efforts produced mutual commercial benefit and do not demonstrate pervasive control or impermissible financial flow-back; (c) absence of common workforce, lack of shareholding, no undisputed evidence of advances/loans or profit siphoning, and varying transfer prices weighed against a finding of dummy units; and (d) the release of seized goods to DMUs and imposition of fines on DMUs were inconsistent with a finding that DMUs had no independent existence. Applying settled authorities, the Tribunal concluded that the Revenue had not proved that the DMUs were dummy units and therefore the turnover of DMUs could not be clubbed with Sepack for denial of benefit under Notification No.8/2003-CE. [Paras 13, 16, 18, 19, 23]
Clubbing of clearances is not justified; DMUs are not dummy units of Sepack and are entitled to SSI exemption under Notification No.8/2003-CE on the facts of this case.
Marketability and manufacture - Note 6 to Section XVI - principal-to-principal transactions - Whether the sealing machines supplied by DMUs to Sepack were incomplete/unfinished such that subsequent branding, packing and quality checks at Sepack's premises amount to 'manufacture' under Note 6 to Section XVI, making Sepack the manufacturer liable to duty. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined the factual evidence of inspection and packaging and applied the test of marketability. It found that the machines received from DMUs were complete and capable of being used and sold in the market; Sepack carried out quality checks (including pre-delivery inspection) and branding/packing thereafter, but those processes did not convert an unfinished article into a finished one. The Tribunal held that mere branding, packing and warranty insertion, and the ancillary quality checks undertaken by Sepack, did not constitute manufacture so as to render the DMUs' output non marketable at source. Accordingly, Note 6 was not attracted on the facts and Sepack could not be treated as the manufacturer for the purposes claimed by the Revenue. [Paras 21, 22, 23]
The sealing machines were marketable at the DMUs' premises; the subsequent processes by Sepack do not amount to manufacture under Note 6 to Section XVI and do not render Sepack the manufacturer for duty liability.
Final Conclusion: The impugned adjudication is unsustainable on merits: the Tribunal set aside the order and allowed the appeals, holding that the DMUs are not dummy units and that the sealing machines were marketable at the DMUs; consequential claims of duty, confiscation and penalties were rendered academic and not adjudicated.
Issues: Whether oxygen captively consumed in the manufacture of sulphuric acid, which arose as a by-product in the manufacture of copper products, was eligible for exemption under Notification No. 67/95-CE and whether the Tribunal's order calling for no interference suffered from any legal infirmity.
Analysis: The Tribunal's view was examined in the light of the settled position that sulphuric acid generated in the course of processing sulphur dioxide is a by-product and not the final product of the manufacturing activity in issue. The manufacturing process showed that oxygen produced in the captive plant was used in the manufacture of copper products and that the emergence of sulphuric acid was only incidental to the process adopted to control emissions and complete the chemical conversion. The earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Zinc and the Tribunal's decision in Sterlite Industries were treated as governing the controversy, and on that basis the exemption notification was held applicable. The factual findings recorded by the Tribunal were found to be neither perverse nor contrary to the evidence on record.
Conclusion: Notification No. 67/95-CE was held applicable to the oxygen so captively consumed, the duty demand was unsustainable, and the Revenue's challenge failed.
Final Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose from the Tribunal's order, and the Revenue's appeal stood dismissed with the assessee succeeding on the exemption issue.
Ratio Decidendi: Where oxygen is captively consumed in a manufacturing process and the resulting sulphuric acid is only a by-product, exemption meant for captive consumption cannot be denied merely because the by-product is cleared at nil rate.
