Issues: Whether a customs broker licence already revoked could be revoked again through separate proceedings for another alleged violation.

Analysis: The licence had already been revoked under an earlier order, whose validity had been upheld. A further order purporting to revoke the same licence constituted a second revocation. Even where more than one cause for revocation exists, the grounds should be dealt with in the same revocation proceedings; a separate subsequent revocation of an already revoked licence lacks statutory authority and results in unnecessary multiplicity of litigation.

Conclusion: A licence already revoked cannot be revoked again by a separate order; the second revocation was beyond the statutory framework.

Outcome: By consent, the appeal was allowed, the impugned appellate and tribunal orders were set aside, and the appellant was directed to be impleaded in the pending application.

Issues: (i) Whether the criminal complaint arising from alleged non-payment for executed civil works disclosed a criminal offence or was an impermissible money-recovery process; (ii) Whether the 2022 Enforcement Case Information Report and consequent summons survived the later quashing of its predicate FIRs; (iii) Whether an FIR based on non-delivery of a flat could continue despite the developer company not initially being arraigned as an accused; (iv) Whether the complaint concerning non-delivery, alleged double sale and multiple financing of an allotted flat disclosed only a civil dispute; (v) Whether payments by home buyers for promised flats could constitute deposits under the Karnataka Protection of Interest of Depositors in Financial Establishments Act, 2004; and (vi) Whether the 2025 Enforcement Case Information Report and the provisional attachment order were liable to be quashed.

Issue (i): Whether the criminal complaint arising from alleged non-payment for executed civil works disclosed a criminal offence or was an impermissible money-recovery process.

Analysis: The complaint arose from a contract for excavation and civil works, partial payment, and a claim for the remaining contractual amount. Its predominant object was recovery of the alleged outstanding sum; allegations of cheating and intimidation did not alter the essentially monetary and contractual character of the dispute. Criminal process cannot be employed as a debt-recovery mechanism where the complaint does not disclose the essential criminal ingredients.

Conclusion: The proceedings were quashed as an abuse of process, in favour of the petitioners.

Issue (ii): Whether the 2022 Enforcement Case Information Report and consequent summons survived the later quashing of its predicate FIRs.

Analysis: One predicate FIR had been quashed upon settlement, while the other was quashed only for procedural infirmity in the referral for investigation. The underlying private complaint alleging inducement of home buyers, collection of substantial amounts, non-delivery of units and diversion of funds remained pending. A money-laundering inquiry is not automatically extinguished by technical quashing of a predicate FIR where the scheduled-offence allegations remain subject to inquiry and there is no final merits exoneration.

Conclusion: The 2022 Enforcement Case Information Report and summons were not quashed, against the petitioners.

Issue (iii): Whether an FIR based on non-delivery of a flat could continue despite the developer company not initially being arraigned as an accused.

Analysis: The alleged statutory contravention arose from acts of the developer company, which ordinarily ought to have been included as an accused along with persons responsible for its business. However, the complaint named the company and attributed the transaction and alleged misconduct to it. Its formal omission from the array of accused was a curable defect and did not nullify allegations that prima facie disclosed cognizable offences. The investigating agency could implead the company in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The FIR was not quashed and investigation may continue, against the petitioners.

Issue (iv): Whether the complaint concerning non-delivery, alleged double sale and multiple financing of an allotted flat disclosed only a civil dispute.

Analysis: The allegations included receipt of substantial loan proceeds through a tripartite arrangement, non-delivery of possession, failure to honour pre-EMI obligations, alleged resale of the same allotted flat to another purchaser, and alleged multiple mortgages. These assertions went beyond a bare contractual default and prima facie raised issues of cheating and criminal breach of trust. At the threshold stage, disputed facts could not be resolved through a mini-trial.

Conclusion: The complaint was held to warrant investigation and was not quashed, against the petitioners.

Issue (v): Whether payments by home buyers for promised flats could constitute deposits under the Karnataka Protection of Interest of Depositors in Financial Establishments Act, 2004.

Analysis: The statutory definition of deposit has broad and inclusive scope, covering money received under an arrangement that is returnable in cash, kind or specified service. The substance of the transaction, rather than its nomenclature, is decisive. Amounts collected from home buyers against the promise of construction and delivery of flats can constitute deposits, while the developer may answer the description of a financial establishment where the statutory ingredients are prima facie met.

