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Issues: Whether proceedings under Section 129(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 could be sustained when the detention order was not passed within the prescribed time limit.
Analysis: The challenge was founded on non-compliance with the seven-day time line prescribed under Section 129(3) for passing the detention order after issuance of notice. The Court followed its earlier view that where the statutory time line is breached, the detention proceedings are rendered unsustainable and the defect is fatal to the action taken under the provision.
Conclusion: The impugned proceedings were set aside and the detained vehicle was directed to be released forthwith.
Failure to adhere to the time lines - Whether the proceedings under Section 129(3) can be sustained in the absence of complying with the time line mandated under Section 129(3)? - HELD THAT:- Petitioner has relied upon the judgment of this Court in TVL. UDHAYAN STEELS PRIVATE LIMITED, REP. BY ITS DIRECTOR SELVAN VERSUS DEPUTY STATE TAX OFFICER (INT.) ROVING SQUAD, COIMBATORE, THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER (ST), ADJUDICATION, COIMBATORE [2023 (1) TMI 378 - MADRAS HIGH COURT]wherein this Court held that 'The impugned proceedings are set aside and the vehicles/goods in question shall be released forthwith.'
This Court is of the view that the impugned proceedings are liable to be set aside inasmuch as it is in contravention of the time lines stipulated in Section 129 of the Act. Consequently, vehicle bearing Registration No. TN-29-AB-7887 shall be released forthwith.
Petition disposed off.
Outcome: Writ petition closed with a direction to grant the petitioner a personal hearing and pass fresh orders; provisional release, if sought, was left to be considered in accordance with law.
Levy of penalty under Section 129(1)A of the CGST Act - penalty based on the interception of goods, which were found to be unloaded at an unauthorized location without proper documentation - It is the case of the petitioner that on 04.11.2024 while filing the reply they had sought for a personal hearing, however, no personal hearing was granted - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- The petitioner would appear for personal hearing at 18.12.2024 at 11.00 a.m. Orders would be passed afresh after considering the submission of the petitioner. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the goods may be provisionally released. It is open to the petitioner to make such request before the appropriate authority in accordance with law. If any such request is made the same would also be considered and orders would be passed in accordance with law.
Petition closed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions addressed in this judgment include:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of the Impugned Order of Assessment
Issue 2: Opportunity to Contest the Assessment
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The judgment emphasizes the importance of procedural fairness in tax proceedings, ensuring parties are adequately informed and given opportunities to contest assessments. The court's decision to remand the matter, subject to conditions, reflects a balanced approach to resolving disputes while safeguarding the petitioner's rights.
Right to be heard / natural justice - service of notice via electronic GST Portal - treatment of assessment order as show cause notice - interim relief subject to deposit of disputed tax - remand for fresh consideration after opportunity of hearing
Right to be heard / natural justice - service of notice via electronic GST Portal - Validity of the impugned assessment order in view of non-service of show cause notice and consequent denial of opportunity to be heard - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the show cause notice and the impugned assessment order were not served on the petitioner by tender or RPAD but were uploaded under the "Additional Notices and Orders" tab on the GST Portal, resulting in the petitioner being unaware of the proceedings and unable to participate in adjudication. In these circumstances the Court held that the impugned order could not be allowed to operate without affording the petitioner a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and accordingly set aside the impugned assessment order dated 19.06.2024 to enable further adjudication after giving such opportunity. [Paras 5, 8]
Impugned assessment order set aside for want of effective service and denial of opportunity to be heard; matter ordered to be reconsidered after affording hearing.
Treatment of assessment order as show cause notice - interim relief subject to deposit of disputed tax - remand for fresh consideration after opportunity of hearing - Procedure and conditions for fresh adjudication including interim deposit, filing of objections, and reconsideration by assessing authority - HELD THAT: - The Court directed that the impugned order shall be treated as a show cause notice provided the petitioner deposits 25% of the disputed tax within two weeks. Upon such deposit the petitioner is to submit objections with supporting documents within four weeks; the respondents are directed to consider those objections and pass orders in accordance with law after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The Court further provided that failure to pay the deposit or file objections within the stipulated periods would result in the impugned order standing revived. The direction thus remands the matter for fresh consideration on merits subject to the specified interim conditions. [Paras 8]
Assessment order treated as show cause notice and matter remitted for fresh adjudication on petitioner depositing 25% of disputed tax and submitting objections; non-compliance will revive the impugned order.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition allowed in part: impugned assessment order dated 19.06.2024 set aside and treated as a show cause notice subject to the petitioner depositing 25% of the disputed tax and filing objections within prescribed periods; respondents to reconsider and decide after hearing; non-compliance will revive the order; no costs.
Issues: Whether the recovery pursuant to the impugned order should be stayed pending consideration of the challenge founded on Rule 96(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 and the subsequent amendment to Rule 86(4B)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017.
Analysis: The petition relied on the strike down of Rule 96(10) by a High Court decision, the review of another relied upon judgment, and the prospective omission of the reference to sub-rule (10) of Rule 96 from Rule 86(4B)(b) by notification dated 08.10.2024. On that basis, the matter was taken up for further consideration and notice was directed.
Outcome: Notice was issued, counter and rejoinder affidavits were directed, and recovery pursuant to the impugned orders was stayed until further orders.
Summary order. Notice issued; counter-affidavit to be filed within six weeks and rejoinder within two weeks thereafter; till further orders, recovery pursuant to the order in original dated 16.04.2024 as rectified by order dated 12.06.2024 is stayed.
Issues: Whether the impugned appellate orders rejecting the petitioner's appeals were liable to be set aside and the matter remanded for fresh consideration on merits.
Analysis: The appellate authority had rejected the petitioner's appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The Tribunal contemplated under Section 112 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 had not yet been constituted. The impugned orders were stated to have been passed based on Circular No.135/05-2020-GST dated 31.03.2020, and in an identical situation similar orders had already been remitted for reconsideration after the circular was struck down.
Conclusion: The impugned orders were set aside and the matter was remitted for a fresh order on merits in accordance with law.
Challenge to order u/s 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - appeal to GST Tribunal under Section 112 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - HELD THAT:- Since, the order has been passed by the 1st respondent as an Appellate Authority under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, an appeal lies before the GST Tribunal under Section 112 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
However, the Tribunal is yet to be constituted, although it has been notified. The reading of the impugned order indicates that it is based on the Circular No.135/05-2020-GST dated 31.03.2020. While dealing with an identical situation, this Court had taken note of the decisions of the Guwahati High Court, Calcutta High Court, Rajasthan High Court and Delhi High Court, wherein these Courts have struck down the above circular and passed order in M/S. EVEREADY SPINNING MILLS PRIVATE LIMITED, REPRESENTED BY ITS JOINT MANAGING DIRECTOR S. CHANDRAKUMAR. VERSUS THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, O/O. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL GST & CENTRAL EXCISE, DINDIGUL [2024 (7) TMI 1160 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] by remitting the case back to the respondent to pass a fresh order de-novo, in the light of the striking down of the above circular.
The case remanded back to the 2nd respondent to pass a fresh order on merits in accordance with law, within a period of three (3) months from the date of receipt of copy of this order - petition allowed by way of remand.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The legal judgment primarily revolves around the following core issues:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Jurisdiction Over Supplies Outside Tamil Nadu
Issue 2: Excessive Tax Demand Beyond Show Cause Notice
Issue 3: Violation of Principles of Natural Justice
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The judgment highlights the importance of jurisdictional clarity, adherence to procedural mandates, and the safeguarding of natural justice in tax assessments. The court's decision to set aside the impugned order and allow the petitioner a chance to respond underscores the judiciary's role in ensuring fair administrative practices.
Departure from Show Cause Notice - limitation on demand under Section 75(7) of the Act - principles of natural justice - opportunity of hearing / right to be heard - jurisdiction to levy tax on supplies effected outside the State - remand for fresh consideration
Departure from Show Cause Notice - limitation on demand under Section 75(7) of the Act - principles of natural justice - opportunity of hearing / right to be heard - Impugned order demanding amounts in excess of the show cause notice and without affording opportunity violated Section 75(7) and principles of natural justice. - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the order under challenge quantified a demand substantially greater than the amounts specified in the show cause notice and thereby traversed beyond the foundation on which the notice was issued. Where an order departs from the scope of the show cause notice, the affected party must be given notice of the new bases and an opportunity to reply; otherwise the right to be heard becomes illusory. Having regard to the absence of an opportunity to meet the enhanced demand and the statutory limitation that the amount demanded in the order shall not exceed the amount specified in the notice, the impugned order could not be sustained. By consent of parties and in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, the Court set aside the impugned order and provided the petitioner a further opportunity to file its reply, subject to the condition of remitting a specified sum, after which the assessing authority is to complete proceedings in accordance with law after affording a reasonable hearing. [Paras 6, 7, 10]
Impugned order set aside; petitioner permitted to file reply within two weeks after remittance of the directed amount and the authority to proceed afresh after affording hearing.
Jurisdiction to levy tax on supplies effected outside the State - remand for fresh consideration - opportunity of hearing / right to be heard - Question of levy of tax on PAN India supplies (including supplies outside Tamil Nadu) was not finally adjudicated and required fresh consideration. - HELD THAT: - The Court noted the petitioner's contention that the impugned order sought to levy tax on supplies effected outside the State of Tamil Nadu and that many such supplies had already been taxed in other jurisdictions. Rather than adjudicating the jurisdictional and factual contentions on the merits, the Court treated the impugned order as vitiated by lack of opportunity and set it aside, directing that the order be treated as a show cause notice so that the petitioner may file its reply. The assessing authority is directed to examine and decide the territorial/jurisdictional contentions afresh, in accordance with law, after considering the petitioner's submissions and documents and after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing. [Paras 4, 10]
Territorial/ jurisdictional issues remitted to the assessing authority for fresh consideration after the petitioner files its reply and is afforded a hearing.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition is allowed in part: the impugned order is set aside for having raised demands beyond the show cause notice and without fair opportunity; the petitioner shall remit the directed amount within the stipulated time and may file its reply, after which the assessing authority shall proceed to decide the matters (including territorial jurisdiction) afresh in accordance with law. The writ petition is disposed of with no costs.
Issues: Whether initiation of proceedings under section 73 of the Odisha Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was valid when the assessee's reply furnished in the earlier section 61 proceeding was not considered.
Analysis: Section 61(2) requires consideration of the explanation furnished, and section 61(3) permits further action only when no satisfactory explanation is furnished. The reply dated 29 July 2021 was on record, but it was not shown that the reply was considered before the section 73 action was initiated. The failure to consider the reply while moving to the next stage vitiated the proceeding.
Conclusion: The initiation of proceedings under section 73 was without jurisdiction and the impugned order was set aside and quashed. The assessee's reply is to be dealt with under section 61 before any further action is taken.
Initiation of section 73 proceeding without considering explanation under section 61 - Obligation to consider explanation furnished in statutory enquiry before invoking penal/recoupment provisions - Jurisdictional incompetence of action taken without compliance with procedural mandate - Quashing of order and remand for fresh consideration under section 61
Initiation of section 73 proceeding without considering explanation under section 61 - Jurisdictional incompetence of action taken without compliance with procedural mandate - Quashing of order and remand for fresh consideration under section 61 - Impugned initiation of proceedings under section 73 and consequent order was without jurisdiction because the explanation furnished under section 61 was not considered; the order is quashed and the matter is remitted for adjudication under section 61. - HELD THAT: - The Court noted that sub section (2) of section 61 mandates that the explanation furnished in response to statutory communication must be considered, and sub section (3) permits initiation of action under provisions such as section 73 only where no satisfactory explanation is furnished. The petitioner produced a reply dated 29th July, 2021 to the ASMT 10 communication which, on the record, was not shown to have been considered before initiating proceedings under section 73. The revenue could not demonstrate that the reply was taken into account in the impugned notice or in the order under section 74. In these circumstances initiation of section 73 proceedings without considering the explanation was held to be without jurisdiction. The Court therefore set aside the impugned order and directed that the petitioner's reply dated 29th July, 2021 be dealt with afresh under section 61, after which the revenue is free to proceed as permissible by law. [Paras 4, 5]
Impugned order set aside; reply dated 29th July, 2021 to be considered under section 61 and thereafter proceedings may be initiated as permissible.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition allowed; impugned order quashed and matter remitted for fresh consideration of the explanation under section 61, with liberty to the revenue to proceed thereafter in accordance with law.
Issues: Whether the writ petition should be entertained when the petitioner was required to seek rectification under the departmental procedure after notification of the relevant amendment.
Analysis: The petitioner's grievance concerned denial of input tax credit on the footing that the amendment to section 16 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 had not been notified when the impugned order was passed. The revenue pointed to the departmental circular and the rectification procedure under section 148 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The Court noted that the writ petition had been filed without preferring an appeal, that the circular had been issued after institution of the writ petition, and that time remained available to invoke the rectification mechanism.
Conclusion: The writ petition was not entertained on merits and the petitioner was directed to pursue rectification under the departmental procedure.
Final Conclusion: The matter was disposed of by directing the petitioner to avail the statutory departmental remedy, leaving the substantive tax dispute unresolved in writ proceedings.
Input Tax Credit - extension of time for filing return - notification of amendment - rectification under section 148 - departmental rectification procedure - writ jurisdiction
Input Tax Credit - extension of time for filing return - notification of amendment - rectification under section 148 - departmental rectification procedure - Petition seeking writ relief against adjudicating order declining ITC due to late filing was disposed of and petitioner directed to seek rectification under departmental procedure. - HELD THAT: - The petitioner asserted entitlement to Input Tax Credit and relied on an amendment extending the time for filing returns, which was not notified at the time the impugned order was passed but was notified subsequently on 27th September, 2024. After issuance of a departmental circular dated 15th October, 2024 setting out a rectification process and prescribing that, where no appeal has been preferred, affected parties should apply for rectification under section 148 within six months of the notification, the Court declined to grant writ relief. Noting that the circular and rectification mechanism were issued after presentation of the writ and that time to make the rectification application remains available, the Court required the petitioner to comply with the departmental procedure for rectification rather than entertain writ relief at this stage. [Paras 3]
Writ petition disposed directing the petitioner to apply for rectification in accordance with the departmental circular within the prescribed period.
Final Conclusion: The petition was disposed of without adjudicating the merits of the claimed Input Tax Credit; the petitioner was directed to follow the departmental rectification procedure (as per the circular) and apply for rectification under section 148 within the available period.
Issues: Whether proceedings under section 129 of the Goods and Services Tax Act could be sustained where the goods physically found on inspection tallied with the e-way bill and no intent to evade tax was found.
Analysis: The record disclosed no discrepancy between the goods intercepted and the particulars mentioned in the e-way bill available with the driver. The authorities below also did not record any finding of intent to evade tax. The defect complained of was only the non-filling of part of the e-way bill, which amounted to a mere technical breach in the facts of the case. In such circumstances, substantial compliance of the statutory requirements was established and the coercive proceedings could not be justified.
Conclusion: Proceedings under section 129 of the Goods and Services Tax Act were not sustainable on the basis of a mere technical lapse, and the impugned order was liable to be quashed in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The challenge succeeded and the order under appeal was set aside because the interception did not disclose any tax evasion or material mismatch in goods.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the goods tally with the e-way bill and no intent to evade tax is found, a mere technical defect in e-way bill particulars does not justify proceedings under section 129 of the Goods and Services Tax Act.
Challenge to proceedings under Section 129 of GST Act - Seizure of goods - E-Way Bill not filled - intent to evade tax or not - HELD THAT:- The facts which are admitted and disclosed from the records are these. There was no discrepancy in the goods which were physically found at the time of inspection and details of goods recorded in the E-Way Bill available with the driver of the vehicle. The authorities below have not found any intent to evade tax.
This Court has set its face against initiation of proceedings under Section 129 of GST Act in the wake of mere technical breaches. When substantial compliance of the provisions is disclosed and when the physical inspection of goods tallies with the goods declared in the E-Way Bill and no intent of tax evasion is made out, proceedings under Section 129 of GST Act become vitiated.
In VSL ALLOYS (INDIA) PVT. LTD. VERSUS STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER [2018 (5) TMI 455 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] this Court has held 'In the present case, all the documents were accompanied the goods, details are duly mentioned which reflects from the perusal of the documents. Merely of none mentioning of the vehicle no. in Part-B cannot be a ground for seizure of the goods. We hold that the order of seizure is totally illegal and once the petitioner has placed the material and evidence with regard to its claim, it was obligatory on the part of the respondent no.2 to consider and pass an appropriate reasoned order. In this case, no reasons are assigned nor any discussion is mentioned in the impugned order of seizure and notice of penalty.'
Conclusion - When substantial compliance of the provisions is disclosed and when the physical inspection of goods tallies with the goods declared in the E-Way Bill and no intent of tax evasion is made out, proceedings under Section 129 of GST Act become vitiated.
The impugned order dated 22.12.2023 passed by the respondent no. 2, Additional Commissioner, Commercial Tax Grade-2 (Appeal)-I, State Tax, Noida is unsustainable and is quashed - petition allowed.
Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the notice proposing recovery of excess input tax credit should be entertained, or whether the matter should be left to the tax authority to take a final decision after considering the petitioner's response and representation.
Analysis: The petitioner had not responded to the notice within the stipulated period, but the record showed that the expected reply was reflected in the notice itself and that a detailed representation had allegedly been filed. In these circumstances, the writ court declined to adjudicate the dispute on merits and considered it appropriate to permit the competent authority to examine the petitioner's reply and representation before passing a final order.
Outcome: The petition was disposed of with a direction to the concerned tax authority to take a final decision after considering the petitioner's representation and the response already reflected in the notice.
Invocation of extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the impugned notice, primarily, on the ground that any decision taken pursuant to the impugned notice would be violative of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- It is found that the expected response from the Petitioner is already reflected at S. No. 9 of Part-B of the impugned notice. That apart, the Petitioner also claims to have filed a detailed representation explaining its position.
