Section 148 deposit direction cannot reopen a fully heard cheque dishonour appeal already posted for judgment.

Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was discussed as a post-conviction deposit mechanism in cheque dishonour appeals, intended to deter frivolous challenges and support recovery. The Kerala HC noted that its operation is linked to the stage at which the appellate court entertains the appeal and considers suspension of sentence under Section 389(1) CrPC. Where the appeal had already been fully heard and posted for judgment, and a substantial deposit had already been ordered, a fresh direction to deposit twenty per cent of the compensation amount was held inconsistent with the purpose and scheme of the provision. The deposit order was therefore set aside.

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Issues: Whether Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be invoked in an appeal filed before 01.09.2018 and after the appeal had been heard and posted for judgment, to direct deposit of twenty per cent of the compensation amount.

Analysis: Section 148 was introduced by the 2018 amendment to strengthen recovery in cheque dishonour cases and to deter frivolous appeals. The provision was treated as applicable to appeals against conviction under Section 138, but its operation was linked to the stage at which the appellate court entertains the appeal and considers suspension of sentence under Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Where the appeal had already been fully heard and posted for judgment, and where an earlier suspension order had already required the accused to deposit a substantial part of the compensation, a further direction under Section 148 at that late stage was held to be contrary to the purpose and scheme of the provision. The Court also held that the provision could not be read as authorising reopening of a nearly concluded appeal merely to impose a fresh deposit condition.

Conclusion: Section 148 was held inapplicable to the facts of the case, and the order directing deposit of twenty per cent of the compensation amount was set aside in favour of the appellant.

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