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1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Stay on Proceedings Related to Show Cause Notices
Issue 2: Appropriate Course of Action to Protect Interests
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
This judgment reflects the court's careful consideration of procedural fairness and the need to balance competing interests in complex tax litigation. By staying the proceedings, the court ensured that the substantive issues could be addressed without prejudice to either party, allowing for a comprehensive and fair hearing at a later date.
Stay of proceedings - show cause notices - tagging of matters - final disposal - interim protection - time-bar/limitation concern
Stay of proceedings - show cause notices - time-bar/limitation concern - tagging of matters - final disposal - Further proceedings on the impugned show cause notices in the matters tagged with the main matter shall be stayed until final disposal of the main matter and the tagged matters. - HELD THAT: - The Court noted that the batch comprises matters transferred from various High Courts and some filed directly, and that these matters have been formally tagged with the principal Special Leave Petition. The revenue informed the Court that certain show cause notices may become time-barred by the first week of February, 2025. In light of the stated limitation risk and upon request of the parties for appropriate protective orders, the Court directed that further proceedings on all the impugned show cause notices be stayed as an interim protective measure until the main matter and all tagged matters are finally disposed of. The Court also listed the matters, including W.P. (C) No.858 of 2024, for final disposal on the specified date. [Paras 3, 4, 5]
Proceedings on the impugned show cause notices are stayed pending final disposal of the main matter and tagged matters; list for final hearing on 18.3.2025.
Final Conclusion: Interim order: all further proceedings on the impugned show cause notices are stayed until the final disposal of the main Special Leave Petition and the matters tagged therewith; matters posted for final disposal on 18.3.2025.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Jurisdiction of Authority under Section 129(3) of the Act
Issue 2: Acceptance of Bank Guarantee under Section 129(1)(c)
Issue 3: Alternative Remedy of Appeal under Section 107
Issue 4: Interim Protection Pending Appeal
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Power of detention and release under Section 129(1)(c) of the GST Act read with Rule 140 - Provisional release on furnishing bond and bank guarantee in Form GST MOV-08 - Authority under Section 129 determining alleged undervaluation of goods - Availability of appellate remedy under Section 107 - Non-invocation of bank guarantee for a limited period after dismissal of appeal
Authority under Section 129 determining alleged undervaluation of goods - Availability of appellate remedy under Section 107 - Factual controversies relating to alleged undervaluation and discrepancies in e-way bills are to be examined by the Appellate Authority under the appeal remedy, and not finally determined in the writ petition. - HELD THAT: - The Court observed that certain factual aspects and discrepancies (for example, differences in values shown in the e-way bills) were raised for the first time before the High Court and were not before the authority which passed the impugned order. Given that these are factual matters amenable to examination in the appellate process, the appropriate forum for adjudication is the Appellate Authority under the statutory appeal mechanism. The respondents' contention that the authority had not valued the goods was noted, but the Court directed that the issues the petitioner sought to raise should be ventilated before the Appellate Authority rather than in writ proceedings. [Paras 5]
Petitioner directed to approach the Appellate Authority under Section 107 for examination of the factual issues; writ petition disposed to that extent.
Power of detention and release under Section 129(1)(c) of the GST Act read with Rule 140 - Provisional release on furnishing bond and bank guarantee in Form GST MOV-08 - Seized goods are to be released provisionally upon the petitioner furnishing the bond and bank guarantee as provided under Section 129(1)(c) read with Rule 140 and Form GST MOV-08. - HELD THAT: - The Court recorded the statutory scheme permitting provisional release of seized goods upon execution of a bond for the value of the goods and furnishing of security in the form of a bank guarantee equivalent to the amount of applicable tax, interest and penalty. Exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, the Court directed release of the petitioner's seized goods on the petitioner taking steps in accordance with those provisions and the prescribed form. [Paras 6, 7]
Seized goods to be released on petitioner furnishing the bond and requisite bank guarantee in terms of Section 129(1)(c), Rule 140 and Form GST MOV-08.
Non-invocation of bank guarantee for a limited period after dismissal of appeal - Bank guarantee furnished for provisional release shall not be invoked immediately upon dismissal of the appeal; a limited protective period is granted. - HELD THAT: - Considering the pecuniary magnitude and the petitioner's offer to furnish a bank guarantee, the Court granted a limited protective concession: in the event the appeal is dismissed, the respondents are restrained from invoking the bank guarantee for a period of two weeks from the date of dismissal. This order provides a short window for the petitioner to take further steps post dismissal before the guarantee may be enforced. [Paras 8]
If the appeal is dismissed, the bank guarantee shall not be invoked by respondents for two weeks from the date of dismissal.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition disposed: seized goods ordered released on petitioner furnishing bond and bank guarantee in terms of Section 129(1)(c) read with Rule 140 and Form GST MOV-08; petitioner permitted to pursue appeal under Section 107; if appeal is dismissed, the bank guarantee shall not be invoked for two weeks from the date of dismissal.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The legal judgment from the Allahabad High Court presents and considers the following core legal questions:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Jurisdiction and Natural Justice
Issue 2: Classification of 'Chyawanprash Awaleha'
Issue 3: Trademark Allegations
Issue 4: Extended Period of Limitation
Issue 5: Territorial Jurisdiction
Issue 6: GST Council Recommendations
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Challenge to SCN issued by Joint Director D.G.G.I., Surat - facts necessary for invoking the provisions of Section 74 of CGST Act do not exist - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- The aspect pertaining to invoking extended period of limitation under Section 74 of the Act is essentially a jurisdictional aspect in the present matter as admittedly the petitioner has been paying GST under Entry No. 181-A since 2017 @ 5% for the product in question whereas for the products which are different from the product in question, it is paying higher GST @ 12%.
Further as apparently the Entry No. 181-A in Schedule-I is not different from sub heading 3003.31 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 which was worded exactly in similar manner and has been repeatedly interpreted contrary to the allegations made in the show cause notice, the aspect invoking the extended period of limitation in the circumstances requires consideration along with the binding nature of the deliberations of GST Council in its minutes dated 06.10.2017 - The issue as raised are jurisdictional in nature and, therefore, the aspect of availability of opportunity to respond to the show cause notice apparently would not come in way of the petitioner in maintaining the petition.
The matter requires consideration - Issue notice.
Issues: Whether successive regular bail should be granted in a prosecution concerning alleged fraudulent availment of input tax credit under the GST regime.
Analysis: The application was considered on the basis that investigation had been completed, recovery or discovery from the accused was no longer required, the alleged offence was punishable up to five years, and the case was triable by the JMFC. The Court also considered the undertaking to deposit tax amount, the documentary nature of the material, the expected delay in trial, and the settled principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception, while keeping in view the protection of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
Conclusion: Successive regular bail was granted to the applicant, subject to conditions.
Seeking grant of regular bail - fraudulent availment of ITC - fraudulent invoices issued by non-existent suppliers - cancellation of GST registration - HELD THAT:- Investigation is completed by the department and commencement of trial will take its own time. The offence is punishable upto 5 years only and based on the documentary evidence.
An undertaking has been filed on behalf of Director of M/s Nandeshwari Steel Co., wherein stating that he will pay GST amount of Rs.2.00 crores and the same shall be paid in two monthly installments of 1.00 crore each. The first installment would be paid at the end of January, 2025 and second installment would be paid in the month of February i.e. on or before 28.02.2025, failing which, non-bailable warrant can be issued against the present applicant to show his bona fide.
This Court has also taken into consideration the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of SANJAY CHANDRA VERSUS CBI [2011 (11) TMI 537 - SUPREME COURT] as well as in the case of GUDIKANTI NARASIMHULU AND ORS. VERSUS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH [1977 (12) TMI 143 - SUPREME COURT]. Obviously, the conclusion of trial will take time and keeping the accused behind the bars is nothing but amounts to pre-trial conviction and therefore, considering the celebrated principle of bail jurisprudence is that “bail is a rule and jail is exception” as well as the concept of personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, present application deserves consideration.
Considering the nature of the allegations made against the applicant/s in the FIR, without discussing the evidence in detail, prima facie, this Court is of the opinion that this is a fit case to exercise the discretion and enlarge the applicant/s on successive regular bail.
Hence, the present application is allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The legal judgment primarily revolves around the following core issues:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Justification of Detention under Section 132(1)(c) of the CGST Act
Issue 2: Powers under Section 69 of the CGST Act
Issue 3: Invoking Article 226 for Release from Detention
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The judgment underscores the balance between enforcing tax laws and safeguarding individual liberties, emphasizing procedural compliance and evidence-based decision-making in detention cases.
Initiation of proceedings against the petitioner u/s 132(1) (c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax, (CGST) Act, 2017 - evasion of GST by falsely claiming ITC - reasons to believe - power to arrest - HELD THAT:- Perusal of the records reveals that the authorization required under the statue has been given by the Commissioner on the ground that he has reasons to believe on the materials placed before the authority. However, what is not seen from the materials placed before the court at this stage is the determination of the liability as is required for recovery of taxes from any assessee. No material has been shown that such determination of the liability had been arrived at by the respondent authorities on whom the Commissioner had concluded that he had “reasons to believe” that the person has committed any offence specified under the various Clauses under Section 132.
From the statements recorded before the investigating authority it is seen that there are other partners in the partnership besides the petitioner and at this stage of investigation there are no materials to suggest that the petitioner will tamper with the evidence or have evaded the summons or did not respond to summons when served. The question of whether the directions of the Apex Court in ARNESH KUMAR VERSUS STATE OF BIHAR & ANR [2014 (7) TMI 1143 - SUPREME COURT] were followed by the respondent is also an issue which would required determination by this court.
While there is no quarrel with the proposition that Section 69 does confer power on the Commissioner to order arrest in case any of the specified offences under Section 132 of the CGST Act, the question remains is whether arrest or detention is called for merely because is power is available on the authority to do so.
The petitioner has cooperated with the investigating authority and his statement has been recorded there is no material to suggest that he will abscond or not respond to summons issued. There is also no material which prima facie suggests that the determination of the liability has been arrived that by the Commissioner or the investigating officer. Under such circumstances this court of the view that continued detention of the petitioner at the stage of investigation is not required. This therefore court considers that the petitioner can be released on interim bail until further orders.
Conclusion - There is no material which prima facie suggests that the determination of the liability has been arrived that by the Commissioner or the investigating officer. Under such circumstances this court of the view that continued detention of the petitioner at the stage of investigation is not required.
The petitioner is directed to be released on interim bail subject to fulfilment of conditions imposed - bail application allowed.
Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to similar relief by condonation of delay and consideration of revocation of cancellation of GST registration, subject to compliance with monetary dues and other formalities.
Analysis: The relief sought was treated as covered by the earlier coordinate Bench order dealing with the proviso to Rule 23 of the Odisha Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017. The operative direction accepted the request for analogous treatment and linked reconsideration of revocation to deposit of taxes, interest, late fee, penalty and compliance with other formalities, in the interest of revenue.
Conclusion: The petitioner was granted the requested relief, and the application for revocation of cancellation of registration was directed to be considered in accordance with law upon compliance.
Cancellation of client’s registration under Odisha Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - petitioner is ready and willing to pay the tax, interest, late fee, penalty and any other sum required to be paid for the return form - HELD THAT:- Reliance placed in M/S. MOHANTY ENTERPRISES VERSUS THE COMMISSIONER, CT & GST, ODISHA, CUTTACK AND OTHERS [2022 (11) TMI 1521 - ORISSA HIGH COURT] where it was held that 'In that view of the matter, the delay in Petitioner’s invoking the proviso to Rule 23 of the Odisha Goods and Services Tax Rules (OGST Rules) is condoned and it is directed that subject to the Petitioner depositing all the taxes, interest, late fee, penalty etc., due and complying with other formalities, the Petitioner’s application for revocation will be considered in accordance with law.'
The writ petition is disposed of.
Issues: Whether service of notices, summons and orders under Section 169 of the Tamil Nadu Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 could be confined to the common portal alone, and whether the provision required the statutory modes of service to be read conjunctively so as to ensure compliance with natural justice.
Analysis: Section 169 was read as a complete scheme for service of communications. The modes specified in clauses (a) to (c) were treated as alternative modes of direct service, registered post or e-mail, while clauses (d) to (f) operated as further alternatives where the earlier modes were not practicable. The Court compared Section 169 with the earlier service provision under Rule 52 of the TNGST Rules, 1959 and held that the structure of the provision showed a statutory preference for effective service in the listed sequence, rather than service through the portal as the sole mode. Rules could not curtail the broader statutory modes provided by the Act. The object of the provision was held to be strict observance of natural justice.
Conclusion: Service only through the portal was held to be insufficient where the statutory modes under Section 169 were not followed in the manner required by law, and the impugned assessment orders were set aside with liberty to proceed afresh after proper notice and hearing.
Final Conclusion: The writ petitions succeeded and the assessments were remitted for fresh consideration after lawful service and opportunity of hearing.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a taxing statute prescribes multiple modes of service, the authorities must adopt the statutorily effective modes in a manner that secures natural justice, and subordinate rules cannot be used to narrow the statutory requirement.
Service of notices - Compliance of Section 169 of the Tamil Nadu Goods and Services Tax Act 2017 - upload of only the notices/ orders in the web portal and not by any other modes as prescribed under Section 169 of the Act - HELD THAT:- It is to be noted that Rule 52 of the TNGST Rule 1959 had provided for service of notices on the assesses. The same had been considered by the two Division Bench of this Court. Firstly, in the judgment reported in 1972 SCC Online Mad 347 [1972 (9) TMI 133 - MADRAS HIGH COURT], a Division Bench of this Court had rejected the contentions that Section 52(a), (b) & (c) all have to be complied with independently before compliance of Section 52 (d). The Division Bench had held that the authority would have to comply with any of the three modes under (a), (b) & (c) of Rule 52 and if found such service was not effective, then the Clause (d) of Rule 52 would have to be complied.
A similar view had been taken by a subsequent Division Bench in a judgment in the case of Singaravelar Spinning Mills (P) Ltd., Vs State of Tamil Nadu and Another [2010 (12) TMI 1102 - MADRAS HIGH COURT]. The Division Bench in the said judgment had also taken note of the earlier Division Bench indicated supra, wherein, the Division Bench had held that the mode of service referred to under Clause (a) to (c) are only alternative and not cumulative and that any one of the modes have to be exhausted before proceeding under Rule 52 (d).
A conjoined reading of Sub-Section (1)(2) & (3) of Section 169 would amply make it clear that the State is obliged to comply with the Clauses (a) to (c) alternatively and thereafter, comply with Clauses (d) to (f). Further, even though Clause (f) has also been proceeded with the word 'or' indicating it to be disjunctive / an alternative mode of services, a reading of the Clause (f) would indicate that Clause (f) could be resorted to by the State, if any of the Clauses preceding it, was not practicable. Here also, Clause (f) makes it imperative that such affixure shall be in a conspicuous place and the last known business or residence of the asseesse. Therefore, the object of Section 169 is for strict observance of the principles of natural justice.
Conclusion - Section 169 mandates a notice in person or by registered post or to the registered e-mail ID alternatively and on a failure or impracticability of adopting any of the aforesaid modes, then the State can, in addition, make a publication of such notices/ summons/ orders in the portal/ newspaper through the concerned officials.
The orders of assessment impugned in these Writ Petitions set aside remitting the same back to the respective respondents to comply with the directions indicated - petition allowed by way of remand.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Absence of Signature on Assessment Orders
Issue 2: Non-Inclusion of Document Identification Number (DIN)
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
In conclusion, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh invalidated the assessment orders due to procedural defects, specifically the absence of the assessing officer's signature and the lack of a DIN, reaffirming the necessity of these elements for the validity of such orders under the GST Act. The respondent was allowed to reissue the orders with proper compliance, excluding the period from the date of the original orders to the receipt of this judgment from the limitation period.
