Issues: (i) Whether the search, seizure and retention of the jewellery and other articles under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 were justified on the ground that they had a nexus with proceeds of crime; (ii) Whether the alleged non-service of the show-cause notice vitiated the retention order for breach of principles of natural justice.

Issue (i): Whether the search, seizure and retention of the jewellery and other articles under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 were justified on the ground that they had a nexus with proceeds of crime.

Analysis: Section 17 permits search and seizure upon the requisite material, while retention and adjudication require a prima facie connection between the property and proceeds of crime. The material disclosed substantial movement of alleged tainted funds through accounts operated by or connected with the appellant and their utilisation for acquisition of assets, including jewellery. At the retention stage, a transaction-wise tracing of every item of jewellery was not essential where the material as a whole established a continuous flow and utilisation of funds. Recovery from a joint-family residence, or the assertion that some jewellery belonged to a person not accused in the scheduled offence, did not by itself invalidate the seizure; the relevant inquiry was whether the property was connected with, or required examination in relation to, proceeds of crime.

Conclusion: The search, seizure and retention were justified, and the seized jewellery was prima facie connected with proceeds of crime. The finding is against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the alleged non-service of the show-cause notice vitiated the retention order for breach of principles of natural justice.

Analysis: The appellant participated in the adjudicatory proceedings and had an effective opportunity to place a defence. No specific prejudice resulting in a failure of natural justice was established. A procedural irregularity does not invalidate an adjudication unless it causes substantial prejudice.

Conclusion: The alleged non-service of the show-cause notice did not vitiate the retention order. The finding is against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The confirmation of retention of the seized property remains legally sustainable under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Ratio Decidendi: Retention of property under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 may be sustained on prima facie material connecting it with proceeds of crime, notwithstanding its recovery from a joint-family premises or a claim by a person not accused in the scheduled offence.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with a direction to consider and decide the representations.

Issues: Whether an adjudication and appellate order can be sustained when the personal hearing under the show-cause notice was fixed before expiry of the time allowed for filing a reply.

Analysis: Sections 75(4) and 75(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 require a meaningful opportunity of hearing before an adverse determination. Fixing the hearing before the deadline to submit a reply deprived the assessee of an effective opportunity to respond and seek a hearing on the proposed demand, contrary to the prescribed statutory procedure and principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The hearing was ineffective and the resulting adjudication and appellate orders were invalid for breach of principles of natural justice.

Issues: Whether recovery from the electronic cash ledger may continue after payment of the statutory pre-deposits pending appeal.

Analysis: The Court noted the statutory stay of recovery upon the required pre-deposit and found a prima facie case for examining whether any amount recovered exceeded the cumulative pre-deposit. Compliance with the pre-deposit requirements and the claim for recredit or refund were left for independent determination by the competent authority.

Outcome: The representation was directed to be decided by a reasoned order after personal hearing, with recredit or refund of any excess recovery if found due.

Issues: (i) Whether commission earned for soliciting orders for a foreign principal constituted export of Business Auxiliary Service and was not liable to service tax; (ii) Whether equipment rentals involving transfer of possession, custody and effective control constituted a deemed sale rather than Supply of Tangible Goods service; (iii) Whether service tax under reverse charge on imported software was time-barred because the demand was based on disclosed financial records and was revenue-neutral; (iv) Whether Cenvat credit transferred on demerger under Rule 10 was admissible and, in any event, whether its recovery was time-barred; (v) Whether Cenvat credit could be denied for want of documents despite invoices, input-service register and reconciliation having been furnished; (vi) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for demands founded on audit records, filed returns and information disclosed to the Department.

Issue (i): Whether commission earned for soliciting orders for a foreign principal constituted export of Business Auxiliary Service and was not liable to service tax.

Analysis: Under Rule 3(1)(iii) of the Export of Services Rules, 2005, the service qualified as export where provided to a recipient located outside India and consideration was received in foreign exchange. For the subsequent period, Rule 3 of the Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012 located the provision of the service at the recipient's location. The foreign principal was the recipient of the order-procurement service.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the commission-based order-procurement service was export of service and was not liable to service tax.

Issue (ii): Whether equipment rentals involving transfer of possession, custody and effective control constituted a deemed sale rather than Supply of Tangible Goods service.

Analysis: The contractual terms placed the rented equipment under the customer's possession, custody, control and overall supervision during the rental tenure, and restricted its withdrawal by the supplier. VAT had also been discharged on the transaction as a deemed sale.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the rentals were deemed-sale transactions and no service tax was payable under Supply of Tangible Goods service.

Issue (iii): Whether service tax under reverse charge on imported software was time-barred because the demand was based on disclosed financial records and was revenue-neutral.

