TaxTMI Updates e-Newsletter
Jul 15,2026

Availability of the GST Appellate Tribunal remedy after its constitution and the conditions governing appeal filing - Subject to mandatory pre-deposit

HELD THAT:- The writ petition was disposed of, without examining the validity of the impugned orders, permitting the petitioner to file an appeal before the GST Appellate Tribunal by June 30, 2026; such appeal is to be entertained without limitation objection, subject to the stated directions regarding pre-deposit and removal of defects.

Pre-deposit for appeal to Appellate Tribunal - Payment of prescribed court fee - Requirement of further pre-deposit for an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal where the pre-deposit made at the first appellate stage exceeded the prescribed percentage of the reduced tax demand

Whether the appellant has rectified the defects pointed out by the Registry, whether the statutory Court fees have been paid by them and whether the Appellant is required to make statutory pre-deposit for admission of this Appeal? - HELD THAT: - Section 112 requires payment of the admitted dues and ten per cent of the tax in dispute, in addition to the amount paid under Section 107. As the first appellate authority had reduced the tax demand and the pre-deposit already made in the first appeal covered the prescribed pre-deposit on that reduced demand, the principle applied in M/s Ashirwad Food Industries [2026 (2) TMI 596 - JHARKHAND HIGH COURT] governed the matter. [Paras 12]

No further pre-deposit under Section 112 was required.

Whether the prescribed court fee had been paid? - The Registry has sent a defect notice to the appellant that the Court fee payable is Rs. 1000/- for each one lakh Rupees of demand and the minimum Court fee to be paid is Rs.5000/-. However, the appellant has paid only Rs. 3000/- as Court fee. Hence there is a short payment of Rs.2000/- The learned Counsel for the appellant agrees to pay the remaining statutory Court fees.

Upon proof of payment of the required statutory Court fees and verification of pre-deposit made during the first appeal by the appellant, the Registry shall place the matter before the Bench for Orders regarding admission of the appeal. [Para 14 and 15]

List the matter on 22nd July 2026.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was directed to be placed before the Bench for admission upon payment of the balance statutory court fee and verification of the pre-deposit made in the first appeal.

Writ maintainability against GST assessment orders - Alternative statutory remedy of appeal - Breach of natural justice for want of adequate personal hearing - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the impugned assessment orders were appealable under the statutory mechanism, and the grievance regarding denial of sufficient opportunity of hearing could appropriately be raised before the Appellate Authority. It further held that a mere plea of violation of natural justice does not, in every case, justify bypassing the alternate remedy. The decision in M/s Radha Krishan Industries [2021 (4) TMI 837 - SUPREME COURT] was treated as turning on the validity of provisional attachment and the peculiar facts of that case, and not as laying down a rule that the existence of an appellate remedy must always be ignored whenever a natural justice objection is raised. [Paras 5, 6]

The writ petitions were declined on the ground of availability of an efficacious statutory appeal, with liberty to the petitioner to raise all grounds before the Appellate Authority.

Final Conclusion: The Court declined to entertain the writ petitions against the GST assessment orders in view of the available statutory appeal. The petitioner was left free to urge before the Appellate Authority all grounds, including the plea of inadequate opportunity of hearing.

Alternative statutory remedy - Compliance with unstayed appellate order - Entitlement to enforcement of the appellate order for release of goods - Compliance With Appellate Order - Equitable Adjustment

Alternative statutory remedy - Challenged by the State to the first appellate order under the GST enactment ought to be pursued before the statutory appellate forum rather than examined in writ jurisdiction at the first instance. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the order of the First Appellate Authority was ordinarily appealable before the Tribunal, where both facts and law could be examined. Since that statutory remedy had become available, though the Tribunal was not yet fully functional, it was not proper for the High Court to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction at the first instance to test the legality of the appellate order. The State was therefore left to institute an appeal before the competent forum. [Paras 6]

The writ petitions filed by the State were not entertained on merits, and the State was relegated to its statutory appellate remedy.

Compliance with unstayed appellate order - Entitlement to enforcement of the appellate order for release of goods - HELD THAT: - The Court found that, as matters stood, the appellate order in favour of the petitioner remained operative and had not been stayed or set aside by any higher forum. A mere proposal by the State to challenge that order did not justify withholding compliance. At the same time, to balance equities in case the State ultimately succeeded in appeal, the Court directed release subject to the petitioner furnishing a bond with local surety to the satisfaction of the Assessing Authority, leaving consequential recovery open in accordance with law. [Paras 7, 8, 9]

The petitioner became entitled to enforcement of the appellate order for release of goods, subject to furnishing bond and local surety.

Final Conclusion: The Court declined to examine the State's challenge to the first appellate order in writ jurisdiction and directed the State to pursue the statutory appeal. As the appellate order remained unstayed, its compliance could not be withheld, and release was directed subject to bond and local surety.

Opportunity of hearing in ex parte adjudication - Communication of order on GST portal- Principles Of Natural Justice - Ex parte adjudication order passed under Section 74 for the relevant tax period, failure to afford the petitioners an opportunity to contest the show cause notice. - HELD THAT: - The Court noted the peculiar facts placed by the petitioners, including the circumstances said to have prevented a response to the show cause notice, and also took into account the specific plea that the impugned order had been uploaded on the portal under the tab "view additional notices and orders", because of which it was missed. On that basis, the Court held that the petitioners should be granted an opportunity of hearing. The relief, however, was made conditional upon payment towards the disputed tax, after giving credit for any amount already recovered, and upon filing a response to the show cause notice within the time stipulated by the Court. [Paras 9, 10]

The impugned adjudication order was set aside and the matter was reopened for reply to the show cause notice, subject to the conditions imposed by the Court.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by setting aside the ex parte order for the tax period in question and by directing that the petitioners be allowed to respond to the show cause notice, subject to deposit of the amount directed and subject to credit for any recovery already made.

Writ maintainability against show-cause notice on jurisdictional challenge - Protective interim arrangement pending adjudication of jurisdictional objection - Show-cause notice - Jurisdiction to determine the short payment/non-payment of tax - Prima facie case - HELD THAT: - The Court did not decide the merits of the petitioners' contention regarding the scope of the notification or the authority of the Joint Commissioner to issue a notice under Section 73. It held only that, as the challenge went to jurisdiction and disclosed a prima facie case, the writ petition deserved to be heard notwithstanding the pendency of show-cause proceedings. At the same time, since the show-cause notice had already been issued, the Court directed the petitioners to respond to and participate in the proceedings, while permitting the authority to decide the notice but restraining enforcement of such decision against the petitioners until disposal of the writ petition or further orders. [Paras 6]

The writ petition was entertained on the jurisdictional objection, with a direction that the petitioners participate in the show-cause proceedings; the authority could decide the notice, but any decision was not to be enforced against the petitioners pending further orders or disposal of the writ petition.

Final Conclusion: The Court did not adjudicate the merits of the authority's power to issue the impugned show-cause notice. It nevertheless entertained the writ on the jurisdictional challenge, directed the petitioners to participate in the proceedings, and protected them by restraining enforcement of any decision taken on the notice pending further orders or disposal of the writ petition.

