Section 148 cheque dishonour appeals: retrospective application allowed, but statutory deposit time cannot be curtailed.

Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was held to apply to appeals arising from cheque dishonour complaints even where the complaint was filed before the 2018 amendment, because the provision is remedial and procedural; the objection to its invocation failed. However, the appellate court could not shorten the statutory sixty-day deposit period, extendable by thirty days, or make suspension of sentence automatically stand vacated for non-deposit, as that was inconsistent with the statutory scheme and amounted to impermissible review of an earlier order. The impugned direction was therefore held illegal to that extent.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 applies to an appeal arising from a complaint and appeal filed before the 2018 amendment. (ii) Whether the appellate court could fix a period shorter than the statutory period for deposit and make suspension of sentence liable to stand vacated on non-deposit.

Issue (i): Whether Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 applies to an appeal arising from a complaint and appeal filed before the 2018 amendment.

Analysis: The amended provision was held to be remedial and procedural in character, intended to curb delay in cheque dishonour litigation and to give relief to the complainant during the pendency of appeals. The earlier Supreme Court decisions on the subject were understood as supporting retrospective application to appeals against convictions under Section 138, even where the complaint itself was filed before the amendment, provided the appeal fell within the post-amendment regime. On that basis, the objection to maintainability of the application under Section 148 was rejected.

Conclusion: The provision was held applicable to the appeal, and the challenge to its invocation failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellate court could fix a period shorter than the statutory period for deposit and make suspension of sentence liable to stand vacated on non-deposit.

Analysis: The statute itself prescribes deposit within sixty days, extendable by thirty days, and the appellate court could not curtail that period. Further, the court could not, at that stage, convert the existing suspension of sentence into a condition that would stand automatically vacated, as that amounted in substance to impermissibly reviewing its earlier order. The impugned direction was therefore inconsistent with the statutory scheme and beyond the permissible exercise of appellate power.

Conclusion: The direction fixing one month and threatening vacation of suspension of sentence was held illegal.

Final Conclusion: The petition succeeded because the appellate court could act under Section 148, but its order was unsustainable to the extent it shortened the statutory compliance period and attached an impermissible consequence to non-deposit.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can apply to appeals arising from pre-amendment complaints, but the appellate court must adhere to the statutory deposit period and cannot, by such an order, effectively review or nullify an earlier suspension of sentence.

---