Captively produced input eligible for exemption under Notification No. 67/95-C.E. - by product versus final product classification in excise law - application of Hindustan Zinc Ltd. precedent on Modvat/Cenvat credit and Rule 57CC - requirement of separate records where inputs are common to dutiable and exempt products - appellate authority's factual finding not to be interfered with unless perverse
Captively produced input eligible for exemption under Notification No. 67/95-C.E. - by product versus final product classification in excise law - Entitlement of the assessee to benefit of Notification No. 67/95-C.E. for oxygen produced and captively consumed where sulphuric acid emerges from the process - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal applied the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Hindustan Zinc Ltd. and the Tribunal decision in Sterlite Industries to conclude that sulphuric acid produced from sulphur dioxide in the smelting process is a by product, not the final product of the assessee's manufacturing activity, which is the metal (copper). The Tribunal examined the manufacturing process and environmental obligations which require processing of SO2, and found that the oxygen from the captive plant is used in the purification of copper concentrate and not as an input into the chemical steps that create sulphuric acid; additional oxygen for conversion comes from the atmosphere and water contributes oxygen in the final acid. On those factual findings and by following the Hindustan Zinc ratio that by products arising as technological necessity do not render Rule 57CC or related provisions applicable, the Tribunal held the assessee eligible for the exemption under Notification No. 67/95 for the captive oxygen and set aside duty and penalty demands. [Paras 5, 6]
Assessee entitled to benefit of Notification No. 67/95 for the captive oxygen; sulphuric acid treated as by product and not a bar to exemption.
Application of Hindustan Zinc Ltd. precedent on Modvat/Cenvat credit and Rule 57CC - requirement of separate records where inputs are common to dutiable and exempt products - Whether Rule 57CC or record keeping requirements disentitle the assessee to exemption when a by product cleared at nil rate is produced - HELD THAT: - Relying on the Apex Court's treatment in Hindustan Zinc Ltd., the Tribunal and this Court accepted that where a by product (sulphuric acid) emerges out of a technological necessity and no part of the dutiable raw material is traceable in the by product, the mischief that Rule 57CC seeks to prevent is absent. The Court endorsed the view that separate accounts requirement under Rule 57CC is inapplicable in such circumstances and that the exemption provisos (including compliance with the relevant rule) were satisfied. Consequently, the exemption cannot be denied on the ground that a by product is cleared at nil rate. [Paras 5, 6]
Rule 57CC and separate accounts requirements do not defeat the exemption where sulphuric acid is a by product arising as technological necessity; exemption remains available.
Appellate authority's factual finding not to be interfered with unless perverse - Entrenchment of the Tribunal's factual findings and whether they are perverse or unsupported by record - HELD THAT: - The High Court reviewed the Tribunal's findings about the manufacturing process, role of captive oxygen, and the environmental regulatory requirement to process SO2. The Court found no perversity or contradiction with the evidence in the Tribunal's factual conclusions and determined that the Tribunal correctly applied binding precedent to those facts. Therefore, there was no basis for judicial interference with the Tribunal's determination. [Paras 7]
Tribunal's factual findings are not perverse and do not warrant interference.
Substantial question of law arising from appellate order - Whether the appeals raised any substantial question of law warranting this Court's interference with the Tribunal's order - HELD THAT: - The Court examined the substantial questions of law advanced by Revenue, including whether the Tribunal properly verified use of oxygen in manufacture of sulphuric acid and whether the impugned order was speaking. Having found the Tribunal's reasoning to follow and apply the Supreme Court precedent and to rest on unchallenged factual findings, the High Court concluded that no substantial question of law arose from the impugned order that would justify upsetting the Tribunal's decision. [Paras 1, 8]
No substantial question of law arises; Revenue's appeal dismissed.
Final Conclusion: The High Court upheld the Tribunal's allowance of the assessee's appeals for the stated tax periods, agreeing that sulphuric acid produced in the process is a by product and that captive oxygen is eligible for exemption under Notification No. 67/95; the Tribunal's factual findings were not perverse and no substantial question of law arises, and the Revenue's appeal is dismissed.
