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This is a neutral professional article. The judgment is analysed in the context of its factual background, issues framed, and conclusions reached by the Court.
2026 (10) TMI 211 - GSTAT BENGALURU
The dispute concerned credit availed during financial year 2019-20 on goods and services used in establishing a resort. The taxpayer supplied accommodation, restaurant and catering services, and used the premises for weddings, events and photo shoots. It argued that the resort was the apparatus through which its taxable services were supplied and therefore qualified as a "plant".
The adjudicating authority excluded the credit attributable to items that the taxpayer specifically identified as falling outside building construction, but disallowed the remaining construction credit. The first appellate authority upheld that result. Before the tribunal, the taxpayer relied on the earlier Supreme Court interpretation of "plant or machinery", disputed construction "on his own account", and sought further segregation of equipment and other inward supplies.
In 2026 (10) TMI 211 - GSTAT BENGALURU, the tribunal dismissed the appeal. Its principal conclusion rested on the retrospectively amended statutory expression and the exclusion of buildings from its definition. The corresponding State GST amendment produced the same result for the State tax component.
Section 16(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 permits credit on inward supplies "used or intended to be used in the course or furtherance of his business", subject to the prescribed conditions and restrictions. Business use is therefore the starting point, not a complete answer to eligibility.
Section 17(5) begins with "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of section 16 and sub-section (1) of section 18". Its specific prohibitions prevail over the general business-credit entitlement.
As amended, clause (d) covers:
"goods or services or both received by a taxable person for construction of an immovable property (other than plant and machinery) on his own account including when such goods or services or both are used in the course or furtherance of business."
Clause (c) separately addresses works contract services supplied for constructing immovable property, other than plant and machinery, with an exception where the service is an input service for further supply of works contract service. The clauses address related but distinct situations; the resort owner's claim principally engaged clause (d).
The definition in Section 17 describes "plant and machinery" as "apparatus, equipment, and machinery fixed to earth by foundation or structural support" used for making outward supplies. It includes the relevant foundations and structural supports, but excludes "land, building or any other civil structures", telecommunication towers and pipelines laid outside factory premises.
The explanation governing clauses (c) and (d) states that "construction" includes "re-construction, renovation, additions or alterations or repairs, to the extent of capitalisation, to the said immovable property". The capitalisation qualification must be read with that extended meaning; accounting treatment does not independently determine whether an original construction input escapes the prohibition.
Section 124 of the Finance Act, 2025 provides that "plant and machinery" shall replace "plant or machinery" and "shall be deemed to have been substituted with effect from the 1st day of July, 2017". It also inserts Explanation 2, under which, notwithstanding anything contrary in a judgment, decree or order, the earlier expression "shall be construed and shall always be deemed to have been construed as a reference to 'plant and machinery'".
Section 124 came into force on 1 October 2025 through Notification No. 16/2025-Central Tax. That commencement date must be distinguished from the expressly retrospective substitution date.
Section 155 provides: "Where any person claims that he is eligible for input tax credit under this Act, the burden of proving such claim shall lie on such person." This becomes particularly important where a construction project includes both civil work and separately identifiable equipment.
The tribunal applied clause (d) to financial year 2019-20 as containing the expression "plant and machinery". The relevant question was no longer whether the resort building could satisfy an unrestricted commercial understanding of "plant". It was whether it fell within the statutory definition now expressly governing the exception.
A resort building remains a building notwithstanding its importance to accommodation, dining or event services. The definition excludes that category. The tribunal applied the same reasoning to the resort's other civil structures. Functional necessity could not displace an express statutory exclusion.
The retrospective deeming provision was decisive. A competent legislature may amend the legal basis on which an earlier interpretation rested and make the amended rule applicable to an earlier period. Here, the substitution changed the operative expression, while Explanation 2 expressly addressed contrary judicial interpretations of that expression.
The tribunal did not treat the earlier Supreme Court judgment as judicially overruled. It distinguished interpretation of the former wording from application of the wording now deemed to have existed. Nor did it decide the constitutional validity of the amendment: that validity was not challenged before it, and the taxpayer accepted the retrospective operation of the substitution.
In 2024 (10) TMI 286 - Supreme Court, the central interpretative issue was whether the former expression "plant or machinery" could be equated with the defined expression "plant and machinery". The Supreme Court declined to replace the disjunctive wording or import into it the definition's exclusion of buildings. Courts could not rewrite the taxing provision to supply a perceived deficiency.
Under that wording, whether a building qualified as "plant" required a factual functionality inquiry. The inquiry concerned the nature of the business and whether the building served as an essential business tool, including whether it had been planned and constructed to meet special technical requirements. The Court remitted the relevant factual determination; it did not establish that every building generating taxable revenue qualified for credit.
