Interlocutory deposit condition under cheque law upheld as mandatory pending appeal and not revisable.

A direction requiring deposit of 20% of the cheque amount pending appeal was treated as interlocutory because it did not finally determine the parties' rights, so revisional interference under Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was barred and the revision was not maintainable. On merits, the court applied the settled reading of Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act that "may" is ordinarily to be read as "shall," requiring appellate courts to direct deposit of at least 20% of the compensation or fine amount. The impugned deposit condition was therefore within jurisdiction and was upheld.

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Issues: (i) Whether a revision under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was maintainable against the order directing deposit of 20% of the cheque amount as a condition for suspension of sentence. (ii) Whether the appellate court was justified in directing deposit of 20% of the amount under Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Issue (i): Whether a revision under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was maintainable against the order directing deposit of 20% of the cheque amount as a condition for suspension of sentence.

Analysis: The order challenged was only a direction regarding deposit pending appeal and did not finally determine the rights of the parties. Such an was treated as interlocutory in nature. In that view, the bar under Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 applied and revisional interference was not available.

Conclusion: The revision against the interlocutory order was held not maintainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellate court was justified in directing deposit of 20% of the amount under Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Analysis: The court applied the principle that the word "may" in Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is to be read as "shall" and that the appellate court ordinarily must direct deposit of a minimum of 20% of the compensation or fine amount imposed by the trial court. On that basis, the impugned condition was found to be within jurisdiction and not illegal, irregular or perverse.

Conclusion: The direction to deposit 20% of the amount was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The revisional challenge failed both on maintainability and on merits, and the impugned deposit condition was left undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: A direction imposing deposit of 20% under Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, when operating only pending appeal and not finally determining rights, is interlocutory in nature and not revisable under Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

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