The ends of justice would be served by disposing of this Petition by directing the concerned tax authority to take a final decision in the matter, after considering the representation stated to have been filed by the Petitioner and the response reflected against S. No. 9 of Part-B of the impugned notice.
Petition disposed off.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of Proceedings under Section 130
Issue 2: Liability for Transportation without Documentation
Issue 3: Justification for Penalty and Fine
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The petitioner is granted the liberty to file an appeal against the Ext.P4 order, with the period during which the writ petition was pending being excluded for calculating the limitation period for filing an appeal.
Penalty and fine in lieu of confiscation under Section 130 of the CGST/SGST Act - liability to comply with GST law despite cancellation of registration - transportation of goods without proper documents - onus on the purchaser/registered person to transport goods with supporting documents - exclusion of period of pendency of writ for limitation
Liability to comply with GST law despite cancellation of registration - transportation of goods without proper documents - penalty and fine in lieu of confiscation under Section 130 of the CGST/SGST Act - Validity of Ext.P4 order imposing penalty and fine in lieu of confiscation under Section 130 against the petitioner whose GST registration had been cancelled - HELD THAT: - The Court found that goods were being transported without the cover of any supporting documents. The petitioner's subsequent contention that his registration had been cancelled and that the goods were sold to a third person who took delivery does not absolve compliance obligations under the GST laws. Even assuming a sale to the purchaser, the purchaser (a registered person) was required to ensure transportation under proper documents. On these determinative facts and legal principle, the proceedings culminating in Ext.P4 under Section 130 were not without jurisdiction and were not wrongly initiated or concluded against the petitioner.
Writ petition dismissed; liberty reserved to the petitioner to file an appeal against Ext.P4.
Exclusion of period of pendency of writ for limitation - Effect of pendency of this writ petition on the limitation for filing appeal against Ext.P4 - HELD THAT: - The Court ordered that the period during which this writ petition was pending before the Court (17.07.2024 to 29.10.2024) shall be excluded for the purpose of computing any period of limitation within which the petitioner had to file an appeal against Ext.P4.
Period from 17.07.2024 to 29.10.2024 excluded for limitation purposes.
Final Conclusion: The challenge to the Section 130 order (Ext.P4) fails and the writ petition is dismissed; petitioner may appeal against Ext.P4, and the Court has excluded the writ's pendency period from computation of limitation for any such appeal.
Issues: Whether, pending constitution of the Goods and Services Tax Tribunal, the assessee was entitled to the statutory benefit of stay of recovery on depositing 10% of the disputed tax amount under the amended appellate scheme, and whether consequential attachment of the bank account was liable to be lifted.
Analysis: The amendment to Section 112 of the Bihar Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 reduced the pre-deposit requirement to 10% for maintaining an appeal before the Tribunal. Since the Tribunal had not yet been constituted, the assessee could not be deprived of the statutory stay benefit on account of the respondents' failure to make the Tribunal functional. At the same time, the stay protection was treated as linked to the future availability of the appellate forum, so the assessee was required to file the appeal once the Tribunal became functional.
Conclusion: On deposit of 10% of the disputed tax amount, the assessee was held entitled to stay of recovery, and any bank account attachment pursuant to the demand was directed to be released. The benefit was made contingent upon filing the appeal before the Tribunal after its constitution.
Amendment made to Section112 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 substituting “twenty per cent” pre deposit to “ten per cent” for maintaining an appeal before the Goods and Services Tax Tribunal - HELD THAT:- As of now pre-deposit has been reduced to “ten per cent” but however, the same is made effective only from 01.11.2024. It is an admitted position that the GST Tribunals have not been constituted as yet and there is no possibility of an appeal being filed prior to 01.11.2024. In such circumstance we direct that the assessee on payment of “ten per cent” of the tax amounts in dispute shall be entitled to stay of recovery till the Tribunal is constituted and an appeal is filed within such term as provided therein.
Petition disposed off.
Withdrawal of writ petition to pursue appellate remedy - liberty to approach appellate forum - application of limitation and condonation by Appellate Authority - no adjudication on merits or maintainability
Withdrawal of writ petition to pursue appellate remedy - liberty to approach appellate forum - Permission to withdraw the writ petition so that the petitioner may avail the appellate remedy. - HELD THAT: - The Court allowed the petitioner to withdraw the writ petition and to proceed before the appropriate appellate authority. The grant of liberty is subject to the appellate process being invoked by the petitioner in place of the writ proceedings. [Paras 2]
Liberty granted to withdraw the writ petition and to approach the appellate authority.
Application of limitation and condonation by Appellate Authority - Entitlement of the appellate authority to consider limitation and any exceptions in accordance with the statute and law. - HELD THAT: - The Court directed that questions of limitation and condonation - including any exceptions to limitation - are to be considered and decided by the Appellate Authority in accordance with the statutory scheme and settled legal principles. The Court did not pre-empt or decide those questions; rather it left them for statutory adjudication by the appellate forum. [Paras 2]
Appellate Authority to consider limitation and condonation as per statute and law.
No adjudication on merits or maintainability - Whether the High Court made any observation on the merits or maintainability of the appeal. - HELD THAT: - The Court expressly stated that it has not made any observation on the merits of the matter or on the maintainability of the appeal, particularly if the appeal is time-barred. The dismissal of the writ petition is by way of withdrawal and does not constitute any adjudication on substantive issues. [Paras 3, 4]
No observations on merits or maintainability; writ petition dismissed as withdrawn.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition dismissed as withdrawn; petitioner granted liberty to file the statutory appeal, with limitation and condonation matters to be decided by the Appellate Authority in accordance with law; no observations made by the Court on merits or maintainability.
Issues: Whether the impugned order under Section 73 of the Gujarat Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 could be challenged on the ground that proceedings had already been initiated by another GST authority, and whether interim protection against coercive action should be granted.
Analysis: The petitioner questioned the authority of the respondent to proceed with the original order when earlier proceedings had been commenced by the Directorate General of GST Intelligence on the basis of a prior search. Reliance was placed on the bar under Section 6(2)(b) of the Gujarat Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 to contend that parallel initiation was impermissible. The Court issued notice and, pending further consideration, protected the petitioner by restraining coercive action under the impugned order.
Outcome: Notice issued. Ad-interim protection against coercive action was granted in relation to the impugned order.
Assumption of jurisdiction where Directorate General has initiated proceedings - prohibition on parallel proceedings by State revenue authority in GST matters - interim relief restraining coercive action
Assumption of jurisdiction where Directorate General has initiated proceedings - prohibition on parallel proceedings by State revenue authority in GST matters - Legal challenge to initiation of proceedings by respondent No.1 despite earlier proceedings by Directorate General of GST Intelligence (respondent No.3). - HELD THAT: - Petitioner's contention that respondent No.1 lacked jurisdiction to proceed because respondent No.3 had earlier initiated proceedings (notice in Form GST DRC-01A dated 05.12.2023) was recorded and relied upon before the Court. The court considered the submissions and prima facie accepted that the sequence and existence of earlier proceedings by respondent No.3 was a matter requiring adjudication. The court did not decide the substantive question on the competing exercise of jurisdiction but directed issuance of notice to the respondents for adjudication on merits. [Paras 3]
Notice issued returnable on 05.12.2024 for consideration of the jurisdictional contention; substantive question left for adjudication.
Interim relief restraining coercive action - Grant of ad-interim relief restraining coercive action pursuant to the impugned order. - HELD THAT: - On the basis of the petition and the submissions recorded, the court granted limited interim protection to the petitioner. The relief is narrowly confined to restraining respondent Nos.1 and 2 from taking any coercive action against the petitioner in respect of the impugned order until the next date, thereby preserving the status quo while the notice is pending. The court also permitted direct service of processes by e-mail. [Paras 4]
Until the next date, no coercive action shall be taken by respondent Nos.1 and 2 against the petitioner in respect of the impugned order; email service permitted.
Final Conclusion: Notice issued returnable on 05.12.2024 on the petitioner's challenge to respondent No.1's proceedings; ad-interim injunction granted restraining coercive action under the impugned order and permitting service by e-mail.
Issues: Whether, for the purpose of limitation under Section 54 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the State Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, a fresh refund application filed after rectification of deficiencies under Rule 90(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 must be treated as filed on the date of the original application.
Analysis: Section 54 permits a refund claim to be made within the prescribed period from the relevant date. Rule 90(3) requires a fresh application after deficiencies in the original refund application are pointed out, but the rule does not provide that the date of the fresh application becomes the operative date for computing limitation under Section 54. The statutory scheme therefore supports treatment of the corrected application as continuing from the original refund claim, rather than as a new claim attracting a fresh limitation bar.
Conclusion: The rejection of the refund claim as time-barred on the basis of the second application date was unsustainable, and the refund application had to be treated as filed on the date of the original application.
Ratio Decidendi: A fresh refund application filed after removal of defects under Rule 90(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 does not reset limitation under Section 54 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
Refund of tax - limitation for refund applications under Section 54 - acknowledgement of refund application - deficiency memo and fresh application under Rule 90(3) - date of original application to determine limitation
Limitation for refund applications under Section 54 - date of original application to determine limitation - The date of the original refund application, not the date of a subsequently filed rectified application, governs the limitation period under sub-section (1) of Section 54. - HELD THAT: - Sub-section (1) of Section 54 prescribes the period within which an application for refund must be made. Although Rule 90(3) of the CGST Rules requires a fresh refund application to be filed after deficiencies are pointed out, the rule does not provide that the date of the fresh application replaces the date of the original application for the purpose of computing the limitation under Section 54. The Court held that rejecting a rectified application as time-barred by reference to the date of the second application is not legally sustainable where an initial application was filed within the statutory period and deficiencies were subsequently intimated. [Paras 5]
The second application filed after rectification cannot be treated as the relevant date for limitation; the original application date governs the statutory time limit under Section 54.
Acknowledgement of refund application - deficiency memo and fresh application under Rule 90(3) - refund of tax - A fresh application filed pursuant to a deficiency intimation under Rule 90(3) must be processed treating the claim as having been originally filed on the date of the first application, provided deficiencies are cured. - HELD THAT: - Rule 90(3) contemplates filing a fresh application after cure of deficiencies, but the rule does not alter the statutory limitation computed under Section 54. Consequently, where an initial application was submitted within time and the applicant subsequently remedies defects in response to a deficiency communication, the corrected application is to be processed on the footing that the claim was originally filed on the date of the first application. The Court directed that the rejected communication (Ext.P4) be quashed and the refund application treated as filed on the date of the first application, enabling processing if deficiencies have been cured. [Paras 5]
Ext.P4 is quashed; the refund application shall be treated as filed on 05-04-2021 and processed in accordance with law if the deficiencies have been cured.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition allowed; Ext.P4 quashed and the refund application shall be treated as having been filed on 05-04-2021 and processed in accordance with law upon curing of the deficiencies; no decision expressed on Ext.P5 notification.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal question addressed in this judgment is whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) was correct in directing the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption) [CIT(E)] to grant registration under Section 12AA of the Income Tax Act, 1961, to the respondent assessee Society, despite the CIT(E)'s findings that the activities of the Society were in the nature of trade, commerce, or business and thus covered by the proviso to Section 2(15) of the Act.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents
The legal framework primarily involves Section 12AA of the Income Tax Act, which outlines the procedure for the registration of a trust or institution. The provision requires the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner to satisfy themselves about the objects of the trust or institution and the genuineness of its activities. Additionally, Section 2(15) defines "charitable purpose" and includes relief of the poor, education, medical relief, and the advancement of any other object of general public utility, with a proviso excluding activities in the nature of trade, commerce, or business.
The judgment references the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhattisgarh Urology Society, where it was held that the Commissioner at the stage of Section 12A is not to assess the application of income but to verify if the application is made in accordance with the requirements of Section 12A and whether the objects are charitable.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning
The court examined whether the activities of the respondent Society were genuinely charitable or if they fell within the ambit of trade, commerce, or business. The court noted that the CIT(E)'s role is limited to assessing the genuineness of the activities and the charitable nature of the objects, not the application of income or potential benefits to the members of the society.
Key Evidence and Findings
The ITAT found that the respondent Society was a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) supported by state government grants aimed at fostering economic activities and entrepreneurship, which are inherently charitable. The ITAT emphasized that the Society's activities are primarily funded by the government and are intended to develop and improve economic activities, thus aligning with charitable purposes.
Application of Law to Facts
The court applied the legal principles from the Chhattisgarh Urology Society case, determining that the activities of the respondent Society were charitable in nature. The ITAT's decision was based on the assessment that the Society fulfilled all conditions for registration under Section 12AA, and the CIT(E)'s objections were not in accordance with the law.
Treatment of Competing Arguments
The Revenue argued that the Society's activities were commercial, thus not qualifying for charitable status. However, the court found these arguments unpersuasive, noting that the Society's objectives and activities were aligned with charitable purposes as defined under the Act.
Conclusions
The court concluded that the ITAT was justified in directing the CIT(E) to grant registration under Section 12AA, as the activities of the respondent Society were charitable and not in the nature of trade or business.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The court upheld the ITAT's decision, emphasizing that:
"The reasons based on which the recognition denied are not in accordance with the law when this special purpose vehicle created in the name of the society and funded it by way of grant to develop and improve the economic activities by the state government and it helps start-up entrepreneurship. This is an activity of charitable in nature..."
The court established the principle that the assessment of a trust's or society's application for registration under Section 12AA should focus on the genuineness of its activities and the charitable nature of its objectives, rather than potential commercial benefits.
The final determination on the issue was that the activities of the respondent Society were indeed charitable, and the ITAT's directive to grant registration was affirmed. The appeal by the Revenue was dismissed, and the substantial question of law was answered in favor of the assessee.
Grant of registration u/s 12AA - charitable activity - as per CIT (E) that the activities of the trust is in the nature of trade, commerce or business and covered by proviso to Section 2 (15) - HELD THAT:- Principal Commissioner or the Commissioner has to satisfy himself about the objects of the trust or institution and the genuineness of its activities as required under sub-clause (i) of clause (a) and compliance of the requirements under sub-clause (ii) of the said clause, and has to pass an order in writing registering the trust or institution and a copy of the order so passed will be sent to the applicant.
Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of the order passed by this Court in Chhattisgarh Urology Society’s case [2018 (2) TMI 1156 - CHHATTISGARH HIGH COURT] and in view of the finding of the learned ITAT, it is quite vivid that the activities of the assessee Society are for charitable purpose for public at large and in that view of the matter, the learned ITAT is absolutely justified in directing the CIT(E) to grant registration under Section 12AA of the IT Act by setting aside the order of the CIT(E), as such, the order impugned passed by the ITAT is in accordance with law.
Accordingly, the finding recorded by the CIT(E) that the activities of the respondent assessee Society is in the nature of trade, commerce or business and covered by proviso to Section 2 (15) of the IT Act was not the correct finding. Decided in favour of assessee.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal issues considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Non-speaking and cryptic orders
Issue 2: Violation of principles of natural justice
Issue 3: Adherence to guidelines from KEC International Ltd. and UTI Mutual Fund
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The court ordered that no coercive steps be taken against the petitioner until the stay application is reconsidered, and directed the petitioner to appear before the relevant authority on a specified date.
Stay application rejected - petitioner directed to deposit 20% of the demand - HELD THAT:- The respondent authorities has passed the assessment order dated 31.03.2024 passed u/s 143 (3) along with copy of demand notice issued under Section 156 against the petitioner. Thereafter the petitioner has filed an application u/s 220 (6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 filed on 29.04.2024 before respondent No. 3. The respondent-No. 3 has not decided the case on the basis of prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable loss caused to the petitioner, Genuine hardship, CBDT instruction and hi-pitched assessment.
The respondent No. 3 rejected the application without reasoned and speaking order on 14.06.2024. Subsequently, aggrieved of the same, the petitioner has filed review application before the respondent No. 2/PCIT (Central) Bhopal. The respondent No. 2 has also not decided the review application on merits and passed the order to pay 20% of the tax liability by way of installments in 5 months on. 18.10.2024. Thus, the impugned orders dated 14.06.2024 and 18.10.2024 are non-speaking orders.
AO has not adopted the correct procedure in deciding the stay application and review application of the petitioner and has not followed the guidelines as stated by Bombay High court in KEC International Ltd. [2001 (3) TMI 32 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] and in UTI Mutual Fund [2012 (3) TMI 333 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] and also the decision rendered by this Court in M/s Aarti Sponge & Power Ltd. [2018 (4) TMI 1284 - CHHATTISGARH HIGH COURT].
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions addressed in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Disallowance of LC Discounting Charges
Issue 2: Delay in Filing the Appeal
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
This judgment establishes that the mere existence of interest-free advances does not justify disallowance of interest expenses if business justification is provided and supported by evidence. Additionally, genuine reasons for delay in appeal filing, such as medical emergencies, are valid grounds for condonation.
Disallowance u/s 36(1)(iii) - interest free advances given by assessee - HELD THAT:- CIT(A) has given finding that the prudent business man will never give such interest free advances, the fact remains that these are for a purchase of material and it was for conducting the business of the assessee and therefore, the same cannot be stated as certain interest free loan / advances was not rightly disallowed by the AO u/s 36(1)(iii).
In fact, the opening balance of these advances was submitted by the assessee in the details and therefore, the contention of the A.R. that such funds were not diverted towards interest free advances appears to be justifiable from the records i.e. Tax Audit Report, Financial Statements and the evidence in support of these advances given to the related parties.
Thus, the disallowance made by the AO as well as confirmed by the CIT(A) is not justifiable in light of the decision of CARGILL GLOBAL TRADING (P.) LTD. [2011 (2) TMI 209 - DELHI HIGH COURT] and SA BUILDERS LTD. VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX [2006 (12) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT]. Thus, the appeal of the assessee is allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of the Satisfaction Note under Section 153C
Issue 2: Jurisdictional Grounds for Assessment under Section 153C
Issue 3: Justification of Additions under Section 69A
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The judgment underscores the necessity for precise and reasoned satisfaction notes and the importance of substantiating additions with credible evidence, aligning with established legal standards and precedents.
