Section 148 deposit orders in cheque dishonour appeals apply to pending cases and override CrPC control.

Amended Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was held to apply to appeals against conviction filed after the amendment, even where the underlying cheque dishonour complaint pre-dated it, because the change was treated as procedural at the appellate stage and consistent with the object of strengthening Section 138 enforcement. The Court also read the word "may" as ordinarily enabling a deposit order, with 20% of the fine or compensation serving as the statutory minimum unless special reasons justify departure. Section 357(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was held not to control this power because Section 148 operates notwithstanding the Code, so a deposit direction pending appeal was sustained.

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Issues: (i) Whether amended Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 applies to appeals arising from complaints filed before the amendment came into force; (ii) whether the word "may" in Section 148 confers a real discretion on the appellate court or requires deposit of at least 20% of the fine or compensation as a normal rule; (iii) whether Section 357(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 prevents an order directing deposit pending appeal.

Issue (i): Whether amended Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 applies to appeals arising from complaints filed before the amendment came into force.

Analysis: The amendment was enacted to curb delay in cheque dishonour litigation and to strengthen the remedy under Section 138. The right affected was only procedural at the appellate stage and no vested substantive right of appeal was taken away. The appeal against conviction was filed after the amendment had come into force, and a purposive construction was required to avoid frustrating the object of the amendment.

Conclusion: The amended Section 148 applies even where the complaint under Section 138 was filed before the amendment.

Issue (ii): Whether the word "may" in Section 148 confers a real discretion on the appellate court or requires deposit of at least 20% of the fine or compensation as a normal rule.

Analysis: Reading the provision with its statement of objects and reasons, the power to direct deposit is intended to operate as the norm, with a departure only for special reasons. The minimum deposit is statutory, the time for deposit is fixed, and the provision is designed to discourage dilatory appeals and secure the complainant's interest during pendency.

Conclusion: The appellate court is empowered to direct deposit of not less than 20% of the fine or compensation, and such direction is ordinarily justified in appeals against conviction under Section 138.

Issue (iii): Whether Section 357(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 prevents an order directing deposit pending appeal.

Analysis: Section 148 begins with a non obstante clause overriding the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Therefore, the appellate court's power under Section 148 is not controlled by Section 357(2), and a deposit order can be made notwithstanding pendency of appeal.

Conclusion: Section 357(2) does not bar an order directing deposit under Section 148.

Final Conclusion: The amended deposit provision was correctly applied to the pending appeals, the direction to deposit 25% was sustained, and the appeals were dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Amended Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 applies to pending appeals against conviction under Section 138, and the appellate court may direct deposit of a statutory minimum sum notwithstanding the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

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