Challenge to assessment orders - proceedings does not contain the signature of the assessing officer and also DIN number on the impugned assessment orders - no DIN numbers on the impugned assessment orders.
Absence of signatures - HELD THAT:- The effect of the absence of the signature, on an assessment order was earlier considered by this Court, in the case of A.V. Bhanoji Row Vs. The Assistant Commissioner (ST) [2023 (2) TMI 1224 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT]. A Division Bench of this Court, had held that the signature, on the assessment order, cannot be dispensed with and that the provisions of Sections-160 & 169 of the Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017, would not rectify such a defect. Following this Judgment, another Division Bench of this Court, in the case of M/s. SRK Enterprises Vs. Assistant Commissioner [2023 (12) TMI 156 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT] had set aside the impugned assessment order.
Non-inclusion of DIN number on proceedings - HELD THAT:- The question of the effect of non-inclusion of DIN number on proceedings, under the G.S.T. Act, came to be considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pradeep Goyal Vs. Union of India & Ors [2022 (8) TMI 216 - SUPREME COURT]. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after noticing the provisions of the Act and the circular issued by the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (C.B.I.C.), had held that an order, which does not contain a DIN number would be non-est and invalid.
In view of the aforesaid judgments and the circular issued by the C.B.I.C., the non-mention of a DIN number and absence of the signature of the assessing officer, in the impugned assessment order would have to be set aside.
Petition allowed.
Issues: Whether, in the absence of a constituted Tribunal, the writ petitioner's challenge to the first appellate order should be disposed of by applying the revised pre-deposit requirement of 10% of the disputed tax for the impugned order to remain stayed.
Analysis: The petitioner sought appellate recourse to the Tribunal, which was not yet constituted, and relied on the earlier writ directions governing appeals and stay against first appellate orders. It was also pointed out that the pre-deposit requirement had been reduced to 10% by the relevant notification, and that the State revenue had issued a corresponding notification. The Court accepted the submission that the revised deposit requirement should apply to the impugned first appellate order.
Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to have the impugned first appellate order stayed upon deposit of 10% of the remaining disputed tax.
Deposit for stay - stay of appellate order - modification of deposit directions - deposit reduction by notification
Deposit for stay - modification of deposit directions - deposit reduction by notification - Requirement of deposit to secure stay of the First Appellate Authority's order was modified to reflect the reduced deposit notified by the revenue. - HELD THAT: - The petitioner sought modification of the deposit directions contained in the Division Bench order dated 16th February, 2024, which had originally required an initial deposit on filing and a further deposit for stay. The petitioner relied on a subsequent Central revenue notification reducing the latter deposit to 10% and on a corresponding State notification dated 29th October, 2024. The Court accepted the petitioner's submission that the State notification correspondingly reduced the deposit requirement and held that the directions for obtaining a stay of the impugned first appellate order should be read subject to that reduction. Consequently, the deposit required to maintain the stay was ordered to be made in accordance with the reduced requirement of 10%. [Paras 5]
The deposit requirement for the impugned first appellate order to remain stayed is modified to the reduced requirement of 10%, and the writ petition is disposed of accordingly.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition disposed of by modifying the earlier deposit directions so that the impugned first appellate order shall remain stayed upon deposit in accordance with the reduced requirement of 10% as notified.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal issue considered in this judgment is the legality and validity of the retrospective cancellation of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) registration of the petitioner. Specifically, the court examined whether the cancellation of GST registration with retrospective effect was justified and in accordance with the statutory scheme under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act).
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Legal Framework and Precedents
The relevant legal framework for this issue is Section 29 of the CGST Act, which outlines the conditions under which a GST registration can be cancelled. Sub-section 29(2) allows for cancellation from a retrospective date if the circumstances warrant such action. The court referred to previous judgments, including Riddhi Siddhi Enterprises v. Commissioner of Goods and Services Tax and Ramesh Chander v. Assistant Commissioner of Goods and Services Tax, to understand the application of this section.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning
The court emphasized that while the CGST Act provides the power to cancel registration retrospectively, the exercise of this power must be reasoned and demonstrate due application of mind. The court noted that the mere existence of the power does not justify its automatic application. The court insisted that any order of cancellation must clearly outline the reasons for retrospective application, considering the significant consequences such an action entails.
Key Evidence and Findings
The court found that the Show Cause Notice (SCN) issued to the petitioner did not specify any intent to cancel the registration retrospectively. Furthermore, the final order of cancellation lacked detailed reasoning and failed to address why retrospective cancellation was deemed necessary. The court also noted that the petitioner had not submitted a reply to the SCN, which was a factor in the cancellation decision.
Application of Law to Facts
The court applied the principles established in previous cases to the current scenario, highlighting the need for objective criteria and clear reasoning when cancelling GST registration retrospectively. The lack of such reasoning in the SCN and the final order led the court to conclude that the cancellation was not sustainable.
Treatment of Competing Arguments
The respondents argued that the petitioner's failure to respond to the SCN justified the cancellation. However, the court found this argument insufficient, as the cancellation order did not provide adequate reasoning for its retrospective application. The court also considered the potential consequences for the petitioner's customers, who might be denied input tax credit due to the retrospective cancellation.
Conclusions
The court concluded that the retrospective cancellation of the petitioner's GST registration was unjustified due to the lack of reasoning and clarity in the cancellation order. The court quashed the stipulation in the impugned order that set the effective date of cancellation as 02 July 2017, instead ruling that the cancellation should take effect from the date of the SCN, 08 October 2022.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning
The court stated, "The power to cancel retrospectively can neither be robotic nor routinely applied unless circumstances so warrant." This emphasizes the necessity for careful consideration and reasoning when applying retrospective cancellation.
Core Principles Established
The judgment reinforces the principle that retrospective cancellation of GST registration requires clear and objective reasoning, as well as a demonstration of due application of mind. The power to cancel retrospectively should not be exercised mechanically or without sufficient justification.
Final Determinations on Each Issue
The court allowed the writ petition, quashing the retrospective cancellation of GST registration. The cancellation was ordered to take effect from the date of the SCN, 08 October 2022, rather than the earlier date stipulated in the impugned order.
Retrospective cancellation of the Goods and Services Tax [GST] registration of the petitioner-assessee - it is contended that in the absence of the SCN having embodied any intent of the respondents to cancel the registration with retrospective effect, the action would not sustain - HELD THAT:- Reliance in this respect is placed on the decision rendered in Riddhi Siddhi Enterprises v. Commissioner of Goods and Services Tax (CGST), South Delhi & Anr [2024 (10) TMI 278 - DELHI HIGH COURT] where it was held that 'In view of the fact that Petitioner does not seek to carry on business or continue the registration, the impugned order dated 15.12.2021 is modified to the limited extent that registration shall now be treated as cancelled with effect from 04.09.2021 i.e., the date when the Show Cause Notice was issued.'
The stipulation contained in the impugned order dated 29 April 2024 and which ordains that the cancellation of registration would take effect from 02 July 2017 quashed - petition allowed.
Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of by granting the petitioner liberty to seek revocation of cancellation of GST registration under Section 30(2) of the CGST Act within the stipulated time, subject to filing the pending returns and depositing outstanding tax dues, interest and penalty, whereupon the competent authority was directed to consider the application in accordance with law.
Violation of principles of natural justice - cancellation of registration of the petitioner by a non-speaking and vague order - now the petitioner is ready to make the payment towards GST return as well as the penalty and interest - HELD THAT:- In view of the consensus between the parties, the matter is covered by the order in KIRAN ENTERPRISES GSTIN VERSUS COMMISSIONER, STATE GOODS & ANOTHER [2024 (10) TMI 1306 - UTTARAKHAND HIGH COURT], the present writ petition is also decided in terms of the said order. The petitioner shall be at liberty to move an application for revocation or cancellation of the order under Section 30(2) of the CGST Act, 2017, within two weeks.
Petition disposed off.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Ultra Vires of the Impugned Order and Circular
Issue 2: Entitlement to Refund and Justification of Interest
Issue 3: Absence of GST Appellate Tribunal
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The judgment underscores the importance of adhering to statutory provisions while issuing circulars and highlights the necessity for proper utilization of ITC to justify interest imposition. The court's decision to hear the writ petition in light of the tribunal's absence reflects its commitment to ensuring justice without procedural delays.
Constitutional validity of Circular No.94/13/2019-GST dated 28.03.2019 - denial of refund of the accumulated input tax credit on account of inverted rate of duty structure - HELD THAT:- The necessity for quashing the circular at the behest of the petitioner in the given facts and circumstances, may not be necessary, as the petitioner claims that the petitioner had excess Input Tax Credit all along and there was no occasion to wrongly utilize the Input Tax Credit, which was to lapse on 31.03.2017.
The law on the Input Tax Credit has long settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in The Collector of Central Excise, Pune & Others Vs. Daichi Karkaria Ltd. & Ors. [1999 (8) TMI 920 - SUPREME COURT] wherein it has been held that 'There is no provision in the Rules which provides for a reversal of the credit by the excise authorities except where it has been illegally or irregularly taken, in which event it stands cancelled or, if utilised, has to be paid for. We are here really concerned with credit that has been validly taken, and its benefit is available to the manufacturer without any limitation in time or otherwise unless the manufacturer itself chooses not to use the raw material in its excisable product. The credit is, therefore, indefeasible.'
Perforce, the petitioner as was required to reverse Input Tax Credit lying unutilized Input Tax Credit for payment of tax for the period after the Month of July 2018. As such, credit was to lapse with effect from 01.08.2018. The petitioner reversed Input Tax Credit on 19.03.2019 for a sum of Rs. 6,68,66,289/- on 19.03.2019 which is not in dispute. There is also no dispute the aforesaid credit amount was also not utilized by the petitioner after 01.08.2018.
Since, the petitioner had no occasion to utilize the accumulated credit after the cut off date towards the tax liability incurred, the question of imposing interest under Section 50 (3) in terms of above said circular cannot be justified.
Conclusion - Validly availed ITC is indefeasible unless utilized improperly. The imposition of interest requires actual utilization of the credit.
Petition allowed.
Issues: Whether the impugned show cause notice was issued without compliance with Section 74(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, and whether interim protection was warranted pending adjudication.
Analysis: The petitioners challenged the notice on the ground of non-compliance with the statutory precondition and pointed out that a similar matter was already pending before the Court. The Court issued notice returnable on 20.11.2024 and directed that the petition be heard with the connected matter. By way of ad-interim relief, the proceedings pursuant to the impugned show cause notice were permitted to continue, but no final order was to be passed without the Court's permission during the pendency of the petition.
Outcome: Notice issued, and ad-interim protection granted against passing a final order without the Court's permission during pendency.
Issuance of SCN without following the provisions of sub- section (5) of Section 74 of the Central Goods & Service Tax Act, 2017 - HELD THAT:- Issue Notice returnable on 20.11.2024.
By way of ad-interim relief, the proceedings pursuant to the impugned show cause dated 10th July, 2024 may continue, however no final order shall be passed without permission of this Court during the pendency of this petition.
Validity of reopening of assessment - Reasons to believe - addition u/s 68 - whether the notice issued u/s 148 and the order passed disposing of the objection can be said to be legal in eye of law? - delay filling SLP - As decided by HC [2024 (2) TMI 1506 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] AO has while issuing notice and recording reasons completely gone into oblivion to the fact that in the present case, the assessment order u/s 143(3) was passed keeping in mind all the details available with regard to transaction done and on NMCE platform - AO has mechanically recorded that the return was processed only u/s 143(1) which itself goes to suggest that recording of reasons at the instance of Assessing officer was nothing but in a mechanical manner and with no application of mind.
HELD THAT:- There is a gross delay of 209 days in filing the Special Leave Petition which has not been satisfactorily explained by the petitioner.
Even otherwise, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court. Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed on the ground of delay as well as merits.
Validity of Proceedings u/s 153C - issuance of the notice was preceded by the drawl of a Satisfaction Note by the jurisdictional AO - action u/s 153C for the six AYs’ - importance of material recovered in the course of a search or a requisition made and a right to reassess u/s 153A and 153C - usage of the expression “have a bearing” -
As decided by HC [2024 (4) TMI 461 - DELHI HIGH COURT] abatement of the six AYs’ or the “relevant assessment year” would follow the formation of that opinion and satisfaction in that respect being reached.
We come to the firm conclusion that the “incriminating material” which is spoken of would have to be identified with respect to the AY to which it relates or may be likely to impact before the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C - The power to undertake such an assessment would stand confined to those years to which the material may relate or is likely to influence. Absent any material that may either cast a doubt on the estimation of total income for a particular year or years, the AO would not be justified in invoking its powers conferred by Section 153C. It would only be consequent to such satisfaction being reached that a notice would be liable to be issued and thus resulting in the abatement of pending proceedings and reopening of concluded assessments.
HELD THAT:- There is a gross delay of 142 and 172 days respectively in filing the Special Leave Petitions which has not been satisfactorily explained by the petitioners.
Even otherwise, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court.
Special Leave Petitions are, accordingly, dismissed on the ground of delay as well as merits.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The High Court of Gujarat considered the following core legal questions in the appeal:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Justification of ITAT's Restriction of Addition to 6%
Issue 2: Consideration of Precedents
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The High Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the ITAT's decision was based on a thorough analysis of the facts and evidence, and no interference was warranted.
Estimation of income - bogus purchases - ITAT restricting the addition made by the AO being 100% to 6% -HELD THAT:- As in view taken and the conclusion arrived at by the Appellant Tribunal are based on material before it and after analysing the facts and figures available before it, when the Tribunal thought it fit to reduce the disallowance to 6% from 100%, the Tribunal had before it the facts which were duly analysed by it. Therefore, in our well considered view, no interference is called for in the said conclusion and findings of the Tribunal in the present appeal.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The legal judgment from the Gujarat High Court involves the following core legal questions:
(i) Whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in law in confirming the disallowance of depreciation amounting to Rs. 2,81,25,000/- croresRs.
(ii) Whether the Tribunal was correct in not treating Rs. 20 crores as the cost of the pipeline eligible for depreciationRs.
(iii) Whether the Tribunal was correct in treating the minimum liability payable to the Gujarat Maritime Board and the Kandla Port Trust of Rs. 10 crores each as neither contractual nor legal, but a contingent liability, thereby not treating Rs. 20 crores as the cost of the pipeline eligible for depreciationRs.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Disallowance of Depreciation
Relevant legal framework and precedents: The case revolves around the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961, particularly concerning the eligibility for depreciation deductions. The relevant legal precedent includes the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Earth Movers, which discusses the conditions under which a business liability can be considered to have arisen.
Court's interpretation and reasoning: The court upheld the Tribunal's decision, agreeing that the depreciation claimed included amounts that were not legally or contractually agreed upon as liabilities. The court emphasized the absence of a binding agreement between the appellant and the two corporations.
Key evidence and findings: The court noted that the appellant unilaterally created the liability in its books without any mutual agreement or legal obligation from the KPT and GMB.
Application of law to facts: The court applied the principles from the Indian Contract Act, emphasizing that a contract requires mutual consent and cannot be based solely on one party's assertions.
Treatment of competing arguments: The appellant argued for the recognition of the liability based on its accounting practices, but the court found this insufficient without a formal agreement.
Conclusions: The court concluded that the depreciation claim was not justified as the liability was contingent and not contractually agreed upon.
Issue (ii) & (iii): Treatment of Rs. 20 Crores as Cost of Pipeline
Relevant legal framework and precedents: The court examined the principles of contingent liabilities and the requirements for a liability to be recognized for depreciation purposes.