Assessment u/s 153C - incriminating material which was seized had to pertain to the Assessment Years in question - mandation of recording of satisfaction - HELD THAT:- Satisfaction note recorded by the AO of the searched person u/s 153C of the Act when read along with the satisfaction note recorded by the AO of the appellant u/s 153C he two are similar in content. The narration of facts of search and seizure operation, details of documents allegedly pertaining to the assessee are mirror images except for the fact that in the satisfaction note recorded by the AO of searched person, the said AO uses the words that the allegedly the seized documents ‘pertain’ to a person other than the person searched and the AO of the assessee before us record the satisfaction that the documents pertain to an information contained in the said documents ‘related’ to Shri Rajiv Agarwal, i.e., a person other than the person searched u/s 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
It is very apparent from the two satisfaction notes before us that none of the alleged incriminating documents has been examined or the contents of these documents analysed in a manner to show that how these alleged documents have any bearing on the determination of total income of the assessee for a particular year for which the reassessment was initiated by issuance of notice u/s 153C r.w.s. 153A of the Act.
In the case of Canyon Financial Services Ltd. Vs. ITO [2017 (7) TMI 539 - DELHI HIGH COURT] has held that where satisfaction notes recorded by Assessing Officer of assessee and Assessing Officer of searched person were identically verdict carbon copy proceeding could not be initiated against assessee u/s 153C.
When the satisfaction notes are compared with the notice u/s 142(1) of the Act along with the annexure having analysis of the seized material, it appears that at the time of assumption of jurisdiction by way of recording the satisfaction, the AO of the assessee before us had not applied his mind while issuing the notic.
CIT(A) has erred in law by not appreciating that the impugned assessment orders in both the years were based on illegal assumption of jurisdiction on the basis of satisfaction note which was recorded without application of mind and quite in a mechanical manner. The reasons do not demonstrate how the nature of seized material has bearing on the total income of the assessee and to which assessment year particularly. The satisfaction note does not reflect any rational connection with or relevant bearing on the alleged seized material and the alleged undisclosed income of the assessee for a particular year sought to be assessed. Decided in favour of assessee.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The legal judgment involves several core legal questions:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of Assumption of Jurisdiction under Section 147
Issue 2: Legality of Reassessment Order under Sections 147/144B
Issue 3: Additions under Sections 68 and 69
Issue 4: Limitation of Reassessment Order
Issue 5: Interest Charged under Sections 234A, 234B, and 234C
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 -‘reason to believe’ or 'reason to suspect' - addition u/s 68 - HELD THAT:- AO solely relied on some unspecified and unintelligible information in the category of ‘high risk transactions’ of unsecured loans. Allegations towards escapement without giving specific particulars of the lenders is apparently in the realm of bald allegations devoid of any specific details. To reiterate, the name of the lendor(s) who are alleged to be susceptible to section 68 of the Act do not feature in the reasons recorded at all. No definitive link is present.
At the time of formation of belief, the AO is not shown to be in possession of any document of adverse nature which may led to allegations of escapement. Clearly, the AO has harboured belief on vague and non-descript hypothesis emerging from so-called analysis of any specified information collected.
No tangible material has been referred in the reasons recorded which is capable in igniting the belief towards alleged escapement. Mere identification of transactions fueling in ‘high risk transaction’ category ipso facto would not provide cause of action to invoke the drastic power of reopening of a concluded assessment. Requirement of main provision of section 147 is thus apparently not met.
AO must have reason to believe that chargeable income has escaped assessment. The expression ‘reason to believe’ is the most valuable safeguard available to prevent arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction. It is trite that the ‘reason to suspect’ cannot be equated with expression ‘reason to believe’.
The reasons recorded in the instant case, gives an infallible impression that it is a case of ‘reason to suspect’ on so-called risk transactions categorised by the automated system of the Department. rather than ‘reason to believe’.
It is well-settled that notice of re-opening can be supported by the Revenue within the confines of the reasons recorded by the AO alone.
AO cannot supplement the reasons at a later stage. Other principle which is equally well-settled and which applies in the present case is that re-opening of assessment would not be permitted for a fishing or a roving inquiry as a part of requirement of main provision of section 147 of the Act.
The purported ‘belief’ in the instant case is premised on some vague and undisclosed grounds and thus, a mere pretence. Such action does not pass the test of ‘reason to believe’. We thus, see no semblance in the action of the AO on the touchstone of main provision of section 147 of the Act. Assessee appeal allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The legal judgment revolves around the following core issues:
1. Whether the reassessment proceedings initiated under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 were valid, given that the reasons for reopening the assessment were allegedly flawed or incorrect.
2. Whether the Assessing Officer (AO) was justified in making additions on grounds other than those originally recorded for reopening the assessment.
3. Whether the reassessment proceedings were based on a mere change of opinion, thus rendering them invalid.
4. The legality of the reassessment orders in light of the procedural and substantive requirements under the Income Tax Act, 1961.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of Reassessment Proceedings
Relevant legal framework and precedents: The reassessment proceedings were initiated under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, which requires the AO to have a "reason to believe" that income has escaped assessment. The precedents cited include decisions from various High Courts, emphasizing the necessity of a valid reason for reopening an assessment.
Court's interpretation and reasoning: The court found that the reasons for reopening the assessment were based on incorrect information and lacked independent verification. The AO's reliance on information from the Investigation Wing without proper verification was deemed insufficient to justify reopening the assessment.
Key evidence and findings: The AO failed to confront the assessee with alleged bogus transactions, and no incriminating evidence was shared during the proceedings. The court noted discrepancies in the procedure followed, such as issuing notices under incorrect sections.
Application of law to facts: The court applied the principles from precedents, concluding that the reassessment proceedings were invalid due to the lack of a valid reason for reopening.
Treatment of competing arguments: The assessee argued that the reassessment was based on incorrect information and a change of opinion. The Revenue contended that the AO had the power to make additions on other grounds. The court sided with the assessee, emphasizing the need for a valid reason for reopening.
Conclusions: The court concluded that the reassessment proceedings were invalid and quashed the reassessment orders.
Issue 2: Additions on Grounds Other Than Originally Recorded
Relevant legal framework and precedents: The issue revolves around the AO's power to make additions on grounds not originally recorded for reopening. The court referred to precedents, including the decision in Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd., which limits the AO's power to make additions on other grounds if no additions are made on the original grounds.
Court's interpretation and reasoning: The court held that the AO could not make additions on other grounds if the original grounds for reopening were found to be invalid. The reassessment should focus on the reasons initially recorded.
Key evidence and findings: The AO made additions on issues not included in the reasons recorded for reopening. The court found this approach inconsistent with the legal principles established in precedents.
Application of law to facts: The court applied the principles from precedents, concluding that the AO's approach was incorrect and the reassessment orders were invalid.
Treatment of competing arguments: The Revenue argued that the AO had the power to make additions on other grounds. The court rejected this argument, emphasizing the need to adhere to the reasons initially recorded for reopening.
Conclusions: The court concluded that the AO's additions on other grounds were invalid, and the reassessment orders were quashed.
Issue 3: Reassessment Based on Change of Opinion
Relevant legal framework and precedents: The court referred to precedents, including Kelvinator of India Ltd., which prohibits reassessment based on a mere change of opinion.
Court's interpretation and reasoning: The court found that the reassessment proceedings were based on a change of opinion, as the AO revisited issues already examined during the original assessment.
Key evidence and findings: The court noted that the reassessment proceedings were initiated without new tangible material, indicating a change of opinion.
Application of law to facts: The court applied the principles from precedents, concluding that the reassessment proceedings were invalid due to being based on a change of opinion.
Treatment of competing arguments: The Revenue argued that the reassessment was justified. The court rejected this argument, emphasizing the prohibition on reassessment based on a change of opinion.
Conclusions: The court concluded that the reassessment proceedings were invalid and quashed the reassessment orders.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve verbatim quotes of crucial legal reasoning: The court emphasized, "The reassessment proceedings were invalid due to the lack of a valid reason for reopening and were based on a change of opinion, which is prohibited by law."
Core principles established: The court reinforced the principles that reassessment must be based on valid reasons, not on a change of opinion, and that the AO cannot make additions on other grounds if the original grounds for reopening are invalid.
Final determinations on each issue: The court quashed the reassessment orders, dismissing the Revenue's appeals and allowing the assessee's cross-objections.
Validity of Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - Borrowed satisfaction - AR argued that the AO had mechanically recorded the reason for reopening the case and the AO had not verified the veracity of the information received from the Investigation Wing of the Income Tax Department - AR further contended that the reassessment proceedings were based on change of opinion - HELD THAT:- This case is squarely covered by the decision of ATS Infrastructure Ltd. [2024 (7) TMI 1441 - DELHI HIGH COURT] wherein the case of Manjinder Singh Kang [2012 (6) TMI 616 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT] and N. Govind Raju [2015 (8) TMI 271 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] were discussed and distinguished.
The case of Mehak Finvest P. Ltd. [2014 (11) TMI 56 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT] are also held distinguishable on the facts of the case. The decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of ATS Infrastructure Ltd. [2024 (7) TMI 1441 - DELHI HIGH COURT] are binding in nature as the AO was situated within the territorial and subjective jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court.
Thus, hold that there were no infirmities in the impugned orders and we thus, decline to interfere with. We hold that reassessment orders in these cases were bad in the eyes of the law and therefore, these are hereby quashed. Decided in favour of assessee.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The primary legal issue presented in this case was whether the deduction claimed under Section 10AA of the Income Tax Act, 1961, by the assessee was rightfully denied by the Centralized Processing Center (CPC) due to a technical glitch during the e-filing of the income tax return.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Relevant legal framework and precedents:
Section 10AA of the Income Tax Act, 1961, provides for a deduction in respect of profits derived by a unit set up in a Special Economic Zone (SEZ). The deduction is subject to certain conditions and procedural requirements, including the filing of prescribed forms and adherence to timelines.
Court's interpretation and reasoning:
The court considered the technical glitch as an inadvertent error that occurred during the e-filing process. It was observed that the assessee had consistently claimed the deduction under Section 10AA in previous years and had complied with the procedural requirements by submitting the necessary forms, such as Form 56F and Form 29C, within the stipulated time.
Key evidence and findings:
The evidence presented included the tax audit report under Section 44AB, Form 56F, and Form 29C, which were duly filed along with the income tax return. The court noted that the deduction under Section 10AA was reflected in the adjusted total income and the Alternate Minimum Tax (AMT) computation.
Application of law to facts:
The court applied the provisions of Section 10AA and the procedural requirements for claiming deductions. It concluded that the technical glitch did not negate the bona fide claim of the assessee, as the deduction was appropriately claimed in the return and supported by requisite documentation.
Treatment of competing arguments:
The Revenue's argument was based on the denial of the deduction due to the technical error in the e-filing process. However, the court found this argument insufficient to disallow the deduction, given the consistent past allowance of the deduction and the fulfillment of statutory requirements by the assessee.
Conclusions:
The court concluded that the technical glitch should not prevent the allowance of a legitimate deduction claim under Section 10AA. The appeal by the Revenue was dismissed, affirming the decision of the Ld. Addl./JCIT (Appeals) to allow the deduction.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve verbatim quotes of crucial legal reasoning:
The court stated, "The disallowance of the deduction claimed under section 10AA of the Act arose due to a technical glitch/inadvertently the deduction could not be filled in the appropriate column of computation of Income. But the total income has been computed by allowing claimed deduction only."
Core principles established:
The judgment reinforced the principle that technical errors in e-filing should not undermine the substantive rights of taxpayers to claim legitimate deductions, especially when procedural compliance is otherwise demonstrated.
Final determinations on each issue:
The court upheld the allowance of the deduction under Section 10AA, dismissing the Revenue's appeal and affirming the decision of the Ld. Addl./JCIT (Appeals). The judgment emphasized the importance of considering the intent and compliance of the taxpayer, notwithstanding technical filing errors.
In summary, the judgment highlights the judiciary's approach to balancing procedural technicalities with substantive tax rights, ensuring that genuine claims are not denied due to inadvertent errors in the digital filing process.
Denial of deduction u/s 10AA - inadvertent mistake in e-filing of return of income - technical error/glitch in the software used by the assessee for preparing.xml file format wherein inadvertently the deduction u/s 10AA could not be captured in appropriate column of the computation of income - fourth year of claiming of deduction.
HELD THAT:- The assessee made his elaborate submissions before the Ld. Addl./JCIT(Appeals) with evidences stating that while e-filing the return there corrupt an error due to which the deduction claimed u/s 10AA was denied even though the assessee has duly furnished Form 56F in the prescribed Form by Chartered Accountant.
Disallowance of the deduction claimed u/s 10AA of the Act arose due to a technical glitch/inadvertently the deduction could not be filled in the appropriate column of computation of Income. But the total income has been computing by allowing claimed deduction only. Upon reviewing the submissions made by the appellant and examining the data available on the system, the prima facie of the appellant's case is found to be acceptable as per the order of the Ld. Addl./JCIT(Appeals).
No valid reason to interfere with the findings given for allowing the claim of deduction u/s 10AA of the Act to the assessee which was otherwise denied due to technical glitch in e-filing the return. Decided against revenue.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions presented and considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Addition of Rs. 47,49,200/- as unexplained cash deposits
Issue 2: Addition of Rs. 23,26,003/- as unexplained credit entries
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Addition u/s 69A - unexplained money - cash deposited by assessee in his bank account during the year - HELD THAT:- Assessee claims to have deposited Rs. 47,53,965/- from the various amounts kept by his wife as gifts received during the 11 years on account of marriage, marriage anniversary, celebrations on account of birthday of two children, cash received from uncle, sister, mother and brother. It is a fact that the appellant/assessee has failed to furnish the details of business activities carried by him.
As per e-filing portal, assessee filed Income-tax Returns for the years 2010-11, 2011-12 & 2015-16 only. The bank statements show that assessee conducted activities beyond assessment year 2015-16 but had not filed any ITR. The assessee has not offered income arising out of his activities for taxation. Be that as it may, in view of facts and circumstances of the case, to balance equity and to meet the ends of justice, we hold that source of cash deposits to the extent of Rs. 10,00,000/- as unexplained and remaining cash deposits to be out of explained source.
Assessee had transferred Rs. 10,00,000/- each vide entries dated 11.05.2013 & 14.05.2013 to Harbans Lal Gulati who had returned Rs. 20,00,000/- vide bank entry dated 19.01.2017 in South Indian Bank, Janakpuri stand fully explained. The deposits in bank thus represents repayment of earlier payment to Gulati. Appellant/assessee has claimed that his family members vide various bank credit entries had transferred Rs. 2,63,600/- (i.e. Rs. 2,09,600/- from his mother, Rs. 27,000/- from his wife, Rs. 17,000/- from his brother and Rs. 10,000/- from his father). As such, the additions of Rs. 23,26,003/- under section 69A is unsustainable and is deleted.
Appeal filed by assessee is partly allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment include:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Addition of Rs. 31,93,527/- as unexplained cash credit
Relevant legal framework and precedents: The addition was made under Section 68 of the Income Tax Act, which deals with unexplained cash credits. The AO's reliance on preponderance of probability and hypothetical calculations was challenged.
Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal noted that the AO accepted the sales and purchases declared by the assessee and did not reject the books of account. The Tribunal emphasized that any addition under Section 68 must be backed by cogent evidence.
Key evidence and findings: The assessee provided VAT returns, purchase bills, and quantitative details, which were not disputed by the Commercial Tax Department. The AO's calculation lacked evidentiary support.
Application of law to facts: The Tribunal found that the AO's addition was based on assumptions without evidence, which is contrary to the principles of taxation.
Treatment of competing arguments: The assessee argued that the cash deposits were from legitimate sales, supported by documentation. The Department's argument of inflated sales was not substantiated with evidence.
Conclusions: The Tribunal concluded that the addition was unsustainable and directed its deletion.
Issue 2: Treatment of cash sales during demonetization as bogus sales
Relevant legal framework and precedents: The AO treated the cash sales as bogus based on the sudden increase during demonetization.
Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal highlighted that the AO did not provide evidence of inflated sales and that the books of account were audited and accepted by the Commercial Tax Department.
Key evidence and findings: The Tribunal noted the absence of any adverse findings from the Commercial Tax Department regarding the sales figures.
Application of law to facts: The Tribunal emphasized that sales recorded in the books and accepted by tax authorities cannot be deemed bogus without evidence.
Treatment of competing arguments: The Department's reliance on circumstantial evidence was deemed insufficient without concrete proof.
Conclusions: The Tribunal rejected the treatment of cash sales as bogus and supported the assessee's position.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve verbatim quotes of crucial legal reasoning: The Tribunal stated, "Once the amount has been declared in the VAT return as well and the same has also been accepted by the AO, such sales cannot be considered as concealed income."
Core principles established: The judgment reinforced the principle that tax additions must be based on evidence, not assumptions. It also emphasized the need for consistency between the treatment of sales in VAT returns and income tax assessments.
Final determinations on each issue: The Tribunal set aside the First Appellate Authority's order and directed the AO to delete the addition of Rs. 31,93,527/-. The appeal of the assessee was allowed.
In conclusion, the Tribunal's decision underscores the importance of evidence-based assessments and the inadmissibility of hypothetical calculations in determining unexplained cash credits. The judgment also highlights the necessity for tax authorities to align their assessments with documented and verified sales figures.
Unaccounted/unexplained income - Unexplained Cash Credit u/s 69A - assessee was selected for scrutiny under CASS for the reason that there was an abnormal increase in the cash deposits during the demonetization period - HELD THAT:- AO was of the view that the assessee had inflated cash sales even prior to the declaration of the demonetization and had introduced bogus sales and had deposited cash so generated in the books of account to account for his unaccounted money, which was otherwise lying outside the books of account. While arriving at this conclusion, the AO has heavily relied on preponderance of probability and, thus, has worked on the assumption/presumption that the assessee had resorted to this kind of exercise for the purpose of depositing his unaccounted money in the Bank account through the cash book.