Violation of principles of natural justice - presumption of income from Profit and Loss Account as sale of dutiable goods - denial of CENVAT credit for alleged erroneous filing of NIL returns - remand for de novo adjudication
Violation of principles of natural justice - Adjudicating Authority failed to comply with principles of natural justice by not providing the Divisional Assistant Commissioner's verification report to the appellant and by not considering the appellant's documentary explanations. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the vital verification report relied upon by the learned Commissioner was not supplied to the appellant prior to finalization of the adjudication order. The adjudicating authority also did not properly consider the documents and explanations submitted by the appellant regarding the discrepancy between ER-1 returns and the Profit & Loss account. These procedural omissions amounted to a grave breach of natural justice, rendering the impugned order non-speaking and unsustainable. [Paras 4, 5]
Impugned order set aside and matter remanded to the Adjudicating Authority for fresh adjudication with directions to afford the appellant adequate opportunity of hearing and to consider the material on record.
Presumption of income from Profit and Loss Account as sale of dutiable goods - Whether income shown in the Profit and Loss Account can be treated as income from sale of dutiable goods was not adjudicated on merits and is remanded for fresh consideration by the Adjudicating Authority. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal did not decide the substantive question of treating P&L account entries as sales of dutiable goods. Given the procedural defects-non-supply of the verification report and non-consideration of the appellant's explanations-the Tribunal left the factual and legal determination open and directed de novo adjudication so that the Adjudicating Authority may examine evidence, submissions and invoices and record a reasoned conclusion. [Paras 4, 5]
Issue remanded to the Adjudicating Authority for fresh adjudication, keeping all contentions open.
Denial of CENVAT credit for alleged erroneous filing of NIL returns - The question whether CENVAT credit availed on the basis of valid invoices and receipt of inputs/input services can be denied on account of erroneous filing of NIL returns was not adjudicated on merits and is remanded for fresh consideration by the Adjudicating Authority. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal observed that the adjudicating authority did not properly consider the appellant's documentary record and explanations before denying credit. In view of the procedural infirmities and the need for a reasoned decision, the Tribunal directed that the Adjudicating Authority shall re-examine the entitlement to CENVAT credit, including invoices and proof of receipt, after giving the appellant an opportunity to be heard. [Paras 4, 5]
Issue remanded to the Adjudicating Authority for fresh adjudication, keeping all contentions open.
Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed in part: the impugned adjudication order is set aside for non-compliance with principles of natural justice and the matter is remanded to the Adjudicating Authority for de novo adjudication on all issues after affording the appellant adequate opportunity to place submissions and evidence.
Includability of sales tax concession in assessable value - invocation of extended period of limitation in excise demands - penalty under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 - application of Board Circular No. 1063/2/2018-CX
Includability of sales tax concession in assessable value - Super Synotex precedent - Sales tax concession retained by the assessee is required to be added to the assessable value for levy of Central Excise duty. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the issue is no longer res integra in view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in Super Synotex (India) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur-II, and accordingly applied that precedent to the facts of this appeal. Relying on that binding authority, the sales tax concession retained by the appellant must be included in the assessable value for central excise duty. The appellant has, however, agreed to pay duty only for the normal period of limitation. [Paras 6]
Sales tax concession retained by the appellant is includable in the assessable value; appellant liable to pay duty accordingly for the admissible period.
Invocation of extended period of limitation in excise demands - application of Board Circular No. 1063/2/2018-CX - Extended period of limitation cannot be invoked for the demand in the absence of suppression of facts; therefore the demand raised by invoking the extended period is set aside. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined whether there was any positive act of suppression by the appellant. It found that details of VAT collected and retained were reflected in the audited financial statements and that earlier tribunal decisions had taken contrary views, so the appellant could not be faulted for omitting the amount from assessable value. The Board's Circular No. 1063/2/2018-CX, which accepts certain orders and clarifies that the extended period should not be invoked in such cases (including reliance on Super Synotex), was applied. In view of absence of suppression and the Circular's clarificatory position, invocation of the extended period was held not permissible and the extended-period demand was set aside. [Paras 7, 8, 9]
Demand confirmed by invoking the extended period of limitation is set aside; duty is payable only for the normal period of limitation.