Court's interpretation and reasoning: The court agreed with the Tribunal that the liability was contingent, as there was no enforceable agreement with KPT and GMB. The court highlighted the lack of acceptance of the liability by these entities.
Key evidence and findings: The court observed that the appellant's proposal for a one-time payment was rejected by both KPT and GMB, further supporting the contingent nature of the liability.
Application of law to facts: The court applied the legal standards for recognizing liabilities, noting that the appellant's actions did not meet these standards due to the absence of mutual consent.
Treatment of competing arguments: The appellant's reliance on previous case law was dismissed, as the facts did not support the existence of an agreed liability.
Conclusions: The court concluded that the Rs. 20 crores could not be treated as part of the pipeline's cost for depreciation purposes due to its contingent nature.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve verbatim quotes of crucial legal reasoning: The tribunal noted, "The assessee has unilaterally created the liability and this liability has not been accepted by KPT and GMB. Therefore, this liability cannot be allowed as deduction and this is only recreated liability."
Core principles established: The judgment reinforces the principle that liabilities must be legally or contractually recognized to be eligible for depreciation. Contingent liabilities, without mutual agreement, do not qualify.
Final determinations on each issue: The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the Tribunal's decision that no substantial question of law arose from the impugned order. The court concluded that the depreciation claim was not justified, and the Rs. 20 crores could not be treated as part of the pipeline's cost.
Contingent liability - mercantile system of accounting - incurrence of liability - allowability of deduction - depreciation eligibility - concurrent findings of fact
Contingent liability - depreciation eligibility - incurrence of liability - mercantile system of accounting - concurrent findings of fact - Confirmation of disallowance of depreciation by treating the Rs.20 crores shown payable to Kandla Port Trust and Gujarat Maritime Board as not forming part of pipeline cost. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found on the facts that no agreement or contract had been executed between the assessee and KPT/GMB as on the year under consideration, that the assessee had unilaterally recorded the liability and that proposals for one time payments were rejected by KPT and GMB. Applying the tests for deductibility under the mercantile system and the principle that deduction requires that a business liability have definitely arisen or be incurred with reasonable certainty, the Tribunal treated the amounts as contingent and not as part of the pipeline's installation cost eligible for depreciation. Those factual findings are concurrent with the authorities below. The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises to warrant interference with these concurrent findings of fact and declined to disturb the Tribunal's conclusion.
Appeal dismissed; Tribunal's confirmation of the disallowance upheld and the Rs.20 crores not treated as cost eligible for depreciation.
Final Conclusion: The High Court upheld the Tribunal's concurrent factual findings that the Rs.20 crores liability was contingent and not contractual; therefore the disallowance of depreciation was sustained and the tax appeal dismissed for lack of any substantial question of law.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The High Court considered the following core legal questions:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of Reasons to Believe
Issue 2: Borrowed Satisfaction vs. Independent Satisfaction
Issue 3: Live-Link Requirement
Issue 4: Exercise of Jurisdiction under Article 226
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - reasons to believe -independent satisfaction or borrowed satisfaction of AO - HELD THAT:- AO has failed to give the requisite details in the reasons recorded so as to form a requisite prima-facie belief that income has escaped assessment. The reasons recorded only refer to the information received from the credible sources that the search was carried out in case of Kushal Group and during course of search, incriminating documents were found and seized and on going through the information available on Insight Portal, it was found that the petitioners are one of the beneficiaries of the accommodation entries in form of different types of income like Long Terms Gains/Loss/Short Terms Gains/Loss and also beneficiary of unsecured loans etc., without there being any basis for forming such belief.
Therefore, it is clear that the AO has recorded the reasons only on the basis of the borrowed satisfaction without there being any live-link between the information available on the Insight Portal and the data available on the record of the petitioners-assesses. AO cannot be said to have formed an independent satisfaction regarding the reasons recorded to re-open the assessment to come to the prima-facie conclusion that there is escapement of income.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of Notice under Section 148
Issue 2: "Reason to Believe" Requirement
Issue 3: Independent Application of Mind
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Reopening of assessment under section 147/148 - reason to believe - borrowed satisfaction - independent application of mind - nexus between information and formation of belief - use of information from investigation/insight portal - reassessment pursuant to search under section 153C
Reopening of assessment under section 147/148 - reason to believe - borrowed satisfaction - independent application of mind - nexus between information and formation of belief - use of information from investigation/insight portal - Validity of notice under section 148 read with section 147 to reopen assessment where the Assessing Officer relied on information from the investigation/insight portal without independent verification or application of mind. - HELD THAT: - The Court examined the reasons recorded for reopening and the material placed on record and found that the Assessing Officer had not made any verification of the petitioner's material nor formed an independent opinion that income had escaped assessment. The reasons recorded show that the reopening was initiated on the basis of information available on the investigation/insight portal and related reports, without articulating the critical material that connected that information to the petitioner's transactions. The court observed that mere reliance on information from another agency, without considering the assessee's own records and forming an independent belief, amounts to borrowed satisfaction and is impermissible. The requirement that the reasons for reopening must disclose a discernible link or nexus between the information relied upon and the belief that income has escaped assessment was not met; consequently the requisite reason to believe as envisaged by the statute was absent. The court noted that the petitioner had produced contract notes, broker ledger and bank statements evidencing purchase and sale of shares, and there was no finding in the reasons that these records were false or incomplete. The court therefore held that initiation of reassessment could not be sustained where the AO mechanically relied upon investigative information without independent application of mind to the material on record in the petitioner's case. [Paras 40, 41, 42, 43, 44]
Impugned notice under section 148 and the order disposing objections were quashed for being founded on borrowed satisfaction and lacking independent reasons to believe that income had escaped assessment.
Final Conclusion: The petitions are allowed; the notice dated 31.03.2021 under section 148 and the consequential order dated 13.12.2021 dismissing objections are quashed and set aside for want of independent satisfaction by the Assessing Officer.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Entitlement to Stay on Outstanding Tax Demand
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Stay for outstanding demand u/s 10(3) and u/s 12 of the Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015 - penalty u/s 42 of the BMA for the assessment year 2016-17 and penalty u/s 41 and 43 of the BMA for 2017-18 - HELD THAT:- On perusal of contents of the stay petitions filed by the appellant, we are of the considered view that the assessee has made out a prima facie case and also balance of convenience in its favour.
The appellant also partly paid Rs. 2,15,08,248/- out of 20% taxes/penalties demands (Rs. 5,73,10,158/-) which is evident from chart filed for the assessee.
We also conciously note that the appellant has offered balance being Rs. 3,58,01,910/- out of the 20% towards disputed demand for two assessment years will be paid in three installments on or before the 31.03.2025.
Therefore, appellant has given assurance that the appellant will satisfied the balance payment of 20% disputed demand on or before 31.03.2025, in our considered view, it is a fit case for granting stay for balance outstanding demands.
Thus, we stayed the balance outstanding demand for a period of 6 months from the date of this order or till disposal of the appeals filed by the assessee whichever is earlier. Appeals filed by the assessee are posted for hearing on 03.02.2025 for which no separate notice shall be issued to both sides.
Stay Applications filed by the assessee are allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions addressed in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of the Assessment Order
Issue 2: Approval under Section 153D
Issue 3: Lack of Document Identification Number (DIN)
Issue 4: Additions Towards Unaccounted Business Income
Issue 5: Disallowances under Sections 37(1) and 40A(3)
Issue 6: Addition of Seized Cash under Section 69A
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Conclusion
In conclusion, the court dismissed the appeals, affirming the CIT(A)'s decision to reject the books of accounts, estimate income based on average net profit rates, and delete separate disallowances and additions related to seized cash. The judgment emphasizes the importance of a comprehensive approach to income estimation post-search, ensuring that all discrepancies are accounted for without resorting to separate disallowances.
Addition towards undisclosed income - rejecting the books of account of the assessee and directing to estimate 18.75% of Net profit on total sales (both accounted and unaccounted and other income), HELD THAT:- The profits / income has ultimately been determined at figures which are much more than even the gross sales turnover worked out by Ld. AO. It could never be possible that the assessee has earned income which is much more than its gross receipts. The assessed income for all the AY(s) put together was much more than the accounted and unaccounted turnover as considered by AO. Therefore, the working of Ld. AO is clearly illogical and without any rational basis and accordingly, the same has rightly been rejected by Ld. CIT(A).
The inevitable conclusion would be that the books of the assessee were inaccurate unreliable, incomplete and incapable of reflecting the true and correct picture of assessee’s financial affairs. The same could, therefore, be not relied upon to determine the income of the assessee. The assessee failed to reconcile the errors in its books of account. In such a situation, the action of Ld. CIT(A) in rejecting the books u/s 145(3) is to be upheld. The same was quite logical on the given facts.
Therefore, the action of Ld. CIT(A) in rejecting the books is in accordance with law. We concur with the same.
Profit estimation by Ld. CIT(A) - We find that the same is based on average net profit earned by the assessee on regular receipts in all the years. The process of averaging would take care of any abnormal situation and iron out the differences that may be arising in various financial years. Therefore, this methodology of estimating the income of the assessee also found our concurrence. The methodology could not be faulted with. We concur with the working made by Ld. CIT(A).
Separate additions as made by AO u/s 37(1) or u/s 40A(3) would have no legs to stand. It is quite logical that once the books have been rejected and the income has been estimated on gross receipts, no separate addition / disallowances would be warranted. This view is duly supported the cited decision of Hon’ble High Court of Madras in CIT v. Amman Steel & Allied Industries [2015 (11) TMI 395 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] - Thus, the separate disallowance as made by Ld. AO u/s 37(1) and 40A(3) has rightly been deleted by Ld. CIT(A).
Cash found and seized for AY 2021-22 - It is a fact that the assessee has filed return of income in response to notices issued u/s 153A and offered additional income of 26.92 Crores from AYs 2018-19 to 2020-21. The same is much more than the cash found for Rs. 919.50 Lacs. In the absence of any other source of income, the benefit of telescoping would be available to the assessee. Therefore, the action of Ld. CIT(A) in granting of benefit thereof to the assessee could not be faulted with.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions addressed in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Entitlement to Deduction under Section 54F
Issue 2: Authority to Entertain Fresh Claims
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The judgment underscores the importance of interpreting tax provisions in a manner that aligns with their intended purpose, ensuring that procedural lapses do not undermine substantive entitlements. The decision also highlights the appellate authorities' role in ensuring fair and just taxation by considering all relevant facts and claims presented during proceedings.
Higher authorities entertain a fresh claim of the assessee, where it was not claimed in the ITR, but was claimed before the CIT(A) -Appellant has not made a claim for deduction u/s 54F during the assessment proceedings, but simply submitted that he may be allowed deduction u/s. 54F
HELD THAT:- We observe that similar issue was considered and adjudicated in the case of R. Venkata Dhana Lakshmi [2021 (6) TMI 982 - ITAT VISAKHAPATNAM] and decided the issue in favour of the assessee.
Assessee is eligible for deduction under section 54F of the Act from the long-term capital gains, though assessee has made a claim while filing the return of income in response to notice under section 148 of the Act, Appellate Authorities are not barred from entertaining the fresh claim. Hence, we set aside the order of the lower authorities and direct the Ld.AO to verify the facts regarding acquiring the new asset and allow deduction u/s.54F in respect of long-term capital gains. Accordingly, the grounds raised by the assessee on this issue are allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Treatment of Outstanding Receivables as a Separate International Transaction
Issue 2: Re-characterization of Receivables and Computation of Notional Interest
Issue 3: Appropriateness of the Interest Rate for Benchmarking
Issue 4: Entitlement to Working Capital Adjustment
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning:
Core Principles Established:
Final Determinations on Each Issue:
Separate international transaction - benchmarking of overdue receivables - recharacterisation as loan/financing - transactional net margin method (TNMM) subsumption - arm's length interest rate for crossborder receivables - currencyappropriate reference rate (LIBOR vs SBI PLR) - markup for credit risk
Separate international transaction - transactional net margin method (TNMM) subsumption - recharacterisation as loan/financing - Outstanding receivables from Associated Enterprises exceeding the agreed days constitute a separate international transaction and cannot be subsumed within the underlying sale/service transaction. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that receivables outstanding beyond the contractually agreed period amount to providing capital financing to the Associated Enterprise, since the AE enjoys funds beyond the agreed time without cost. The agreed terms of payment are distinct from the provision of sales or services and there is no link between overdue receivables and the principal transaction; accordingly the matter of delayed receipts is a separate international transaction that requires independent benchmarking. The Tribunal therefore upheld the TPO's characterisation of the overdue receivables as a separate international transaction and found no infirmity in that aspect of the TPO's order. [Paras 12]
Outstanding receivables beyond agreed days are a separate international transaction and must be benchmarked separately; the TPO's recharacterisation in this respect is sustained.
Arm's length interest rate for crossborder receivables - currencyappropriate reference rate (LIBOR vs SBI PLR) - markup for credit risk - The interest rate applied by the TPO (SBI PLR @ 13.27%) for overdue receivables raised in foreign currency is incorrect; interest should be benchmarked using LIBOR (with an appropriate markup) and the matter is remitted for computation. - HELD THAT: - The TPO's own order differentiated the reference rate depending on invoice currency: domesticcurrency invoices attract SBI PLR, while foreigncurrency invoices should be benchmarked to prevailing LIBOR plus a markup. The assessee's invoices were in Euro; therefore application of SBI PLR was without basis. The Tribunal directed the TPO to adopt LIBOR as the basis for computing arm's length interest and to determine an appropriate markup based on the actual delineation and risk profile of overdue receivables. The Tribunal observed that such markup depends on the nature and extent of risks (generally minimal for overdue receivables) and required the assessee to demonstrate the risk factors to support the proposed markup; the TPO is to verify invoices and risk content before finalising the rate. [Paras 13, 14]
TPO's use of SBI PLR is set aside for foreigncurrency invoices; the matter is remitted for recomputation using LIBOR plus an appropriate markup after verification of invoices and risk factors, with the assessee to furnish particulars supporting the markup.
Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed in part: the Tribunal affirms that receivables outstanding beyond agreed days are a separate international transaction requiring separate benchmarking, but directs recomputation of interest for foreigncurrency invoices using LIBOR plus an appropriate markup (to be shown by the assessee and verified by the TPO); the matter is remitted to the TPO for calculation in accordance with these directions.
ISSUES:
RULINGS / HOLDINGS:
RATIONALE:
TP Adjustment - comparability - rejection of usage of multiple years’ data - AR seeks inclusion of M/s Automotive Stamping Assemblies Ltd. and M/s Majestic Ltd.- HELD THAT:- These entities were initially selected as comparable entities. However, the same could not pass product filter. TPO rejected the same since both these entities were loss making entities. During proceedings before Ld. DRP, TPO reported that both these entities were not persistent loss making entities but these entities had incurred loss only in the current year. Since, TNMM require broad comparability and these entities were initially selected as comparable entities and in view of the reporting made by TPO, we direct AO / TPO to accept both these entities as comparable entities. The assessee is directed to provide the requisite data of these entities.
Exclusion of M/s Spicer India Pvt. Ltd. on the ground that this entity has significant related party transactions and exclusion of M/s JBM Auto Ltd. on the ground that this entity is functionally not comparable - AR has placed on record product information as available in public domain. The same is not supported by any segmental data or financials of these entities. Therefore, merely on the basis of product information as available in public domain, such argument cannot be accepted. We are also of the opinion that TNMM require broad comparability only and therefore, if business model is same, these entities could be accepted.