While doing so, as rightly pointed out by the A.R., the AO has not brought on record any single piece of evidence, which would suggest that the assessee has inflated sales so as to create cash balance in the books of account. Moreover, no deficiency has been pointed out by the AO in the books of account nor has the availability of stock been doubted. Thus, the AO has, on the one hand, accepted the sales and purchases declared by the assessee and, on the other hand, has made addition on account of bogus sales made out of books of account and deposited in the Bank account during the period of demonetization.
Undoubtedly, there has been a substantial jump in the turnover during the period of demonetization, but without there being any evidence to justify the claim of the AO that such jump in turnover was due to bogus sales having been created in the books, such claim remains a mere presumption. Although the principle of preponderance of probability is an accepted principle, but such probability has to be backed by some cogent evidence and the onus is squarely on the Department to establish that what is being said to be probable has proper evidence to support such claim. The Ld. First Appellate Authority, while dismissing the appeal of the assessee has also not considered this aspect.
AO was legally not entitled to calculate sales on a hypothetical basis completely ignoring various evidences submitted during the course of assessment proceedings in the form of VAT returns, Purchase Bills and quantitative details, etc. Once the amount has been declared in the VAT return as well and the same has also been accepted by the AO, such sales cannot be considered as concealed income. Appeal of assessee allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal issues addressed in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Determination of Transfer Price for Electricity
Issue 2: Discrepancies in PF and Depreciation Figures
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
In conclusion, the judgment underscores the importance of aligning transfer pricing determinations with market realities and acknowledges the necessity for accurate financial reporting in tax assessments.
TP Adjustment - determination of transfer price for supply of electricity from thermal unit to washeries division of the assessee during the year - reference u/s 92CA(1) - TPO applied an average of the rate published by CSEB (as adjusted by transmission and distribution cost but not adjusted for transmission and distribution losses) and the rate of trade as per IEX (without adjusting for any transmission / distribution loss or charges) and arrived at the rate of Rs 2.868 per unit to be the ALP - fair market value for the transfer rate of power or the selling rate of power in the industry by CSEB is Rs 4.05 per unit - HELD THAT:- Whether the said rate of Rs 4.05 per unit being the prevailing market rate could be used for transfer of electricity between two units of the same Assessee for captive consumption was subject matter of consideration by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs Jindal Steel & Power Ltd [2023 (12) TMI 417 - SUPREME COURT] as held market value of the power supplied by the State Electricity Board to the industrial consumers should be construed to be the market value of electricity. It should not be compared with the rate of power sold to or supplied to the State Electricity Board since the rate of power to a supplier cannot be the market rate of power sold to a consumer in the open market. The State Electricity Board's rate when it supplies power to the consumers have to be taken as the market value for computing the deduction under section 80-IA of the Act.
Thus, Tribunal had rightly computed the market value of electricity supplied by the captive power plants of the assessee to its industrial units after comparing it with the rate of power available in the open market i.e., the price charged by the State Electricity Board while supplying electricity to the industrial consumers.
In the present case before us, the market value is Rs 4.05 per unit being the rate charged by CSEB on the industrial consumers, whereas the transfer price between two units of the assessee was Rs 4 per unit. The same is well within the market rate of Rs 4.05 per unit and hence the price of Rs 4 per unit is to be construed to be at ALP. Accordingly, no transfer pricing adjustment is warranted.
Addition towards Employees contribution to PF and towards disallowance of depreciationon the ground that the said figures does not even pertain to the assessee before us - AR was very fair in stating that the said issue may be restored to the file of Learned AO for denovo adjudication for adopting the correct figures in accordance with law after considering the facts and figures pertaining to the assessee and make an addition if warranted.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The legal judgment presents several core issues for consideration:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Deletion of Disallowance of Fictitious Losses
Issue 2: Change of Opinion and Reassessment Validity
Issue 3: Legality of Notice under Section 148
Issue 4: Right to Cross-Examination
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Validity of reopening of assessment as barred by limitation - period of six years expired - HELD THAT:- The notice u/s.148 issued on 27/07/2022 is clearly barred by limitation. The reason being the test for checking the time limit and the validity of notices issued u/s.148 under new regime applicable from A.Y. 2021-22 and prior regime is, whether period of six years had expired at the time of issue of such notice or not. In the case of assessee, the period of six years had expired on 31/03/2022 and consequently, the notice dated 27/07/2022 is clearly barred by limitation and on this ground, the assessment proceedings u/s.147 is hereby quashed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The legal judgment primarily revolves around the following core legal questions:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of Approval under Section 153D
Issue 2: Justification of Additions under Section 153A
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
In conclusion, the judgment underscores the importance of a substantive approval process under Section 153D of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The court's decision to quash the assessment orders highlights the necessity for procedural compliance and thoughtful application of mind by the approving authority. The judgment serves as a precedent emphasizing that mechanical or perfunctory approvals cannot sustain the validity of assessment orders. All appeals filed by the assessee were allowed based on these findings.
Assessment u/s 153A - Invalid approval granted u/s 153D - as argued approval granted by the superior authority u/s 153D is non-est approval being a mechanical and a perfunctory approval and suffers from the vice of non-application of mind - HELD THAT:- On a perusal of the approval addressed by the Ld. Addl. CIT to the AO, it emerges that the Ld. Addl.CIT has not uttered a word on the subject matter of additions. The approval is in the nature of Performa approval; the approval granted smacks of mechanical or perfunctory approval in a symbolic exercise of powers vested u/s 153D of the Act.
Approval memo is totally silent on the issues involved and has granted omnibus approval without any thoughtful process being discernible. The Order Sheet has not docketed any interaction or directions of the Ld. Addl. CIT in the course of assessment either. There is no other material to show involvement of the superior authority in the course of assessment.
In the first para of the approval memo, it is mentioned that draft assessment order has been received for approval and in the second para of the approval memo, it was stated that the draft assessment order has been approved. Nothing else is discernible. Such mechanical approval cannot be countenanced - the assessment order based on ritualistic approval stands vitiated and thus quashed. Assessee appeal allowed.
Issues: (i) Whether administrative support service charges received from the Indian subsidiary were taxable as fees for technical services under Article 13(4) of the India-UK DTAA; (ii) Whether reimbursement of expenses received from the Indian subsidiary was taxable as fees for technical services under Article 13(4) of the India-UK DTAA.
Issue (i): Whether administrative support service charges received from the Indian subsidiary were taxable as fees for technical services under Article 13(4) of the India-UK DTAA.
Analysis: The services consisted of administrative and day-to-day support functions. The settled treaty test requires the services to be technical or consultancy in nature and, under the relevant treaty language, to make available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how, or processes. The services were held to be group support and managerial in character, without transfer of technology or enabling the recipient to apply any technical knowledge independently. The prior co-ordinate bench view in the assessee's own case was followed.
Conclusion: The issue was decided in favour of the assessee and the service charges were held not taxable as fees for technical services.
Issue (ii): Whether reimbursement of expenses received from the Indian subsidiary was taxable as fees for technical services under Article 13(4) of the India-UK DTAA.
Analysis: The reimbursements were on a cost-to-cost basis without any mark-up or profit element. A pure reimbursement does not assume income character merely because the underlying expenses were incurred through the holding structure. The record did not show any technical services being rendered for consideration, nor any making available of technical knowledge or skill to the recipient. The earlier decision in the assessee's own case was again followed.
Conclusion: The issue was decided in favour of the assessee and the reimbursement was held not taxable as fees for technical services.
Final Conclusion: The substantive additions under the treaty were deleted, and the Revenue's remaining challenges failed on the merits.
Ratio Decidendi: Under the India-UK DTAA, administrative support or similar group support services are not taxable as fees for technical services unless they are technical or consultancy services that make available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how, or processes to the recipient; pure cost reimbursements without mark-up do not constitute taxable income as fees for technical services.
Income deemed to accrue or arise in India - taxability of administrative support service charges as fees for technical services (FTS) in terms of Article 13 of Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) between India – United Kingdom (UK) - HELD THAT:- As decided in assessee’s own case in A.Y. 2012- 13. [2023 (3) TMI 1485 - ITAT MUMBAI] the services provided by the group entities or holding company to its subsidiaries as support services to run their business effectively will not be considered as FTS or FIS under the treaty and these services does not amount to make available technical or skill or expertise while providing these services.
Thus the services provided by the assessee to its subsidiaries are only to support to function the administration and day to day management of JIPL considering the fact that JIPL does not have any infrastructure to carry out any administration and day to day management. These facts are confirmed by the lower authorities and also facts on record. Therefore, these services are outside the ambit of FIS and FTS. Hence we are incline to allow the grounds raised by the assessee.
Taxability of reimbursement of expenses as FTS under Article 13(4) of India-UK treaty - As decided in assessee’s own case in A.Y. 2012- 13 [2023 (3) TMI 1485 - ITAT MUMBAI] we hold that reimbursement of expenses cannot be treated as FTS. Accordingly, we uphold the decision of learned first appellate authority by dismissing the grounds raised.
Issues: Whether the revisionary order under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, could be sustained in relation to tax deduction at source on external development charges paid to HUDA, where the Assessing Officer had proceeded under section 194I and the revisional authority held that section 194C applied.
Analysis: The dispute turned on the character of the payment to HUDA and the applicable TDS provision. The Assessing Officer had passed the order under section 201/201(1A) after examining the material and treating the payment as falling under section 194I. The revisional authority relied on a later High Court ruling to hold that section 194C applied, and thereby invoked section 263. The Tribunal noted that the issue was already pending in appeal before the first appellate authority, that the legal position was still debatable in view of the stay of the later High Court ruling, and that the Assessing Officer's view was a possible view on the record as it then stood. It also noted that the rate applied by the Assessing Officer was higher than the rate under section 194C, so prejudice to the Revenue was not established.
Conclusion: The invocation of section 263 was unsustainable and the revisional order was quashed.
Final Conclusion: The assessees succeeded in all connected appeals, and the revisionary interference with the Assessing Officer's order was set aside.
Ratio Decidendi: Section 263 cannot be invoked where the Assessing Officer has taken a plausible view on a debatable issue on the basis of the record available at the time, and the Revenue fails to show both error and prejudice.
Revision u/s 263 - TDS u/s 194I or 194C - Payment in nature of external/infrastructure development charges to HUDA - liability u/s 201/201(1A) - HELD THAT:- The issue under consideration is already pending before ld. CIT(A) and the issue under consideration is not settled considering the fact that Hon’ble Supreme Court has stayed the operation of Hon’ble Delhi High Court decision in the case of Puri Construction (P.) Ltd. [2024 (2) TMI 756 - DELHI HIGH COURT]
The issue under consideration is payment of EDC to HUDA which is pending before first appellate authority where the provisions of section 194I or 194C can also be the point of adjudication. PCIT found that it is against the law and also observed that it is against the interest of Revenue.
After careful consideration, we are of the view that the slab at which the AO calculated liability u/s 201/201(1A) is at 10% considering the same as rental payment. However, ld. PCIT has cancelled the relevant assessment order following the provisions of section 194C for which slab of 2% is applicable. It is not against the interest of Revenue.
We observed that the order passed by the AO is not erroneous when the same was passed and also this is a debatable issue not settled considering the fact that the issue was pending before CIT (A) and also PCIT should not have proceeded to initiate proceedings u/s 263 when the same was pending before the ld. CIT (A). Let alone the fact that there is no prejudicial to the interest of Revenue in this case. Therefore, we are inclined to set aside the order passed u/s 263. Assessee appeal allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Proper Service of Notice under Section 148
Issue 2: Validity of Assessment Order under Sections 144/147
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
In conclusion, the court emphasized the importance of adhering to procedural requirements in tax assessments, particularly the proper service of notices, as a foundational element of jurisdiction. The appeal was allowed, and the impugned assessment order was set aside.
Validity of reopening of assessment in the absence of proper service of notice u/s 148 - HELD THAT:- No notice u/s. 148 was ever served on the assessee. The AO without service of mandatory notice u/s. 148 of the Act, proceeded to complete the assessment. The proceedings u/s. 147 of the Act without mandatory notice u/s. 148 of the Act are bad and liable to be quashed.
As in the case of CIT vs. Laxman Das Khandelwal,[2019 (8) TMI 660 - SUPREME COURT] has held that provisions of section 292BB of the Act does not save complete absence of notice u/s. 148 of the Act. In the instance case since there was no service of notice u/s. 148 of the Act nor the assessee was provided the reasons for issuance of notice u/s. 148 of the Act, the assessment order passed in the instant case is held to be without jurisdiction. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions addressed in the judgment include:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of Seizure Proceedings and Notices/Summons
Issue 2: DRI Officers as Proper Officers
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
In conclusion, the appellate court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Single Judge's order based on the Supreme Court's review, which clarified the jurisdiction and authority of DRI officers under the Customs Act, 1962.
Challenge to seizure proceedings initiated by the appellants - ‘proper officer’ for the purpose of Section 28 (4) of the Customs Act, 1962 for initiating proceedings and issuing a show cause notice to recovery duty - whether the proceedings initiated by the authorities of the Appellants was justified or not? - HELD THAT:- The Supreme Court, in Commissioner of Customs [2021 (3) TMI 384 - SUPREME COURT], has observed 'DRI officers came to be appointed as the officers of customs vide Notification No. 19/90-Cus (N.T.) dated 26.04.1990 issued by the Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Government of India. This notification later came to be superseded by Notification No. 17/2002 dated 07.03.2002 issued by the Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, to account for administrative changes.'
Conclusion - The officers of Directorate of Revenue Intelligence are proper officers for the purposes of Section 28 and are competent to issue show cause notice thereunder.
Appeal allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Liability for Penalty under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act
Issue 2: Jurisdiction of the Issuing Authority
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The judgment underscores the importance of distinguishing between procedural compliance by CHAs and active participation in offenses such as misdeclaration. It highlights the necessity of evidence in establishing abetment and clarifies the scope of liability under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act.
Levy of penalty u/s 112(a) of CA, on appellant, a Customs House Agent (CHA) - whether there was abetment of the appellant in the misdeclaration of the imported goods? - HELD THAT:- It is on record that the statement of Shri Gyan Prakash Nirmal, Vice President of the importer has never implicated the appellant in the act of alleged misdeclaration of the imported goods. The impugned order vide para 81 categorically places the responsibility of the misdeclaration of the impugned goods on the importer, and specifically on Mr Gyan Prakash Nirmal, based on the investigations & evidences available with the Department. There is not even a whisper of any advice or action undertaken by the appellant to facilitate or abet the said misdeclaration. There is nothing on record to prove that the appellant had connived/abetted with the importers in filing the Bills of Entry for importing the said products, without the mandatory documents. It is also noted that the impugned order for the said offence has already penalized the importer in terms of redemption fine and penalty. Hence, penalty under Section 112(a) can be imposed only if there is evidence of abetment by the appellant.
Conclusion - As there is nothing on record to prove that the appellant had connived/abetted with the importers in filing the documents for importing the restricted products without the mandatory documents, the penalty cannot be sustained.
Appeal allowed.
Issues: (i) Whether imported health supplements classifiable under CTH 2106 9099 were chargeable to IGST at 28% under Schedule IV or at 18% under Schedule III of Notification No. 1/2017-Integrated Tax (Rate). (ii) Whether the demand for differential IGST was barred by limitation.
Issue (i): Whether imported health supplements classifiable under CTH 2106 9099 were chargeable to IGST at 28% under Schedule IV or at 18% under Schedule III of Notification No. 1/2017-Integrated Tax (Rate).
Analysis: The relevant rate notification under Section 5(1) of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 provides different schedules for different rates. The entry in Schedule IV relied upon by the department specifically names certain food preparations, while Schedule III contains the residuary entry for goods not specified elsewhere. The expression used in the entry was treated as restrictive and not as a general enlargement of the whole heading. The imported health supplements were not shown to answer the specific description in Schedule IV. The Revenue also failed to discharge the burden of proving that the goods were in fact protein concentrates, textured protein substances, or food flavouring material. In the absence of supporting test reports or other evidence, the goods remained classifiable as claimed by the importer.
Conclusion: The goods were chargeable to IGST at 18% under Schedule III and not at 28% under Schedule IV.
Issue (ii): Whether the demand for differential IGST was barred by limitation.
Analysis: The imports were declared in the bills of entry and the classification particulars were on record. There was no suppression of facts or positive act to justify invocation of the extended period. The demand was raised after a substantial lapse of time, and the case also involved revenue neutrality because any additional tax paid would have been available as input tax credit. On these facts, the extended period could not be sustained.
Conclusion: The demand for differential IGST was barred by limitation.
Final Conclusion: The impugned orders were set aside and the appeals succeeded with consequential relief.
Ratio Decidendi: A specific tariff entry must be applied strictly according to its description, the Revenue bears the burden of proving classification under a higher-rated entry, and the extended period cannot be invoked absent suppression or mala fide when the classification was disclosed and the matter is revenue neutral.
Classification of imported goods - health supplements - Food supplements - classifiable under CTH 2106 9099 are liable to IGST @28% under Sr. No. 9 of Schedule IV of Notification No. 1/2017- IGST rate or at 18% under serial No. 453 of Schedule III of the said notification? - demand for differential IGST is barred by limitation or otherwise.
Classification of health supplements - HELD THAT:- The issue in the present case is no longer res-integra as the same has been considered by this Tribunal in the case of Neuvera Wellness Venture Pvt Ltd [2023 (10) TMI 964 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD] wherein by the detailed finding, this Tribunal has considered that the nutrient/health supplements is not covered under Sr. No. 9 of Schedule IV whereas the same is covered under Serial No. 454 of Schedule iii for the purpose of charging the IGST - In view of the above judgment, the issue being identical is no longer res-integra. Accordingly, the assessee imported good attract 18% IGST and not 28%.