Conclusion: Invocation of the Karnataka Protection of Interest of Depositors in Financial Establishments Act, 2004 was sustainable at the investigation stage and the proceedings were not quashed, against the petitioners.

Issue (vi): Whether the 2025 Enforcement Case Information Report and the provisional attachment order were liable to be quashed.

Analysis: The predicate proceedings, including a central investigation into alleged builder-financier collusion, remained alive. The provisional attachment recorded reasons concerning alleged diversion, layering and siphoning of homebuyer funds as proceeds of crime. Whether the attached assets bear the requisite nexus to proceeds of crime is to be examined through the statutory adjudicatory mechanism governing confirmation of attachment and appellate review. The allegations involved serious economic offences affecting numerous home buyers and required unhindered investigation.

Conclusion: The 2025 Enforcement Case Information Report and provisional attachment order were not quashed, against the petitioners.

Final Conclusion: The contractual payment dispute was excluded from criminal process, while the homebuyer-related criminal investigations and the money-laundering proceedings were permitted to continue through the prescribed statutory processes.

Ratio Decidendi: An Enforcement Case Information Report under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is not automatically invalidated by subsequent technical quashing of a predicate FIR where the underlying scheduled-offence complaint survives and there is no final exoneration on merits.

Issues: Whether amounts deposited pursuant to judicial interim directions during a pending patent dispute constituted royalty or consideration for intellectual property rights services liable to service tax under the reverse-charge mechanism.

Analysis: The service-tax provisions invoked required a payment constituting consideration for taxable services. The interim deposits were made to secure interests and balance equities pending adjudication; no vested right to receive those amounts accrued to the patent holder, and the use of the patents or technologies had not been determined. Upon settlement and withdrawal of the suit, the interim directions stood vacated and the deposited sums were released. The subsequent settlement payment towards royalty was separately subjected to IGST under the taxation regime applicable at that time.

Conclusion: The interim deposits were neither royalty nor consideration for intellectual property rights services and were not liable to service tax.

Issues: (i) Whether Cenvat credit was admissible where invoices named a third party as customer but identified the assessee as consignee and the inputs were received and recorded by the assessee; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked despite disclosure of the credit in statutory records and monthly returns.

Issue (i): Whether Cenvat credit was admissible where invoices named a third party as customer but identified the assessee as consignee and the inputs were received and recorded by the assessee.

Analysis: Rule 7(1) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2002 recognises invoices issued by registered dealers as valid documents for Cenvat credit. The invoices expressly identified the assessee as consignee and contained its registration details. Documentary material established that the inputs were physically received, entered in RG 23A records and used in manufacture. The naming of another entity as customer did not invalidate the invoices when receipt and correlation of inputs by the consignee were established.

Conclusion: Cenvat credit was admissible to the assessee; the denial of credit was unsustainable on merits.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked despite disclosure of the credit in statutory records and monthly returns.

Analysis: The credit and relevant input details were recorded in RG 23A registers and reflected in monthly returns. These disclosures negated suppression of material facts.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The credit denial and consequential demand could not survive either on merits or on limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: Cenvat credit cannot be denied merely because an invoice names a third party as customer where the assessee is identified as consignee and establishes actual receipt and statutory recording of the inputs.

Issues: Whether reassessment could be initiated solely on unverified Insight portal information without material linking the assessee to the alleged transaction or demonstrating application of mind.

Analysis: The notice and the order did not disclose any transaction details or material connecting the assessee with the alleged Angadiya transaction. The identical alleged escaped-income amount had been attributed to several ceramic dealers, while the beneficiary chart did not specify any amount attributable to the assessee. The information was neither verified nor supplied to the assessee, and the record did not demonstrate application of mind. Reassessment cannot rest on a roving and fishing inquiry based merely on portal information suggesting possible escapement of income.

Conclusion: The reassessment initiation was invalid for want of verified material establishing a nexus between the assessee and the alleged escaped income.

Issues: Whether, after giving effect to the rectification deleting the negative working capital adjustment, the assessee's margin falls within the permissible arm's length range so that no transfer pricing adjustment survives.

Analysis: The rectification order directed deletion of the negative working capital adjustment, but the consequential appeal-effect order had not been issued. The determination of whether the revised margin falls within the permissible range required consideration while implementing that rectification.