Therefore, M/s Spicer India Pvt. Ltd. has rightly been included. The Ld. AR stated that segmental of M/s JBM Auto Ltd. is available and the assessee is in a position to provide the requisite details thereof. Considering the same, the issue qua this entity is restored back to the file of AO/TPO with a direction to the assessee to provide segmental information. AO / Ld. TPO is directed to re-adjudicate the issue with respect to this entity.
AR has stated that forex exchange loss would be nonoperating in nature. This argument could not be accepted since the assessee has carried out import transactions and forex loss has direct linkage with the international transactions as carried out by the assessee. Therefore, forex losses / gains have to be considered as operating in nature.
AR has sought various economic adjustments. However, it was admitted position that these adjustments were not granted by Tribunal in earlier years. Therefore, no indulgence is required on the same.
Disallowance as per the provisions of Sec.43A - It could be seen that the assessee has failed to provide the requisite details of forex loss before lower authorities. AR has submitted that the impugned loss has two components i.e., ECB Loan which is capital in nature and second component is forex on Buyer’s credit which is revenue in nature. Since adequate details thereof were not filed before lower authorities, we restore this issue back to the file of Ld. AO for fresh adjudication with a direction to the assessee to substantiate its case. The corresponding grounds stand allowed for statistical purpose.
Additional Depreciation not allowed by AO in the absence of revised return - HELD THAT:- Assessee has claimed depreciation in subsequent years on WDV of the assets. The additional depreciation was neither provided in the books nor claimed in the return of income. In such a case, the allowance of claim would disturb the working of depreciation in all the subsequent years which could not be permitted at this stage. Even otherwise also, this claim would be revenue neutral since the assessee has claimed as well as allowed depreciation on WDV of the assets in subsequent years. This being so, this claim cannot be accepted in this year. The corresponding grounds raised by the assessee stand dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment include:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Determination of ALP for SBLC
Issue 2: Disallowance of Revenue Expenditure
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
TP Adjustment - TPO/DRP considering bank guarantee rates as suitable comparable under CUP method for determination of ALP of the international transaction i.e. Stand-by Letter of Credit (SBLC) issued to foreign AE - HELD THAT:- We find that the assessee’s bank has charged 0.50% per annum for the period after 17.06.2018 till 17.06.2022 and before that assessee was charged @ 1% for the period 17.06.2016 to 17.06.2018. Thus, in the financial year 2016-17 assessee had paid 1% as the cost of extending the SBLC to AE, for which assessed should have been compensated by the AE. Therefore, we are inclined hold that Ld. AO/TPO shall consider rate of 1%, to be ALP for this international transaction and accordingly we allow the grounds No.5-7. Further as per the provisions of Rule 115 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, the TPO will apply the correct conversion rate for which assessee may also be given opportunity of hearing.
Disallowance u/s 35(2AB) - revenue expenditure claimed by the Appellant, which was in excess of the amount quantified by the DSIR - further disallowing the same u/s 37(1) - whether AO has not examined the aspect of differential amount being for the purpose of business only? - HELD THAT:- We are of the considered view that section 37 of the Act is the primary basis for consideration of an expense debited in the books before being considered for a disallowance u/s 35(2AB) of the Act and the fact that a part of the expenditure stands allowed on the basis of Form 3CL as capital expenditure. The remaining should be allowed as revenue expenditure and both the tax authorities have fallen in error in not considering the same. Accordingly, these grounds are also allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal issues presented and considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Justifiability of the TP Adjustment at 1.9%
Relevant legal framework and precedents:
The relevant legal framework involves the application of sections 92B(1) and 92CA of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which deal with international transactions and the computation of Arm's Length Price (ALP). Precedents include decisions from the Bombay High Court in CIT vs. Everest Kanto Ltd and the Madras High Court in CIT vs. Redington India Ltd.
Court's interpretation and reasoning:
The Tribunal noted that the TPO had used a median rate of 1.9% for the corporate guarantee fee based on information from commercial banks. However, the Tribunal highlighted its previous decisions in the assessee's own case for AYs 2014-15 and 2016-17, where it had determined that a 0.50% rate was appropriate.
Key evidence and findings:
The TPO relied on data from commercial banks to determine the 1.9% rate. However, the Tribunal found that in prior cases, a 0.50% rate was deemed appropriate based on judicial precedents and consistent application of the law.
Application of law to facts:
The Tribunal applied the principle of consistency, emphasizing that the same issue had been decided in the assessee's favor in previous years, thus supporting a 0.50% rate.
Treatment of competing arguments:
The Tribunal considered the Revenue's argument supporting the TPO's decision but found it unpersuasive in light of its own previous rulings and the principle of consistency.
Conclusions:
The Tribunal concluded that the corporate guarantee commission should be charged at 0.50% instead of 1.9%, aligning with its earlier decisions.
Issue 2: Consistency with Previous Tribunal Decisions
Relevant legal framework and precedents:
The Tribunal relied on its own previous decisions and the principle of consistency in judicial decisions, referencing the doctrine of res judicata's inapplicability to tax matters.
Court's interpretation and reasoning:
The Tribunal emphasized that while res judicata does not apply, consistency in decision-making is crucial, especially when facts and circumstances remain unchanged.
Key evidence and findings:
The Tribunal referenced its prior rulings in the assessee's case, which had established a 0.50% rate for corporate guarantee fees.
Application of law to facts:
The Tribunal applied its previous rulings to the current case, finding no reason to deviate from the established rate of 0.50%.
Treatment of competing arguments:
The Tribunal acknowledged the Revenue's position but found the principle of consistency and previous decisions more compelling.
Conclusions:
The Tribunal upheld its earlier decisions, reinforcing the 0.50% rate for corporate guarantee fees.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve verbatim quotes of crucial legal reasoning:
"We hereby hold that the corporate guarantee commission is an international transaction and should be charged @ 0.50% on the corporate guarantee amount given to the AEs."
Core principles established:
Final determinations on each issue:
In conclusion, the Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee, thereby reducing the corporate guarantee commission rate to 0.50% and emphasizing the significance of consistency in judicial decisions.
TP adjustment - corporate guarantee commission addition @ 1.9% on the amount guaranteed as corporate guarantee given to AEs - HELD THAT:- As per assessee’s own case for the earlier AYs 2014-15 and 2016-17 as well as following the principle of consistency and respectfully following the decision of this Tribunal [2023 (2) TMI 1174 - ITAT VISAKHAPATNAM], we hereby hold that the corporate guarantee commission is an international transaction and accordingly should be charged @ 0.50% on the corporate guarantee amount given to the AEs.
Therefore, we have no hesitation to delete the addition confirmed by the Ld. DRP being 1.9% of the corporate guarantee amount. Thus, the grounds raised by the assessee are allowed.
Issues: Whether the review petitions disclosed any error apparent on the face of the record so as to warrant review under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules 2013.
Analysis: The review jurisdiction is confined to cases where a patent and manifest error is shown on the face of the record. On perusal of the review petitions, no such error was found and no ground satisfying the threshold for review was established.
Conclusion: The review petitions did not meet the requirements for review and were liable to be dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi: Review under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules 2013 lies only when an error apparent on the face of the record is demonstrated.
Rectification of mistake - error apparent on the face of the record or not - Imposition of penalty on the Appellant under Section 112 (a) of the Customs Act, 1962 - cryptic and non-speaking order - HELD THAT:- There is no error apparent on the face of the record. No case for review under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules 2013 has been established.
The Review Petitions are therefore, dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The legal judgment presented involves multiple core legal questions, which are considered in two separate appeals, CUSTA/65/2024 and CUSTA/70/2024. The issues can be summarized as follows:
For CUSTA/65/2024:
For CUSTA/70/2024:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 (CUSTA/65/2024): Credibility of PSIC and Chemical Analysis Reports
Issue 2 (CUSTA/65/2024): Competence of Customs Authorities
Issue 3 (CUSTA/70/2024): Tribunal's Decision and Penalties
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Verbatim Quotes:
Core Principles Established:
Final Determinations:
Pre-Shipment Inspection Certificate - Chemical Analysis Report - External examination - Classification of waste - Hazardous and other wastes (Management and Transboundary Movement) Rules, 2016 - Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change - Office Memorandum - Penalty under section 112(a) and 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 - Penalty under section 114AA of the Customs Act - Disposal under supervision of SPCBs/PCCs
Pre-Shipment Inspection Certificate - Chemical Analysis Report - External examination - Classification of waste - Office Memorandum - Admission of appeals on specified substantial questions of law relating to the evidentiary value of PSICs and Chemical Analysis Reports, the effect of external/customs examination, classification of waste, competence of customs vis-a-vis the nodal agency, and applicability of earlier OM. - HELD THAT: - The High Court admitted the appeals and framed multiple substantial questions of law for consideration. Those questions, as recorded by the Court, concern (a) the weight to be given to PreShipment Inspection Certificates and their appended Chemical Analysis Reports where their integrity is not impugned by Customs; (b) whether findings in such Chemical Analysis Reports can be displaced by visual/external examination without chemical testing; (c) whether Customs' conclusion that the consignment constituted municipal/domestic waste is supported by evidence when the Chemical Analysis Report recorded absence of such waste; (d) whether PSICs and appended chemical reports issued by DGFTauthorised agencies can be overridden by Customs' external reports if the PSICs' integrity is unchallenged; (e) whether Customs is competent to identify/classify wastes when the Hazardous and other wastes Rules, 2016 designate a nodal agency; (f) whether Customs may rely solely on visual examination without consulting the nodal agency or verifying waste source; (g) whether the tribunal's findings are perverse or unsupported by evidence; and (h) the applicability of an earlier Office Memorandum to imports after issuance of a later OM. The Court admitted these substantial questions for full consideration on merits by the appellate process; no merits determination on these questions was made at this stage.
Appeals admitted on the stated substantial questions of law for consideration.
Disposal under supervision of SPCBs/PCCs - Office Memorandum - Direction permitting the appellant to comply with the Commissioner (Appeals) order for supervised disposal of the impugned goods subject to the outcome of the appeal. - HELD THAT: - Having regard to the value of the goods and demurrage being suffered, and without prejudice to the rights and contentions in the appeal, the Court directed the appellant to comply with the disposal option granted by the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) in his order dated 28.08.2023. That order provides the appellant may dispose of the impugned goods in wastetoenergy plants or by use in a cement plant under the supervision of the respective State Pollution Control Boards/ Pollution Control Committees, where the appellant has such arrangements, on payment of the prescribed percentage of the value of the goods. The High Court expressly made such compliance subject to the final outcome of this appeal, thereby allowing immediate relief to mitigate demurrage while preserving appellate rights.
Appellant directed to comply with the Commissioner (Appeals) disposal direction dated 28.08.2023 under SPCB/PCC supervision, subject to the outcome of the appeal.
Filing directions - Listing and stay applications - Procedural directions concerning preparation of paper books, listing timetable, and the closure of interim stay applications. - HELD THAT: - The Court directed the appellant to file requisite informal paper books, prepared out of Court and containing all relevant materials used before the court below, within ten weeks and to serve copies on the respondent's advocate. The matters were listed for hearing twelve weeks hence together with the related appeal. The Court recorded that settlement of index and other formalities were dispensed with and that, since the respondent was represented, service of notice of appeal stood dispensed with. The interim stay applications were ordered closed.
Appellant to file paper books within ten weeks; matters listed twelve weeks; stay applications closed; procedural formalities dispensed with.
Final Conclusion: The High Court admitted the appeals on the specific substantial questions of law set out in the order; allowed the appellant to comply with the Commissioner (Appeals) disposal direction dated 28.08.2023 (disposal under SPCB/PCC supervision on payment of the prescribed percentage) subject to the final outcome of the appeals; directed preparation and filing of paper books and listed the matters for further hearing; and closed the interim stay applications.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal issues considered in this judgment include:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Mistaken Delivery and Entitlement to Auction Money
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The Customs Act, 1962, particularly Sections 45, 46, 47, and 48, outlines the procedures for the importation, custody, and clearance of goods. The definition of "importer" under Section 2(26) and the requirements for an Indian consignee were central to this issue.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The court examined the sales contract and related documents, which indicated that the goods were indeed destined for India, specifically Wardha. The court found that the petitioner's claim of a mistake was unfounded, as the documentation consistently showed India as the destination.
Key Evidence and Findings: The sales contract, bills of lading, and communication between the parties demonstrated that the goods were intended for India. The court noted the petitioner's awareness of the destination and the lack of evidence supporting a mistake claim.
Application of Law to Facts: The court applied the definitions and procedures outlined in the Customs Act, concluding that the goods were lawfully imported and the petitioner's claims of mistake were without merit.
Treatment of Competing Arguments: The court rejected the petitioner's arguments regarding the absence of an Indian consignee and the alleged mistake in delivery, emphasizing the documentary evidence to the contrary.
Conclusions: The court concluded that the goods were correctly delivered to India and the petitioner was not entitled to claim a mistake or the auction money based on the alleged error.
Issue 2: Enforcement of Public Notices and Regulations
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Public Notices No. 33/2018 and 154/2018, along with the Sea Cargo Manifest and Transhipment Regulations, 2018, were examined to determine their applicability and enforcement.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The court noted that while the public notices and regulations aimed to ensure accurate documentation, they did not carry statutory penalties for non-compliance. The transitional provisions allowed for flexibility in implementation.
Key Evidence and Findings: The court found no evidence that the absence of an Indian consignee in the documentation was a mandatory requirement at the time of import.
Application of Law to Facts: The court concluded that the public notices and regulations did not mandate the presence of an Indian consignee for the importation of goods, and their non-compliance did not invalidate the import process.
Treatment of Competing Arguments: The court addressed the petitioner's reliance on the public notices, clarifying that they did not have the force of law to prevent the unloading of goods without an Indian consignee.
Conclusions: The court held that the public notices and regulations did not impose mandatory requirements that were violated in this case, and the importation process was valid.
Issue 3: Legality of the Auction
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Sections 48 and 150 of the Customs Act, 1962, govern the auction of unclaimed goods and the procedure for such sales.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The court examined the auction process, including the issuance of notices and the permission granted by the customs authorities. It found that the necessary procedures were followed.
Key Evidence and Findings: The court noted that the petitioner was informed of the auction and had opportunities to clear the goods, which it failed to do.
Application of Law to Facts: The court applied the statutory requirements for auctioning unclaimed goods, concluding that the auction was conducted lawfully.
Treatment of Competing Arguments: The court rejected the petitioner's claims of inadequate notice and improper auction procedures, citing evidence of compliance with legal requirements.
Conclusions: The court upheld the legality of the auction, finding no procedural violations or grounds for cancellation.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve verbatim quotes of crucial legal reasoning: "The primary responsibility for payment of the rent/demurrage charges is that of the importer, who obviously would be the person claiming title to the goods, which in the present matter is the petitioner."
Core Principles Established: The court reaffirmed the responsibilities of importers under the Customs Act and clarified the non-mandatory nature of certain public notice requirements.
Final Determinations on Each Issue: The court dismissed the petition, ruling against the petitioner on all issues and upholding the actions of the customs authorities and the legality of the auction.
This summary provides a comprehensive analysis of the judgment, focusing on the key issues, legal reasoning, and conclusions reached by the court.Seeking to recall the permission granted by them to the respondent No. 3 to proceed with the auction of the Cargo under the bills of lading - direction to hand over the entire sale proceeds of the Cargo to the petitioner, unconditionally and free of all lien - Whether the goods were in fact destined for India or there was a mistake in the delivery of goods by the respondent No. 4/Shipper at Nhava Sheva Port, so as to entitle the petitioner to claim a mistake by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, in having custody of the goods and continuing with it, and thus entitlement to the auction money?