Contract price adjustment for change in tax regime - Entitlement to reimbursement of the additional tax burden arising from the shift from the earlier VAT/service tax regime to the GST regime under the contract conditions and the Government Order - Refund of retention amount despite pending audit objection - claims for price escalation/price adjustment

Contract price adjustment for change in tax regime - Reimbursement of GST burden under works contract - Entitlememt to reimbursement of the additional tax burden arising from the shift from the earlier VAT/service tax regime to the GST regime during the subsistence of the contracts - HELD THAT: - The Court held that Clause 43.2 of the General Conditions of Contract specifically required adjustment of the contract price where taxes, duties or levies changed between the date prior to bid submission and the date of the last completion certificate, provided such change was not already reflected in the contract price. Since the contracts were awarded under the earlier tax regime and GST became applicable from 01.07.2017 during execution, the increased tax incidence had to be borne by the employer. The Court also held that this contractual stipulation embodied the principle akin to Section 64-A of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, and that Clause 6 of G.O.Ms.No.296 expressly supported the position that GST is ultimately to be borne by the purchaser. [Paras 17, 22, 23, 24, 28]

The respondents were directed to refund the tax component under Clause 43.2 on account of the change from the earlier tax regime to GST.

Refund of retention amount despite pending audit objection - Pending audit objections were held not to be a sufficient ground to withhold refund of the retention amounts. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that retention amounts were liable to be refunded unless there were reasons to appropriate them on account of the works executed under the contract. A mere reference to pending audit objections could not justify non-processing or withholding of the contractors' claim for refund of retention amounts. [Paras 26, 28]

The respondents were directed to refund the retention amounts with interest at the commercial rate.

Price escalation disputes involving disputed questions of fact - Contractual dispute resolution for price adjustment claims - claim for price escalation or price adjustment - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the claim for price escalation or price adjustment under Clause 45 involved several disputed factual issues and therefore no opinion could be rendered on the merits in writ proceedings. Since the contract itself provided an alternative dispute resolution mechanism, the contractors were left to pursue that remedy in accordance with law. [Paras 27, 28]

The petitioners were relegated to pursue their price escalation or price adjustment claims through the contractual and other remedies available in law.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions were disposed of by directing refund of the tax component arising from the GST transition and refund of the retention amounts with interest. The claim for price escalation or price adjustment was left open to be pursued through the contractual dispute resolution mechanism and other remedies in law.

Composite assessment order for multiple tax periods -Violation of the provisions of Section 73 and Section 74 - Maintainability of writ petition against original assessment order after appellate dismissal - Exclusion of Limitation Period

Composite assessment order for multiple tax periods - Separate proceedings for each financial year - HELD THAT: - The Court followed the earlier Division Bench view that a single show-cause notice or a single composite assessment order cannot be issued for more than one tax period and, where the due date for filing annual return has been reached, not for more than one year. Since the impugned assessment order covered 2017-18 to 2018-19 in one composite proceeding, the Court accepted the petitioner's challenge on that ground alone and left the remaining grounds open. On that finding, the assessment order was set aside and the matter was remitted, with liberty to the respondents to initiate fresh proceedings separately for each assessment year. [Paras 4, 5, 8, 9]

The composite assessment order was set aside, and fresh proceedings, if any, were permitted only year-wise, subject to the deposit condition and exclusion of time for limitation.

Maintainability of writ petition against original assessment order after appellate dismissal - HELD THAT: - Rejecting the respondents' objection, the Court followed the earlier Division Bench order [2025 (9) TMI 1215 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT] holding that, in similar circumstances, a challenge to the original assessment order remains maintainable even after disposal of the appeal. The dismissal of the appeal therefore did not bar examination of the legality of the original assessment order in writ jurisdiction. [Paras 7, 8]

The writ petition was held maintainable despite the earlier dismissal of the appeal.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed on the limited ground that the assessment had been made through a composite order for more than one financial year. The impugned assessment was set aside and the matter was remitted for fresh year-wise proceedings, while holding that the writ challenge to the original assessment remained maintainable despite dismissal of the appeal.

Fees for technical services - Payments received for providing Customer Relationship Management (CRM) Services - satisfy the 'make available' test - Whether chargeable to tax as fees for technical services under the Act as well as under the India-Singapore?

As decided by HC [2024 (12) TMI 1779 - DELHI HIGH COURT] subscription fees as received not constitute 'royalty' under the India-Singapore DTAA or under Section 9(1)(vi), do not satisfy the 'make available' test for fees for technical services, and are not payments for use of 'equipment' and business profits would be taxable only if attributable to a PE.

HELD THAT:- We are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order(s) in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

The Special Leave Petitions are, accordingly, dismissed

Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - valid "reason to believe" - notice issued after expiry of four years - assessment under Minimum Alternate Tax (Section 115JB)

As decided by HC [2025 (3) TMI 1227 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] in view of assessment under Section 115JB, no escapement of income was established and the reassessment proceedings could not be sustained

HELD THAT:- Having regard to the facts of the present case, we are not inclined to interfere in the matter. The Special Leave Petition stands dismissed.

However, the question of law, if any, is kept open.

Rectification of mistake apparent from the record - limitation for filing miscellaneous application u/s 254(2) - delayed payment of the statutory dues like the Provident Fund and Employees State Insurance Corporation amounts - subsequent decision of higher court taken a ground for review/rectification - comparative scope of review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC and Section 254(2)

View taken by the Tribunal qua setting aside of the additions as made by the assessing officer, cannot be accepted to be a correct view, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Checkmate Services Private Limited [2022 (10) TMI 617 - SUPREME COURT] which was rendered subsequent to the orders passed by the Tribunal.

High Court [2024 (12) TMI 1488 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] allowed the petitions, holding that the Tribunal erred in exercising jurisdiction under Section 254(2) to reopen its earlier orders on the basis of a subsequent Supreme Court decision and in entertaining time barred miscellaneous applications; the Tribunal's order setting aside its earlier decision was set aside.

HELD THAT:- We see no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the High Court. The special leave petition is, accordingly, dismissed.

Reassessment based on unrelated third-party material - Failure to consider objections to reopening - validity of Reopening of assessment for A.Y. 2012-13 founded on material concerning another entity, and sustained ignoring with the assessee's specific objection denying any connection with that entity - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the notice for reopening was premised on material arising from the case of Jignesh Shah, in which Royal Arcade Private was stated to be a beneficiary of accommodation entries. The petitioner had specifically objected that it was not Royal Arcade Private and had no connection with that entity. Nothing was shown to establish any nexus between the petitioner and Royal Arcade Private.

The Court further found that the order disposing of objections did not address this central objection, and even the affidavit-in-reply remained silent on that aspect. In the absence of any link between the petitioner and the third-party material relied upon, the assumption of jurisdiction for reassessment could not be sustained. [Paras 7, 8]

The notice issued under Section 148 for reopening the assessment for A.Y. 2012-13 was quashed.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed. The reassessment notice was set aside because it rested on material relating to another entity and the assessee's objection denying any connection with that entity was not dealt with.