The retrospective substitution removes the textual distinction on which that route depended. A resort building cannot now enter the exception merely by demonstrating that it is indispensable to taxable hospitality supplies. This is a change to the governing statutory basis, not a rejection of the Court's interpretative method.
Other parts of the judgment retain significance. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of clauses (c) and (d), rejected a general reading down, and recognised that credit operates within statutory limits. Its interpretation of "on his own account" also remained relevant because the amendment did not alter those words.
The tribunal also rejected the claim on an alternative reading of the unamended provision. It noted that the Supreme Court had framed the functionality question for "a mall, warehouse or any building other than a hotel or a cinema theatre". On that basis, it regarded the resort, which supplied accommodation and food, as substantively a hotel building outside the functionality inquiry so framed.
In examining the income-tax authorities relied upon by the taxpayer, the tribunal distinguished the building from assets installed within it. The authority concerning hotel and cinema buildings treated the premises as the setting in which business was carried on, rather than the apparatus with which it was carried on.
The separate authority concerning sanitary and pipeline fittings installed in a hotel involved an inclusive definition of "plant" under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. It did not establish that the hotel building itself was plant. Its relevance was therefore limited: a conclusion about particular fittings under another statutory definition could not overcome the CGST Act's express exclusion of buildings.
These were alternative grounds. The retrospective substitution independently determined the building-credit issue under the amended law.
The taxpayer argued that construction undertaken to make taxable supplies was not construction "on his own account". That interpretation could not accommodate the express words "including when" the inward supplies are used in the course or furtherance of business. Treating taxable business use as sufficient would deprive those words of effect.
The earlier Supreme Court ruling distinguished a building used as the setting of the constructor's own business from one intended to be sold, leased or licensed to another. The tribunal applied that distinction because the substitution had not amended this separate condition.
On the facts, guests received the taxpayer's accommodation services, while rooms and associated facilities remained within its management and control. The taxpayer had not established that any identified portion was constructed for transfer under a lease or licence rather than for supplying its own hospitality and event services. No supporting lease deed, licence agreement or renting invoice was produced.
Descriptions such as "renting" a wedding venue or photo-shoot location were not conclusive. For clause (d), the tribunal examined the substance of the supply and the manner in which the premises were used. The decision therefore does not establish that every arrangement described as a lease or licence necessarily avoids blocked credit.
The tribunal also distinguished the works-contractor authority relied upon by the taxpayer. That authority concerned a contractor constructing a hotel for its owner and supplying works contract services to that owner. It did not determine the eligibility of an owner constructing premises for its own business. The identity and role of the credit claimant were material.
The retrospective substitution does not dispense with the requirement that clause (d) concern construction of immovable property. In 2024 (12) TMI 998 - DELHI HIGH COURT, the issue was whether telecommunication towers were immovable property and whether their express exclusion from "plant and machinery" itself justified denial.
The High Court examined annexation, permanency, functionality and marketability. The towers could be dismantled, relocated and resold without losing their character; foundations provided stability and operational efficacy rather than permanent beneficial enjoyment of land. The Court held that the statutory exclusion did not itself convert movable goods into immovable property and quashed the denial founded on that premise.
The relevance to resort expenditure is methodological, not factual equivalence. An item must first satisfy the applicable construction and immovability requirements. Exclusion from the defined exception cannot independently establish those requirements. The retrospective replacement of "or" with "and" does not, by itself, displace this distinct movability reasoning.
The resort decision expressly rejected a blanket prohibition on every purchase made while establishing the business. The tribunal identified two questions: was the supply received for constructing the building or another civil structure; and, if so, did the resulting property qualify as defined plant and machinery?
Furniture, movable fixtures and equipment acquired and used as such may fall outside clause (d), although eligibility remains subject to the other applicable conditions of Sections 16 and 17. Conversely, separate capitalisation does not rescue an item that substantively forms part of building construction.
The taxpayer's identified invoices for electrical equipment, air-conditioners and expensed purchases had already been excluded from the disallowance. The taxpayer did not identify further invoices or substantiate additional eligible categories within the balance. A general request for verification did not discharge Section 155's burden.
The tribunal acknowledged that the adjudication order would have benefited from itemising the remaining credit. Nevertheless, on this record, the taxpayer's admissions, the relief already granted and the absence of further identified items supported confirmation. That finding should not be enlarged into a proposition that item-specific examination is unnecessary in every construction-credit dispute.
The governing distinction is between a building used for taxable business and property satisfying the statutory definition of plant and machinery. Taxable use alone does not bridge that distinction. The retrospective substitution brings the express building exclusion into clause (d) for the period considered by the tribunal.
At the same time, the amendment does not convert all resort expenditure into blocked construction credit. The construction nexus, immovable character, own-account requirement and defined exception remain distinct inquiries. The practical significance of the decision lies in combining a firm exclusion for the resort building with an evidence-based examination of separately identifiable assets and supplies.
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