Food supplement - HELD THAT:- It is found that the goods are ready to human consumption. Department seeks to classify under CTH 21061000 as Protein Concentrates and Textured protein substances. By description itself it appears that Protein Concentrates cannot be fit for human consumption. At the most Protein Concentrates can be categorized as input for making Protein based food/Health supplement. The department has neither got the goods tested nor adduced any evidence to establish the exact nature of the goods that whether the same is Protein Concentrates or otherwise. Therefore, the burden cast on the revenue in the matter of classification of goods has not been discharged. For this reason, itself as per settled legal position on this point, the case of department clearly fails.
Food Flavouring Material - HELD THAT:- On scrutiny of records and the products leaflets available in appeal papers, it is not found any product which bears the name Food Flavouring Materials. There may be Food/Health supplement products containing miniscule percentage of food flavour which does not mean the said goods itself is food flavour material, therefore, the department's contention on this point cannot be agreed upon.
Time limitation - HELD THAT:- Firstly the appellants have declared the goods as appearing in all the import documents. Therefore, there is no suppression of fact on that part. Secondly, this is a case of demand of IGST which is available as input tax credit for further sale of the goods. Therefore, under any circumstances, the mala fide intention cannot be attributed to the appellant. Accordingly, the demand under extended period is not sustainable also on the ground of limitation.
Conclusion - The health supplements were subject to an 18% IGST rate under Sr. No. 453 of Schedule III, and the demand for differential IGST was time-barred.
The impugned order set aside - appeal allowed.
Issues: (i) Whether shareholder approval under Section 62(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 was mandatory before the equity shares arising from conversion of debt into shares could be accepted for listing. (ii) Whether the refusal to accept the listing request for want of BSE approval under Regulation 28 of the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 was justified.
Issue (i): Whether shareholder approval under Section 62(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 was mandatory before the equity shares arising from conversion of debt into shares could be accepted for listing.
Analysis: Section 9(1) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 enables conversion of debt into shares, but the conversion in the present case was not an independent act of the asset reconstruction company. The company itself agreed to the conversion, its board resolved to implement the proposal, and it then applied for listing of the additional shares. On those facts, the proposal was treated as one initiated by the company, resulting in an increase of subscribed capital. For such a proposal, a special resolution of shareholders was required under Section 62(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013.
Conclusion: Shareholder approval was mandatory and was absent; the objection was valid against the appellant.
Issue (ii): Whether the refusal to accept the listing request for want of BSE approval under Regulation 28 of the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 was justified.
Analysis: The finding that approval of the stock exchange was necessary under Regulation 28 was accepted as correct and not shown to be perverse. In the absence of the requisite shareholder approval and in view of the procedural requirements governing listing, the rejection of the listing request could not be faulted.
Conclusion: The refusal to accept the listing request was justified and stood sustained.
Final Conclusion: The statutory appeal failed on the legal requirements governing conversion of debt into equity and the consequent listing of shares, and the impugned refusal to list the shares was upheld.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a company itself initiates and adopts a debt-to-equity conversion proposal that increases its subscribed capital, shareholder approval by special resolution under Section 62(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 is mandatory before the resulting shares can be accepted for listing.
Rejection of application of the appellant for the listing of shares - appellant had not taken the approval of the shareholders for the allotment of the shares to the Asset Reconstruction Private Limited - HELD THAT:- The conversion of the debt into additional shares had taken place with the agreement of the appellant company and RARE, and it is on the basis of such an agreement between the parties that a resolution was passed on 02.05.2018 by the Board of Directors of the appellant company accepting the proposal to convert the debt into shares and to allot them in favor of RARE, thus, resulting in increase of the equity capital of the appellant company. Even the application for listing of the aforesaid additional shares was made by the appellant company to the BSE meaning thereby that the proposal for increasing the subscribed capital of the company by converting part of the debt into equity shares, as aforesaid, was initiated by the appellant company itself and not actually by RARE. Therefore, the proposal was that of the company only. Accordingly, as contemplated by Section 62(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013, the approval of the shareholders would be mandatory before the shares are accepted for listing on the BSE.
For want of approval of the BSE, the Securities Appellate Tribunal has returned a clear finding that the approval of the BSE is necessary in view of Regulation 28 of the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 and there are no different opinion on it rather the said finding is accepted which is not perverse in any manner. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is opined that no error or illegality has been committed either by the BSE or the Securities Appellate Tribunal in refusing to accept the request of the appellant company for the listing of the shares at the Stock Exchange inasmuch as Section 62 of the Companies Act stands duly attracted and in the light of sub-clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 62 of the Companies Act, special resolution of the shareholders is necessary which is lacking in the instant case.
Conclusion - When a company proposes to increase its subscribed capital, shareholder approval is mandatory under Section 62(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013.
This statutory appeal under Section 22 F of Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 is devoid of merit and is dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions addressed in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Maintainability of the Petition under Section 241
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents:
Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013, allows members of a company to apply to the tribunal for relief in cases of oppression and mismanagement. Section 244 specifies the eligibility criteria for members to file such applications, requiring either a minimum number of members or a certain percentage of shareholding.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning:
The Appellate Tribunal examined the criteria under Section 244, which provides three alternative conditions for eligibility: (a) not less than one hundred members, (b) not less than one-tenth of the total number of members, or (c) members holding not less than one-tenth of the issued share capital. The Tribunal noted that the NCLT focused solely on condition (c) regarding share capital, ignoring the alternative conditions (a) and (b).
Key Evidence and Findings:
The appellants argued that they met condition (b) as they represented more than one-tenth of the total number of members, given that there were 30 members and the petition was filed by four. The NCLT, however, dismissed the petition based on the appellants not meeting the share capital threshold under condition (c).
Application of Law to Facts:
The Tribunal found that the NCLT erred by not considering the alternative conditions under Section 244. Since the appellants fulfilled condition (b), the petition was indeed maintainable.
Treatment of Competing Arguments:
The respondents contended that the appellants did not meet the shareholding requirement. However, the Tribunal emphasized that meeting any one of the conditions under Section 244 suffices for maintainability.
Conclusions:
The Tribunal concluded that the petition was maintainable as the appellants satisfied the requirement of representing more than one-tenth of the total number of members.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning:
"Section 244 clearly states that the members had the right to file petition under Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013, only when the members either fulfil the (i) threshold of not less than one hundred members of the company or not less than one-tenth of the total number of its members, whichever is less or (ii) any member or members holding not less than one-tenth of the issued share capital of the company."
Core Principles Established:
Final Determinations on Each Issue:
The judgment underscores the importance of considering all alternative legal criteria in determining the eligibility of members to file petitions under the Companies Act, thereby ensuring that procedural technicalities do not hinder substantive justice.
Dismissal of petition filed by the appellants under Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013 - dismissal on the ground it does not meet the criteria as is provided for in Section 244 of the Companies Act, 2013 - HELD THAT:- A bare perusal of the impugned order would show the Ld. NCLT had observed Section 244 of the Companies Act, 2013 requires the following conditions for filing an application/petition under Section 241 of the Companies Act viz. a) in case of a company having share capital, not less than 100 members of the company; or b) not less than 1/10 of the total number of its members whichever is less; or c) Any member of members holding not less than 1/10 of the issued share capital of the company.
Admittedly there were 30 members of Respondent No.1 at the time of filing of Company Petition. Admittedly four of them filed the petition under Section 241 hence condition (b) above viz. not less than 1/10 of the total number of members could apply was fulfilled, thus Company Petition was maintainable.
Appeal allowed.
Seeking grant of bail - money laundering - proceeds of crime - it is alleged that petitioner was involved in dealing with the proceeds of crime and in transferring of funds of M/s. PACL through various companies and making transactions of purchasing of properties etc. -it was held by High Court that 'The petitioner herein is admitted on bail on his executing a personal bond of Rs.25.00 lacs with one surety of like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court and subject to conditions imposed'.
HELD THAT:- It is not required to interfere with the impugned order. Although it is made clear that the observations made in the impugned judgment will not have any bearing on any further proceedings.
SLP dismissed.
Maintainability of SLP - Time limitation - HELD THAT:- Though on a prima facie view, the submissions made by learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is agreed, in view of the fact that the impugned order has been passed more than two and a half years ago, and much water has flown under the bridge thereafter, it is not required to interfere with the impugned order(s).
SLP dismissed.
Issues: Whether the appellant was entitled to anticipatory bail in connection with proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, subject to deposit and compliance conditions.
Analysis: The appellant had deposited Rs.80,00,000/- against a tripartite agreement referring to Rs.92,00,000/-, and an additional deposit of Rs.20,00,000/- was agreed to be made within three weeks. The direction was linked to permitting the complainants and other depositors to repatriate the amount after compliance with formalities. The grant of bail was made conditional upon deposit and compliance, and was also to operate on the terms fixed by the trial court, with further compliance under Section 482(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
Conclusion: The appellant was held entitled to be released on anticipatory bail in the event of arrest, subject to the stipulated deposit and compliance conditions.
Seeking grant of Anticipatory Bail - commission of a serious economic offence of money laundering - offence punishable under Section 3 read with Section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 - HELD THAT:- In view of the statement made and subject to compliance and deposit as directed, the appellant, Rajkumar Daitapati, shall be released on bail in the event of being arrested in connection with ECIR No. JPZ0/1/2015 (Sessions Case No.37 of 2021) (Enforcement Directorate vs. Rajkumar Daitapati) for the offences punishable under Section 3 read with Section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, on the terms and conditions fixed by the trial Court. In addition, the appellant will comply with the provisions mentioned in Section 482(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
The impugned judgment is set aside and the appeal is allowed.
Issues: Whether the applicants were entitled to regular bail in a case involving alleged criminal conspiracy, illegal extortion, and corruption-related offences.
Analysis: The applications arose from a common crime and were considered together, with the individual role of each applicant examined separately. The material collected during investigation was treated as showing prima facie active participation of the applicants in the alleged syndicate and in the collection and routing of illegal levy. The Court treated the allegations as disclosing an economic offence of serious magnitude and applied the settled bail parameters, including the nature of accusation, gravity of the offence, prima facie evidence, possibility of tampering with evidence, and the need for custodial interrogation. In that context, the Court found that the defence pleas of false implication and lack of material were matters for trial and not sufficient to outweigh the prosecution material at the bail stage.
Conclusion: The applicants were not entitled to regular bail and the bail applications were rejected.
Final Conclusion: The decision leaves the prosecution case and the trial court's assessment intact, while declining pre-trial release to the applicants.
Ratio Decidendi: In a serious economic offence, regular bail may be refused where the investigation discloses prima facie involvement in a conspiracy, the accused's release may impede investigation or affect evidence, and the defence challenge requires trial-level adjudication.
Grant of Regular bail - Moeny Laundering - collection of illegal levy amounts from the coal transporters - alleged offences under Sections 420, 120-B, 384 of the IPC and Sections 7, 7-A, 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - HELD THAT:- The prosecution has collected the material regarding active involvement of the applicants in the syndicate and main accused-Suryakant Tiwari has extorted money, which has been utilized for purchase of properties. Thus, involvement of the applicants in commission of offence under Section 7, 7A & 12 of the PC Act, is prima facie reflected.
Hon’ble the Supreme Court while considering the gravity of economic offence in case of P. CHIDAMBARAM VERSUS DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT [2019 (9) TMI 286 - SUPREME COURT] has held that 'Grant of anticipatory bail at the stage of investigation may frustrate the investigating agency in interrogating the accused and in collecting the useful information and also the materials which might have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the accused knows that he is protected by the order of the court. Grant of anticipatory bail, particularly in economic offences would definitely hamper the effective investigation.'
The prosecution has collected sufficient material to demonstrate that the applicants have active participation in the syndicate which has collected illegal money as per the directions of the main accused Suryakant Tiwari by extorting money which has also been utilized for purchase of properties by the accused persons and in the bail petition, they have contended that they are falsely implicated in the crime by taking the stand which is required to be ascertained by the trial Court only during the trial and the applicants have not placed any material to demonstrate that they are not prima facie involved in the commission of offence. The accused persons have nowhere stated that they are unknown to the main accused and there is no linkage between them for commission of offence by the main accused-Suryakant Tiwari with the add of government officers - looking to the involvement of the applicants, gravity of the offence which is economic offence, the applicants are not entitled to get bail. As such, this is not a fit case where the applicants should be granted regular bail.
Conclusion - The prosecution has collected sufficient material to demonstrate that the applicants have active participation in the syndicate which has collected illegal money as per the directions of the main accused. This is not a fit case where the applicants should be granted regular bail.
All the bail applications filed under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. are liable to be and are hereby rejected.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Attachment of Properties Acquired Prior to Crime
Issue 2: Lapse of Provisional Attachment Order
Issue 3: Connection Between Properties and Proceeds of Crime
Issue 4: Retrospective Application of Scheduled Offences
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Money Laundering - attachment of the properties acquired prior to the commission of the alleged crime - misappropriation of the funds in conspiracy with government officials - lapse of attachment order after expiry of 180 days - No connection between properties and proceeds of crime - Invalidity of scheduled offence.
Properties acquired prior to commission of crime could not have been attached - HELD THAT:- There are no force in the first argument when the proceeds out of crime was not available with the appellant rather vanished and siphoned off,the property of equivalent value has been attached. The proceeds were siphoned off by diverting it to various group companies and by layering the proceeds. In the light of the aforesaid, second limb of the definition of "proceeds of crime" has been applied to attach the property of equivalent value. Thus, the first ground raised by the appellant cannot be accepted.
The attachment order would be lapsed after expiry of 180 days - HELD THAT:- There are no substance in the argument to seek lapse of the provisional attachment order when the intervening period was suffered due to Covid-19 and the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 has been eliminated by the Apex Court for termination of proceedings - the ground for challenge to the order cannot be accepted.
No connection between properties and proceeds of crime - HELD THAT:- The properties were linked to the proceeds of crime through financial transactions and layering - the attachment of properties as connected to the proceeds of crime upheld.
Invalidity of scheduled offence - HELD THAT:- The relevant date is a date when the tainted property is projected to be untainted and as a consequence to it, the ECIR is recorded showing offence under Section 3 of the 2002 Act. The relevant date to find out the scheduled offence and the offence of money laundering is when it is projected tobe untainted property to make out an offence under section 3 of the Act of 2002 - the relevant date is of the year 2012 when after registration of FIR other discovery of the offence, an ECIR was recorded in the same year finding an offence of moneylaundering.
Conclusion - The attachment of properties was upheld. The provisional attachment order did not lapse. The properties were connected to the proceeds of crime.
There are no merit in the appeals and they are accordingly dismissed.
Issues: Whether service tax paid on deposit insurance premium under the statutory deposit insurance regime is eligible for CENVAT credit as an input service.
Analysis: The deposit insurance service was mandatory for banks and was necessary for carrying on banking operations and providing taxable output services. The insurance service obtained from the Deposit Insurance Corporation was treated as commercially expedient and integral to the banking business. The service fell within the main part of the definition of input service because it was used by the provider of output service for providing such output service. Once covered by the main part, it was unnecessary to examine the inclusive limb, and the service was not shown to be excluded from the definition.
Conclusion: CENVAT credit on the service tax paid on deposit insurance premium was admissible and the assessee's claim succeeded.
Final Conclusion: The demands, interest, and penalties could not be sustained, and the adjudication orders were set aside with consequential relief.
Ratio Decidendi: A mandatory statutory insurance service received by a bank for conducting its output banking services falls within the main part of the definition of input service, so CENVAT credit of tax paid on that service is allowable.
CENVAT Credit on tax paid in terms of Deposit Insurance Act - input services or not - HELD THAT:- It is, worth-noting, that Mumbai Bench of this Tribunal had expressed its apprehension on the precedent value of M/S. SOUTH INDIAN BANK VERSUS THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, CENTRAL EXCISE AND SERVICE TAX-CALICUT [2020 (6) TMI 278 - CESTAT BANGALORE - LB] Larger Bench decision for the reason that observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in several other cases including that of COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS (IMPORT) , MUMBAI VERSUS M/S. DILIP KUMAR AND COMPANY & ORS. [2018 (7) TMI 1826 - SUPREME COURT (LB)] concerning strict interpretation of taxation statute was not considered, for which suggestion was made for a reference to a still Larger Bench comprising of Five Members but that was negated by the same Three Members Larger Bench with reasoning noted in the said decision including affirmation of the decision of the Larger Bench made in South Indian Bank Ltd. by Hon'ble Kerala High Court and Hon'ble Bombay High Court.
The decision of the Larger Bench made in South Indian Bank that insurance service provided by the Deposit Insurance Corporation to the banks is an “input service” and CENVAT Credit on Service Tax paid by this service received by the banks from the Deposit Insurance Corporation can be availed by the banks for rendering output service, still holds the field.
Conclusion - The admissibility of CENVAT Credit on the Service Tax paid for insurance premiums under the Deposit Insurance Act upheld.
Appeal allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal question addressed in this judgment is:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents
The legal framework involves the classification of services under the Finance Act, 1994, specifically under 'Business Auxiliary Service'. Precedents considered include previous Tribunal decisions such as those in the cases of Continental Carriers, DHL Logistics (P) Ltd., and Karam Freight Movers, which dealt with similar issues regarding service tax liability on incentives and commissions earned from booking and selling cargo space.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning
The Tribunal interpreted the activities of the appellant as not falling under 'Business Auxiliary Service'. It reasoned that for an activity to be categorized under BAS, there must be a third-party client involved in the transaction. The Tribunal noted that the appellant was engaging in transactions directly with airlines, purchasing cargo space for resale, and not acting on behalf of a client. Thus, the income from these activities, including incentives and commissions, could not be classified as BAS.
Key Evidence and Findings
The Tribunal relied on the appellant's business model, which involved buying cargo space in bulk and selling it to exporters. The Tribunal found no evidence that the appellant was acting as an agent for a third party, which is a requisite for classification under BAS. The Tribunal also noted the absence of any contractual obligation to a client that would necessitate the application of BAS.
Application of Law to Facts
The Tribunal applied the legal principles from prior decisions, emphasizing the need for a third-party client relationship for BAS to apply. It found that the transactions were principal-to-principal, involving only the appellant and the airlines, thus negating the applicability of BAS.