Taxability of advance under section 56(2)(ix) - Advance for land procurement - Negotiations for transfer of a capital asset - Stock-in-trade and not capital asset - Forfeiture not established - Section 56(2)(ix) applicability to the advances received for identifying, procuring and acquiring lands for the business projects of the funding concerns - HELD THAT: - The Court held that section 56(2)(ix) applies only where a sum is received as an advance or otherwise in the course of negotiations for transfer of a capital asset and such sum is forfeited while the negotiations do not result in transfer. Both conditions must coexist, the provision having used the conjunction 'and'. On the facts, the amounts were not received in the course of negotiations for transfer of any capital asset belonging to the assessee, but were made available to the assessee for carrying out the business activity of locating, procuring and acquiring lands. Such transactions related to land intended for business purposes and therefore partook of the character of stock-in-trade, which stands excluded from capital asset. The Court further held that mere lapse of time and absence of a refund claim could not amount to forfeiture in law, especially when the amounts continued to be shown as liabilities in the books and stood confirmed by the payers. Accordingly, the foundational requirements of section 56(2)(ix) were not satisfied. [Paras 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]

The deletion of the addition was upheld and the substantial questions of law were answered against the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The Court upheld the Tribunal's view that the advances received for land procurement did not fall within section 56(2)(ix), since they were not received in the course of negotiations for transfer of a capital asset and there was no forfeiture in law. The Revenue's appeal was accordingly dismissed.

Applicability of revised CBDT monetary limits to pending appeals - Prospective operation of exceptions in CBDT litigation-management circulars

Whether the revised monetary limit prescribed by the CBDT Circular dated 17.09.2024 applies to a pending revenue appeal? - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the revised monetary limit in the CBDT Circular dated 17th September, 2024 governed even pending appeals. It further held that exceptions carved out by CBDT circulars operate only prospectively and cannot validate continuation of an appeal filed before the introduction of such exception. Since the appeal had been lodged earlier and the exception relied upon by the Revenue was introduced subsequently, that exception was unavailable to justify prosecution of the appeal. The Court therefore did not examine the further contention whether the appeal, on facts, fell within the stated exception, and kept the questions of law open. [Paras 6, 7, 8, 9]

The appeal was disposed of as the tax effect was below the applicable monetary limit, and the subsequently introduced exception could not be relied upon to continue it.

Final Conclusion: The Court applied the revised CBDT monetary limit to the pending departmental appeal and held that a later-introduced exception could not be invoked retrospectively. The appeal was therefore disposed of on the ground of low tax effect, with the larger questions of law kept open.

CBDT monetary limits for departmental appeals - Applicability of revised monetary limits to pending revenue appeals - Prospective operation of exceptions in litigation-management circulars

HELD THAT: - The Court held that the monetary limits prescribed in CBDT circulars govern pending appeals as well. At the same time, the exceptions carved out in such circulars operate only prospectively and cannot validate prosecution of an appeal that had already been filed before the exception was introduced. Since the appeal had been lodged prior to the circular introducing the relied-upon exception, and the tax effect was below the revised monetary threshold, the Revenue could not continue the appeal on the strength of that later exception. [Paras 6, 7]

The appeal was disposed of as falling below the monetary limit, with the questions of law kept open.

Final Conclusion: The Court held that the revised CBDT monetary limit applied to the pending appeal and that the later-introduced exception relied upon by the Revenue was only prospective. Since the tax effect was below the applicable threshold, the appeal was disposed of, leaving the questions of law open.

Reassessment notice under section 148A(b) - Mandatory inquiry under section 148A(a) before reassessment - HELD THAT: - The Court held that section 148A contemplates that, before issuance of notice u/s 148, the AO may conduct inquiry, if required, with prior approval of the specified authority, and thereafter provide an opportunity of hearing u/s 148A(b). In the present case, the annexure to the show-cause notice itself recorded that approval had been obtained to conduct inquiry. Once such approval had been taken on the footing that inquiry was to be conducted, the Assessing Officer could not skip that stage and directly issue notice under section 148A(b).

Since no inquiry was conducted despite the approval obtained for that purpose, the notice under section 148A(b) was held illegal, and the consequential order under section 148A(d) and notice under section 148 were also unsustainable. [Paras 7, 8]

The notice under section 148A(b), the consequential order under section 148A(d), and the notice under section 148 were quashed, and the matter was remitted to the Assessing Officer to conduct inquiry under section 148A(a) and thereafter proceed in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed. The Court quashed the impugned reassessment proceedings on the ground that the Assessing Officer, having obtained approval to conduct inquiry under section 148A(a), could not validly issue notice under section 148A(b) without first conducting that inquiry, and remitted the matter for fresh action in accordance with law.

Rejection of objections to reopening of assessment - Failure to consider material submissions while disposing objections to reassessment - Source of funds for purchase of shares

HELD THAT: - The Court held that the petitioner's principal challenge to the reopening was founded on his case that the share purchase was funded through loans and own funds, as stated in the objections and further supported by the later reply furnished in response to notices under sections 143(2) and 142(1). Though the Court observed that, prima facie, the reasoning of the Assessing Officer in rejecting the objections could not be faulted on the material then before him, it found that, in the peculiar facts of the case, the interests of justice required the Assessing Officer to also consider the letter dated 8th March 2022 and its annexures before deciding the objections. The Court expressly refrained from deciding the merits of the challenge to reopening and kept all contentions open. [Paras 11, 12, 14]

The impugned order disposing of the objections was quashed, and the Assessing Officer was directed to pass a fresh order after taking into account the subsequent letter and annexures; merits of the reopening were left open.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by setting aside the order rejecting the objections to reopening and directing fresh consideration of those objections after taking into account the additional material furnished by the petitioner. The Court did not adjudicate the validity of the reopening on merits and kept all contentions open.

Section 194Q compliance on business purchases - Failure to consider binding administrative circular - whether assessment order concerning alleged non-deduction of tax on business purchases under section 194Q could not be sustained when the assessing authority had not considered Circular No. 13/2021 governing the applicability of that provision?- HELD THAT: - The Court found from the record that Circular No. 13/2021 dated 30.06.2021, which contains the guidelines issued for removal of difficulties under section 194Q, had not been considered or appreciated while passing the assessment order. Since the impugned determination proceeded without examining the effect of that circular on the controversy relating to non-deduction of tax on purchases, the order was held liable to be interfered with and the matter required fresh consideration in the light of the circular and in accordance with law. [Paras 7]

The impugned assessment order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the assessing authority for fresh reconsideration in the light of Circular No. 13/2021.

Final Conclusion: The petition was allowed on the limited ground that the assessing authority had failed to consider Circular No. 13/2021 while passing the assessment order for the relevant assessment year. The assessment order was therefore set aside and the matter remitted for fresh consideration in accordance with law.

