Interim compensation under Negotiable Instruments law is discretionary, requiring prima facie scrutiny of complaint, defence, and relevant circumstances.

Section 143A(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act is directory, not mandatory, because the use of "may" and the pre-conviction nature of interim compensation indicate judicial discretion rather than an automatic obligation. Interim compensation under Section 143A can be ordered only after a prima facie assessment of the complainant's case and the accused's defence; the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 alone is insufficient. Relevant considerations include the plausibility of the defence, the financial condition of the accused, the nature of the transaction, the parties' relationship, and other case-specific circumstances, with brief reasons recorded. The impugned orders were set aside and the application remitted for fresh consideration.

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Issues: (i) Whether sub-section (1) of Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is mandatory or directory. (ii) What factors govern the exercise of discretion while considering an application for interim compensation under Section 143A.

Issue (i): Whether sub-section (1) of Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is mandatory or directory.

Analysis: The provision empowers the trial court to order interim compensation before guilt is established. The language used is "may", and the power operates at a pre-conviction stage, unlike Section 148 which applies after conviction in appeal. Treating the word "may" as "shall" would compel payment of interim compensation in every case under Section 138, despite the accused not yet being found guilty, producing drastic consequences and risking manifest arbitrariness. The scheme of recovery and refund also shows that the provision is intended to confer a judicial discretion rather than impose an automatic obligation.

Conclusion: Section 143A(1) is directory and not mandatory. The power to award interim compensation is discretionary.

Issue (ii): What factors govern the exercise of discretion while considering an application for interim compensation under Section 143A.

Analysis: While deciding such an application, the court must prima facie evaluate the complainant's case and the accused's defence. The statutory presumption under Section 139 is rebuttable and, by itself, is not enough to direct payment. Relevant considerations include whether the complainant has made out a prima facie case, whether the defence is prima facie plausible, the financial condition of the accused, the nature of the transaction, the relationship between the parties, and other case-specific circumstances. The court must record brief reasons showing that relevant factors have been considered.

Conclusion: Interim compensation can be ordered only on a prima facie assessment of the complaint and defence, and the quantum must be fixed after considering all relevant circumstances with brief reasons recorded.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders were set aside and the application for interim compensation was sent back for fresh consideration in accordance with the stated principles; the appeal succeeded in part.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory power expressed in permissive language will be treated as discretionary where its exercise before adjudication on guilt would have drastic consequences, and an order for interim compensation under Section 143A can be made only after a prima facie evaluation of the complaint, the defence, and other relevant circumstances with reasons recorded.

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