Just a moment...
Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
Use comma for multiple locations.
---------------- For section wise search only -----------------
Accuracy Level ~ 90%
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Don't have an account? Register Here
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Issues: Whether, in an appeal against conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the Appellate Court can decline to direct deposit of the minimum 20% amount under Section 148 of that Act on the ground that the provision uses the expression "may".
Analysis: Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was enacted with a non obstante clause and prescribes that in an appeal by the drawer against conviction under Section 138, the Appellate Court may order deposit of a sum which shall be a minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation. The statutory object is to discourage delay in cheque dishonour litigation and to protect the complainant during pendency of the appeal. Reading the provision as wholly discretionary would make the minimum-deposit requirement ineffective and defeat the legislative purpose. The expression "may" in the context of a provision prescribing a minimum mandatory deposit was therefore construed purposively as imposing an obligation, consistent with the controlling interpretation already settled by the Supreme Court.
Conclusion: The requirement to direct deposit of at least 20% under Section 148 is mandatory in substance, and the Appellate Court was justified in imposing the condition. The challenge to the deposit direction failed.