Deduction for Special Economic Zone undertaking - Belated filing of audit report in Form 56F - Doctrine of consistency - Technical lapse in return processing

Denial of deduction claimed for the Special Economic Zone undertaking solely because Form-56F was not attached with the return, though it had been obtained before the due date and uploaded subsequently - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the audit report in Form-56F had in fact been obtained before the last date for filing the return and was later uploaded, and the omission to attach it with the return was only a procedural lapse. It held that the authorities could not reject the deduction merely on the technical ground that the return was processed through an automated system or that the Centralized Processing Centre had no facility to issue a fresh notice or consider the claim.

Such technicalities, according to the Court, could not defeat the assessee's legitimate claim, particularly when the benefit under Section 10AA had been extended in the earlier and subsequent years and the doctrine of consistency was required to be followed. The authority was therefore required to examine the subsequently filed Form-56F and consider the claim on that basis. [Paras 8, 9, 10]

The impugned order was quashed, and the jurisdictional authority was directed to scrutinize the Form-56F uploaded by the assessee and thereafter consider grant of the deduction, if otherwise admissible in law.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed. The rejection of the deduction claim on the basis of non-attachment of Form-56F with the return and the asserted inability of the automated processing system to consider it was set aside, with a direction to examine the uploaded Form-56F and grant the benefit if the assessee is otherwise entitled.

Condonation of delay in appeal against processing under section 143(1) - Sufficient cause for delayed appeal - Adjudication on merits not to be defeated on technical limitation - delay in filing the assessee's appeals before the Commissioner (Appeals) against denial of exemption at the stage of processing of return - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the Tribunal had adopted a pedantic approach in refusing condonation. It found that the assessee had placed reasons for the delay before both appellate authorities and those reasons required due consideration in the facts of the case.

Relying on Inder Singh [2025 (3) TMI 1479 - SUPREME COURT] the Court applied the principle that, though delay cannot be condoned without sufficient cause, a matter which requires examination on merits should not be shut out merely on the technical ground of limitation. On that footing, the Court held that the delay deserved to be condoned and that the appeals ought to be heard on merits. [Paras 10, 13, 14]

The Tribunal's order refusing condonation was quashed, the delay was condoned, and the appeals were restored to the Commissioner (Appeals) for decision on merits.

Final Conclusion: The High Court held that the Tribunal had erred in refusing to condone the delay by adopting an unduly technical approach. The delay in filing the appeals was condoned, the Tribunal's order was set aside, and the matters were restored to the Commissioner (Appeals) for adjudication on merits for both assessment years.

Full and true disclosure in settlement application - Manner of deriving undisclosed income - Scope of Settlement Commission's power to recharacterise disclosed income

Full and true disclosure in settlement application - Substantiation of manner of deriving undisclosed income - maintainability of settlement application under Section 245C(1) - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the statutory requirement of full and true disclosure applies to the entire settlement application and not to selected parts of it. Although the disclosure relating to inflated refinery loss for the earlier assessment years was accepted, the claim regarding the additional stock offered in AY 2017-18 was not supported by materials showing how that income was derived or substantiating its treatment as stock-in-trade arising from business. The Court held that a voluntary disclosure before the Settlement Commission does not dilute the statutory obligation under Section 245C(1); the applicant must disclose, with supporting particulars, the manner in which the income was earned. Since the petitioner failed to do so for the disputed portion, the Commission was justified in holding that there was no full and true disclosure and in rejecting the settlement application in its entirety rather than dealing with it piecemeal. [Paras 6, 7]

The finding that the petitioner had not made a full and true disclosure in respect of the disputed income was upheld, and the rejection of the entire settlement application was sustained.

Recharacterisation of disclosed income in settlement proceedings - Section 69B and Section 115BBE in settlement proceedings - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the Settlement Commission must examine the application as filed and determine whether the disclosure made therein satisfies the statutory test. It cannot alter the head under which the assessee has disclosed the income in order to recast the proposal and levy tax on a different basis. Once the Commission concludes that the disclosure of the disputed amount as business income is not full and true, its course is to reject the application; the question whether that amount may instead be assessed as income under Section 69B and taxed under Section 115BBE arises only in regular assessment proceedings before the Assessing Officer. The Court therefore rejected the contention that the matter should be remitted for the Commission to decide whether the income should be taxed at 30% as business income or at the higher rate applicable to income under Section 69B. [Paras 6, 7]

The Settlement Commission's lack of power to recharacterise the disputed income for applying Section 69B and Section 115BBE was affirmed, and the plea for remand on that basis was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was dismissed. The Court upheld the Settlement Commission's order treating the settlement application as invalid for want of full and true disclosure and held that any recasting of the disputed income under Section 69B with consequential tax treatment under Section 115BBE could arise only in regular assessment proceedings, not before the Settlement Commission.

Denial of Foreign tax credit - Belated filing of Form No. 67 - Procedural requirement vis-a-vis DTAA relief

HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the controversy stood covered by various Tribunal decisions taking the view that filing of Form No. 67 is directory and not mandatory. It further held that where the applicable DTAA provides for credit of tax paid on the same income in another country, such relief cannot be denied merely because of a procedural lapse in delayed filing of Form No. 67. On that reasoning, the foreign tax credit claimed by the assessee was directed to be allowed. [Paras 8]

The assessee was held entitled to foreign tax credit, and the CPC/AO was directed to grant credit of tax paid in the foreign jurisdiction.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed. The Tribunal held that foreign tax credit could not be denied merely for delayed filing of Form No. 67 and directed grant of the credit claimed by the assessee.

Mistake apparent from record in capital gains computation - Deduction for investment in residential flat u/s 54F

Rectification of capital gains computation - Incorrect cost of acquisition - Incorrect adoption of cost of acquisition in computing capital gains treated as an apparent mistake - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that, though the assessee had not appeared before the Assessing Officer, the documents and workings relating to capital gains were later placed before the first appellate authority and were even noticed in its order. Those materials showed that the cost of acquisition adopted in the assessment was at variance with the sale deeds relied upon by the assessee. Since the correct computation of capital gains had not been examined either by the Assessing Officer or by the first appellate authority, the rejection of rectification on the footing that no apparent mistake existed could not be sustained. [Paras 8]

The matter was remitted to the Assessing Officer to verify the documents relating to cost of acquisition and recompute the correct capital gains after giving opportunity to the assessee.

Fresh deduction claim before Assessing Officer - Appellate consideration of deduction under section 54F - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal accepted that a fresh claim for deduction could not be entertained by the Assessing Officer in the absence of such claim in the return, in view of Goetz (India) Ltd. [2006 (3) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT]. At the same time, it held that the first appellate authority ought to have taken a call on the assessee's plea for deduction under section 54F instead of leaving it unadjudicated. As the issue had not been examined on eligibility and fulfilment of statutory conditions, it required fresh consideration. [Paras 8]

The question of deduction under section 54F was remitted to the Assessing Officer for examination of eligibility and allowance if the statutory conditions are satisfied.

Final Conclusion: The delay in filing the appeal was condoned on payment of costs. On merits, the rejection of rectification was not sustained, and the questions of correct cost of acquisition and eligibility for deduction under section 54F were remitted to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication after opportunity to the assessee.