Penalty under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 - penalty not imposable in absence of suppression - Penalty imposed under Section 11AC is set aside because there is no evidence of suppression of facts warranting penalty. - HELD THAT: - Since the Tribunal found no positive act of suppression and applied the Board Circular which indicated extended period and related penalties were not invocable in such cases, it concluded that the penalty under Section 11AC could not be sustained. The appellant's disclosure in audited accounts and absence of settled fault militated against imposition of penalty. [Paras 8, 9]
Penalty under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 is set aside.
Final Conclusion: Appeal partially allowed: inclusion of retained sales tax concession in assessable value affirmed; demand confirmed only for the normal period of limitation (extended-period demand set aside); penalty under Section 11AC set aside. Appeal disposed of with consequential relief, if any, as per law.
Exemption for goods produced in a technical, educational and research institution - satisfaction of the designated officer as condition precedent to exemption - certification, maintenance of records and inspection as enforcement measures - interpretation of exemption notifications - remand for fresh decision where findings are inadequate
Exemption for goods produced in a technical, educational and research institution - satisfaction of the designated officer as condition precedent to exemption - certification, maintenance of records and inspection as enforcement measures - remand for fresh decision where findings are inadequate - Whether the exemption under notification no.167/71-CE applies to the impugned prototypes and upgradations produced and cleared by the appellant, and whether the adjudicating order contains adequate findings to deny the exemption. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the factual matrix was not in dispute but the core question was the applicability of the exemption to the impugned clearances. The notification makes the exemption subject to satisfaction of a designated officer and, where required, production of certification, maintenance of records and inspection of premises. The adjudicating authority did not engage with the changed clearance paradigm, did not seek or record certification, records or inspections for the clearances in question, and the impugned order fails to demonstrate the nature and characteristics of each clearance or to establish non-compliance with the conditions expressly contained in the notification. In these circumstances the findings recorded in the order are inadequate to support denial of the exemption. The Tribunal therefore concluded that the matter must be reopened and decided afresh by the original authority, directing that denial of the benefit of the notification be predicated on a clear finding of non-compliance with the notification's conditions.
Impugned order set aside and matter remanded to the original authority for fresh decision; exemption may be denied only upon clear findings of non-compliance with the conditions of the notification.
Final Conclusion: The Tribunal set aside the adjudicating order and remanded the matters for fresh decision by the original authority, directing that denial of the exemption under notification no.167/71-CE be based on clear findings of non-compliance with the notification's conditions (including satisfaction of the designated officer and, where applicable, certification, records or inspection).
Issues: Whether CENVAT credit of duty paid on inputs allegedly procured from a supplier was admissible when the department relied on third-party statements and claimed non-receipt of goods, and whether denial of credit could stand in light of cross-examination and independent evidence of the supplier's manufacturing facility.
Analysis: The appeal turned on whether the invoices represented mere paper transactions or actual receipt of duty-paid goods. The evidentiary basis for denial consisted largely of statements of third parties. Where such statements are used against the noticee, cross-examination is necessary before they can be relied upon, and the requirement of fair procedure under Section 9D of the Central Excise Act, 1944 must be satisfied. In the de novo proceedings, cross-examination of only some witnesses was possible, and one cross-examined witness supported receipt of the goods. The record also contained independent material showing that the supplier had installed manufacturing machinery and could manufacture copper ingots. On this material, the finding that the supplier had no facility and that the goods were not received could not be sustained.
Conclusion: Denial of CENVAT credit was unsustainable; the credit was admissible, and the demand and consequential penalties could not survive.