HELD THAT:- The definition of the word ‘importer’, as defined in Section 2 (26) of the Customs Act, in relation to any goods, at the time between their importation and the time when they are cleared for home consumption, indicates that it includes any owner, beneficial owner or any person holding himself out to be the importer. This would indicate that the definition is an inclusive one and considering the definition of ‘beneficial owner’, as defined in Section 2(3-A) of the Customs Act, which defines it to mean any person on whose behalf the goods are being imported or exported, or who exercises effective control over the goods being imported or exported, would further indicate that it would also mean a person, who is capable of exercising legal control and possession over the same. The language of the definition of ‘importer’, nowhere indicates that such importer, for the purposes of importing of goods into India, has to be an Indian Party.
A perusal of the Public Notice No. 33/2018, indicates that it was issued on account of a number of instances where consignments of hazardous waste, other waste or restricted items were imported in the name of certain importers and remained uncleared, without anyone coming forward to claim the cargo, leading to a suspicion that such consignments were imported for dumping hazardous waste from the exporting country which was posing a serious environmental threat. It is in this background that the requirement of details regarding the (a) Import and Export Code (IEC) of the Importer, (b) GST identification number (GSTIN) of the importer and (c) Official e-mail id of the importer, were directed to be supplied by the importers to their exporters, so that they could be included in the Bills of Lading at the time of booking of such consignments, which was to be applicable w.e.f. 01/04/2018 - What is material to note is that neither Public 15 Notice No. 33/2018; Public Notice No. 154/2018 nor the pursis referred to above, indicate that any penalty has been prescribed for the Bills of Lading and the Import General Manifest, not disclosing the (a) Import & Export Code (IEC) of the Importer, (b) GST identification number (GSTIN) of the importer and (c) Official e-mail id of the importer. If a requirement is claimed to be mandatory, then its violation, ought to carry consequences, which is not the position as is reflected from Public Notice No. 33/2018, Public Notice No. 154/2018 or for that matter the stand of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 as reflected from the pursis dated 10/12/2024.
Till 31/11/2024, the requirement to indicate the name of the consignee as well as to furnish the details of the consignee such as IE Code, GSTIN and other requirements as indicated in Public Notice Nos.33/2018 and 154/2018, which now stand culminated in Statutory Regulations, vide Regulation No. 4 of the Regulations of 2018, stood postponed, on account of the transitional provisions, as contained in Regulation 15 (2) of the Regulations of 2018. The provisions of Sections 30, 31 and 32 of the Customs Act, relating to Arrival or Import manifest, therefore have to be construed accordingly - It therefore does not now lie with the petitioner to contend that the goods were never destined for India, and the respondent No. 4, ought not to have discharged them at Nhava Sheva, India, in the custody of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The contention is, therefore, rejected.
It is equally trite, that since a plea of fraud is being invoked, the same would require evidence to be led, as disputed questions of fact would be involved and would not permit the invocation of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the goods reached ICD Wardha, between 17/01/2023 to 09/03/2023, on account of their transshipment from Nhava Sheva, India. The obligation of the petitioner, who claims title to such goods, to get them cleared, after following the procedure as prescribed in Sections 45 to 47 of the Customs Act, thus accrued on such dates when the goods reached ICD Wardha. The petitioner, thus had to get them cleared within a period of 30 days as and when they were unloaded at ICD, Wardha - the earlier communication dated 15/05/2024 (pg.212) by the petitioner to the Assistant Commissioner of Customs, ICD Wardha, in fact, indicates its knowledge of the entire set of events which had led to the consignment reaching ICD Wardha, and so also its obligation and responsibility to get them cleared as the said communication specifically records the intention of the petitioner to pay the customs duty and clear the consignments. Even if customs duty was not payable on the consignment, as is contended, still, this communication indicates the willingness of the petitioner to clear the consignment, which in turn would mandate it to follow the procedure for clearance as indicate in Sections 45 to 49 of the Customs Act.
The action of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, permitting the goods to be auctioned and that of the respondent No. 3, in auctioning the goods, in view of the above discussion, cannot be faulted with. For the same reasons, we also hold that the claim by the petitioner that the custody of the respondent Nos. 1 to 3, was invalid, is incorrect, as a result of which, the plea by the petitioner, that the deductions as contemplated by Section 150 (2) of the Customs Act, are not attracted or applicable is turned down.
Conclusion - The primary responsibility for payment of the rent/demurrage charges is that of the importer, who obviously would be the person claiming title to the goods, which in the present matter is the petitioner.
There are no merit in the petition. The writ petition is dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Legality of Seizure Without Reasonable Belief under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962
- Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 123 mandates that seizure can only be effected if the proper officer has a 'reasonable belief' that the goods are smuggled or illegally imported. Precedents emphasize that mere possession without reasonable belief does not justify seizure.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court observed that the authorities failed to form or record any reasonable belief that the gold was smuggled. The impugned orders were based on assumptions and presumptions without evidentiary basis. The absence of any cogent reason or credible evidence to support the belief that the gold was illegally imported rendered the seizure unsustainable.
- Key Evidence and Findings: No evidence was produced by the Revenue to prove foreign origin or illegal importation. The seizure memo lacked findings of reasonable belief. The Court relied on prior Tribunal decisions emphasizing the necessity of reasonable belief for lawful seizure.
- Application of Law to Facts: Since no reasonable belief was formed, Section 123 was held inapplicable. The burden to prove smuggling lay on the Revenue, which was not discharged.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Revenue's argument that the burden lay on appellants to prove licit purchase was rejected in light of Section 123's requirement of reasonable belief before seizure. The appellants' reliance on established case law was accepted.
- Conclusion: Seizure without reasonable belief is illegal; thus, the seizure of gold was not sustainable.
Issue 2: Burden of Proof and Evidence of Licit Purchase
- Legal Framework and Precedents: Under Section 123, once reasonable belief is formed, the burden shifts to the person claiming ownership to prove licit possession. However, if no reasonable belief exists, the Revenue must prove smuggling.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The appellants produced invoices from indigenous sources (M/S DCM & Co) showing legal purchase of the gold. The investigating officers did not produce any evidence negating these documents or challenging the genuineness of the purchase.
- Key Evidence and Findings: Invoices No. 56 and 58 evidencing purchase of 174.900 gms and 274.450 gms from indigenous sources were submitted. No contrary evidence was adduced by the Revenue.
- Application of Law to Facts: The appellants discharged their evidentiary burden to prove licit possession. The absence of any counter-evidence by the Revenue supported the appellants' claim.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Revenue's contention that appellants failed to discharge the burden under Section 123 was dismissed due to the absence of reasonable belief prerequisite and lack of contradictory evidence.
- Conclusion: The appellants successfully established licit purchase and possession of the seized gold.
Issue 3: Validity of Confiscation and Penalty under Section 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962
- Legal Framework and Precedents: Confiscation and penalty under Section 112(b) require proof of smuggling or illegal importation. Without such proof, confiscation and penalty are not sustainable.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: Since seizure itself was unsustainable due to lack of reasonable belief and evidence, consequential confiscation and penalty were also held invalid. The Court noted that penalty imposition is contingent on lawful confiscation.
- Key Evidence and Findings: No evidence was produced to establish smuggling or illegal importation. The penalty was imposed mechanically without proper adjudication on merits.
- Application of Law to Facts: The confiscation and penalty orders were quashed as they were founded on an unlawful seizure and absence of proof of smuggling.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Revenue's support for confiscation and penalty was rejected for failure to meet statutory requirements.
- Conclusion: Confiscation and penalty were set aside as legally unsustainable.
Issue 4: Compliance with Principles of Natural Justice
- Legal Framework and Precedents: Natural justice requires fair opportunity to the affected party to produce evidence, be heard, and receive relied upon documents (RUDs).
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court found that no Panchanama was drawn at seizure, and the appellants' repeated requests for RUDs were ignored. The adjudicating and appellate authorities failed to provide reasonable opportunity to explain or contest allegations.
- Key Evidence and Findings: Absence of Panchanama, non-supply of RUDs, and lack of hearing opportunity were established from record and submissions.
- Application of Law to Facts: Non-observance of natural justice principles vitiated the confiscation and penalty orders.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: No credible justification was offered by the Revenue for non-compliance.
- Conclusion: Orders passed without adherence to natural justice were held invalid.
Issue 5: Sufficiency of Evidence to Establish Foreign Origin and Smuggled Nature of Gold
- Legal Framework and Precedents: Mere possession is insufficient; Revenue must produce evidence proving foreign origin and smuggling.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court noted absence of any foreign markings on gold, no evidence of illegal import, and no corroboration of smuggling allegations. Reliance was placed on prior rulings emphasizing evidentiary requirements.
- Key Evidence and Findings: No investigation report or expert evidence was submitted to prove foreign origin or smuggling. Appellants' documents showed indigenous purchase.
- Application of Law to Facts: Without evidence, the allegation of smuggling remained unsubstantiated.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: Revenue's reliance on presumption was rejected.
- Conclusion: Evidence was insufficient to establish foreign origin or smuggled character.
Issue 6: Validity of Seizure Procedure including Absence of Panchanama and Non-Supply of RUDs
- Legal Framework and Precedents: Proper seizure procedure requires drawing Panchanama and supplying RUDs to ensure transparency and fairness.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court observed procedural lapses including no Panchanama at seizure and failure to provide RUDs despite appellants' requests. Such lapses undermined legality of seizure and subsequent proceedings.
- Key Evidence and Findings: Record showed absence of Panchanama and no response to RUD requests.
- Application of Law to Facts: Procedural irregularities contributed to invalidation of seizure and confiscation.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: No valid explanation was offered for procedural non-compliance.
- Conclusion: Seizure procedure was flawed and contributed to unsustainability of orders.
Reasonable belief for seizure under Section 123 of the Customs Act - burden of proof regarding foreign origin and smuggling - confiscation of goods under Section 111 of the Customs Act - penalty under Section 112 of the Customs Act - principles of natural justice in adjudication and supply of RUDs
Reasonable belief for seizure under Section 123 of the Customs Act - burden of proof regarding foreign origin and smuggling - confiscation of goods under Section 111 of the Customs Act - Validity of seizure and absolute confiscation of the seized gold in absence of evidence forming a reasonable belief of foreign origin and smuggling, and sufficiency of documents produced by the appellants to rebut smuggling allegation - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the Department produced no evidence to corroborate that the seized gold was of foreign origin or illegally imported and that no mens rea of smuggling was established. The adjudicating authorities proceeded on presumptions and assumptions without recording cogent reasons constituting a reasonable belief as required for invoking Section 123. The appellants produced invoices from M/s DCM & Co. evidencing purchase by the firm M/s Rahul Jewellers; the investigating officers produced no contrary evidence to negate those documents. Applying the principle that seizure under Section 123 requires formation of a reasonable belief supported by cogent reasons/evidence, and that initial burden lies on Revenue to establish foreign origin and smuggling, the Tribunal held that confiscation under provisions including Section 111 is not sustainable where such belief and supporting evidence are absent. The Tribunal relied on its earlier reasoning in a recent Tribunal order which emphasised that mere possession or suspicion without recorded reasons is insufficient to justify confiscation. [Paras 13]
Seizure and absolute confiscation of the gold set aside as unsustainable for want of reasonable belief and absence of proof of foreign origin and smuggling; appellants' documents held sufficient to dispel smuggling allegation.
Principles of natural justice in adjudication and supply of RUDs - penalty under Section 112 of the Customs Act - Whether the adjudication complied with principles of natural justice and whether the penalties imposed are sustainable in view of the invalidation of confiscation - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal observed that no panchanama was drawn at the time of seizure and that the appellants' repeated requests for release and for supply of relied-upon documents (RUDs) went unanswered, indicating failure to follow principles of natural justice. Because the confiscation was set aside on substantive grounds, the penalties imposed under Section 112 cannot survive; the penalties are ancillary to and dependent on the validity of confiscation. Accordingly, for both procedural infirmity and as a consequence of setting aside the confiscation, the penalties were held to be not sustainable. [Paras 13, 14]
Non-observance of natural justice found; penalties set aside as unsustainable consequent to invalidation of confiscation; appeals allowed with consequential relief.
Final Conclusion: Impugned orders of confiscation and penalty set aside; appeals allowed and seized gold ordered released with consequential relief as per law.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Classification of Imported Goods
Issue 2: Entitlement to Exemption Benefits
Issue 3: Justification of Confiscation and Penalties
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
In conclusion, the court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned order, and ruled in favor of the appellant on all issues presented.
Classification of imported goods - Broom Sticks (between 140 to 160 cm.) - to be classified under the CTH 14049090 or under CTH 96031000? - denial of benefit under Sl. No.1580(I) of Notification No.46/2011-CUS dated 01.06.2011. and Sl. no. 93B of Notification No. 2/2017 dated 01.07.2017 - HELD THAT:- Sub-heading 9603 specifically covers brooms, whereas chapter sub-heading 1404 deals with 'vegetable products not elsewhere specified'. In the Order-in-Original, the Ld. adjudicating authority has observed that CTH 1404 covers 'raw stalks of broom'. It is observed that chapter 1404 is a residuary sub- heading covering vegetable products not elsewhere specified. As per the General Rules of Interpretation for classification of goods, a specific heading is always preferred over a general heading. In the present case it is observed that the goods imported by the appellant are 'brooms' which is specifically covered under the sub-heading 9603 whereas sub-heading 1404 is a general entry covering vegetable material not elsewhere specified. Resorting to such general entry is required only when there is no specific sub-heading covering the goods. In this case there is a specific sub-heading 9603 is available in the Tariff covering the goods brooms and broomsticks used for making brooms. Thus, on comparison of the description of the entries available in CTH 9603 and CTH 1404, the imported goods are more appropriately classifiable under Chapter 96 and not under Chapter 14.
Chapter Note 3 of Chapter 96 provides that such expression in heading 9603 applies to materials which are ready for incorporation without division in brooms or which require only such further minor process as trimming to shape at the top, to render them ready for such incorporation. In other words, broom sticks can be of vegetable twigs and are merit classifiable under CTH 96031000 when ready for incorporation without division in broom or when require minor process as trimming to shape at the top to render them ready for such incorporation - the goods imported by the appellant are appropriately classifiable under the CTH 96031000 and the appellant would be eligible for the benefit of Sl. No.1580 (I) of Notification No.46/2011-CUS dated 01.06.2011 with respect to BCD and Sl. No.144 of Notification No.02/2017-CUS towards exemption of IGST. Thus, the demand of customs duty of Rs.4,59,025/- along with interest confirmed in the impugned order, by denying the benefits of the above said notifications, is not sustainable and accordingly, the same is set aside.
Conclusion - The demand of customs duty confirmed in the impugned order by denying the benefit of the Notification No. 46/2011-Cus on the ground of mis declaration is legally not tenable. The benefit of Notification No.002/2017- ITR dated 01.07.2017 available for IGST exemption cannot also be denied to the importer/appellant. Assuming but not admitting that the goods are merit classifiable under CTH 14049090, then also benefit of Sl. No. 93B of Notification No. 002/2017-ITR dated 01.07.2017 for IGST and Sl. No. 116(I) of Notification No.46/2011-CUS dated 01.06.2011 for BCD, is available to the importer/appellant. The demand of customs duty of Rs.4,59,025/- along with interest confirmed in the impugned order, by denying the benefits of the above said notifications, is not sustainable. The order of confiscation and imposition of fine in lieu of such confiscation in the impugned order set aside - penalties set aside.
Appeal allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment include:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Mis-declaration of Goods
Issue 2: Justification of Demands and Penalties
Issue 3: Confiscation and Redemption Fine
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Benefit of exemption from payment of CVD under N/N. 4/2006-CE dated01.03.2006, as amended - declaration of goods as Rutile Sand/Rutile in the Bill of Entry and claimed classification under Heading No.26.14 of the Customs Tariff - Extended period of limitation.