Maintainability and jurisdiction at the Pre-admission hearing under customs appeal - Respondent's locus standi at admission stage - Ex parte framing of substantial question of law - Statutory primacy over High Court Rules - Post-admission hearing under Section 130(5) - Whether the memorandums of appeal disclose any substantial question of law warranting this Court’s intervention ? - HELD THAT: - The statutory scheme intentionally segregates the “Admission” phase from the “Final Hearing” phase. The Respondent’s right to challenge the maintainability, the jurisdiction, or the “rate of duty” notification is not lost; it is merely deferred to the postadmission hearing under Section 130(5). By appearing at the final stage of hearing, the Respondent can fully argue that the substantial questions of law framed by the Court do not actually arise or are barred by law. This sequence ensures that the Court is not unnecessarily distracted by protracted arguments before it has even satisfied itself that the appeal is worth hearing.

The Court held that the appellate structure under Section 130 is a self-contained statutory scheme which deliberately separates the admission stage from the final hearing stage. At admission, the Court performs a preliminary screening confined to examining whether the memorandum of appeal discloses a substantial question of law, and that exercise is to be undertaken ex parte. Rule VI of the High Court Rules could not be invoked to alter that statutory sequence, since court rules cannot override the procedure enacted by Parliament; the Rule was understood as addressing objective procedural defects and not as permitting a merits-based or jurisdictional contest at the threshold. The decisions cited on civil court jurisdiction were held inapplicable in this specialized appellate setting, while the principle stated in R. Nagaraj (Dead) through LRs [2025 (4) TMI 1677 - SUPREME COURT] was treated as governing, namely, that the respondent's right to object arises at the hearing after admission because the substantial question is framed prior to issuance of notice. The Court also adhered to its earlier view that permitting such intervention would disturb the statutory two-stage process. [Paras 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]

The respondents' preliminary prayer to be heard on maintainability at the admission stage was rejected, and the Court directed that the appeal proceed ex parte on the question of admission.

Final Conclusion: The Court held that, in an appeal under Section 130 of the Customs Act, the pre-admission exercise is an ex parte statutory screening confined to the existence of a substantial question of law, and the respondent cannot intervene at that stage to contest maintainability. The respondents' preliminary objection was therefore rejected and the matter was directed to proceed ex parte on admission.

Maintainability of appeal against revocation of Authorised Courier authorisation - Statutory appeal under Customs Act vis-a-vis representation under Courier Regulations - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the 2010 Regulations are framed under the Customs Act, 1962, and when the Commissioner of Customs passes an Order-in-Original under Regulation 13(1), he acts as an adjudicating authority under the statutory scheme. Section 129A therefore provides a statutory right of appeal against such order. The mere availability, or even prior availing, of a representation to the Chief Commissioner under Regulation 13(2) does not displace that appellate remedy. The Court agreed with the view taken in Principal Commissioner of Customs v. Bombino Express Pvt. Ltd.[2018 (2) TMI 1509 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] and distinguished Pacific Express [2025 (9) TMI 1064 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] on the ground that that decision concerned the maintainability of an appeal against the Chief Commissioner's order under Regulation 13(2), whereas the present appeal was directed against the Commissioner's Order-in-Original under Regulation 13(1). [Paras 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]

The CESTAT erred in holding the appeal not maintainable; its order was set aside and the matter was remanded for consideration of the appeal on merits.

Final Conclusion: The Court held that the statutory appeal under Section 129A against the Commissioner's Order-in-Original revoking the appellant's Authorised Courier authorisation was maintainable, and that the remedy of representation under the 2010 Regulations did not exclude or exhaust that right. The impugned order of the CESTAT was set aside and the appeal was remitted to it for decision on merits.

Due diligence in mutual fund investments - Close-ended mutual fund schemes - Mandatory redemption at maturity - Regulatory non-compliance irrespective of investor gain - Disclosure obligations to unitholders and regulator - Penalty for breach of civil obligations under securities law

Investment by the asset management company in the Essel group debentures was made without the due diligence and care required under the mutual fund regulatory framework - Fiduciary standard of care -HELD THAT: - The Court accepted the findings that the investment decision was not preceded by proper assessment of the issuer entities and that the relevant due diligence material did not show analysis of risk parameters such as credit, liquidity and interest rate risks. It held that, in technical and financial matters, deference is due to the expert regulator where its view is reasonable and based on relevant material. Since the regulations required due diligence, the focus was on compliance with that obligation, and not on the eventual financial outcome of the investment. [Paras 15, 17, 18, 19]

The finding of lack of due diligence against the asset management company was upheld.

Close-ended mutual fund schemes - Mandatory redemption at maturity - Roll over only with statutory compliance - Extending the maturity of the debentures beyond the maturity dates of the close-ended schemes and making only partial redemption/winding up - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the regulatory scheme required a close-ended scheme to be fully redeemed and wound up on expiry of its fixed duration, unless it was rolled over in the manner prescribed. As no roll over was undertaken with disclosure and consent as mandated, the postponement of redemption by extending the underlying debt instrument maturity was contrary to the regulations. The Court further held that the fact that other market participants may also have invested similarly afforded no defence, since illegality cannot be justified by alleging similar conduct by others. It also rejected the plea that no investor suffered loss, or that investors ultimately gained, holding that the securities law regime is consequence-neutral for purposes of establishing breach and that investor gain or absence of complaint cannot excuse non-compliance. The attempt to invoke the concept of segregated portfolio was also rejected because the appellants had not followed the prescribed procedure or incorporated the requisite provision in the scheme documents. [Paras 32, 33, 34, 35, 37]

The breach arising from extension of maturity and delayed partial redemption of the schemes was affirmed, and all defences founded on investor benefit, absence of complaint, parity with others, or segregated portfolio were rejected.

Disclosure obligations to unitholders and regulator - Fiduciary duties of trustee - Compliance oversight by senior executives - failure to make adequate disclosures to unitholders and SEBI regarding the course adopted - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the adopted course was not disclosed to the regulator when the decision was taken and was revealed only after the regulator sought information. It further observed that the unitholders were not given any real choice in respect of the departure from the stated maturity structure of the schemes. The trustee, holding the funds in a fiduciary capacity, was required to make an independent assessment of regulatory compliance and investor interest, but instead merely concurred with the asset management company's course. On that basis, the Court upheld the conclusion that the asset management company, trustee, and senior executives had all failed to ensure compliance with the regulations. [Paras 38, 39, 40, 41, 42]

The findings of inadequate disclosure and failure of the trustee and senior executives to ensure regulatory compliance were sustained.

Penalty for breach of civil obligations under securities law - Mens rea not required - Penalty on senior executives - HELD THAT: - The Court held that, once contravention of the statutory and regulatory obligations stood established, the only available defence was to show that no breach had occurred at all; considerations such as bona fides or beneficial consequence could not displace liability. It treated the penalties on the asset management company and trustee as calling for no interference. As regards the senior executives, the Court found that, being domain experts, they could not claim indulgence, and that the risk to which the unitholders were exposed by their conduct was such as to disentitle them to waiver or reduction of penalty. [Paras 8, 9, 49, 50, 51]

The penalties imposed on the asset management company, trustee, and senior executives were upheld in full.