CENVAT credit admissibility - reliance on third party statements and right to cross examination - evidentiary value of independent local commissioner's inspection report - remand for cross examination and de novo adjudication - precedential weight of similar Tribunal decisions on supplier existence
CENVAT credit admissibility - evidentiary value of independent local commissioner's inspection report - precedential weight of similar Tribunal decisions on supplier existence - CENVAT credit taken by the appellants on the basis of invoices issued by M/s Annapurna Impex Pvt. Ltd., Ludhiana is admissible. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the adjudicating authorities erred in concluding that the supplier did not possess manufacturing facilities and that the invoices were without supply. An independent Local Commissioner's inspection report, produced in civil proceedings and detailing installed copper processing machinery and corroborative photographs, constituted independent evidence that M/s AIPL had manufacturing capability and supplied copper ingots. Further, cross examination of witnesses available during the remand supported the appellants' case (the manager confirming receipt of invoices with material), and a coordinate Tribunal decision with similar facts held that credit could not be denied where documents established the supplier's existence and supply. On holistic appreciation of the record, therefore, the denial of CENVAT credit and confirmation of demand was unsustainable. [Paras 4, 6, 7, 8, 9]
The denial of CENVAT credit was set aside and the appellants' appeal allowed to the extent of credit claimed.
Reliance on third party statements and right to cross examination - remand for cross examination and de novo adjudication - Obligation to allow cross examination of third party witnesses relied upon by the department and effect of failure to conduct adequate cross examination. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal reiterated that when adjudication relies on statements of third parties adverse to a person, the adjudicating authority is obliged to allow cross examination under the statutory scheme; if such cross examination is not allowed, the statements cannot be used. In the earlier litigation the matter had been remanded for cross examination. On remand, cross examination could be carried out only for two of seven witnesses; those examinations did not support the department's adverse conclusion. Given the partial and inconclusive cross examination and the existence of independent inspection evidence, the authorities could not sustain denial of credit based solely on third party statements that were not properly tested. [Paras 5, 6]
Failure to permit or effectively complete cross examination of relied upon third party witnesses rendered the adverse reliance unsustainable.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order denying CENVAT credit and confirming demand is set aside; the appeal is allowed in favour of the appellants with consequential relief.
Clandestine clearance - admission of facts - recovery under Section 11A - payment before show cause notice - interest under Section 11AA - penalty under Section 11A(6) - proof of shortage without stock taking
Clandestine clearance - admission of facts - proof of shortage without stock taking - Admissibility of clandestine clearance and reliance on admissions to uphold duty liability despite absence of independent stock taking. - HELD THAT: - The Account Manager and the Director unequivocally admitted removal and sale of 411 MT of cement without payment of excise duty and without invoices. The Tribunal accepted that these admissions, corroborated by the private records showing the quantity removed and its omission from the Daily Stock Account Register, suffice to establish clandestine clearance. Applying the settled principle that admitted facts need not be proved, the finding of clandestine clearance and the resulting duty liability were upheld. [Paras 7, 8]
Duty liability in respect of the clandestinely cleared quantity is upheld on the basis of admissions and supporting records.
Recovery under Section 11A - payment before show cause notice - Effect of payment of duty prior to issuance of show cause notice under the recovery scheme of Section 11A. - HELD THAT: - Section 11A(6) permits a person chargeable with duty to pay the duty (and specified interest and penalty) before service of a show cause notice and to inform the officer in writing; where duty is so paid prior to issuance of the show cause notice, the question of issuance of a show cause notice does not arise. The Tribunal found that the assessee paid the duty promptly-on the next day and before the due date of filing the central excise return-thus attracting the protection contemplated by the provision and negating the need for initiation of recovery proceedings by show cause notice. [Paras 8, 9]
Payment of duty before issuance of the show cause notice precludes the requirement of issuance of a show cause notice under Section 11A.
Interest under Section 11AA - payment before show cause notice - Liability to pay interest where duty was paid before due date of return and prior to show cause notice. - HELD THAT: - Interest under Section 11AA is payable where duty is not paid in time. The Tribunal recorded that duty was paid on the very next day and prior to the due date of filing the central excise return; consequently, no interest was leviable in the circumstances of the case. [Paras 9]
No interest is payable as the duty was paid before the due date of filing the return.