HELD THAT:- The appellant-company had been importing the said goods by declaring the same as Rutile Sand/Rutile all along in the Bills of Entry filed by them. At the time of importation, they have submitted all the necessary documents, such as, invoices, packing lists, test certificates, certificates of origin, bills of lading, marine insurance, etc. The said goods were thereafter examined by the Customs authorities and after being satisfied about the correctness of the appellant's claim, the Customs authorities duly assessed the bills of entry. The Customs authorities duly allowed the exemption, as claimed under the said notifications, and no C.V.D. was charged in the assessed bills of entry. The appellant has paid the duty according to the assessed bills of entry and cleared the said goods.
The appellant has been importing the said goods and declared the same as Rutile sand/Rutile even on earlier occasions. The Test reports attached to the earlier imports indicate that the same have 90% to 96% of Titanium Dioxide. Upon due examination, the appellant was allowed such exemption in respect of all their imports right from the year 2007 up to September 2012. Along with the bill of entry, the appellant always submitted copy of test certificate of the foreign supplier which mentioned the Titanium Dioxide content in the Rutile Sand as 95% and above.
The goods imported by the appellant in the years 2007 to 2010 has enclosed the Certificate of Analysis which shows the Titanium Di Oxide percentage ranging above 95%. The said goods were declared by the appellant-importer as Rutile sand/Rutile and the Customs authorities had duly allowed the exemption as claimed under the said notifications and no C.V.D. was charged in the assessed bills of entry.
Extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- In the instant case in respect of all the four Bills of entry, the appellants have made the correct declaration at the time of importation of the said goods as Rutile Sand/Rutile and correctly claimed classification under the Heading 26.14 of the Customs Tariff and also rightly claimed exemption from payment of C.V. Duty under the said notifications. Thus, the allegations of mis-declaration in all the four Bills of Entry in the instant case are not sustainable - the demands of differential duty along with interest confirmed in the impugned order by invoking the extended period of limitation is not sustainable.
Conclusion - i) The goods imported by the appellant in the years 2007 to 2010 has enclosed the Certificate of Analysis which shows the Titanium Di Oxide percentage ranging above 95%. The said goods were declared by the appellant-importer as Rutile sand/Rutile and the Customs authorities had duly allowed the exemption as claimed under the said notifications and no C.V.D. was charged in the assessed bills of entry. ii) The demands of differential duty along with interest confirmed in the impugned order by invoking the extended period of limitation is not sustainable.
Appeal allowed in part.
ISSUES:
RULINGS / HOLDINGS:
RATIONALE:
Availability of exemption under Notification No. 57/2017 (Sl. No.5D(b)) for inputs or parts for use in manufacture of display assemblies - availability of exemption for inputs or parts scrapped or lost in the manufacturing process - interpretation of the phrase 'for use' in exemption notifications as meaning intended for or put to use in manufacture - competence to seek an advance ruling in respect of ongoing imports under Section 28E(b) read with Section 28I(2) of the Customs Act
Competence to seek an advance ruling in respect of ongoing imports under Section 28E(b) read with Section 28I(2) of the Customs Act - Whether the applicant was eligible to file the advance ruling application in respect of goods which it was already importing - HELD THAT: - The Authority construed Section 28E(b) together with Section 28I(2) and the statutory scheme introduced by the 2018 amendments, observing that the phrase 'its' in 'in respect of any goods prior to its importation' must be read in harmony with the bar on applications where a lis is pending. Each import is a separate event and advance rulings may be sought in relation to goods before the particular importation in question provided no dispute is pending in the applicant's case. Past imports do not ipso facto oust jurisdiction to entertain an application which will have prospective effect. Having applied this construction and considered prior administrative rulings, the Authority held the applicant eligible to seek an advance ruling on the questions raised.
The application for advance ruling is maintainable and the applicant is eligible to seek the advance ruling in respect of the goods under consideration.
Availability of exemption under Notification No. 57/2017 (Sl. No.5D(b)) for inputs or parts for use in manufacture of display assemblies - interpretation of the phrase 'for use' in exemption notifications as meaning intended for or put to use in manufacture - Whether Sl. No. 5D(b) of Notification No. 57/2017-Customs applies to imports of inputs or parts put to use in manufacture of display assemblies that are in turn used in manufacture of cellular mobile phones - HELD THAT: - The Authority examined the language of entry 5D(b) and Condition No.1 (performance of IGCR/IGCR2022 procedures) and concluded that the exemption covers 'inputs or parts for use in manufacture of' the specified display assemblies irrespective of the tariff classification of those inputs. The Authority accepted the statutory and precedential approach that 'for use' denotes intention/putting to use in the manufacturing process and that the IGCR framework (bonds, records and postimport compliance) contemplates goods 'put to use' in manufacture. Applying this construction to the facts presented (imports for manufacture of display assemblies destined for cellular mobile phones and compliance with IGCR Rules), the Authority held the exemption available for such imports.
The benefit under Sl. No. 5D(b) of Notification No. 57/2017 is available for imports of inputs or parts for use in the manufacture of display assemblies that will be used in manufacture of cellular mobile phones.
Availability of exemption for inputs or parts scrapped or lost in the manufacturing process - interpretation of the phrase 'for use' in exemption notifications as meaning intended for or put to use in manufacture - Whether the nilduty benefit under Sl. No. 5D(b) extends to inputs or parts that are damaged/scrapped or lost in the manufacturing process and do not physically form part of the finished display assembly - HELD THAT: - Relying on the statutory language, the IGCR Rules' emphasis on goods being 'put to use', and consistent judicial principles that inputs consumed or inevitably lost in an integrated manufacturing process are to be regarded as 'used' or 'intended for use' in manufacture, the Authority held that such process loss/scrap falls within the ambit of 'for use in manufacture'. The Authority therefore concluded that inputs or parts damaged or scrapped during manufacture are eligible for the exemption, and because that question is answered in the affirmative the related question of reversal of exemption was rendered not applicable.
The nilduty exemption under Sl. No. 5D(b) applies to inputs or parts that are damaged, scrapped or lost in the manufacturing process; question of reversal is not applicable.
Final Conclusion: The Authority accepted the applicant's eligibility to seek an advance ruling and ruled that Sl. No. 5D(b) of Notification No. 57/2017Customs (subject to compliance with IGCR procedures) applies to imports of inputs and parts for manufacture of display assemblies used in cellular mobile phones and extends to inputs or parts that are damaged or scrapped during the manufacturing process; the issue of reversal of exemption accordingly does not arise.
Issues: Whether directions should be issued to ensure statewide verification of commencement certificates and sanctioned plans before real estate project registration under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, and whether a generalized re-scrutiny of all RERA registrations in Maharashtra was warranted.
Analysis: The petition arose from concern over fraudulent commencement certificates and unauthorized constructions. The statutory scheme of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 requires prior registration of projects, submission of authenticated approvals and commencement certificates, and empowers the Authority to revoke registrations in appropriate cases. On the material placed, the Authority and State authorities had already taken substantial steps, including revocation of tainted registrations, directives for website integration, and a mechanism for uploading and verifying statutory certificates. The Court also noted that a writ court cannot order a speculative or roving inquiry across all registrations in the absence of concrete prima facie material showing widespread fraud in identified projects. At the same time, the record showed that systemic verification measures were necessary and were being implemented, and directions could be issued to strengthen that process.
Conclusion: A broad prayer for statewide re-scrutiny of all RERA registrations was declined, but limited directions were issued to secure verification, website integration, prompt uploading of certificates, and demolition of identified illegal structures. The relief was therefore granted only to the extent of systemic compliance and specific enforcement measures.
Seeking Court's intervention to direct respondents to adopt a rational policy framework to prevent registration of illegal buildings and to verify the authenticity of documentation submitted for project registration - HELD THAT:- It is pertinent to note the legislative intent behind the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016. The RERA Act, introduced in 2013 and enacted in 2016, was born out of the need for regulatory measures in a sector that had seen substantial growth but lacked adequate consumer protections. As stated in the Act's Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act, the primary objective is to safeguard home buyers and promote transparency in real estate transactions. This regulatory framework was envisioned to address consumer grievances by establishing accountability mechanisms for developers, minimizing fraud, and reducing delays. Section 3 of the RERA Act mandates prior registration of real estate projects with RERA, prohibiting any advertisement or sale without proper registration, thus reflecting the legislature’s intent to curtail unscrupulous practices in the real estate sector.
The legal position is well settled that, under Article 226 of the Constitution, courts should not engage in speculative or roving inquiries. In A. Hamsaveni & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1994 (8) TMI 322 - SUPREME COURT] the Supreme Court held that a petitioner must independently establish a prima facie case, and that court proceedings should not be used as a means to conduct speculative investigations. Similarly, in N.K. Singh v. Union of India [1994 (8) TMI 315 - SUPREME COURT] the Court emphasized that a speculative inquiry is neither warranted nor justified under judicial review, particularly when private rights are at issue. The principle was reiterated in Ratan Chandra Sammanta v. Union of India, [1993 (5) TMI 202 - SUPREME COURT] where it was held that a writ should only be issued when the petitioner has an established right, and that speculative inquiries unsupported by evidence are impermissible.
Conclusion - The integration of local authority websites with MahaRERA's portal is directed within three months to enhance document verification. The commencement and occupation certificates be uploaded within 48 hours of issuance until full integration is achieved.
The PIL petition is hereby disposed of.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1. Whether, in view of a settlement/OTS accepted by a Financial Creditor and issuance of a "no dues" certificate, the appeal against admission of a Section 7 petition should be kept pending or disposed with directions to follow the remedial mechanism under Section 12A and applicable regulations.
2. Whether a Financial Creditor may file an application under Section 12A of the Code through the Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) in accordance with Regulation 30A of the CIRP Regulations, 2016, in light of the law laid down in the referred precedent.
3. How CIRP costs are to be treated when a Section 12A application is filed and whether the IRP must be furnished a Form 'FA' to reflect CIRP costs in such application.
4. The extent to which other Financial Creditors (including intervenors) may oppose a Section 12A application and the procedural timeline the Adjudicating Authority/IRP must follow pending disposal of such application.
5. Whether the IRP should continue to manage the Corporate Debtor as a going concern until the Adjudicating Authority passes final orders.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Disposition of appeal in view of OTS/no-dues certificate
Legal framework: The remedy under Section 12A (and related CIRP Regulations) permits settlement and pre-admission resolution efforts; appellate discretion to keep appeals pending or dispose with directions is exercised in consonance with settlement steps and judicial precedents.
Precedent Treatment: The Tribunal treated the referred Supreme Court authority as guiding the appropriate recourse (GLAS Trust Company - followed as the governing precedent on filing under Section 12A through the IRP and related procedure).
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court observed that an OTS had been submitted and, subsequently, accepted by the Financial Creditor with issuance of a "no dues" certificate and payments having been made. In these circumstances, keeping the appeal pending was unnecessary; instead, the appropriate procedural route is to permit the Financial Creditor to file under Section 12A through the IRP so the Adjudicating Authority can consider settlement and related modalities.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - where a binding settlement/OTS is in place and the creditor has issued a "no dues" certificate, appellate proceedings need not be kept pending; the proper course is to permit Section 12A route through the IRP for adjudication.
Conclusion: The appeal was disposed with liberty to proceed under Section 12A through the IRP rather than maintaining the appeal.
Issue 2 - Filing Section 12A application through IRP in accordance with Regulation 30A
Legal framework: Section 12A of the Code and Regulation 30A of the CIRP Regulations, 2016 permit filing of applications for withdrawal of insolvency proceedings or for settlement through the IRP; the IRP is the conduit for listing before the Adjudicating Authority.
Precedent Treatment: The Tribunal expressly relied on the Supreme Court authority (referred) that delineates the procedure under Section 12A and Regulation 30A - the precedent was followed as binding guidance.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that the appropriate recourse is to permit the Financial Creditor to file a 12A application through the IRP in accordance with the statutory/regulatory scheme. The IRP is required to take steps for listing and securing an early disposal. The Court set a timetable for filing (within two weeks) and for the Adjudicating Authority to dispose (within six weeks) to prevent undue delay and prejudice to other stakeholders.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Section 12A applications must be filed through the IRP as per Regulation 30A; the IRP is duty-bound to list and facilitate early disposal. The timetable direction is an application of supervisory jurisdiction to ensure expeditious adjudication.
Conclusion: Financial Creditors are permitted to file Section 12A applications through the IRP under Regulation 30A; the IRP must list and secure adjudication within the directed timeframes.
Issue 3 - Treatment of CIRP costs and use of Form 'FA' when filing under Section 12A
Legal framework: The Code contemplates CIRP costs and their priority/settlement; Form 'FA' (as per regulations/procedure) can be used to communicate amounts sought to be treated in the application filed by the Financial Creditor via the IRP.
Precedent Treatment: The Court did not distinguish precedent on this narrow point but applied the regulatory mechanism to ensure CIRP costs are not overlooked.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court observed CIRP costs have been incurred and clarified it is open to the Financial Creditor, while filing the Section 12A application, to take CIRP cost into account by furnishing a Form 'FA' to the IRP for inclusion in the application. This ensures transparency and that the Adjudicating Authority can consider CIRP cost liabilities when deciding the application.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - insofar as an application under Section 12A is filed, CIRP costs should be indicated and can be incorporated by providing Form 'FA' to the IRP; this is a necessary element of a complete application under Regulation 30A.
Conclusion: The Financial Creditor should furnish Form 'FA' to the IRP to reflect CIRP costs in the 12A application; the costs may be considered by the Adjudicating Authority and other creditors may object if their dues are not covered.
Issue 4 - Rights of other Financial Creditors to object and consequences
Legal framework: The Code grants other Financial Creditors the right to object to settlement/withdrawal applications and to seek protection of their claims; Adjudicating Authority must consider objections when adjudicating Section 12A applications.
Precedent Treatment: The Court applied settled procedural principles and did not depart from existing doctrine regarding creditors' rights to oppose settlements.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal explicitly permitted other Financial Creditors (including intervening banks) to file objections in the event their dues are not settled or otherwise taken care of by the proposed settlement. The Court's directions facilitating an early hearing preserved the rights of other creditors to be heard within the prescribed timetable.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - other Financial Creditors retain the right to object to Section 12A applications; such objections must be considered by the Adjudicating Authority in adjudicating the application.
Conclusion: Intervening/other Financial Creditors are free to file objections to the 12A application; the IRP/Adjudicating Authority must consider such objections during the early disposal mandated by the Tribunal.
Issue 5 - Continuation of IRP and status of Corporate Debtor as going concern
Legal framework: The Code requires that the IRP/Resolution Professional manage the Corporate Debtor during CIRP and preserve it as a going concern unless and until the Adjudicating Authority orders otherwise.
Precedent Treatment: The Tribunal followed statutory mandate and established practice that the IRP continues duties until final orders are passed.
Interpretation and reasoning: Given the pendency of procedural steps and the possibility of objections, the Tribunal directed that the IRP already in place shall continue to manage the Corporate Debtor as a going concern until any orders are passed by the Adjudicating Authority, ensuring continuity and protection of stakeholder interests.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - IRP to continue responsibilities and maintain the Corporate Debtor as a going concern until the Adjudicating Authority issues further orders.
Conclusion: The IRP must continue to manage the Corporate Debtor as a going concern pending the Adjudicating Authority's decision on any Section 12A application or other proceedings.