Outcome: The Assessing Officer was directed to pass the appeal-effect order within 15 days, consider the assessee's claim regarding its revised margin, and afford an opportunity of hearing if a different conclusion is reached. Liberty was granted to seek revival of the appeal if aggrieved by the consequential order.

Issues: Whether the Assessing Officer could reject the Discounted Cash Flow valuation adopted for determining fair market value of unquoted shares and substitute the Net Asset Value method for an addition under section 56(2)(viib).

Analysis: Section 56(2)(viib) read with Rule 11UA of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 permits valuation of unquoted equity shares through prescribed methods, including the Discounted Cash Flow method and the Net Asset Value method. The choice of a prescribed method rests with the assessee, though the valuation and its underlying assumptions remain open to scrutiny. Discounted Cash Flow valuation is necessarily based on future cash-flow estimates, management projections, growth assumptions, discount rates and business conditions prevailing on the valuation date. Doubts arising from past losses or reliance on management projections require examination of the inputs within the Discounted Cash Flow framework; they do not permit replacement of that method with the Net Asset Value method. No arithmetical error, factual inaccuracy, internal inconsistency, or foundational defect in the Discounted Cash Flow computation was established.

Conclusion: The substitution of the Discounted Cash Flow method with the Net Asset Value method was impermissible, and deletion of the addition was sustained in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether Sections 42 and 43 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 governed the searches commenced at the airport and completed at a government hospital.
(ii) Whether deficient notices under Section 50 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, and the absence of a fresh notice before body-cavity recovery, vitiated the recovery of contraband.
(iii) Whether alleged departures from Section 52-A, Standing Instruction No. 1/88, Standing Order No. 1/89, and the sampling rules rendered the seizure unreliable at the bail stage.
(iv) Whether the rigours applicable to commercial-quantity offences precluded bail despite prolonged pre-trial incarceration and lack of trial progress.

Issue (i): Whether Sections 42 and 43 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 governed the searches commenced at the airport and completed at a government hospital.

Analysis: Section 42 concerns information relating to contraband kept or concealed in a building, conveyance, or enclosed place, whereas Section 43 authorises seizure, detention, search, and arrest in a public place. An airport is a public place, and the government hospital where medically necessary recovery was completed also remained a public place. The search-and-seizure action was a continuous process and did not lose its character merely because medical assistance was required. In the cases founded on DRI intelligence, the information had also been recorded, transmitted to the superior officer, and followed by authorisation and reporting. Profiling based on prior experience was treated as personal knowledge rather than unrecorded third-party information.

Conclusion: The airport searches and medically completed recoveries were governed by Section 43, and non-compliance with Section 42 did not invalidate the action.

Issue (ii): Whether deficient notices under Section 50 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, and the absence of a fresh notice before body-cavity recovery, vitiated the recovery of contraband.

Analysis: Section 50 requires meaningful communication of the right to be searched before an independent Gazetted Officer or Magistrate. Some notices merely asked whether the person desired such a search, without conveying the statutory right; another notice improperly suggested a particular officer connected with the search team as a third option. Those notices were deficient, and the initial personal searches founded on them were affected. In two matters, however, the original notice validly conveyed the right and the subsequent personal search yielded nothing incriminating. Following admission that capsules were secreted inside the body and voluntary submission to medical action, Section 103 of the Customs Act, 1962 operated as an independent mechanism; a fresh Section 50 notice was unnecessary. In the medical-emergency cases, direct hospitalisation followed by judicial orders under Section 103 was prima facie justified to protect life and facilitate recovery. In the remaining defective-notice cases, the ejection and medically supervised seizure of capsules under judicially authorised Customs Act procedure supplied independent prima facie evidence of possession.

Conclusion: Although Section 50 was deficient or misleading in four matters, the medically supervised recovery under Section 103 of the Customs Act, 1962 was not prima facie invalidated, and the absence of a fresh Section 50 notice in the other two matters was not fatal.

Issue (iii): Whether alleged departures from Section 52-A, Standing Instruction No. 1/88, Standing Order No. 1/89, and the sampling rules rendered the seizure unreliable at the bail stage.

Analysis: Section 52-A and the applicable standing instructions or Rules 3 and 10 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Seizure, Storage, Sampling and Disposal) Rules, 2022 regulate classification, sampling, inventory, and disposal. The capsules were allegedly swallowed as one batch for a single journey, were similar in size, shape, and appearance, and contained homogeneous substances. The record reflected testing of either each capsule or a representative capsule, mixing of the homogeneous contents, inventory proceedings before a Magistrate, and chemical analysis confirming the narcotic substances. Delay in inventory certification and deviations from the prescribed sampling method are procedural irregularities; they do not by themselves invalidate the seizure or establish prejudice. Whether the procedures were fully complied with, and whether any irregularity impaired representative sampling, requires evidence at trial.