Final Conclusion: The Court upheld the Tribunal's decision sustaining the findings of regulatory breach against the asset management company, the trustee company, and the senior executives. It dismissed all the appeals, affirmed the penalties, and declined any relief on merits or on the quantum of penalty.

Financial debt including interest - Section 7 admission threshold for inter corporate deposits - Acknowledgment of liability - Interest forming part of inter corporate deposits - Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that, at the Section 7 stage, the enquiry is confined to existence of a financial debt, occurrence of default and completeness of the application. Since financial debt under the Code includes interest, if any, interest payable under the financial arrangement cannot be artificially separated from the debt while testing the statutory threshold. In the present case, the claim was not founded merely on TDS deductions. The admitted inter corporate deposit transactions, the demand letters specifying principal and interest, the corporate debtor's reply seeking time to repay the entire claimed amount without disputing the interest component, the previous repayment conduct, and the TDS deductions together established that interest formed part of the financial obligation. The absence of a written agreement did not by itself negate the interest liability when the surrounding circumstances and subsequent conduct corroborated the oral arrangement. The Adjudicating Authority, by treating the matter as resting only on TDS deductions and by considering only the principal outstanding, failed to consider the cumulative effect of the material on record. [Paras 18, 19, 20, 21, 22]

The exclusion of the interest component was held erroneous; the financial creditor had established a financial debt and default exceeding the statutory threshold, and the impugned order was set aside with a direction permitting payment within the time granted, failing which the Section 7 petition was to be admitted.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed. The Tribunal held that the outstanding debt had to be assessed by including the interest component supported by the parties' conduct and acknowledgment, and that the dismissal of the Section 7 application on the footing that only the principal amount could be counted was unsustainable.

Transportation of goods by individual truck owners - Taxability under Goods Transport Agency service - Consignment note by whatever name called - Refund of tax deposited during investigation - Whether the Tribunal was justified in rejecting the appellant's claim that, in the absence of consignment notes issued by a Goods Transport Agency, no service tax liability could arise under the category of “Goods Transport Agency” service? - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the definition of Goods Transport Agency under Section 65(50b) turns on provision of road transport service coupled with issuance of a consignment note, and makes no distinction between an incorporated transporter and an individual truck owner. It further held that the statutory expression consignment note, by whatever name called makes the substance and contents of the document decisive, not its label. Since the pay slips contained vehicle details, description and quantity of goods, origin and destination points, and acknowledgment of the transporter, they substantially answered the description of consignment notes. On that basis, the Tribunal was justified in treating the service as GTA service, and the authorities' concurrent finding that the documents evidenced movement of goods could not be faulted. The decisions cited by the assessee were distinguished because, in those cases, no such transport documents amounting to consignment notes were found. [Paras 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]

The levy under Goods Transport Agency service was upheld, and the assessee's refund claim was consequently held to be not maintainable.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed. The Court affirmed that the pay slips issued in relation to the transportation of iron ore answered the legal description of consignment notes, bringing the service within Goods Transport Agency service and defeating the refund claim.

Extended period of limitation - Suppression of facts - Jurisdictional invalidity of time-barred demand - Coram Non Judice - Service tax demand on subcontracted data capturing and data processing activity - HELD THAT: - Limitation is a jurisdictional issue that goes to the root of the matter and hence must be examined whenever it arises, even if not specifically pleaded. If a proceeding is time-barred, an authority lacks jurisdiction to decide the issues involved on merits, and any order passed in the circumstances would be coram non judice, void, and a nullity in the eye of law.

The Tribunal held that limitation, being a jurisdictional issue, had to be examined first and, once the show cause notice was found to be beyond the normal period, the demand could survive only if wilful suppression or intent to evade was established. It found that the notice, issued after expiry of the normal period, was founded only on the allegation that the liability was detected during audit and that returns had not been filed. The Tribunal held that discovery during audit does not by itself establish suppression, and that mere non-registration, non-filing of ST-3 returns or non-declaration of activity is not sufficient to invoke the extended period, since such omission may also arise from a bona fide belief regarding taxability. Applying the settled principle in Chemphar Drugs and Liniments [1989 (2) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT]; Cosmic Dye Chemical [1994 (9) TMI 86 - SUPREME COURT]; Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Company [1995 (3) TMI 100 - SUPREME COURT], and Uniworth Textiles Ltd. [2013 (1) TMI 616 - SUPREME COURT], that suppression of facts must be wilful and deliberate and attended by intent to evade tax, the Tribunal held that Revenue had failed to establish the conditions for the extended period. The show cause notice therefore failed the jurisdictional test, rendering the proceedings void ab initio, with the consequence that the demands of tax, interest and penalty could not survive. [Paras 5, 6]

The extended period was held to be not invocable; the show cause notice and the consequential proceedings were treated as without jurisdiction and the impugned order was set aside with consequential relief.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed solely on limitation. The Tribunal held that the extended period was not available in the absence of wilful suppression or intent to evade, and consequently set aside the impugned order with consequential relief.

Refund of tax paid under mistake of law - Unjust enrichment - Burden of duty - Refund of excess tax - Limitation for refund -Applicability of limitation under Section 11B

Refund of service tax paid - Supply of ready-mix concrete was treated as a pure sale transaction and the tax had been paid under a mistaken understanding of liability - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal proceeded on the basis that the appellant's liability to service tax no longer survived, that question having already attained finality in favour of the appellant. On the surviving question of unjust enrichment, it held that where the amount earlier recovered as duty is returned to the customer by credit notes and the reversal is further supported by transfer of funds and certificates from the buyer and the Chartered Accountant, the presumption that the incidence stood passed on stands rebutted. In such a situation, the appellant must be treated as having borne the incidence itself, and refund cannot be denied on the ground that the amount had initially been collected from the buyer. [Paras 9, 10]

The bar of unjust enrichment was held inapplicable on the facts, and the appellant was held entitled to refund of the service tax claim.

Refund of interest paid under mistake of law - Amounts not having the character of duty - Limitation under Section 11B - HELD THAT: - Following the decision of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of EBIZ. Com Pvt. Ltd. [2016 (9) TMI 1405 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT], the Tribunal held that an amount paid under a mistaken notion of law does not assume the character of duty but remains only a deposit. The same principle was applied to the interest paid along with such amount, the interest being merely consequential to that deposit. Since the payment did not partake the character of duty, the refund mechanism and limitation under Section 11B were held inapplicable, and the Revenue was found to have no authority to retain the amount. [Paras 11, 12]

Refund of the interest amount was held admissible, and the objection of limitation under Section 11B was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal allowed both appeals. It held that refund of the service tax could not be denied on unjust enrichment after the tax incidence had been reversed to the buyer, and that the interest paid on the mistaken deposit was also refundable without attracting limitation under Section 11B.