Admissibility of section 7 application - Appellant's proposal for a One-Time Settlement (OTS) with Indian Bank affects the proceedings initiated under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) or not - right of Union Bank of India and Bank of Baroda to intervene in the insolvency proceedings - HELD THAT:- In the facts of the present case and in view of the law laid down with Hon’ble Supreme Court in GLAS Trust Company [2024 (10) TMI 1185 - SUPREME COURT (LB)] the appropriate recourse to be taken by the Appellant in the present matter is to permit the Financial Creditors to file 12A Application through the IRP in accordance with Section 12A read with Regulation 30A of CIRP Regulation, 2016.
It is open for the Financial Creditor while filing the application under Section 12A to take into consideration the CIRP cost by giving a Form ‘FA’ to the IRP for filing the Application. The other Financial Creditors including Union Bank of India, Bank of Baroda or any other Financial Creditors are free to file their objections, in the event their dues are not settled or taken care of.
Conclusion - The appropriate recourse to be taken by the Appellant in the present matter is to permit the Financial Creditors to file 12A Application through the IRP in accordance with Section 12A read with Regulation 30A of CIRP Regulation, 2016. The acceptance of an OTS can justify the withdrawal of insolvency proceedings under Section 12A, provided that CIRP costs are addressed and other Financial Creditors' rights are considered.
There are no reason to keep the appeal pending. The Appeal is disposed of with giving liberty to the Financial Creditor - Indian Bank to file an application under 12A through IRP in accordance with 12A Regulation 30A which shall be done within two weeks from today.
Issues: (i) whether the period between 15.03.2020 and 28.02.2022 stood excluded while computing the 180-day period for confirmation of the provisional attachment order under the PMLA; (ii) whether property could be attached in the hands of a person not arraigned as an accused and without a prosecution complaint against that person; and (iii) whether the attachment could be sustained in respect of properties purchased during the check period, including a property said to have been acquired before the alleged offence.
Issue (i): whether the period between 15.03.2020 and 28.02.2022 stood excluded while computing the 180-day period for confirmation of the provisional attachment order under the PMLA.
Analysis: The 180-day limit under section 5 is a mandatory procedural safeguard, but the Tribunal accepted the application of the Supreme Court's Covid-19 limitation orders to proceedings under the PMLA. Relying on the later clarification that periods prescribed for completion or termination of proceedings may be excluded, the Tribunal held that the interruption caused by the pandemic could not be counted against the time available for confirmation of the provisional attachment.
Conclusion: The challenge on limitation failed and the confirmation order was held not to have lapsed.
Issue (ii): whether property could be attached in the hands of a person not arraigned as an accused and without a prosecution complaint against that person.
Analysis: The Tribunal held that the scheme of sections 5 and 8 of the PMLA is directed to property involved in money laundering and not merely to property standing in the name of an accused. It accepted that the sweep of provisional attachment extends to any person in possession of proceeds of crime, and that a prosecution complaint is filed against the scheduled-offence accused, not necessarily against every person whose property is attached. The Tribunal also rejected the contention that absence of a pending prosecution against the appellant-company barred attachment.
Conclusion: The attachment of property in the hands of a non-accused was upheld.
Issue (iii): whether the attachment could be sustained in respect of properties purchased during the check period, including a property said to have been acquired before the alleged offence.
Analysis: The Tribunal found that the relevant check period was 2007 to 2014 and that the record disclosed a money trail from diverted bank funds to the entities holding the attached properties. It further held that the property purchase in 2012 fell within the check period and that, even otherwise, property of equivalent value may be attached where proceeds of crime are unavailable or have vanished. The Tribunal therefore rejected the claim that the properties were beyond the reach of attachment.
Conclusion: The challenge to attachment on the ground of prior acquisition and lack of nexus was rejected.
Final Conclusion: The Tribunal found no ground to interfere with the confirmed attachment order and sustained the impugned order in full.
Ratio Decidendi: The exclusion of the Covid-19 period applied to computation of the statutory 180-day window under the PMLA, and property involved in money laundering may be attached even when it stands in the name of a non-accused person if the proceeds of crime have reached that person.
Confirmation of provisional attachment order - proceeds of crime - lapse of 180 days as stipulated under Section 5(3) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) - reasons to believe - HELD THAT:- The period intervening was largely effected by Covid-19 started after issuance of PAO on 16.01.2020. The period of Covid-19 from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 and has been eliminated by the Apex Court in COGNIZANCE FOR EXTENSION OF LIMITATION [2022 (1) TMI 385 - SC ORDER] for termination of the proceedings under any statute. In the light of the exclusion of the period of Covid-19 for termination of the proceedings, the impugned order would not lapse. The issue aforesaid has been dealt with by this Tribunal in many cases where the judgment of the Apex Court not only in the Suo Motto Petition No. 03/20 decided by the order dated 10.01.2022 but also in the judgment in the case of Prakash Corporates vs. Dee Vee Projects Limited [2022 (2) TMI 1268 - SUPREME COURT] has been considered. An elaborate judgment was given by Telangana High Court which has been referred by this Tribunal in its order in Bhuneshwar Prasad Verma vs. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Bhubaneswar [2024 (10) TMI 227 - APPELLATE TRIBUNAL UNDER SAFEMA AT NEW DELHI].
It was held in the case that 'Since the period of Covid19 from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 has been excluded by the Apex Court for termination of proceedings, the Telangana High Court took notice to it and held that if period of 180 days was falling during the period eliminated by the Apex Court for termination of proceeding, then the provisional attachment would not lapse.'
It is not necessary that attachment of the property can be only of the person who is accused in the FIR or ECIR. It can be even of a person who is not an accused but holding the property out of proceeds of crime. In that case there cannot be an investigation against the person, who is not made an accused. Prosecution complaint is filed against the accused while property can be attached if someone is in possession of proceeds on its transfer, settlement or adjustment by the accused in favour of such person. In that case though the person occupying or holding the property may not be accused, the property can yet be attached and if such person is not an accused there would be no question of filing prosecution complaint against such a person.
The fact on record shows that acquisition of property under attachment was during the check-period from 2007 to 2014 and the respondent have given complete money trail to show purchase of immovable properties out of the proceeds. It was generated after taking loan from the Punjab National Bank apart from other Banks and Financial Institutions by M/s BPSL and thereupon diverted the amount and thereby account of the company was declared to be forged/fraud by the banks after holding it to be Non-Performing Asset. In the light of the aforesaid and looking to the serious allegations against the appellants and others we do not find any reason to cause interference in the impugned order.
It is a fact on record that the attachment of the property is pending consideration before the Apex Court in the appeal where an interim orders said to have been passed. Looking the fact, aforesaid, couple with the facts that subsequent attachment order was passed by the respondent to attach the property which was directly or indirectly the proceeds out of criminal activity related to schedule offence. The appellant’s Company purchased the property in question on 09.11.2012 for a consideration of Rs.74,35,00,000/-. It was much subsequent to the year 2007 and between the year 2014. The period of commission of crime cannot be taken from the date the account of BPSL were declared NPA or registration of FIR, rather, checkperiod involved in this case is from the year 2007 to 2014 when BPSL had taken the loan and started committing default in making the repayment. The amount was diverted to other entities / companies, therefore, even the case of moneylaundering was found.
Conclusion - The period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 is eliminated for termination of proceedings. The attachment of property can be if any person is in possession of the property as given under Section 5(1)(a) and as per Section 8(3)(a), the continuation of the attachment during the period of investigation for a period of 365 days or pendency of the proceedings relating to any offence under the Act.
The attachment orders were upheld - Appeal dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The legal judgment primarily revolves around the following core issues:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Justification of Property Attachment under PMLA
Issue 2: Legitimate Claims to Attached Properties
Issue 3: Attachment of Common Areas and Amenities
Issue 4: Rights of Purchasers with Agreements to Sell
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The judgment highlights the complexities involved in property attachment under PMLA, balancing the enforcement of anti-money laundering laws with the protection of legitimate property rights. The court's decision underscores the importance of due process in liquidation and attachment proceedings, ensuring that all parties' rights are adequately considered and protected.
Attachment of common areas and easements - Inseparability of appurtenant common areas from sale deeds - Provisional attachment confirmation under PMLA - Claims against assets of a company in liquidation to be pursued before the competent civil forum
Attachment of common areas and easements - Inseparability of appurtenant common areas from sale deeds - Provisional attachment confirmation under PMLA - Whether the provisional attachment confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority could extend to common areas, parking and other appurtenant rights that were sold as an integral part of the floors/premises purchased by the appellants - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined sale deeds and allied documents produced by the appellants which showed that the purchased floors were conveyed together with undivided shares and an express right in common areas, passages, lobbies, lifts, staircases and specified parking spaces. The common areas and parking were held to be appurtenant to and part of the ownership of the respective floors; they cannot be effectively enjoyed in isolation from the main units. Consequently such common areas and parking cannot be segregated for separate alienation, attachment or auction apart from the ownership rights of the floors to which they pertain. Applying that principle to the facts, the Tribunal concluded that confirmation of the provisional attachment insofar as it affected those appurtenant common areas and parking was not sustainable and that the appeals challenging such confirmation must be allowed. [Paras 8, 10]
Appeals by M/s United Spirits Ltd. and M/s United Breweries Ltd. allowed; confirmation of attachment insofar as it affected the common areas, parking and appurtenant rights held to be unsustainable.
Claims against assets of a company in liquidation to be pursued before the competent civil forum - Provisional attachment confirmation under PMLA - Whether the Tribunal should entertain the claims of purchasers who had executed agreements to sell but where sale deeds were not executed because the vendor company was under liquidation - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the appellants in the two appeals had executed agreements to sell and paid part consideration but no sale deeds had been executed and possession had not been handed over as the vendor company was under liquidation. The Appellate Tribunal observed that company petition proceedings for liquidation are pending and several allottees have obtained conditional relief from the High Court of Karnataka. In view of the liquidation proceedings and the existence of an appropriate civil remedy, the Tribunal declined to adjudicate the claim on merits in these appeals and directed the appellants to pursue their claims before the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in Company Petition No. 162/2013. [Paras 9, 10]
Appeals by the purchasers (BMM Construction & Projects Pvt. Ltd. and Mr. Ravishankar Keerthapati Ramaraju) disposed of with liberty to file claim petitions before the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in the pending company petition.
Final Conclusion: The Tribunal allowed the appeals of M/s United Spirits Ltd. and M/s United Breweries Ltd. insofar as the confirmed attachment affected common areas and appurtenant parking, holding such elements inseparable from the respective sold floors; the appeals of the purchaser-appellants who held only agreements to sell were disposed of without adjudication on merits and with liberty to pursue claims before the High Court in the liquidation proceedings.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Classification under "Renting of Immovable Property Service"
Issue 2: Potential Classification under "Hotel Accommodation Service"
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Classification of service - Renting of Immovable Property Service or hotel services - building used solely for accommodation including hotels - HELD THAT:- Allegation in the show-cause notice and findings in the Order-in-Original and Order-in-Appeal are based on the premises that Appellant was engaged in hotel business. The conducting agreement annexed to the appeal memo and relied upon by the parties indicates that Appellant was owner of the premises that was leased for the purpose of hotel business. This Section 85(zzzz) was brought into the statute book on 08.05.2010 with retrospective effect from 01.06.2007. Therefore, the demand made under the category of renting of immovable property services, since covered in the exclusion Clause is not in conformity to the Finance Act as well as Article 265 of the Constitution of India.
Service that has been provided by the Appellant could have been termed as ‘hotel accommodation service’ as provided under Section 65(105)(zzzzw) that was brought into the statute book through amendment in the Finance Act, 1994 on 08.04.2011 which provides that service provided or to be provided to any person by a hotel, inn, guest-house, club or composite, by whatever name called, for providing of accommodation for a continues period of less than three months is a taxable service but in the instant case no such demand is made on this classification of service and the conducting agreement has not made any stipulation that hotel services are to be provided for less than three months.
Conclusion - The demand made under the category of renting of immovable property services, since covered in the exclusion Clause is not in conformity to the Finance Act as well as Article 265 of the Constitution of India.
The demand confirmed against the Appellant on “Renting of Immovable Property Service” is unsustainable both in law and fact - Appeal allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The judgment primarily revolves around the following core legal questions:
(i) Whether the price was the sole consideration for the sale of petroleum products among Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs) under the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)Rs.
(ii) Whether the revenue was entitled to invoke an extended period of limitation under the proviso to Section 11A(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944Rs.
(iii) Whether the revenue was entitled to levy a penalty under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944Rs.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Whether the price was the sole consideration for the saleRs.
- Relevant legal framework and precedents: Section 4(1)(a) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, stipulates that the transaction value is applicable if the price is the sole consideration for the sale, and the buyer and seller are not related.
- Court's interpretation and reasoning: The court examined the MOU and concluded that the arrangement was not purely commercial but aimed at ensuring an uninterrupted supply of petroleum products across India. The MOU facilitated product sharing among OMCs to avoid supply disruptions, indicating that the price was not the sole consideration.
- Key evidence and findings: The court analyzed the MOU's clauses and the intent behind its execution, which was to ensure smooth distribution rather than commercial sale. The MOU was executed at the behest of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, emphasizing mutual assistance over commercial transactions.
- Application of law to facts: The court applied Section 4(1)(a) and determined that since the price was not the sole consideration, the transaction value could not be applied as per the said section.
- Treatment of competing arguments: The court rejected the argument that the price was the sole consideration, as the MOU's primary objective was to ensure supply continuity, not commercial profit.
- Conclusions: The court concluded that the price was not the sole consideration for the sales under the MOU, thereby negating the applicability of Section 4(1)(a) for determining transaction value.
Issue (ii): Whether the revenue was entitled to invoke an extended period of limitationRs.
- Relevant legal framework and precedents: Section 11A(1) of the Central Excise Act allows an extended period of limitation for recovery of duties in cases of fraud, collusion, or suppression of facts.
- Court's interpretation and reasoning: The court found no evidence of suppression or misrepresentation by BPCL regarding the MOU. The department was aware of the MOU, and there was no deliberate concealment by BPCL.
- Key evidence and findings: The court noted that the MOU was known to the department, and there was no specific allegation of misrepresentation by BPCL.
- Application of law to facts: The court held that the conditions for invoking the extended period of limitation were not met, as there was no suppression or misrepresentation by BPCL.
- Treatment of competing arguments: The court dismissed the revenue's argument that BPCL had suppressed the MOU, noting that the department was already aware of its existence.
- Conclusions: The court concluded that the extended period of limitation could not be invoked, and the demand was unsustainable on this ground.
Issue (iii): Whether the revenue was entitled to levy a penalty under Section 11ACRs.
- Relevant legal framework and precedents: Section 11AC imposes penalties for non-levy or short-levy of duty due to fraud, collusion, or suppression of facts.
- Court's interpretation and reasoning: The court found no basis for imposing a penalty under Section 11AC, as the conditions for invoking the extended period of limitation were not satisfied.
- Key evidence and findings: The absence of fraud, collusion, or suppression of facts negated the applicability of Section 11AC.
- Application of law to facts: The court determined that there was no justification for imposing a penalty, as the prerequisites under Section 11AC were not met.
- Treatment of competing arguments: The court rejected the revenue's contention for imposing a penalty, given the lack of evidence for fraud or suppression.
- Conclusions: The court concluded that the penalty under Section 11AC was not applicable, and the imposition was unjustified.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
- Preserve verbatim quotes of crucial legal reasoning: "By no stretch of the imagination, it can be said that the price fixed under the MOU was the sole consideration for the sale by one OMC to the other."
- Core principles established: The court emphasized that for transaction value to apply under Section 4(1)(a), the price must be the sole consideration. Additionally, the extended period of limitation and penalties under Sections 11A and 11AC require evidence of fraud, collusion, or suppression.