Conclusion: The asserted sampling and inventory defects did not furnish a sufficient basis at the bail stage to discredit the seizure or displace the statutory restrictions.

Issue (iv): Whether the rigours applicable to commercial-quantity offences precluded bail despite prolonged pre-trial incarceration and lack of trial progress.

Analysis: The material disclosed prima facie conscious possession and smuggling of commercial quantities, attracting the stringent bail standard. Nevertheless, four applicants had remained in custody for more than four years without sufficient trial progress. Continued unadvanced pre-trial detention was punitive, inconsistent with the presumption of innocence, and contrary to the right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The two remaining applicants could not rely on prolonged incarceration, and the prima facie recovery and commercial-quantity allegations continued to attract the statutory restriction.

Conclusion: Prolonged and unadvanced pre-trial detention justified conditional bail for four applicants, while no equivalent relief was warranted for the other two applicants.

Final Conclusion: Defective personal-search notices and procedural sampling objections did not, at the preliminary stage, negate the independent medically supervised recovery of contraband; however, constitutional protection against punitive and prolonged under-trial detention required conditional relief where trials had not meaningfully progressed.

Ratio Decidendi: In body-packer seizures, defects in personal-search safeguards or sampling procedure do not alone negate prima facie possession where contraband is independently recovered through medically supervised Customs Act procedure, though prolonged unadvanced pre-trial detention may warrant bail to preserve the right to speedy trial.

Issues: (i) Whether the first food-sample test report could be relied upon when the sample was drawn by a customs officer; and (ii) Whether provisional release of the goods pending assessment was justified.

Issue (i): Whether the first food-sample test report could be relied upon when the sample was drawn by a customs officer.

Analysis: Regulations 5 and 10 of the Food Safety and Standards (Import) Regulations, 2017 require food samples to be drawn by an authorised officer under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006. Although Section 144 of the Customs Act, 1962 confers wide sampling powers, it must be read harmoniously with that statutory food-safety regime for edible imports. The first sample, having been drawn by a customs officer, could not be relied upon for the present purpose and stood superseded by the subsequent sample drawn by the authorised officer. The subsequent accredited-laboratory report confirmed conformity with the applicable standards.

Conclusion: The first test report was excluded from consideration, and reliance was placed on the subsequently drawn and tested sample.

Issue (ii): Whether provisional release of the goods pending assessment was justified.

Analysis: Section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962 requires recorded reasons indicating that goods are liable to confiscation. No seizure memo or reasons justifying continued retention were produced, and the goods had remained withheld on suspicion. The subsequent test report showed moisture content below 6%, which prima facie fell outside the moisture range treated as raw areca nut under the applicable advance-ruling framework. The assessment and classification remained matters for adjudication, but the absence of seizure and recorded grounds did not warrant withholding provisional release. A personal bond for differential duty or penalty could be sought at the proper officer's discretion.

Conclusion: Provisional release was sustained pending assessment, with discretion to require an appropriate personal bond.

Final Conclusion: Assessment and adjudication must proceed immediately in accordance with law, without any final determination of classification in these proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: For imported edible goods, Customs sampling powers must be exercised consistently with the prescribed food-safety sampling procedure, and provisional release cannot be withheld merely on suspicion where no recorded grounds support seizure or continued retention.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ challenge to the adequacy of the adjudication order should be entertained despite the statutory appellate remedy; (ii) Whether the substituted pre-deposit requirement under Section 107(6) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 applies to an appeal arising from a show-cause notice issued before 01.10.2025.

Issue (i): Whether the writ challenge to the adequacy of the adjudication order should be entertained despite the statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: Determining whether the extensive adjudication order adequately addressed the assessee's contentions would require examination of facts and merits. Section 107 provides a statutory appellate remedy for such examination.

Conclusion: The challenge to the merits and adequacy of the adjudication order must be pursued through the statutory appeal, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the substituted pre-deposit requirement under Section 107(6) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 applies to an appeal arising from a show-cause notice issued before 01.10.2025.