Treatment of Competing Arguments
The Tribunal considered the arguments of the Revenue, which sought to classify the incentives and commissions as BAS. However, it found these arguments unpersuasive, given the precedents and the nature of the transactions. The Tribunal highlighted that mere purchase and sale of space do not constitute a taxable service under BAS.
Conclusions
The Tribunal concluded that the demand for service tax under BAS was not justified. It set aside the impugned order and allowed the appeal, granting consequential benefits to the appellant.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning
The Tribunal quoted from prior decisions, stating: "The freight rebate is a revenue stream generated out of trading of the space in the airline incentives. Unless the space is booked by the appellant specifically for a client, the components of the Business Auxiliary Service do not come into play."
Core Principles Established
Final Determinations on Each Issue
The Tribunal determined that the appeal should be allowed, and the demand for service tax under BAS was not sustainable. The impugned order was set aside, and the appellant was granted consequential benefits as per law.
Classification of services - Business Auxiliary Service or not - procuring the services of providing cargo space by airlines for their clients use for the export of goods - HELD THAT:- Reliance placed in the appellant’s own case for an earlier period in COMMISSIONER OF SERVICE TAX, CHENNAI VERSUS M/S. AVR CARGO AGENCY PVT. LTD. [2018 (6) TMI 524 - CESTAT CHENNAI], wherein this Bench had considered the ‘additional amount received as incentives based on the volume of transaction for the activity of forwarding cargo through the airlines’ and, after following other orders of coordinate Benches, this Bench had ruled in favour of the assessee and held that the additional amount would not be liable to service tax.
Conclusion - The demand for service tax under BAS was not justified.
There are no merit in the impugned order - appeal allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Time-barred Refund Claim
Issue 2: Applicability of Exemption Notification
Issue 3: Non-Issuance of Show Cause Notice
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Refund claim - time limitation - present refund claim was resubmitted by the appellant on 03-09-2013 for the same amount - Whether the resubmitted refund claim dated 03.09.2013 should be considered time-barred, given its connection to the original refund application dated 30.05.2013? - exemption notification change effective from 01.04.2013 applies retroactively to the refund claim period ending on 30.09.2012 - violation of principles of natural justice.
HELD THAT:- The non-issuance of SCN is a serious issue; the same is required to be issued when the Revenue does not propose to entertain the refund claim of the claimant. It’s a different matter altogether if the application for refund is accepted and refund is granted, in which event, no such SCN is required. This is more relevant as it assumes importance for a bona fide claimant to know the stand of the revenue as to the grounds for not entertaining its application. Hence, SCN is the foundation without which no proceedings shall commence. Calling for a personal hearing, as indicated by the Adjudicating Authority would not take the place of SCN nor would it cure the blunder of non-issuance of the same and nor would it undo the blunder since personal hearing which follows the SCN, is the second stage of meeting with the principles of natural justice.
Hence, the Adjudicating Authority has been very casual in taking very lightly the request of the applicant for non-issuance of SCN and dismissing the same in a very casual manner, thereby seriously prejudicing the principles of Natural Justice. Hence, any order that follows such an incurable irregularity thereafter would only be a castle in the air, lacking seriously the very foundation and hence, the same is to be held as unsustainable, un-enforceable and contrary to the established principles of law and arbitrary. It is unfortunate that such an irregular order has been sustained in the impugned OIA, thereby only perpetuating the irregularity, which also cannot sustain.
Appeal allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The Tribunal considered the following core legal questions:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Payment of service tax of Rs. 5,68,451/- for November 2015
Issue 2: Short payment of service tax of Rs. 42,188/-
Issue 3: Short payment of Swachh Bharat Cess (SBC) of Rs. 22,344/-
Issue 4: Service Tax of Rs. 2,10,11,500/- on Liquidated Damages/Penalty
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The Tribunal's decision underscores the necessity for the Department to adhere to statutory limitations and accurately interpret service definitions under tax law. The appeal was allowed, and the demands were dismissed. The appellant, however, chose not to seek a refund for the amounts already deposited.
Demand for service tax paid under a different registration number - barred by time limitation - short payment of service tax - short payment of Swachh Bharat Cess (SBC) - service tax on liquidated damages/penalties.
Time limitation - Payment of service tax of Rs. 5,68,451/- for November, 2015 through challan mentioning Service Tax Registration of Regional Unit belonging to Appellant - Short payment of service tax of Rs. 42,188/- for the period from June 2015 to September 2015 - Short payment of Swacch Bharat Cess (SBC) of Rs. 22,344/- from November 2015 to March 2016 - HELD THAT:- It is also clearly apparent that those demands pertains to the year 2015-2016 and were proposed to be recovered vide show cause notice dated 9.10.2019. The entire period under three of these issues is therefore, beyond the normal period prescribed under Section 73 of Finance Act, 1994 / 11AC of Central Excise Act, 1944. Both these observations and that there is no other evidence except appellant’s own document to prove the alleged act of suppression on part of appellant, we hold that the aforesaid provisions have wrongly been invoked while issuing the show cause notice. Therefore, the show cause notice is held to be barred by them.
Conscious and deliberate withholding of the information manufacturer is necessary for invoking the extended period. If the department had full knowledge or the manufacturer had reasonable belief that he is not required to give a particular information, only normal period of limitation i.e. one year is applicable. Resultantly, the demand of these issues is held purely barred by period of limitation. The demand on three of the issues are liable to be set aside.
Service Tax of Rs. 2,10,11,500/- on Liquidated Damages/Penalty for the period April 2014 to June 2017 - HELD THAT:- Declared service, otherwise, has first to be a service which in terms of Section 65(B)(44) of Finance Act, 1944 is any activity carried by a person for another for consideration. The term consideration is defined in explanation (a) to Section 67 of the Act to mean any amount that is payable for the taxable service. “Section 2(b) of Indian Contract Act, 1872 also defines ‘consideration’ as when at the desire of the promisor the promise or any other person has done or abstained from doing, or does or abstains from doing or promises to do or to abstain from doing, something, such act or abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the promise.” In the present case there is no agreement nor any intention to breach the terms of the agreement. The appellant herein has simply agreed to be compensated by deducting charges from the bills for any loss or admitted cause to them from the breach of contract on part of the contractor. Resultantly, the recovery of liquidated damages/penalty from the other parties cannot be called as service and the amount so received cannot be called as the amount of consideration. The activity of receiving such an amount of penalty is wrongly alleged to be an amount towards rendering the declared services. The act of receiving such an amount/liquidated damages is otherwise covered under Section 73 and 74 of the Contract Act - the demand on this ground has been wrongly confirmed.
Conclusion - The demand held to be purely barred by period of limitation. The act of receiving such an amount/liquidated damages is otherwise covered under Section 73 and 74 of the Contract Act.
Appeal allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Compliance with Section 37C(1)(a) of the Central Excise Act
Issue 2: Dismissal on Grounds of Limitation
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The tribunal's decision underscores the critical role of procedural compliance and fairness in administrative adjudication, particularly concerning service of orders and the handling of appeals. The judgment reflects a commitment to ensuring that appellants are granted due process and that technicalities do not impede justice.
Service of order - sending of an order by speed post complies with the provision of section 37C(1)(a) of the Central Excise Act or not - Dismissal of appeal on the grounds of limitation holding that the appeal filed on 02.11.2017 is beyond permissible condonable time limit of one month hence cannot be condoned.
Service of notice - HELD THAT:- In the present case the order was not dispatched by registered post. The order was sent by speed post and under the amended section 37C, there should be proof of delivery also. In the present case, admittedly, there is no proof of delivery since what has been stated by the Assistant Commissioner in his comments is that the speed post which was sent to the appellant containing the order in original did not return to the office.
Hon’ble High Court Mumbai, also in the case AMIDEV AGRO CARE PVT LTD VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [2012 (6) TMI 304 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] held that Order Is To Be Served On The Assessee Or His Agent By Registered Post A.D. Or Any Other Mode Specified In Section 37C and mere proof of dispatch of order is not sufficient compliance of the section.
Condonation of delay - HELD THAT:- In the present case, no doubt there occurred a delay in filling the appeal before Commissioner (Appeals) but the same was within the condonable powers of the Commissioner (Appeals) but he didn’t call for the explanation from the appellant. The appeal has been dismissed simply holding that there is no request on record seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The order is clear to hold that no opportunity of personal hearing was given to the appellant nor any reasonable time to file the miscellaneous application - the very basic principle of Principles of Natural Justice has been violated by Commissioner (Appeals). In view thereof and the above discussed decisions, the impunged order of Commissioner (Appeals) set aside. Since there are no findings with respect to the merits of the Order in original as was appealed before Commissioner (Appeals) the matter remanded back to Commissioner (Appeals) to decide the appeal on its merits after giving the proper opportunity of being heard to the appellant.
Conclusion - Service by speed post is valid provided there is proof of delivery. In the absence of any proof of delivery, it cannot be said that there is effective service of notice, as contemplated under Section 37C of the Act.
Appeal allowed by way of remand.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The legal judgment presented revolves around the following core issues:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Liability of Sub-contractor to Pay Service Tax
Issue 2: Invocation of Extended Period of Limitation
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Liability of sub-contractor to pay service tax even if the main contractor has already discharged the service tax liability on the entire value of the contract - extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- It is an admitted fact on record that the show cause notice dated 29.06.2012 had proposed for recovery of service tax from the appellant for the services provided during the period of 2007-08 to 2010-11 and for proposed effecting recovery, the proviso clause appended sub-section (1) of Section 73 ibid was invoked. Insofar as issuance of the show cause notice is concerned, the statute clearly mandates that the same should be issued within the normal period of one year from the relevant date. However, under exceptional circumstances, where there is involvement of fraud or collusion or willful mis-statement or suppression of facts or contravention of any of the provisions of this Chapter or of the Rules made there under with intent to evade payment of service tax, then in such cases instead of the normal period of 1 year, the show cause notice can be issued by invoking the extended period of limitation of 5 years.
In the case in hand, it is an admitted fact that payment of service tax by sub-contractor was not free from doubt and thus, there were different views expressed by Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal, which are resulted in referral of matter to Larger Bench in COMMISSIONER OF SERVICE TAX VERSUS MELANGE DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD. [2019 (6) TMI 518 - CESTAT NEW DELHI-LB]. Thus, under such circumstances, the service tax demand can only be raised within the normal period and since, the elements itemized in the proviso clause are absent, the extended period cannot be invoked.
Conclusion - The sub-contractors are liable for service tax, even if the main contractor has paid it on the total contract value - The extended period of limitation under Section 73 can only be invoked when specific conditions are met, such as fraud or suppression of facts.
The impugned order, to the extent it has confirmed the adjudged demands under the extended period of limitation is set aside - Appeal allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Admissibility of Refund Claim
Issue 2: Interpretation of Notification Requirements
Issue 3: Precedential Authority of Mahindra Engineering Services Ltd.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Refund claim for services availed by a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) unit, which were approved post-receipt but pre-filing of the refund claim - admissibility under N/N. 12/2013-ST. - HELD THAT:- The order of the Tribunal in the case of Kolland Developers Pvt. Ltd. [2016 (8) TMI 847 - CESTAT MUMBAI] was challenged before the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay [2021 (12) TMI 479 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT].
The Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in the case of Kolland Developers Pvt. Ltd. V/s Commissioner of C.EX. & CUS. (Appeals), Nagpur have allowed the appeal of the assessee and set aside the order of the Tribunal and remanded the proceedings to the Tribunal to decide the appeal afresh on its own merits and in accordance with law.
The Tribunal while deciding the appeal in remand proceeding in M/s Kolland Developers Pvt. Ltd. V/s Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur has held that 'the refund claim made as per Notification No.12/2013 could not have been denied just for the reason that at the time of receipt of services, there was no approval of Approval Committee cannot be upheld.'
There are no reasons to interfere with the impugned order and the same is sustained - appeal filed by the Department being devoid of any merits, is dismissed.
Issues: Whether service tax was leviable on erection, commissioning and installation of machines where the contract required supply of the machines along with installation and commissioning, the entire contract value formed part of the sale price, and no separate consideration was received for the service element.
Analysis: The respondent manufactured and supplied the machines under a composite arrangement in which installation and commissioning at the customer's site formed part of the same transaction. The sale invoice and contractual terms showed no segregation of any amount towards erection, commissioning or installation. In such a case, the entire value was treated as the value of sale of goods on which excise duty had already been discharged, and no separate taxable value remained available for service tax. The Tribunal followed its earlier decision in the respondent's own case and the consistent line of decisions holding that artificial bifurcation of a lump sum contract is impermissible when the service activity is only incidental to the supply of the machine.
Conclusion: Service tax was not payable on the erection, commissioning and installation activity in the facts of the case, and the Revenue's challenge failed.
Levy of service tax - Valuation - activities of erection, commissioning, and installation of machines, which are part of a composite contract for the sale and supply of machines - HELD THAT:- As per the facts of the present case the respondent have manufactured and supplied the textile machines as per the contract and sale invoice was issued to the customers. The respondent-assessee is supposed to undertake the supply and also the erection, commissioning and installation of the machine at the customer’s site. The sale value includes all the elements and there is no separate consideration received by the respondent on account of the service related to erection, commissioning and installation. In such case there is no amount available for charging service tax.
The issue has been considered by this Tribunal in the respondent’s own case of C.C.E & S.T. -SILVASA VERSUS AALIDHRA TEXTOOL ENGINEERS PVT LTD [2022 (12) TMI 11 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD] wherein this Tribunal has held that 'in the present case where the entire value has suffered excise duty and the buyer is under obligation to not only manufacture and supply the machinery but also to carry out activity of erection, commissioning and installation of the said machinery, the service tax cannot be demanded.'
Conclusion - The entire value of the goods has to be taken as sale value, consequently, no service value is involved separately.
Appeal of Revenue dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The judgment primarily revolves around three substantial legal issues:
(A) The impact of the Respondent classifying goods under different headings for official and alleged clandestine clearances, specifically under Heading 3917 (taxable) and Heading 8424 (exempt).
(B) Whether the CESTAT was justified in dismissing the issue of clandestine removal of goods as irrelevant and granting relief to the assessee without addressing the Commissioner's findings.
(C) Whether the CESTAT's approach was consistent with the principles established by the Supreme Court in Santosh Hazare v. Purushottam Tiwari.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue A: Classification and Duty Payment
- Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The classification of goods and applicable duties were governed by the Central Excise Tariff Act and related notifications. The Supreme Court's judgments on classification under Heading 8424 were also relevant.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The court found that the CESTAT failed to address the central issue of the differing classifications and duty payments for the same goods when cleared officially and allegedly clandestinely.
- Key Evidence and Findings: The assessee had classified goods under Heading 3917 for official clearance and paid 20% duty, while claiming exemption under Heading 8424 for alleged clandestine clearances.
- Application of Law to Facts: The court determined that the CESTAT should have considered the implications of the different classifications and the duty evasion allegations.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The court noted the revenue's argument that the classification under Heading 3917 was forced, but found that the CESTAT did not address this claim.
- Conclusions: The court concluded that the CESTAT erred in not addressing the classification and duty payment issues, warranting a remand for reconsideration.
Issue B: Clandestine Removal of Goods
- Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The issue of clandestine removal involves examining factual findings and the application of relevant excise laws.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The court criticized the CESTAT for dismissing the issue of clandestine removal as irrelevant without proper examination.
- Key Evidence and Findings: The Commissioner had found evidence of clandestine removal, but the CESTAT did not address these findings.
- Application of Law to Facts: The court emphasized the need for the CESTAT to address the factual disputes regarding clandestine removal.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The court noted the assessee's argument that there was no clandestine removal, but found that the CESTAT did not adequately consider this.
- Conclusions: The court concluded that the CESTAT's failure to address the issue of clandestine removal warranted setting aside the order.
Issue C: Consistency with Supreme Court Precedents
- Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The principles established in Santosh Hazare v. Purushottam Tiwari regarding the duties of appellate courts were applicable.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The court found that the CESTAT's approach was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's directives for appellate courts to provide reasoned judgments.
- Key Evidence and Findings: The CESTAT's order was found to be cursory and lacking in detailed reasoning.
- Application of Law to Facts: The court applied the principles from Santosh Hazare to highlight the deficiencies in the CESTAT's order.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments: The court noted the lack of engagement with the Commissioner's reasoning by the CESTAT.
- Conclusions: The court concluded that the CESTAT's order did not meet the standards set by the Supreme Court, necessitating a remand.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
- Preserve Verbatim Quotes: The court emphasized the need for appellate courts to provide detailed reasoning, stating, "The appellate Court must... reflect its conscious application of mind, and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for the decision of the appellate Court."
- Core Principles Established: The judgment reinforced the principle that appellate bodies must engage with the reasoning of lower authorities and provide detailed, reasoned judgments.
- Final Determinations on Each Issue: The court set aside the CESTAT's orders and remanded the matter for fresh consideration, directing the CESTAT to address all issues comprehensively and provide a reasoned order.
The judgment underscores the importance of detailed judicial reasoning and adherence to procedural standards in appellate reviews, ensuring that all substantial issues are thoroughly examined and addressed.
Clandestine removal - classification of same type of goods under headings 3197 when cleared/removed officially and under 8424 when cleared allegedly unofficially or clandestinely - impact of such classification under different headings - CESTAT did not address the clandestine removal of goods issue, but proceeded on the premise that such clandestine removal was irrelevant - HELD THAT:- The CESTAT’s order warrants interference because the CESTAT has not discharged the duties and obligations expected of a first appellate Court in this case. The central and crucial issues were not considered. The findings of fact were not addressed. The CESTAT failed to address, much less come into close quarters with the reasoning of the Commissioner. The impugned order, with respect, is a cryptic single-paragraphed order. None of the principles in Santosh Hazare [2001 (2) TMI 131 - SUPREME COURT] are followed, and the CESTAT’s approach is contrary to the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
The CESTAT should have considered the rectification application in the facts of this case. The ROM application tried to bring to the notice of the CESTAT that factual issues were raised, and they were not decided. The CESTAT’s attention was drawn to the material on record, which was not even referred to in the “single paragraph” order and was much less considered. Failing to address vital issues or even look into crucial material is grounds for judicial review. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 22 February 2008 warrants interference.