- Final determinations on each issue: The court determined that the price was not the sole consideration, the extended period of limitation was not applicable, and the penalty under Section 11AC was unjustified. Consequently, the demand against BPCL was set aside, and other related appeals were remanded for fresh adjudication.
Valuation of Central Excise duty - price, the sole consideration of sale - invocation of extended period of limitation under the proviso to Section 11A(1) of CEA 1944 - levy of penalty u/s 11AC.
Whether the price was the sole consideration of sale? - HELD THAT:- Taking into consideration the aforementioned parts of the MOU, it is crystal clear that the arrangement reflected from the MOU is essentially for ensuring that every OMC gets smooth and uninterrupted supply all over India, irrespective of whether an OMC has a refinery or otherwise in a particular part of India. Thus, from a plain reading of the MOU, we find that the real consideration for the MOU was to ensure an uninterrupted supply to all the OMCs at various places in India. The MOU incorporates mutual arrangements made by MNCs for an uninterrupted supply of petroleum products so that MNCs can further sell the products to their dealers. By no stretch of the imagination, it can be said that the price fixed under the MOU was the sole consideration for the sale by one OMC to the other. Hence, the conclusion in the impugned judgment concurred with, that the price was not the sole consideration for sale.
Turning to the decision of the Tribunal in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. [2005 (2) TMI 357 - CESTAT, BANGALORE], an appeal against which has been summarily dismissed by this Court. Apart from mentioning that the MOU was executed according to the direction of the Government of India, the Tribunal has not looked into the contents of the MOU. There is a vague reference to HPCL's agreement with other oil companies. There is no specific finding recorded therein, after considering the terms and conditions of the MOU, that the price was the sole consideration for the sale. Therefore, the decision of the Tribunal ignores a crucial ingredient of Section 4(1)(a) of whether the price was the sole consideration for the sale.
Whether the revenue was entitled to invoke an extended period of limitation under the proviso to Section 11A(1) of the 1944 Act? - HELD THAT:- Under the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 11-A, an extended period of limitation can be invoked when there is a nonlevy or non-payment or short levy or short payment of the excise duty by a reason of fraud or collusion or any wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts or contravention of any of the provisions of 1944 Act or the rules made thereunder with the intent to evade payment of duty. The show cause notice referred to the statements recorded of BPCL officers and other OMCs. No detailed reasons have been recorded in support of invoking the extended period of limitation by the Commissioner in his order.
A careful perusal of the show cause notice shows that it is not alleged that any such misrepresentation was made by BPCL that the pricing as provided in the MOU was adopted by the BPCL as per the directions of the Central Government. The reply to the show cause notice submitted by the BPCL contains no such representation. In the show cause notice, statements recorded of officers of BPCL and other OMCs have been referred to and relied upon. However, it is not alleged that any of the officers stated that the price of the goods sold under the MOU was fixed as per the directives of the Central Government - both the grounds in support of invoking an extended period of limitation cannot be sustained, and only on that ground, the demand cannot be sustained.
Whether the revenue was entitled to levy a penalty under Section 11AC of the 1944 Act? - HELD THAT:- In this case, there is no allegation made by the Revenue of fraud, collusion or any wilful mis-statement on the part of the appellant. The stand taken is that the MOU was suppressed, and therefore, Section 11AC will apply. In view of the findings recorded above on the issue of the invocation of the extended period of limitation, the penalty could not have been imposed.
Conclusion - i) The price was not the sole consideration for sale. ii) No detailed reasons have been recorded in support of invoking the extended period of limitation by the Commissioner in his order. iii) The stand taken is that the MOU was suppressed, and therefore, Section 11AC will apply. The penalty could not have been imposed.
Appeal allowed.
Condonation of delay of 875 days in filing the Civil Appeals which has not been satisfactorily explained by the appellant - Area based exemption - Ready Mix Concrete - exemption Notification No.12/2012-CE dated 17.03.2012 - it was held by CESTAT that 'The adjudicating authority had rightly extended the benefit of exemption notification in respect of Ready Mix Concrete (RMC) used by the assessee in their manufacturing premises for construction work hence, the demand for the period April, 2016 to June, 2017 was rightly dropped by the adjudicating authority on the ground of its merit.'
HELD THAT:- The Civil Appeals are, accordingly, dismissed on the ground of delay.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Entitlement to Cash Refund of CVD and SAD
Issue 2: Impact of Non-payment of Interest and Penalties
Issue 3: Empowerment of CESTAT to Grant Refund
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Refund against payment of CVD & SAD in cash under transitional provisions available in Section 142(3) read with Section 142(6)(a) of the CGST Act - denial on the ground that Appellant had paid duty amount alone and not interest or the penalty that was imposed by the DGFT for which regularisation of import remained incomplete - HELD THAT:- The issue that remained primarily confined to absence of any such provision in Rule, 9(1)(b) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 that would have made fulfilment of the condition contained in DGFT letter as a condition precedent for such refund and non-payment of interest that would disentitle the benefit of refund of CVD & SAD to the manufacture upon sale of goods, manufactured from imported inputs, which Appellant claimed to have not paid due to exercise of discretion of Customs Authority in allowing such non-payment of interest by the Appellant in its favour but subsequently have to pay the same interest upon refusal of its refund application and such payment of interest was duly intimated to the Respondent-Department vide its letter dated 31.03.2022. With these developments that occurred during pendency of this appeal, it is to be seen as to if Appellant is entitled to get refund of CVD & SAD in cash and if CESTAT is empowered to pass an order to that effect.
On the point of divergent decision on the issue as has been held in M/S. SERVO PACKAGING LIMITED VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF G.S.T. AND CENTRAL EXCISE, PUDUCHERRY [2020 (2) TMI 353 - CESTAT CHENNAI] and M/S. AUROBINDO PHARMA LTD. VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, CHENNAI II [2022 (5) TMI 394 - CESTAT CHENNAI], this Tribunal at Hyderabad had observed that those were passed before Larger Bench’s view had come in the case of M/S. BOSCH ELECTRICAL DRIVE INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL TAX, CHENNAI [2023 (12) TMI 1145 - CESTAT CHENNAI-LB] and not applicable to the present case since same Chennai Bench itself had subsequently passed another order holding that Appellant would be eligible for cash refund. Therefore, the issue of cash refund of CVD & SAD paid in GST Regime has attained finality in favour of such cash refund.
Another point that is required to be brought on record is that post disposal of appeal by the Commissioner (Appeals), interest was paid by the Appellant and in the normal course matter would have gone to the Commissioner (Appeals) for redetermination had he made any observation on the point that payment of interest against CVD & SAD dues was mandatory to allow refund of those two taxes upon sale of manufactured goods and had there been any such condition available under Rule, 9(1)(b) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 but having regard to fact that Respondent-Department was competent to realise any arrear dues from the refund sanction under Section 142 in view of clear provision contain under Section 142(8) of the CGST Act, apart from the fact that such a provision was already existing under Section 11(1) of the Central Excise Act, there is no point in redetermining the issue that was not dealt by the Commissioner (Appeals).
Conclusion - Appellant is entitled to get refund of CVD & SAD with applicable interest as per law in cash.
Appeal allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Manufacturing Process Determination
Issue 2: Entitlement to Exemption under Notification No. 63/95-CE
Issue 3: Procedural Fairness in Sample Testing
Issue 4: Justification of Demand Raised
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve verbatim quotes of crucial legal reasoning:
"We find that the Order is not a speaking order and has not been dealt with certain aspects which the Advocate has pointed out including the entitlement of benefit of Notification no. 63/95-CE, in the event it is held to be a manufacturing process."
Core principles established:
Final determinations on each issue:
Process amounting to manufacture - whether the activities undertaken by the appellant in respect of certain quantity of ROM manganese ore would result into manufacture of concentrate or otherwise? - HELD THAT:- There is a need to establish that the ROM ore has undergone any change or not due to processes undertaken. This would be mainly depending on the manner in which the samples were drawn and the manner in which they were tested as also the nature of activities undertaken, which is not distputed. Therefore, both the issues of drawal of samples as well as test needs to be amply clear before the charges can be further corroborated. From the perusal of the Order, both these aspects have not been dealt with adequately by the Adjudicating Authority. More so, when cross examination of the Chemical Examiner has been denied, it would definitely tantamount to denial of natural justice, in the facts of the case. Said Test Reports are the major evidence based on which the allegation of increasing concentration has been made by the Department and categorically holding that manufacturing process has been undertaken on ROM ore. There is also some fact in appellant’s contention that quantification of denial is correct as to the ROM and processes have been clubbed together - the Order is not a speaking order and has not been dealt with certain aspects which the Advocate has pointed out including the entitlement of benefit of N/N. 63/95-CE, in the event it is held to be a manufacturing process.
Conclusion - The Order is not a speaking order and has not been dealt with certain aspects which the Advocate has pointed out including the entitlement of benefit of N/N. 63/95-CE, in the event it is held to be a manufacturing process.
The matter should be remanded back to the Original Adjudicating Authority, who shall re-hear the matter after allowing the cross examination of the Chemical Examiner, whose test reports have been relied in the show cause notice and Order-in-Original - Appeal allowed by way of remand.
Issues: (i) Whether refund under the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 required a separate application in prescribed form within limitation, despite filing of self-assessment returns. (ii) Whether the Revenue's appeal disclosed any substantial question of law and whether it could take a different stand from an accepted identical Tribunal decision.
Issue (i): Whether refund under the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 required a separate application in prescribed form within limitation, despite filing of self-assessment returns.
Analysis: The dispute turned on the scheme of refund under the MVAT Act and the effect of the dealer's self-assessment returns showing excess tax paid. The Tribunal's view, relied upon by the Court, was that refund could arise either through an early refund application or upon scrutiny and assessment of the returns. Where the dealer had disclosed the excess in the returns, the Department could not treat the amount as non-refundable merely because a separate refund request was not filed in the manner asserted by the Revenue. The earlier Tribunal decision accepted by the Department had already proceeded on this understanding of the refund provisions.
Conclusion: The refund issue was answered in favour of the Assessee, and the returns were required to be scrutinized in accordance with law, with refund to follow if found payable.
Issue (ii): Whether the Revenue's appeal disclosed any substantial question of law and whether it could take a different stand from an accepted identical Tribunal decision.
Analysis: The Court noted that the Revenue had accepted an identical Tribunal ruling in another matter and had not challenged it. In such circumstances, the Department could not adopt a contrary position in a case turning on the same legal point and substantially similar facts. Applying the principle against selective litigation, the Court held that the present appeal did not raise any substantial question of law.
Conclusion: The appeal was not maintainable on any substantial question of law, and the Revenue was bound by the accepted identical ruling.
Final Conclusion: The Revenue's challenge failed, but the Court directed scrutiny of the relevant returns and payment of refund, if payable, within the specified time.
Ratio Decidendi: Where an identical refund issue has been accepted by the Revenue in another case, the Department cannot take a contrary stand in a subsequent case on the same legal point, and excess tax disclosed in returns must be dealt with by scrutiny under the statutory refund scheme.
Refund claim - mere filing of self-assessment returns under Section 20 (1) r/w Section 50 of the MVAT Act, 2002, is sufficient without filing application for refund as per law to claim refund when it is mandatory to file refund application on portal within stipulated limitation - true and proper construction of Section 51 (7) of Maharashtra Value Added Tax, 2002 is it mandatory to submit E-form-501, within stipulated period of limitation to claim refund despite filing of self-assessment returns under Section 20(1) r/w. Section 50 of the MVAT Act, 2002 - true and proper construction of Section 51 (7) of Maharashtra Value Added Tax, 2002 - issue of limitation with respect to claim of refund ought to be considered in view of the provisions of u/s. 23 of the MVAT Act or not.
HELD THAT:- The Tribunal (in M/s. Om Shree Developers), after relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Vichare and Co. Pvt. Ltd., v/s. State of Maharashtra & Others [2015 (3) TMI 1403 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT], came to the conclusion that the Department had misconstrued the legal provisions and the right to get a refund under Section 51 (1) to (7) of the Act. The Tribunal held that if the dealer has paid an excess amount than what it is liable to pay, then the excess is not the property of the Department, or of the Government, but it is the property of the dealer, who is entitled to get a refund after scrutiny of the returns. In these circumstances, the Tribunal (in M/s. Om Shree Developers) allowed the Appeal and directed the Assessing Authority to scrutinize/ assess the returns submitted by the Appellant [i.e. Om Shree Developers], in accordance with law, at the earliest.
The present Appeal does not give rise to any substantial question of law - Appeal disposed off.
Issues: Whether the complaint and cognizance order were liable to be quashed on the grounds that the cheque dispute attracted the presumption under the Negotiable Instruments Act, the complaint was alleged to be mala fide or by way of counterblast, and the filing of the complaint was delayed.
Analysis: The presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is rebuttable, and on the complaint allegations the cheque was a post-dated cheque whose date was allegedly interpolated. On those facts, the Court held that the statutory presumption did not assist the applicant in seeking quashing. The alleged mala fides and counterblast nature of the complaint were held to be immaterial where the allegations disclosed a cognizable offence. As regards delay, the Court held that mere delay in lodging a complaint or FIR is not, by itself, a ground to quash criminal proceedings, particularly when the case is not shown to be barred by limitation under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Conclusion: The application for quashing was rejected and the proceedings were allowed to continue.
Dishonor of Cheque - Cognizance for offence under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of IPC - case of applicant is that the complaint filed by the respondent is misconceived and the Magistrate should not have taken up the cognizance - complaint in question was filed by way of counter blast and the complaint suffers from malafide - presumption under Section 139 of Negotiable Instruments Act - Whether the prosecution can be quashed on the ground of delay or not?
Presumption u/s 139 of NI Act - HELD THAT:- There is a presumption that whenever a cheque is issued, then it must have been issued in discharge of legal liability. However, that presumption is rebuttable. It is the case of the complainant that a post dated cheque of 25.12.2013 was issued by way of security. However, this date i.e., 25.12.2013 was interpolated by the applicant and 25.12.2013 was made as 25.02.2013 and the cheque was presented. If the postdated cheque dated 25.12.2013 was issued, then even in the light of Section 139 of Negotiable Instruments Act, at the best, it can be said that legal liability to pay the cheque amount was on 25.12.2013 and on 25.02.2013, no legal liability had accrued - even in the light of Section 139 of Negotiable Instruments Act, if the allegations made in the complaint are considered, then it is clear that the presumption as available under Section 139 of Negotiable Instruments Act would not come to the rescue of the applicant - contention of the applicant that the complaint filed by the respondent is bad in the light of Section 139 of Negotiable Instruments Act is misconceived and hereby rejected.
Whether the complaint was filed by the way of counter blast, malafide and is belated or not? - HELD THAT:- The Supreme Court in the case of Renu Kumari vs. Sanjay Kumar [2008 (3) TMI 768 - SUPREME COURT]] has held that if the allegations make out a cognizable offence, then malafides of the complainant would become immaterial.
Whether the prosecution can be quashed on the ground of delay or not? - HELD THAT:- Mere delay in lodging the complaint or FIR cannot be a ground to quash the proceedings unless and until the proceedings/FIR is barred under Section 468 of Cr.P.C. It is not the case of the applicant that complaint is barred under Section 468 of Cr.P.C. Thus, mere delay, if any, in filing the complaint cannot be a ground to quash the proceedings.
Conclusion - i) The contention of the applicant that the complaint filed by the respondent is bad in the light of Section 139 of Negotiable Instruments Act is misconceived and hereby rejected. ii) If the allegations make out a cognizable offence, then malafides of the complainant would become immaterial. iii) Mere delay, if any, in filing the complaint cannot be a ground to quash the proceedings.
This Court is of considered opinion that no case is made out warranting interference - Application dismissed.
TaxTMI