Analysis: The show-cause notice had been issued before 01.10.2025, and the order imposed only penalty without any tax demand. The appellate remedy was therefore governed by Section 107(6) as it stood on the date of issuance of the show-cause notice.

Conclusion: The substituted requirement to deposit ten per cent of the disputed penalty does not apply to the assessee's appeal, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: An appeal filed within two weeks must be considered under the pre-substitution pre-deposit regime applicable to the proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: The pre-deposit regime governing a GST appeal is determined by the law applicable when the show-cause notice initiating the proceedings was issued; a subsequently substituted requirement does not govern proceedings initiated earlier.

Issues: (i) Whether GST is applicable to rent paid for hired godowns used exclusively for storage and warehousing of raw agricultural produce; (ii) Whether GST on such rent is payable under the Reverse Charge Mechanism or the Forward Charge Mechanism; (iii) What GST rate applies to the renting of such godowns.

Issue (i): Whether GST is applicable to rent paid for hired godowns used exclusively for storage and warehousing of raw agricultural produce.

Analysis: Renting of godowns for consideration and the subsequent provision of storage and warehousing services are separate supplies. Although storage or warehousing of agricultural produce is exempt under Entry No. 54(e) of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate), the exemption applies to the outward warehousing service and does not extend to the independent inward supply of renting non-residential godowns. Such renting is a taxable supply of real estate services.

Conclusion: GST is applicable on rent paid for hired godowns notwithstanding their exclusive use for exempt agricultural-produce warehousing, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether GST on such rent is payable under the Reverse Charge Mechanism or the Forward Charge Mechanism.

Analysis: Renting of non-residential godowns by registered suppliers is taxable under forward charge. Entry No. 5AB of Notification No. 13/2017-Central Tax (Rate), as amended, requires a registered recipient to pay tax under reverse charge where the non-residential property is rented by an unregistered supplier; the entry applies from 10.10.2024.

Conclusion: Rent paid to unregistered persons for hired godowns from 10.10.2024 is taxable under reverse charge; rent charged by registered persons is taxable under forward charge, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): What GST rate applies to the renting of such godowns.

Analysis: Renting or leasing of non-residential property falls within real estate services under Entry No. 16(iii) of Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate).

Conclusion: GST is payable at 18%, comprising 9% CGST and 9% SGST, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The exemption available to storage and warehousing of agricultural produce does not alter the taxability of the distinct supply of renting hired godowns.

Ratio Decidendi: Exemption of an outward supply does not exempt a separate inward supply; each supply must be classified and taxed independently under the applicable GST notification.

Issues: (i) Whether the Assessing Authority was required to await expiry of the statutory appeal period before deciding an application for immunity under Section 270AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether rejection of the immunity application after a one-day notice complied with the mandatory opportunity-of-hearing requirement.

Issue (i): Whether the Assessing Authority was required to await expiry of the statutory appeal period before deciding an application for immunity under Section 270AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 270AA(3) makes grant of immunity conditional upon fulfilment of the prescribed requirements and expiry of the appeal-filing period specified in Section 249(2)(b). The statutory scheme therefore precludes determination of the immunity application before that period expires.

Conclusion: The Assessing Authority was justified in awaiting expiry of the statutory appeal period before deciding the immunity application. This issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether rejection of the immunity application after a one-day notice complied with the mandatory opportunity-of-hearing requirement.

Analysis: The proviso to Section 270AA(4) prohibits rejection without an opportunity of hearing. Notice issued on 28 July 2026 requiring appearance on 29 July 2026, followed by rejection on 30 July 2026, did not afford sufficient time to place records and substantiate the claim for immunity, and offended principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The rejection of immunity without an adequate and effective opportunity of hearing was invalid. This issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The immunity applications must be determined after affording the assessees a meaningful hearing and considering their submissions and material in accordance with Section 270AA and principles of natural justice.

Ratio Decidendi: Although an application for immunity under Section 270AA may be decided only after expiry of the statutory appeal period, its rejection is impermissible unless the assessee receives a real and effective opportunity of hearing.

Outcome: The recall application was allowed and the writ petition restored; the writ petition was thereafter closed with liberty to approach afresh on the same cause of action and challenge Section 147A, with the earlier protection continued for 90 days.

Issues: (i) Whether Pine Bark Extract and Grape Seed Extract remain classifiable as vegetable extracts under Heading 1302, rather than as food preparations under Heading 2106, of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975; (ii) Whether the goods fall under the residual Customs Tariff Item 1302 19 39 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.