Transitional refund of KKC and SBC - Limitation under section 142(5) of the CGST Act - Principle of unjust enrichment - business of providing general insurance services - Whether the refund claim filed under section 142 (5) of the CGST Act is barred by limitation or is hit by the principle of unjust enrichment ? - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the controversy stood covered by the earlier decisions in M/S. PUNJ LLOYD LIMITED [2024 (1) TMI 890 - CESTAT NEW DELHI]; M/S. WAVE MEGACITY CENTRE PRIVATE [2025 (8) TMI 1561 - CESTAT NEW DELHI], including the appellant's own case, and accepted the settled position that a refund claim filed under section 142(5) in respect of tax paid under the existing law for services not provided is not liable to be rejected on limitation under section 11B, save to the extent of the bar of unjust enrichment. On the facts adopted from the earlier order, the premium and tax component relating to cancelled policies had been returned through the same financing or agency channel from which the amount was received, and had ultimately reached the insured. Once refund of the service tax component had already been held admissible in the same factual matrix, KKC and SBC, being constituent parts of that levy, could not be treated differently. The statutory requirement stood satisfied and the claim was not hit either by limitation or by unjust enrichment. [Paras 7, 8]

The impugned order was set aside and the appellant was held entitled to refund of KKC and SBC.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal held that the appellant's transitional refund claim for KKC and SBC arising from cancellation of insurance policies was admissible. Denial of refund on limitation and unjust enrichment was set aside, and the appeal was allowed.

Proper service of adjudication order - Limitation for appeal from date of actual receipt - Condonable delay in filing appeal - Proof of Delivery - Statutory Compliance - Rejection of the appeal as time-barred - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found a clear contradiction in the appellate order regarding service of the Order-in-Original, since one part recorded that the registered post had been returned to the department while another part proceeded on the assumption that it had not been returned and therefore must have been delivered. The Tribunal held that mere dispatch by registered post is not sufficient and there must be proof of delivery. Applying the principle in Saral Wire Craft Pvt. Ltd. [2015 (7) TMI 894 - SUPREME COURT], service must be effected in the manner prescribed and under proof of acknowledgement; that requirement, made applicable to service tax matters as well, was absent on record. In that position, the relevant date for computing limitation under Section 85 of the Finance Act, 1994 was the date on which the copy of the order was admittedly supplied to the assessee, namely 11.03.2024. Since the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was filed beyond the initial period of two months but within the further condonable period of one month, it was within limitation and ought not to have been rejected at the threshold. [Paras 7, 8, 11]

The impugned appellate order rejecting the appeal on limitation was set aside and the matter was remanded to the Commissioner (Appeals) for decision on merits after affording hearing.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal held that, in the absence of proof of proper service of the Order-in-Original, limitation for filing the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) had to be reckoned from the date on which the order copy was actually furnished to the assessee. On that basis, the appeal was within the condonable period and the matter was remanded for decision on merits.

Taxability of Reimbursements - Threshold exemption for taxable services - Reverse charge on legal expenses - Penalty consequential to unsustainable service tax demand - Service tax demand on the receipts for construction of Anganwadi Kendra when the assessee's taxable turnover, after excluding exempt services, below the small service provider threshold exemption limit under Notification No. 33/2012-ST

Threshold exemption for taxable services - Construction of Anganwadi Kendra - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that, after excluding the value of services already accepted as exempt, the appellant's total taxable turnover remained below the prescribed threshold limit. Applying Explanation (B) to Notification No. 33/2012-ST, it held that the aggregate value for the purpose of the threshold exemption would not include the value of services exempt under any other notification. On that basis, the residual taxable value relating to construction of Anganwadi Kendra, being below the threshold limit, could not be subjected to service tax. [Paras 4]

The service tax demand on construction of Anganwadi Kendra was set aside.

Reverse charge on legal expenses - Purchase of stamp papers - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal accepted that the amount booked under the legal head represented expenditure towards purchase of stamp papers, which stood supported by material obtained from the concerned Government Department under RTI. Since the payment was not towards any legal service, it could not be brought to tax under thereverse charge mechanism as legal expense. [Paras 4]

The reverse charge service tax demand on the amount shown as legal expenses was set aside.

Penalty consequential to unsustainable service tax demand - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that, as the demand on taxable services and the demand under reverse charge both failed, there was no basis to sustain the penalties imposed. The penal consequences were treated as wholly consequential to the tax demand. [Paras 4]

The penalties imposed on the appellant were set aside.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal allowed the appeal after restoring it, holding that the residual value treated as taxable was covered by the threshold exemption and that the amount shown as legal expenses represented purchase of stamp papers and was not taxable under reverse charge. Consequently, the impugned order, including the penalties, was set aside.

Principles of natural justice- Insufficient to establish a real and effective opportunity of hearing - Failure to consider material submissions - Ex parte adjudication confirming service tax demand on royalty payments passed without granting reasonable opportunity to reply and be heard, and without considering the appellant's earlier written submissions - HELD THAT: - The issue of leviability of service tax on royalty was subjudiced before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and it was finally decided by 9 judges Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M/s Mineral Area Development Authority [2024 (7) TMI 1390 - SUPREME COURT (LB)] The Hon’ble Apex Court resolved the issue of service tax on royalty payment only on 25.07.2024 and therefore, the question of invocation of extended period for raising the demand also cannot be made when the issue relates to interpretation. Further, find that the agreement in the case was entered into prior to 01.04.2016 and as per the appellant, they are not liable to pay the service tax because the same has come into force w.e.f. 01.04.2016 and for this they have relied upon the decision in the case of M/s S.R. Traders [2023 (5) TMI 766 - CESTAT NEW DELHI], which has been upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court also. Further, we find that since the learned Commissioner has passed the impugned order without affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant, thereby violating the principles of natural justice.

The Tribunal found that the final hearing had been fixed during the period of Covid-19 restrictions and the appellant could not attend. It further found that the adjudicating authority had not considered the submissions contained in the appellant's letter sent in response to summons. On that basis, the Tribunal held that the impugned order suffered from breach of principles of natural justice. Since the defect went to the validity of the adjudication itself, the matter required fresh consideration by the Commissioner after affording hearing and passing a reasoned order. The Tribunal also noted that the dispute on leviability of service tax on royalty was an interpretational issue pending before the Supreme Court at the relevant time, reinforcing the need for proper adjudication, but it did not finally decide the merits. [Paras 6, 7]

The impugned order was set aside and the matter was remanded to the Commissioner for fresh decision after affording opportunity of hearing and complying with natural justice.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal set aside the adjudication order on the ground of violation of natural justice, holding that reasonable opportunity of hearing had not been afforded and the appellant's submissions had not been considered. The matter was remanded to the Commissioner for fresh decision by a reasoned order after granting due hearing.

Failure to decide limitation plea before remand - Extended period of limitation under show cause notice - Suppression Of Facts - Tribunal failed to answer the question of limitation raised by the appellant - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the Tribunal had expressly recorded the appellant's contention that the demand for the period April 2007 to March 2009, raised by notice dated 30.01.2012, was barred by limitation and that the extended period could not be invoked in the absence of suppression. Having noted that contention, the Tribunal was required to return a finding on limitation. The Court held that if the appellant were to succeed on limitation, the remand on merits to the Adjudicating Authority would become unnecessary. On that ground, the matter was required to be sent back to the Tribunal only for decision on the limitation issue, while leaving undisturbed the remand on merits subject to the outcome on limitation. [Paras 7, 10]

The matter was remanded to the Tribunal to decide the question of limitation raised by the appellant, while the remand on merits was otherwise maintained.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was disposed of by directing the Tribunal to decide the appellant's limitation objection, which had been left unanswered. The remand on merits was maintained, but its survival was made dependent on the Tribunal's determination of the limitation issue.

