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This is a neutral professional article. The judgment is analysed in the context of its factual background, issues framed, and conclusions reached by the Court.
2026 (9) TMI 711 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Transfer-pricing analysis seeks to determine whether the price or margin arising from a controlled transaction is consistent with the arm's length standard. Section 92 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 provides that "any income arising from an international transaction shall be computed having regard to the arm's length price." The provision also requires allowances for expense or interest arising from an international transaction to be determined on that basis.
The mechanism is set out in Section 92C. Section 92C(1) requires the arm's length price to be determined by the "most appropriate method", having regard to the nature and class of transaction, associated persons, functions performed and other prescribed factors. The recognised methods include the comparable uncontrolled price method, resale price method, cost plus method, profit split method and transactional net margin method.
Where the transactional net margin method is adopted, Rule 10B(1)(e) requires comparison of the tested party's net profit margin with the net profit margin realised by an unrelated enterprise in a comparable uncontrolled transaction, with adjustments for differences that could materially affect the net margin. The exercise is therefore not confined to a mathematical comparison of margins. It requires a defensible selection of enterprises whose economic circumstances provide a reliable benchmark.
The central question is whether turnover disparity and the extent of related-party dealings of a potential comparable can materially affect its profit margin. The Court answered both questions through the statutory framework of comparability, rather than by treating either filter as an inflexible rule.
| Issue | Statutory and rule-based anchor | Operative consequence |
|---|---|---|
| Selection of the most appropriate method | Section 92C and Rule 10C | The method must be best suited to the transaction and provide the most reliable measure of the arm's length price. |
| Turnover filter | Rule 10B(2)(b) and Rule 10B(2)(d) | Assets employed, risks assumed and market conditions, including market size, may make substantial size differences relevant to comparability. |
| RPT filter | Rule 10B(2) and Rule 10B(3) | The filter seeks to reduce the influence of controlled dealings on a comparable's profitability and preserve an uncontrolled benchmark. |
| Associated-enterprise framework | Section 92A | Associated enterprises include enterprises participating directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of the other enterprise, subject also to the statutory deeming tests. |
| Re-determination by the Revenue | Section 92C(3) | The arm's length price may be re-determined only where one or more specified statutory conditions exist, followed by the prescribed opportunity to show cause. |
Rule 10C(1) states that the most appropriate method is the method "best suited to the facts and circumstances" of the particular transaction and which provides "the most reliable measure" of the arm's length price. Under Rule 10C(2), the choice requires consideration of the nature of the transaction, functional analysis, availability and reliability of data, degree of comparability, availability of reliable adjustments, and reliability of assumptions.
More specifically, Rule 10B(2) requires comparison by reference to: the characteristics of the property or services; "the functions performed, taking into account assets employed ... and the risks assumed"; contractual allocation of responsibilities, risks and benefits; and market conditions, including geographical location and "size of the markets". Rule 10B(3) permits an uncontrolled transaction to be treated as comparable only where differences are not likely materially to affect price, cost or profit, or where reasonably accurate adjustments can eliminate their material effects.
In 2026 (9) TMI 711 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT, the Court rejected the proposition that size becomes irrelevant merely because the tested metric is a profit margin. The reasoning was straightforward: if turnover were irrelevant, there would be no basis to use a lower turnover filter to exclude very small companies. The same logic permits examination of an upper turnover limit where comparables are substantially larger than the tested party.
The Court held that size may directly bear on pricing power, competitiveness and exposure to market conditions. High-turnover entities may enjoy established brand value, greater bargaining power, ownership of valuable intellectual property and economies of scale. These features may not be available to smaller enterprises and can influence profitability. The relevance of turnover consequently arises through Rule 10B(2), particularly the evaluation of assets employed, risks assumed and prevailing market conditions.
No provision fixes a universal minimum or maximum turnover threshold. Nevertheless, the adoption of an upper turnover filter of Rs. 200 crores was sustained as a rational and logical factual determination. The conclusion does not convert Rs. 200 crores into a statutory ceiling for every taxpayer or business segment. It confirms that a turnover range may be adopted where the record establishes that it improves economic comparability.
The earlier factual approach in 2018 (8) TMI 1885 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT is consistent with this position. There, a comparable was excluded because its segmental turnover was materially lower than that of the tested party and fell outside the turnover tolerance range used by the Tribunal. The Court sustained that conclusion as a reasoned factual application of the turnover filter. It illustrates that turnover analysis can operate at either end of the range: an enterprise may be unsuitable because it is exceptionally small or exceptionally large relative to the tested party.