Penalty under Section 11A(6) - payment before show cause notice - Levy of the penalty specified in Section 11A(6) where duty was paid within the month in which it was payable. - HELD THAT: - Section 11A(6) prescribes a penalty calculated from the month following the month in which duty was payable. The Tribunal found that the duty itself was discharged within the month in which it was payable; accordingly, the statutory penalty (calculated from the month following the month in which duty was payable) could not be imposed. On this basis the Tribunal set aside the orders of the lower authority insofar as penalties were imposed. [Paras 9, 10]
Penalty under Section 11A(6) is not leviable because the duty was paid within the month in which it was payable; penalty findings are set aside.
Final Conclusion: The Tribunal upheld the duty recovery in respect of the clandestinely cleared cement based on admissions and records, held that payment of duty prior to issuance of the show cause notice precluded issuance and relieved the assessee of interest, and set aside the lower authorities' imposition of penalties under Section 11A(6); appeals are allowed partially.
Issues: Whether the Sales Tax Department could claim priority over the secured creditor's dues on the basis of an attachment order passed under the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002, when there was no material to show that the attachment was carried out in accordance with the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 and the applicable rules, including proclamation of attachment.
Analysis: The dispute turned on the interplay between the statutory priority given to secured creditors under Section 26E of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 and the department's asserted prior attachment. The governing principle applied was that mere issuance of an attachment order is not enough; the attachment must be effected in the manner prescribed by the revenue law and must be followed by proclamation as required by law. In the absence of material showing compliance with the prescribed procedure under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966, the department could not displace the secured creditor's statutory priority.
Conclusion: The challenge succeeded and the secured creditor was held entitled to priority over the Sales Tax Department's claim.
Priority of secured creditors vis-a -vis revenue attachments - priority under section 26-E of the SARFAESI Act - attachment under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 and proclamation requirement under the 1967 Rules - effect of non-publication of attachment on statutory priority
Priority of secured creditors vis-a -vis revenue attachments - priority under section 26-E of the SARFAESI Act - effect of non-publication of attachment on statutory priority - Whether the Co-operative Bank's secured charge obtains priority over the Sales Tax Department's attachment dated 27/06/2016. - HELD THAT: - The Court applied the Full Bench reasoning in Jalgaon Janta Sahakari Bank Ltd (paras 153-154) to hold that statutory priority conferred by section 26-E of the SARFAESI Act will not displace a prior properly publicised attachment made in accordance with the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code and the 1967 Rules. Conversely, where an attachment has not been made public by the proclamation/manner prescribed by the MLR Code and Rules, the secured creditor's charge created and acted upon under the SARFAESI mechanism will have priority once Chapter IV-A (and thereby section 26-E) is enforced. The petitioner's mortgage and subsequent action under the SARFAESI provisions therefore entitles it to priority unless the department demonstrates a legally effective prior attachment and proclamation. [Paras 4, 5]
The Co-operative Bank's secured charge has priority because there is no material that the Sales Tax Department's attachment was made and publicised in accordance with the MLR Code and Rules.
Attachment under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 and proclamation requirement under the 1967 Rules - effect of non-publication of attachment on statutory priority - Whether the Sales Tax Department established that its attachment of the secured asset complied with the MLR Code and the prescribed proclamation requirements. - HELD THAT: - The affidavit filed on behalf of the Sales Tax Department did not place any material on record to show that the attachment dated 27/06/2016 was effected in accordance with the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 and the Rules framed thereunder, including the requirement of publication/proclamation. On the authority of the Full Bench decision, mere issuance of an attachment order is insufficient; the prescribed proclamation and manner of making it public must be shown. The Department's silence on this point meant it could not claim priority over the secured creditor. [Paras 5]
No compliance with the MLR Code's proclamation requirement was shown; the Department cannot claim priority.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition allowed; order of attachment dated 27/06/2016 and notice dated 19/07/2016 quashed insofar as they impinge on the petitioner's claim to priority, with no order as to costs.
TaxTMI