Conclusion - The appellate Court must reflect its conscious application of mind, and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for the decision of the appellate Court.
The three substantial questions of law answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee.
Issues: Whether the Revenue could sustain denial of area-based refund and overturn the Tribunal's relief on the basis of an investigation conducted behind the assessee's back, without an independent inquiry establishing non-procurement of raw material, absence of manufacture, and fraudulent clearance.
Analysis: The refund under Notification No. 56/2002-CE dated 14.11.2002 could be denied only if the jurisdictional authority proved that no raw material was procured, no manufacturing activity was undertaken, and no excisable goods were removed from the unit. The material gathered by the investigating commissionerate, based on verification of suppliers and farmers, at best furnished prima facie suspicion against the assessee's suppliers. It did not, by itself, establish that the assessee had not procured raw material or manufactured goods. The inquiry was conducted without associating the assessee, and the Revenue did not undertake a focused investigation into the assessee's own unit or deal with the documentary material produced by the assessee to show procurement, manufacture, and clearances. In such circumstances, the adverse action could not rest solely on the outside investigation and had to comply with natural justice and evidentiary requirements.
Conclusion: The challenge to the Tribunal's order failed, and the refund demand could not be sustained on the basis of the investigation relied upon by the Revenue.
Final Conclusion: The dispute turned on factual appreciation rather than any substantial question of law, and the Tribunal's relief in favour of the assessee was upheld.
Ratio Decidendi: An area-based excise refund cannot be denied merely on the basis of third-party investigation and suspicion; the Revenue must independently prove, in compliance with natural justice, that the assessee neither procured raw material nor manufactured and cleared excisable goods.
Tribunal can ignore inquiry/investigations conducted and statements recorded under Section 14 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with Section 193 and Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code or not - supplier of crude Menthol oil were found non-existence/fake during investigation - demand on account of assumption and presumption - fraud, wilful suppression/mis-declaration of the material facts - Benefit of N/N. 56/2002-CE dated 14.11.2002.
HELD THAT:- The appellant was required to demonstrate and prove that during the relevant period, when the refund was claimed by the respondent, it had not procured any raw material, nor had it undertaken any manufacturing process. This could have been determined by the appellant by conducting an inquiry/investigation specifically focused on these aspects of the matter.
Indisputably, in the inquiry conducted by the Commissionerate, the respondent was not associated. The clear case of the respondent is that it procured raw material for its unit i.e, crude menthe oil, from various suppliers in Lukcnow and, therefore, it was not for the respondent to further find out and inquire as to how and from whom the suppliers had procured the raw material. The Commissionerate has undoubtedly conducted an elaborate inquiry, but could only conclude that the farmers, whose names were appearing on the vouchers seized from the possession of M/s Sachin and Nitin Enterprises were non-existent. The Commissionerate has, thus, seriously doubted the procurement of raw material by the suppliers of the respondent - The Adjudicating Authority has also ignored the fact that the respondent had installed two DG sets of 125 KVA to supplement the power. The case was clearly set up by the respondent before the Adjudicating Authority, but the same was not enquired into or investigated and the Adjudicating Authority rather placed sole reliance upon the investigation conducted by the Commissionerate. The CESTAT has rightly not approved the manner in which the proceedings were conducted by the Adjudicating Authority.
In reply to the show cause notice issued by the jurisdictional Authority, the respondent had brought on record some evidences clearly demonstrating that not only the raw material stood procured, but the goods were also manufactured in the unit of the respondent from the procured raw material. The raw material was transported in trucks from outside the State of Jammu and Kashmir into the State. The jurisdictional officers of the Central Excise, the State Industries Department, and other statutory authorities had inspected the premises of the respondent from time to time and had never reported that the respondent’s unit was defunct and was not engaged in the permitted manufacturing activity - All these evidences could not have been ignored by the jurisdictional Authority only on the ground that there was investigation report from the Commissionerate belying the claim of suppliers of the respondent that they had procured the crude mentha oil from different farmers in Barabanki District of U.P.
Conclusion - The Tribunal has rightly not approved the manner in which the proceedings were conducted by the Adjudicating Authority.
Appeal dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal question in this judgment is whether the appellant, engaged in the manufacture of sugar and molasses, is liable to pay an amount equivalent to 5%/6% on the value of Bagasse clearances in terms of Rule 6(3) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Relevant legal framework and precedents:
The legal framework revolves around the interpretation of Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, which requires manufacturers to maintain separate accounts for dutiable and exempted goods. If not, they are liable to pay a percentage of the value of exempted goods. The precedents considered include decisions from various judicial fora, including the Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad in the case of Balrampur Chini Mills Ltd., and the Apex Court in the case of CCE Vs. Shakumbari Sugar and Allied Industries Limited.
Court's interpretation and reasoning:
The court interpreted that Bagasse, which emerges as a by-product during the sugar manufacturing process, does not qualify as a manufactured final product. It is considered a waste or residue, and thus, Rule 6 of the CCR does not apply. The court relied on previous judgments that have consistently held that Bagasse is not a final product and cannot be subjected to the reversal of CENVAT credit.
Key evidence and findings:
The court found that Bagasse is not a manufactured product but a by-product or waste generated during the sugar manufacturing process. The court noted that the appellant did not maintain separate accounts for dutiable and exempted goods but held that Bagasse does not fall under the purview of Rule 6, as it is not a manufactured product.
Application of law to facts:
The court applied the law by examining whether Bagasse could be considered a manufactured product or exempted goods under Rule 6. It concluded that since Bagasse is not a manufactured product, the obligations under Rule 6 do not apply, and therefore, the demands for reversal of CENVAT credit are unsustainable.
Treatment of competing arguments:
The court considered the department's argument that Bagasse, being excisable but charged to a 'nil' rate of duty, should be treated as an exempted product. However, it rejected this argument by emphasizing that Bagasse is not a manufactured product and thus does not fall under the scope of Rule 6. The court also noted that similar cases had been decided in favor of the assessees, supporting the appellant's position.
Conclusions:
The court concluded that the demands for reversal of CENVAT credit on Bagasse are not sustainable, as Bagasse is not a manufactured product. Consequently, the imposition of interest and penalties is also unwarranted.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve verbatim quotes of crucial legal reasoning:
"In absence of Bagasse being a manufactured final product, the obligation of reversal of Cenvat Credit under Rule 6(1) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 is not attracted."
Core principles established:
The judgment reinforces the principle that by-products like Bagasse, which are not manufactured products, do not attract the provisions of Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. It emphasizes that the nature of Bagasse as a waste product remains unchanged despite its classification in the Central Excise Tariff.
Final determinations on each issue:
The court set aside the demands for reversal of CENVAT credit and penalties imposed on the appellant, allowing the appeals with consequential relief as per the law.
Recovery of CENVAT Credit with interest and penalties - manufacture of sugar and molasses - manufacture of dutiable and exempted goods - Appellant had availed and utilised Cenvat credit without maintenance of separate accounts - Whether the Appellant is liable to pay an amount equivalent to 5% / 6% on the value of Bagasse clearances in terms of Rule 6(3) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004? - HELD THAT:- The identical issues as involved in the present case, was also involved in the case of M/S. PONNI SUGARS (ERODE) LIMITED VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, SALEM [2023 (10) TMI 876 - CESTAT CHENNAI] wherein Chennai Bench of this Tribunal has allowed the appeal by setting aside the demands of Cenvat credit.
Conclusion - In absence of Bagasse being a manufactured final product, the obligation of reversal of Cenvat Credit under Rule 6(1) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 is not attracted.
The impugned orders set aside - appeal allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal question in this judgment is whether the appellant was justified in availing input service credit of the service tax paid on lease rentals and operation and maintenance charges of windmills. The tribunal also considered whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked by the Revenue due to alleged suppression of facts by the appellant.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Justification for Availing Input Service Credit
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The appellant relied on various judicial pronouncements to justify their claim for input service credit, including precedents from the High Court and the Supreme Court that addressed similar issues of input service credit and revenue neutrality.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The tribunal examined the agreement between the appellant and M/s. ALWEL and found that the agreement was solely for the supply of electricity, with no mention of leasing windmills. The tribunal noted that the operation and maintenance of the windmills were the responsibility of M/s. ALWEL, not the appellant.
Key Evidence and Findings: The tribunal focused on the agreement's clauses, which clearly indicated that M/s. ALWEL was responsible for the operation and maintenance of the windmills, and that they bore the costs associated with these activities. The agreement also stated that M/s. ALWEL was the owner of the equipment and entitled to claim depreciation and other benefits.
Application of Law to Facts: The tribunal applied the legal principles from the cited precedents but found that the facts of the case did not support the appellant's claim for input service credit. The absence of a leasing arrangement in the agreement was pivotal in the tribunal's decision.
Treatment of Competing Arguments: The appellant argued that the electricity generated was used in manufacturing their final products, thus justifying the credit. However, the tribunal found this argument insufficient, as the agreement did not support the claim of leasing windmills.
Conclusions: The tribunal concluded that the appellant was not justified in availing input service credit, as the agreement did not include a lease of the windmills, and the services were not received within the factory premises.
Issue 2: Invocation of Extended Period of Limitation
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The appellant cited Supreme Court decisions that limited the Revenue's ability to invoke the extended period of limitation in cases of revenue neutrality and lack of suppression.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The tribunal found that the appellant had not adequately addressed the concerns raised by the Original Authority regarding the absence of a leasing arrangement, which was central to the issue of suppression.
Key Evidence and Findings: The tribunal noted that the appellant's arguments did not directly address the findings of the Original Authority, particularly the lack of evidence for a leasing arrangement in the agreement.
Application of Law to Facts: The tribunal determined that the appellant's failure to provide clear evidence of a leasing arrangement justified the invocation of the extended period of limitation.
Treatment of Competing Arguments: The appellant's reliance on case law regarding revenue neutrality was dismissed, as the tribunal found that the facts did not support the appellant's claims.
Conclusions: The tribunal upheld the Revenue's invocation of the extended period of limitation, finding no merit in the appellant's arguments against it.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
Preserve Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning: "The finding of the Original Authority however, has not at all been answered by the Appellant but their contentions are only tangential; the Appellant restricts its argument on the observation as to the allegation of windmills being outside the factory and the reliance of various case law is also on the same lines."
Core Principles Established: The tribunal emphasized the importance of explicit contractual terms in determining eligibility for input service credit and the necessity of addressing all findings of the adjudicating authority.
Final Determinations on Each Issue: The tribunal dismissed the appeals, concluding that the appellant was not entitled to input service credit and that the extended period of limitation was justifiably invoked by the Revenue.
Input service credit - service tax on lease rentals and operation and maintenance charges - input service credit in relation to wheeled/boarded electricity - agreement interpretation - lease of assets vis-a -vis sale/supply of electricity - extended period of limitation
Input service credit - agreement interpretation - lease of assets vis-a -vis sale/supply of electricity - input service credit in relation to wheeled/boarded electricity - Appellant was not justified in availing input service credit of service tax paid on alleged lease rentals and operation and maintenance charges of windmills. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined the Agreement between the appellant and M/s. ALWEL and found that the contract expressly made ALWEL solely responsible for operation and maintenance and declared ALWEL as the absolute owner of the windmill equipment; the understanding recorded in the Agreement was for supply of electricity and did not evidence any lease of the windmills to the appellant. The Original Authority's finding that inputs for operation and maintenance were utilized by ALWEL and that ALWEL bore the costs was not answered by the appellant in substance. Reliance on usage of electricity in manufacture or on authorities addressing credit for off site services did not meet the defect in documentary foundation - namely, absence of any contractual lease or O&M obligation undertaken by the appellant. On this basis the Tribunal concluded the appellant's claim to input service credit was not sustainable. [Paras 8, 9, 10, 11]
Claim for input service credit on the service tax paid in respect of the windmills is disallowed.
Extended period of limitation - Commissioner was justified in invoking the extended period of limitation for recovery. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the adjudicating authority's doubt concerning the true nature of the transaction (absence of lease in the Agreement and ALWEL's ownership and responsibility for O&M) remained unanswered by the appellant. Given the unresolved foundational facts and the Authority's findings, the Commissioner was justified in invoking the extended period of limitation for recovery despite the appellant's reliance on precedents on limitation and revenue neutrality. [Paras 12]
Invocation of the extended period of limitation by the Commissioner is upheld.
Final Conclusion: Appeals dismissed; input service credit claimed in respect of the windmills disallowed and the invocation of the extended period of limitation by the Commissioner upheld.
Issues: Whether refund of amounts deposited under departmental direction is barred by limitation under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944.
Analysis: The amounts had been deposited at the instance of departmental officers during investigation into alleged shortages, and the demand based on those allegations was ultimately set aside. Such deposits were therefore not voluntary payments of duty but were made under compulsion and in the course of a contested dispute. Amounts so deposited did not acquire the character of duty merely because they were later sought to be refunded, and the limitation applicable to refund of duty under Section 11B did not govern such deposits. The Tribunal also relied on the settled position that amounts deposited during investigation or pursuant to departmental direction, when the underlying demand fails, are to be refunded without applying the bar of limitation. The Board circular clarifying that pre-deposit is not payment of duty and that refund should follow when the matter is decided in favour of the appellant supported this view.
Conclusion: The refund claim was not barred by limitation and was entitled to be allowed in favour of the assessee.
Ratio Decidendi: Amounts deposited under departmental direction during a contested proceeding, which do not constitute duty and are ultimately found refundable after the demand is set aside, are not governed by the limitation prescribed for refund of duty under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944.
Refund of amounts deposited - amount paid voluntarity or is paid under protest - rejection on the ground of being barred by limitation as provided by Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 - applicability of principles of unjust enrichment - HELD THAT:- It is evident that the amounts have been deposited as per the direction of the departmental officers in respect of certain shortages detected at the time of visit. The amounts so deposited on the direction of the departmental officer cannot be said to be voluntary deposit. Further appellant have contested the demand and have finally succeeded in getting the same set aside by the tribunal. As the appellant was contesting the demand the amount paid by them were necessarily not paid voluntarily but were paid under compulsion from the officer and were paid under protest.
Further it needs to be noted that the amounts paid by the appellant were in respect of the shortages of the raw material detected by the officers at the time of visit. The amounts deposited could not have acquired the character of duty till the time they have been cleared from the premises of the appellant. Tribunal has clearly held that the charge of clandestine clearance of these goods cannot be established. Hence the amounts deposited do not acquire the character of “duty”. The expressions used in the Section 11B are in respect of “refund of Duty” and not the refund of deposits made complying with the directions of the officers.
It is a settled law that any amount which becomes due to the appellant consequent to an Appellate order the deposits should have been refunded to the appellant - In case of GS. RADIATORS LTD. VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, LUDHIANA [2004 (10) TMI 158 - CESTAT, NEW DELHI] it was held that 'such payment will be considered as payment under protest. Tribunal under its Final Order had given direction to give consequential relief to the appellants which should have been given by the department. But instead of giving them refund, they rejected it on time-bar which is not correct. In view of the above, I find that payment made by the appellants has to be considered as payment under protest and the refund should be allowed to them if otherwise in order.'
Conclusion - The amounts so deposited on the direction of the departmental officer cannot be said to be voluntary deposit. Payments made under protest during an ongoing dispute are not subject to the limitation period under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Such payments do not attract the doctrine of unjust enrichment.
There is no reasonable ground for rejection of the refund claim - Appeal allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Concessional Tax Rate under CST Act
Issue 2: Exemption under TNVAT Notification
Issue 3: Justification of the Impugned Revision Order
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
In conclusion, the court allowed the writ petition, set aside the Impugned Revision Order, and granted the petitioner the benefit of the TNVAT notification for local sales, but not for interstate sales under the CST Act.
Entitlement to claim a concessional tax rate under the Central Sales Tax (CST) Act, 1956, without furnishing 'C' forms - It is submitted that in absence of specific notification issued under Section 8(5) of the CST Act, the petitioner cannot claim benefit of exemption under the above notification issued under the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax (TNVAT) Act, 2006 for local clearance - HELD THAT:- As per Sub-Section (5) to Section 8 of the CST Act, the State Government has to issue a notification which should specify the conditions - In this case, no notification has been issued under Sub-Section (5) to Section 8 of the CST Act which has been brought to the attention of the Court.
Unless a specific notification has been issued under Sub-Section (5) to Section 8 of the CST Act, only General Notification issued under the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax (TNVAT) Act, 2006 will apply to the interstate transactions by applying Sub-Section (2) to Section 8 of the CST Act.
Conclusion - Since there is no notification issued under Section 8(5) of the CST Act, the conditions of Section 8(5) of the CST Act will not apply to the facts of the case.
The petitioner is entitled to the benefit of exemption under Notification No.II(1)/CTR/30(a-2)/2007 - Petition allowed.
Issues: Whether the State Tax Department had priority charge over the secured assets sold by the secured creditor under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, and whether the bank was entitled to a declaration of prior and first charge.
Analysis: The secured creditor had registered its security interest with CERSAI before the State Tax Department's attachment steps. Section 26E of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 gives priority to a secured creditor, after registration of security interest, over all other debts and also over revenues, taxes, cesses and other dues payable to the Central or State Government. The Full Bench decision relied upon held that once the secured creditor has registered its security interest, State tax dues cannot rank ahead of the secured creditor merely because an attachment order exists, unless the statutory consequences contemplated by law displace that priority. On the facts, the bank's registration preceded the State's attachment, so the bank's claim had precedence.
Conclusion: The State Tax Department did not have priority over the secured assets, and the secured creditor's claim prevailed. The petition was allowed and the bank was entitled to the relief of prior and first charge.
Recovery of arrears of sales tax - priority charge over the assets - Whether the Respondent No. 5 (The Deputy Commissioner of State Tax) will have priority charge over the secured assets sold by Petitioner bank (secured creditor) under the SARFAESI Act?