Issue (i): Whether Pine Bark Extract and Grape Seed Extract remain classifiable as vegetable extracts under Heading 1302, rather than as food preparations under Heading 2106, of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.

Analysis: Rule 1 of the General Rules for the Interpretation of the Import Tariff requires classification according to the heading terms and relevant notes. Heading 1302 covers vegetable extracts obtained from original vegetable material by solvents, including extracts concentrated and converted into powder, unless specialised post-extraction processing selectively increases or decreases particular compounds or compound classes beyond ordinary solvent extraction.

Analysis: The repeated extraction cycles were performed on the original pine bark and grape seeds to recover soluble botanical constituents before the extraction liquors were combined. No material established selective isolation, enrichment or depletion of particular constituents in Pine Bark Extract. For Grape Seed Extract, no technical evidence established that resin adsorption selectively fractionated compound classes; the recorded material showed recovery of the adsorbed organic fraction together. Concentration, drying, grinding, sieving and stated extraction ratios did not alter the goods' essential character as botanical extracts.

Analysis: Heading 2106 concerns food or dietary preparations put up as supplements to the normal diet. The goods were single-ingredient extracts imported in bulk as industrial inputs requiring further formulation, and were neither presented nor put up as finished dietary supplements for direct consumption. The food-safety regulatory framework corroborated the distinction between nutraceutical ingredients and completed nutraceutical products, without governing Customs tariff classification.

Conclusion: Pine Bark Extract and Grape Seed Extract are classifiable under Heading 1302 as vegetable extracts and not under Heading 2106; this finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the goods fall under the residual Customs Tariff Item 1302 19 39 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.

Analysis: Under Heading 1302, specific tariff items apply to extracts of named plants or products. Neither Pine Bark Extract nor Grape Seed Extract is specifically enumerated under those entries. Following the tariff restructuring effective from 01.05.2026, the applicable residual entry for other vegetable extracts is Customs Tariff Item 1302 19 39.

Conclusion: Both products are classifiable under Customs Tariff Item 1302 19 39 as "Other".

Final Conclusion: The imports are governed by the tariff treatment for residual vegetable extracts rather than that for residual food preparations.

Ratio Decidendi: Classification of botanical extracts depends on their character as imported and on demonstrable selective post-extraction refinement, not merely their ultimate nutraceutical use; absent proof of specialised processing that selectively alters their constituent profile, bulk extracts requiring further formulation fall under Heading 1302 rather than Heading 2106.

Issues: Whether a further pre-deposit under Section 112(8)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is required where the pre-deposit made under Section 107(6) exceeds the prescribed percentage of the tax remaining in dispute after reduction by the first appellate authority.

Analysis: Section 107(6) requires payment of a specified percentage of the disputed tax for a first appeal, while Section 112(8)(b) requires a further prescribed payment for an appeal to the Tribunal. The pre-deposit is a portion of the disputed tax and not an independent liability. The requirement cannot be mechanically applied where the tax in dispute has been substantially reduced in the first appeal and the amount already deposited equals or exceeds the applicable percentage of the surviving disputed tax. Insisting on an additional deposit in those circumstances would produce an anomalous and unworkable result.

Conclusion: No further pre-deposit under Section 112(8)(b) was required because the amount already deposited under Section 107(6) exceeded the prescribed requirement with reference to the reduced tax remaining in dispute.

Issues: Whether penalty under Section 129 was justified where goods were transported under a second e-way bill generated after expiry of the original e-way bill.

Analysis: Rule 138 requires an e-way bill before movement of goods, and Rule 138(10) permits extension only within eight hours of its expiry; generation of a fresh e-way bill on the same invoice after that period was not authorised. The original e-way bill was not extended, while the second e-way bill was generated three days after expiry by inserting an additional zero in the invoice number. The record did not reliably establish the asserted vehicle breakdown, repair, or movement of goods from Orai to Kachora Ghat. The unexplained delay in covering the earlier route, followed by the rapid movement from Kachora Ghat and the changed loading location, constituted circumstantial evidence supporting an adverse inference. In civil proceedings under Section 129, the facts were assessable on the preponderance of probabilities.

Conclusion: The second e-way bill was the product of fraud and deception, and the goods were transported with intent to evade tax; the Section 129 penalty was warranted, against the assessee.