Exemption for wind operated electricity generator parts - Tailor-made unmachined castings - Plain construction of exemption notification - Exemption under Notification No. 6/2006-CE. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the notification grants exemption to goods falling under any chapter when used in the specified conventional energy devices, including wind operated electricity generator, its components and parts. The Commissioner's view that only parts classifiable under the chapter relating to the finished generator were eligible, and that entry 21 in List 5 restricted the scope of exemption, was found to be based on a misreading of the notification. On a plain reading, entry 21 was understood as extending coverage to parts which go into making the parts of the listed devices, and not as cutting down the scope of the earlier entries. The record, including the CBEC clarification, showed that the appellant's castings were tailor-made to drawings supplied by the customer, intended solely for use in WOEG, and not usable elsewhere. The Tribunal further held that classification of the unmachined castings did not defeat the exemption where the notification itself applied to goods falling under any chapter. Relying on the principle of plain construction stated in Dilip Kumar and Company [2018 (7) TMI 1826 - SUPREME COURT (LB)] and drawing support from Magna Gold Castings Ltd [2005 (6) TMI 577 - CESTAT CHENNAI] and the other authorities cited by the appellant, the Tribunal concluded that unmachined castings supplied for exclusive use in WOEG could not be denied the exemption. [Paras 9, 10, 11, 12]

The denial of exemption was set aside and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal held that unmachined castings exclusively manufactured to customer drawings for use in wind operated electricity generators were covered by the exemption under Notification No. 6/2006-CE. The contrary interpretation adopted in the impugned order was rejected and the appeal was allowed.

Scope of review jurisdiction - Error apparent on the face of the record - Reasonable opportunity to produce books of account - Binding effect of earlier decision in assessee's own case - Principles Of Natural Justice - HELD THAT: - Applying the Hon'ble Apex Court by referring to PARSION DEVI[1997 (10) TMI 369 - SUPREME COURT] has held in paragraph 11 as under: “Under Order 47 Rule 1CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”.

Applying the above dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court to the facts and circumstances of this case, This Court find that there is no apparent error on the face of the record/order dated 19.03.2025 passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in STA No. 1/2024.

In the present appeal also, the appellant has contended that he was not afforded sufficient opportunity to produce relevant documents, including vouchers, bank records and other supporting material pertaining to the financial years 2016-17 and 2017-18. However, it is the specific case of the respondent that, notwithstanding the opportunity granted in view of the FIR registered regarding the loss of books of account, the appellant failed to produce the requisite material even at the appellate stage.

Final Conclusion: The Court dismissed the review petition, holding that no error apparent on the face of the earlier order had been shown and that the petition sought an impermissible rehearing on merits. The connected appeal was also dismissed, the Court holding that the controversy was squarely covered by the earlier decision in the assessee's own case and that the plea of lack of opportunity to produce records was without merit.

Entitlement to reduction of VAT from 12.5% to 4% in the absence of a revised return -Relief beyond return without revised return- Reassessment proceedings and fresh claim - Remand for verification of books of account - Declared Goods - Works Contract - Authority Of Law For Taxation

Relief beyond return without revised return - Reassessment proceedings and fresh claim - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the assessee had originally declared VAT on iron and steel incorporated in the works contract at 12.5% and had not filed any revised return under the statutory provision permitting revision of returns. The request for levy at 4% was made only during reassessment, nearly three years after filing of the return. Relying on Nandi Constructions [2016 (2) TMI 95 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT], which followed Infinite Builders and Developers, Bangalore [2014 (7) TMI 236 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT], the Court held that no benefit beyond what is claimed in the original or revised return can be granted by the reassessing authority or the first appellate authority. On that ground, the Tribunal was justified in not granting reduction merely because the assessee later contended that the rate declared was higher than what was legally payable. [Paras 15, 16, 18]

Question of law No. 2 was answered in favour of the State, and the claim for reduction of VAT from 12.5% to 4% was rejected for want of a revised return.

Remand for verification of books of account - HELD THAT: - The Court noted that the Tribunal had remanded the matter with a direction to secure the relevant records and undertake necessary verification, particularly by detailed examination of the books of account and other records. It found no infirmity or illegality in that procedural course. The merits of the underlying question were not adjudicated, and the matter was allowed to remain open for fresh consideration in accordance with the Tribunal's directions. [Paras 17, 18]

The remand direction was upheld, while the related question of law was kept open.

Final Conclusion: The revision petition was dismissed. The Court held that, in the absence of a revised return, the assessee could not seek a lower VAT rate in reassessment proceedings than what had been declared in the original return, while leaving the other questions open and upholding the Tribunal's remand for verification of records.

Dishonour of cheques - legally enforceable debt - Statutory demand notice under Section 138 - reduced demand and the effect of part payments -Revisional interference with summoning order - requirements of endorsement under Section 56 - Whether the learned Session Court was justified in setting aside the summoning order by holding the statutory demand notice to be invalid merely because the amount demanded therein was less than the aggregate amount covered by the dishonoured cheques ? - HELD THAT: - A plain reading of Section 138 of the NI Act makes it evident that for constituting an offence under the said provision, the conditions stipulated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the proviso are mandatory.

It is a pertinent to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Suman Sethi [2000 (2) TMI 822 - SUPREME COURT], wherein the Court examined the scope of the expression ‘the said amount of money’ occurring in clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the NI Act. The Supreme Court held that the expression refers to the cheque amount and that a statutory notice must contain a demand for the cheque amount. At the same time, it was clarified that the notice has to be read as a whole.

The Court held that the statutory notice had to be read as a whole. On its plain terms, the notice was not omnibus, since it specifically set out the original liability, the dishonoured cheques, the part payments received and the manner in which the balance amount was computed before making the demand. The precedents dealing with inflated or facially erroneous demands did not govern a case where the demand stood reduced on account of admitted part payments. Whether, after such part payments, the cheques continued to represent a legally enforceable debt, whether Section 56 of the Act stood attracted, and what legal consequence followed from absence of endorsement, were disputed matters dependent on evidence. At the stage of summoning, and in revision against a summoning order, such questions could not be conclusively determined, since the Court was only required to see whether a prima facie case was disclosed from the complaint and supporting material. [Paras 37, 38, 39, 40, 41]

The Sessions Court erred in treating the notice as invalid and in setting aside the summoning order on that basis; the summoning order was restored and the complaint was directed to proceed to trial on its own merits.

Final Conclusion: The High Court held that the Sessions Court had wrongly invalidated the statutory notice merely because the demand was for the reduced outstanding balance after part payments. Since the notice disclosed the basis of the demand and the remaining objections involved disputed factual issues requiring evidence, the revisional order was set aside and the summoning order was restored.