HELD THAT:- The dicta of the Full Bench in Jalgaon Janta Sahakari Bank Ltd. [2022 (9) TMI 163 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] is squarely applicable to the present proceedings. In the ratio of the said judgment it has been held that even where there is an attachment order of the State Tax authorities prior to the secured assets’ attachment, without any further steps being taken towards issuing a proclamation of sale, the State Tax Authorities cannot claim priority over the dues payable to the secured creditor, whose security interest is registered with CERSAI.
In the present case, the order of attachment issued by the State Tax Department is dated 11th December, 2018. It is thereafter that steps have been taken to attach the immovable property. As noted above, the registration of the Bank Security Interest with CERSAI is dated 18th December, 2014 which is much prior to the order of attachment issued by the State Tax Department.
Conclusion - The claim of secured creditor that is the Petitioner – Bank, will have preference over the claim of Respondents (State Tax Department).
Petition disposed off.
Issues: (i) Whether the CBI lacked authority to register and investigate the FIRs for want of State consent after the bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh. (ii) Whether the Special Judge at Hyderabad lacked jurisdiction, and whether the pre-existing notifications and government orders continued to operate after reorganisation of the State.
Issue (i): Whether the CBI lacked authority to register and investigate the FIRs for want of State consent after the bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh.
Analysis: The statutory scheme under Sections 5 and 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 permits extension of CBI powers to an area in a State subject to consent of that State. The circular issued under Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Re-Organisation Act, 2014 treated existing laws, notifications, orders and other instruments in force immediately before the appointed day as continuing in the successor States until altered, repealed or amended. The general consent earlier granted for CBI investigation, together with later orders extending that consent, continued to operate in the successor State framework. The offences alleged were under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and the relevant CBI authority could not be denied merely because the accused were State-based employees or because the alleged acts occurred in districts that remained within Andhra Pradesh.
Conclusion: The objection based on absence of consent was rejected and the CBI was held competent to register and investigate the FIRs.
Issue (ii): Whether the Special Judge at Hyderabad lacked jurisdiction, and whether the pre-existing notifications and government orders continued to operate after reorganisation of the State.
Analysis: The notifications designating the CBI Court and the government orders regulating jurisdiction were treated as laws/instruments continuing under the reorganisation circular. The Court held that the earlier notification conferring jurisdiction on the Hyderabad CBI Court over the relevant districts did not automatically cease on bifurcation, and the subsequent transfer of cases was also found to be in accordance with law. On that footing, the Special Court's jurisdiction and the later proceedings could not be invalidated merely because the reorganisation had occurred or because a fresh notification was not issued in the manner suggested by the respondents.
Conclusion: The challenge to the Special Judge's jurisdiction and the consequent quashing of proceedings was rejected.
Final Conclusion: The impugned judgment quashing the FIRs, chargesheets and further proceedings could not be sustained, and the criminal cases were restored for continuation of trial in accordance with law.
Ratio Decidendi: On State reorganisation, existing laws, notifications and consent orders continue in the successor States until they are altered, repealed or amended, and CBI jurisdiction under the DSPE Act is not defeated where the pre-existing legal regime remains operative.
Acceptance of an illegal gratification from the original complainant - whether CBI had power to register the FIRs and investigate offences qua respondent No.1 in the appeals? - whether the FIR for offences under the PC Act could be registered in Hyderabad in the State of Telangana when the offences alleged to have been committed at places within the State of Andhra Pradesh and for that reason whether the CBI Court in the State of Telangana got jurisdiction to try the offence under the PC Act in respect of offences allegedly committed at places falling within the State of Andhra Pradesh?
HELD THAT:- The term ‘law’ was defined in para 2(f) of the Circular Memo dated 26.05.2014. The said definition, as extracted above, would reveal that it would take in any order, bye-law, scheme, notification, or any other instrument having immediately before the appointed day viz., 02.06.2014, the force of law in the whole or in any part of the existing State of Andhra Pradesh. Thus, the cumulative effect of para 2(f), clauses (i) to (iii) of para 6 of the said Circular dated 26.05.2014 as also other notifications issued prior to 02.06.2014 or in modification of the then existing law(s), as it is to be understood in terms of the definition in para 2 (f), especially, in the absence of repeal or alteration or amendment in the State of Telangana also have to be looked into while considering the question(s) involved in the cases on hand.
In the contextual situation it is also relevant to refer to Resolution No.4-31-61-T dated 01.04.1963 of Ministry of Home Affairs establishing the Central Bureau of Investigation. Going by the said resolution dated 01.04.1963, it provides the function of the CBI in cases where public servants under the control of the Central Government are involved either themselves or with the State Government servants and/or other person - it is difficult to accede to the contentions of the first respondent in the captioned appeals made in a bid to support and sustain the impugned judgment. In such circumstances, considering the questions from such different angles, the impugned judgment whereunder subject FIRs and further proceedings in pursuance thereof, were quashed cannot be sustained.
Conclusion - The laws which were applicable to the undivided State of Andhra Pradesh would continue to apply to the new States created by the Act and that the laws that operated would continue to operate notwithstanding the bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh. CBI retains jurisdiction to investigate offences within the newly formed states without requiring fresh consent.
Appeal allowed.
Issues: (i) Whether a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 filed in the name of the payee through an authorised manager/power-of-attorney holder satisfied Section 142 of that Act. (ii) Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the summoning order under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on the ground that the authorised person's personal knowledge and authority were not specifically pleaded.
Issue (i): Whether a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 filed in the name of the payee through an authorised manager/power-of-attorney holder satisfied Section 142 of that Act.
Analysis: Section 142 requires the complaint to be in writing and made by the payee or holder in due course. The complaint was filed in the name of the payee firm through its manager, who was authorised by the proprietor. The authorisation letter, the complaint affidavit, and the affidavit of evidence together indicated that the deponent was in charge of the business, was conversant with the transactions, and had been duly empowered to initiate proceedings. The governing law permits a company or proprietary concern to act through an authorised person, and the adequacy of such authorisation and knowledge is ordinarily a matter for trial when prima facie material exists.
Conclusion: The complaint satisfied Section 142, and the filing through the authorised manager was valid.
Issue (ii): Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the summoning order under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on the ground that the authorised person's personal knowledge and authority were not specifically pleaded.
Analysis: The materials on record specifically stated that the authorised manager was well conversant with the facts, handled the day-to-day business, and was aware of the transaction. The Court reiterated that explicit averments must be gathered from the complaint and supporting documents as a whole, not tested by a rigid formula. In proceedings under Section 138, the Magistrate may act on the complaint and supporting affidavit, and disputed questions about authorisation or knowledge should ordinarily be left for trial. The High Court therefore adopted an unduly technical approach and interfered at the threshold without justification.
Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in quashing the summoning order, and its order was unsustainable.
Final Conclusion: The complaint and summoning order were restored for adjudication on merits, and the threshold quashing was set aside.
Ratio Decidendi: In a cheque dishonour prosecution, a complaint filed in the name of the payee through an authorised person is maintainable if the complaint and supporting material prima facie disclose authorisation and knowledge of the transaction; disputes on those points should ordinarily be tried and not decided by quashing at the threshold.
Dishonour of Cheque - cognizance of offences - whether the complaint filed by the appellant herein under Section 138 of the NI Act is in accordance with the requirement under Section 142 of the NI Act? - Power of attorney holder - HELD THAT:- A perusal of the complaint (Annexure P-18) would reveal that Complaint No. 701 of 2021 has been filed in the name of M/s Naresh Potteries through Neeraj Kumar (Manager and Authority-letter holder). Further, a perusal of the cheque which is the subject-matter of the complaint would reveal that it has been issued in the name of Naresh Potteries. As aforementioned, Section 142 of the NI Act contemplates that the complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act should be in writing and should be filed by the payee or the holder of the cheque. Therefore, it is abundantly clear that the complaint in the present matter satisfies the requirements of Section 142 of the NI Act.
Since the High Court has quashed the summoning order on a categorical finding that the power of attorney holder did not have personal knowledge of the facts giving rise to the criminal proceedings as there was no specific pleading to that effect in the letter of authority and the affidavit of the power of attorney holder under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C., we find it apposite to reproduce the relevant portions of the aforesaid documents which contain averments regarding authorisation in favour of and knowledge on the part of Sh. Neeraj Kumar.
This Court in M/S TRL KROSAKI REFRACTORIES LTD. VERSUS M/S SMS ASIA PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR. [2022 (2) TMI 1112 - SUPREME COURT] had come to a categorical finding that what can be treated as an explicit averment, cannot be put in a straightjacket but will have to be gathered from the circumstance and manner in which it has been averred and conveyed, based on the facts of each case. The relevant portion of the said decision has already been extracted above. In the instant matter, the averments made in the documents referred to above, make it wholly clear that Sh. Neeraj Kumar possessed personal knowledge of the facts of the matter at hand and was well-equipped and duly authorised to initiate criminal proceedings against Respondent No.1. That beside the fact that it would always be open for the trial court to call upon the complainant for examination and crossexamination, if and when necessary, during the course of the trial. As such, a peremptory quashing of the complaint case by the High Court is completely unwarranted and that too on an incorrect factual basis.
Conclusion - The complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act must be filed by the payee or holder in due course, and a power of attorney holder must have personal knowledge and authorization to file the complaint.
Appeal allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The legal judgment addresses the following core issues:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of the Demand Notice under Section 138(b) of the NI Act
Issue 2: Impact of Non-production of Bank Statements/IT Returns
Issue 3: Discharge of Onus by Complainant and Accused
Issue 4: Liability of the Judgment to be Set Aside
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
In conclusion, the criminal appeal was allowed, and the trial court's judgment was set aside, reinstating the presumption of the cheque being issued for a legally enforceable debt under the NI Act.
Dishonour of Cheque - violation of cardinal ingredient of Section 138 (b) of the NI Act - discharge of burden to prove - presumption under Sections 139 and 118 of the NI Act - non-production of bank statement / IT return by the complainant would vitiate the complaint itself.
Whether the complainant violated the cardinal principle laid down under Section 138(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act? - HELD THAT:- In Suman Sethi case [2000 (2) TMI 822 - SUPREME COURT] the Hon’ble Supreme Court held 'If in a notice while giving the break up of the claim the cheque amount, interest, damages etc. are separately specified, other such claims for interest, cost etc. would be superfluous and these additional claims would he severable- and will not invalidate the notice. If, however, in the notice an omnibus demand is made without specifying what was due under the dishonored cheque, notice might well fail to meet the legal requirement and may be regarded as bad.'
Thus, to make a valid demand notice as per the proviso of Section 138(b) of the Act, 1881, the due amount of bounced cheque, and other additionally claimed amounts should be mentioned in a separate portion. In the demand notice, if other amount is mentioned with the cheque amount in a separate portion in detail, the said notice cannot be faulted. In the case on hand, the complainant demanded the cheque amount of Rs.9.00 lakhs and he additionally demanded Rs.5,000/- towards charges for issuance of the legal notice. Therefore, Ex.P.11 is a valid one.
Whether the non-production of bank statements or Income Tax returns by the complainant would vitiate the complaint itself? - HELD THAT:- In the light of the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ragini Gupta vs. Piyush Dutt Sharma [2019 (4) TMI 114 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT], the finding of the learned trial Court that as the complainant failed to disclose Rs.42.00 lakhs alleged to have invested for the production of the film in his income tax returns is not correct because if the complainant did not disclose his income in the Income Tax Return, then the Income Tax Department is well within its rights to reopen the assessment of income of the assessee and to take action as per the provisions of Income Tax Act.
Whether the complainant had discharged the onus, and whether the accused failed to discharge the onus on his part? - HELD THAT:- As far as the aspect of existence of basic ingredients for drawing of presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act is concerned, the accused did not deny his signature on the cheque in question that had been drawn in favour of the complainant on a bank account maintained by the accused. The said cheque was presented to the bank concerned within the period of its validity and was returned unpaid for the reason funds insufficient. So all the basic ingredients of Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I Act are apparent on the face of the record. The trial Court had failed to take note of all these facts and failed to draw the requisite presumption. Therefore, it is required to be presumed that the cheque in question was drawn for consideration and the holder of the cheque i.e. the complainant received the same in discharge of an existing debt. The onus, therefore, shifts on the accused to establish a probable defence so as to rebut such a presumption, which he failed to do so.
With regard to the preponderance of probabilities, the accused has to bring on record such facts and circumstances which may lead the Court to conclude either that the consideration did not exist or that its non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would, under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that the consideration did not exist. Mere denial would not fulfil the requirements of rebuttal as envisaged under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act.
Conclusion - i) In the demand notice, if other amount is mentioned with the cheque amount in a separate portion in detail, the said notice cannot be faulted. ii) Complainant correctly disclosed Rs.42.00 lakhs alleged to have invested for the production of the film in his income tax returns. iii) It is required to be presumed that the cheque in question was drawn for consideration and the holder of the cheque i.e. the complainant received the same in discharge of an existing debt. The onus, therefore, shifts on the accused to establish a probable defence so as to rebut such a presumption, which he failed to do so.
Appeal allowed.
Issues: Whether the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be compounded after conviction on the basis of compromise between the parties, and whether the conviction and sentence deserved to be set aside with a reduced compounding fee.
Analysis: The parties had settled the dispute and the complainant had received the entire compensation amount. Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 makes offences under that Act compoundable, and the compounding power is not controlled by the strict scheme of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The settled position permits compounding even after conviction. Considering the financial condition of the petitioner and the discretionary nature of the graded costs scheme, the compounding fee could be reduced in the facts of the case.
Conclusion: The offence was permitted to be compounded, the conviction and sentence were quashed and set aside, the petitioner was acquitted, and a token compounding fee of Rs. 5,000 was directed to be deposited.
Dishonour of Cheque - conviction of the petitioner-accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - compounding of offences - compromise arrived between the parties - HELD THAT:- Having taken note of the fact that the petitioneraccused and the complainant-respondent have settled the matter and the complainant has no objection in compounding the offence, therefore, this Court sees no impediment in accepting the prayer made on behalf of the accusedpetitioner for compounding of offence while exercising power under Section 147 of the Act as well as in terms of guidelines issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Damodar S. Prabhu V. Sayed Babalal H. [2010 (5) TMI 380 - SUPREME COURT], wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held 'A bare reading of this provision would lead us to the inference that offences punishable under laws other than the Indian Penal Code also cannot be compounded. However, since Section 147 was inserted by way of an amendment to a special law, the same will override the effect of Section 320(9) of the CrPC, especially keeping in mind that Section 147 carries a non obstante clause.'
In K. Subramanian Vs. R. Rajathi [2009 (11) TMI 1013 - SUPREME COURT], it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that in view of the provisions contained in Section 147 of the Act read with Section 320 of Cr.P.C., compromise arrived at can be accepted even after recording of the judgment of conviction.
Conclusion - Since, in the instant case, the petitioner-accused after being convicted under Section 138 of the Act, has compromised the matter with the complainant, prayer for compounding the offence can be accepted.
Petition disposed off.
Issues: (i) Whether the complaint contained the necessary averments to proceed against a member of a Hindu undivided family under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; (ii) whether a Hindu undivided family can be treated as an association of individuals for the purposes of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and whether the decision of another High Court to the contrary was binding.
Issue (i): Whether the complaint contained the necessary averments to proceed against a member of a Hindu undivided family under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
Analysis: Section 141 fastens liability only on persons who, at the time of commission of the offence, were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business. The complaint specifically averred that the applicant was actively participating in the day-to-day affairs of the Hindu undivided family and assisting in its business, and those averments were supported by the transaction documents relied upon in the complaint.
Conclusion: The complaint disclosed the necessary factual foundation to proceed against the applicant, and the challenge on this ground failed.
Issue (ii): Whether a Hindu undivided family can be treated as an association of individuals for the purposes of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and whether the decision of another High Court to the contrary was binding.
Analysis: Section 141 contains an inclusive definition of company that extends to a firm or other association of individuals. The judgment followed the view that a Hindu undivided family may fall within that expression for the purposes of the Negotiable Instruments Act when the complaint contains the requisite averments of participation and responsibility. It also held that a decision of another High Court has only persuasive value and does not bind this Court.
Conclusion: A Hindu undivided family was treated as within the statutory expression for the purpose of Section 141 on the facts pleaded, and the contrary view of the other High Court was not binding.
Final Conclusion: The applicant's challenge to the process order was rejected and the criminal application was dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi: For prosecution under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the complaint must specifically aver that the accused was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business at the relevant time, and a Hindu undivided family can be treated as covered by the inclusive expression used in the section when such factual averments are made.
Dishonour of Cheque - Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) can be considered an "association of individuals" under Section 141 of the NI Act - Applicant is actively participating into the affairs of the Accused No. 1. or not - vicarious liability of members of HUF - HELD THAT:- The discussion of the Supreme Court in the said Ramanlal Patel [2008 (2) TMI 859 - SUPREME COURT] is with reference to the definition of “joint family” and “person” as defined under the Gujarat Ceiling Act. The said discussion will not apply to the explanation of the term “Company” as given in Section 141 of the NI Act - the Supreme Court was considering the scope of Section 3 of the Income Tax Act, 1922, which classifies the assessee under the heads “individuals”, “Hindu Undivided Families”, “Companies”, “Local Authorities”, “Firms” and “Other Associations of Persons”. The Supreme Court has observed that if Hindu undivided family is to be considered as an association of persons, there was no point in making separate provision for the assessment of “Hindu Undivided Family”. Thus, the said decision of the Supreme Court interpreting Section 3 of the Income Tax Act, 1922 will have no application to Section 141 of the NI Act.
It is well-settled that the decision of a High Court will have the force of binding precedent only in the State or territories on which the court has jurisdiction. In other States or outside the territorial jurisdiction of that High Court it may, at best, have only persuasive effect. By no amount of stretching of the doctrine of stare decisis, can judgment of one High Court be given the status of a binding precedent so far as other High Courts or Courts or Tribunals within their territorial jurisdiction are concerned.
Conclusion - The term 'association of individuals' will include Hindu Undivided Family of which the business is said to be a joint concern.
The Criminal Application is dismissed.
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