In 2025 (11) TMI 1900 - ITAT BANGALORE, the Tribunal separately held that very high-turnover companies could be excluded from a software-development comparability set because differences in scale, bargaining power and market position could affect arm's length margins. The Tribunal directed recomputation using the remaining comparables. This authority is relevant as an application of the economic rationale for an upper turnover filter; the governing position remains that the filter must be justified by Rule 10B-based comparability analysis in the particular case.
The RPT filter serves a distinct purpose. It is designed to minimise the possibility that the profitability of a proposed comparable has itself been influenced by dealings with related parties. The objective is to select uncontrolled comparables, while recognising that a demand for entities having no related-party dealings at all may unduly reduce the available pool.
The Court described the RPT filter as a permissible tolerance. Its governing proposition is that the percentage should ideally be the lowest possible among available reliable comparables. Where a 15% filter yields an adequate number of comparables that otherwise satisfy the Act and Rules, there is no rational basis merely to raise the threshold to 25%. A lower threshold narrows the tolerance and reduces the possible influence of related-party dealings on the comparable's margin.
Conversely, the Court did not treat a 25% RPT filter as legally impermissible. A threshold of 20% or 25% may be adopted where sufficient comparables satisfying a lower threshold are unavailable. That departure requires a specific recorded finding on the insufficiency of the lower-RPT pool. A standardised adoption of 25%, without that factual foundation, was held to lack rational basis.
Section 92A remains relevant to the statutory distinction between controlled and uncontrolled enterprises. It defines an associated enterprise as one which participates, directly or indirectly, in the management, control or capital of another enterprise, or where the same persons participate in the management, control or capital of both. It also supplies deeming tests, including shareholding and other forms of relationship. However, section 92A does not prescribe an RPT percentage for comparability analysis. The RPT threshold is an evaluative filter operating under Rule 10B to secure a reliable uncontrolled benchmark.
In 2018 (3) TMI 222 - DELHI HIGH COURT, the Court upheld use of an RPT-based filter as a permissible comparability tool under the transactional net margin method. It recognised that substantial related-party dealings may distort the profitability of a proposed comparable. The authority supports the legitimacy of the filter, while the governing ruling supplies the more precise discipline that a higher threshold must rest on availability-based reasons.
Similarly, 2018 (6) TMI 1783 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT treated the Tribunal's choice between 15% and 25% RPT tolerance as a fact-based evaluative determination in the circumstances before it. Its appellate principle must be applied subject to the governing formulation: selection of comparables and filters ordinarily involves factual assessment, but a court may examine whether the statutory and rule-based guidelines were followed and whether the findings are perverse.
Turnover and RPT filters cannot be deployed mechanically. The taxpayer's transfer-pricing study must initially be supported by prescribed information and documentation. Under Section 92C(3), the Revenue may proceed to determine the arm's length price afresh only where it forms the requisite opinion that the price was not determined in accordance with Section 92C(1) and (2), required documentation was not maintained, the data used was unreliable or incorrect, or required material was not furnished within the specified time. The proviso requires an opportunity to show cause before such determination.
Once a transfer-pricing analysis is replaced, the comparables selected or rejected by the Transfer Pricing Officer must independently satisfy Rule 10B. A standard departmental set cannot substitute for transaction-specific functional, asset and risk analysis. The party seeking inclusion or exclusion of a comparable must also substantiate the factual basis of that request. If the Transfer Pricing Officer introduces or retains a comparable, the selection must be justified by relevant material and a Rule 10B-compliant analysis.
The Court further held that these issues do not become immune from scrutiny merely because they are fact intensive. In an appeal under section 260A, the enquiry is whether the Act and Rules were followed and whether the Tribunal's findings are perverse. A challenge that simply seeks a fresh preference between competing factual views will not suffice. A challenge demonstrating disregard of material comparability criteria, unsupported thresholds or a finding contrary to the record may raise a substantial question of law.
The selection of comparables under the transactional net margin method is an exercise in economic reliability governed by statutory standards. Turnover can be a material filter because substantial scale differences may affect margins through brand, intangibles, bargaining power, assets, risks and market position. The acceptance of an upper turnover filter of Rs. 200 crores confirms the legitimacy of a reasoned size-based exclusion, not a universal numerical rule.
RPT filters are equally directed to reliability. A 15% threshold is ordinarily appropriate where it leaves a sufficient set of reliable comparables. A higher threshold may be justified, but only upon a specific availability-based finding. The ultimate requirement is not adherence to a pre-set percentage; it is the selection of comparable uncontrolled enterprises in conformity with Section 92C, Rule 10B and the evidence on record.
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