Analysis: The demand was founded solely on figures appearing in publicly available balance sheets and profit-and-loss records, without evidence of suppression or wilful misstatement. Any service tax paid under reverse charge would have been available as input-service credit under Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, rendering the transaction revenue-neutral.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the reverse-charge demand on imported software was time-barred and liable to be set aside.

Issue (iv): Whether Cenvat credit transferred on demerger under Rule 10 was admissible and, in any event, whether its recovery was time-barred.

Analysis: The credit was reflected as opening balance in the relevant ST-3 return and its availment following demerger had been intimated to the Department. The show-cause notice issued in April 2016 sought recovery of credit availed for April to September 2010, beyond even the extended limitation period. The demerger also entitled the successor entity to carry forward the transferor's closing Cenvat-credit balance under Rule 10 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the transferred Cenvat credit was admissible and its recovery was also time-barred.

Issue (v): Whether Cenvat credit could be denied for want of documents despite invoices, input-service register and reconciliation having been furnished.

Analysis: The invoices, input-service tax register, sample invoices and reconciliation of the Cenvat-credit register with the ST-3 return had been furnished. The eligibility of the input-service credit was undisputed, but the submitted records were not considered.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: denial of Cenvat credit for want of documents was legally unsustainable.

Issue (vi): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for demands founded on audit records, filed returns and information disclosed to the Department.

Analysis: The substantial demands concerned the extended period and were based on audit of records, service-tax returns and information made available to the Department. Such disclosed material did not establish suppression of facts with intent to evade tax.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee: the extended period was wrongly invoked and the demand for October 2011 to March 2014 was liable to be set aside.

Final Conclusion: The impugned fiscal demands, together with consequential interest and penalties, lacked legal sustainability.

Issues: (i) Whether the extended period of limitation for recovery of service tax was invocable; (ii) Whether works contract services for widening and strengthening a road and providing footpaths qualified for exemption applicable to road construction.

Issue (i): Whether the extended period of limitation for recovery of service tax was invocable.

Analysis: The demand was founded on figures appearing in Form 26AS, income-tax returns and statements of receipts supplied by the assessee. The material was already available to the department, and the notice did not identify any independent verification or evidence of a deliberate and wilful act to evade tax. For invoking the extended period under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994, suppression must be a positive, deliberate and wilful non-disclosure; mere omission or failure to declare is insufficient.

Conclusion: The extended period was not available, and the demand raised by invoking that period was unsustainable in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether works contract services for widening and strengthening a road and providing footpaths qualified for exemption applicable to road construction.

Analysis: The services involved material and labour and were works contract services rendered to Government authorities for a public road-development project. Entry 13 of Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012 exempts construction-related services concerning a road for public use. A road includes its integral facilities for public movement, including footpaths; therefore, widening and strengthening works for providing footpaths could not be severed from the composite road-development project.

Conclusion: The works contract services qualified for the exemption under Entry 13 of Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The service-tax demand, and the consequential interest and penalties founded on it, were legally unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: The extended limitation period requires evidence of deliberate and wilful suppression, and public-road construction exemption extends to integral footpath works forming part of a composite road-development project.

Issues: (i) Whether concurrent findings of liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be disturbed in revision on the plea of a blank signed cheque, absence of transaction records, and lack of proof that the complainant owned the business; (ii) Whether the statutory demand notice was duly served; and (iii) Whether the sentence of three months' simple imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,75,000, including compensation, warranted interference.

Issue (i): Whether concurrent findings of liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be disturbed in revision on the plea of a blank signed cheque, absence of transaction records, and lack of proof that the complainant owned the business.

Analysis: Revisional Jurisdiction is supervisory and does not permit reappreciation of evidence or displacement of Concurrent Findings absent perversity, jurisdictional error, or manifest miscarriage of justice. Admission of signature and issuance of the cheque activated the Presumption of Consideration and the Presumption of Legally Enforceable Debt under Sections 118(a) and 139. The Rebuttable Presumption required a Probable Defence supported by material. The inconsistent account of the tyre price and balance payable, absence of proof of part-payment, and admitted connection between the complainant and the business did not displace those presumptions. The absence of transaction records did not by itself require the holder to prove the underlying consideration.

Conclusion: The concurrent finding of liability was not liable to revisional interference.

Issue (ii): Whether the statutory demand notice was duly served.

Analysis: Service of Statutory Notice was established by the acknowledgement bearing the accused's signature. The contention concerning a delayed presumption of service was inapplicable because actual service, rather than deemed service, was proved. Non-payment after receipt of the demand notice completed the relevant statutory requirement.

Conclusion: The statutory demand notice was validly served.

Issue (iii): Whether the sentence of three months' simple imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,75,000, including compensation, warranted interference.

Analysis: The penal provision for cheque dishonour serves a deterrent purpose, while compensation is compensatory and restitutive. Considering the cheque amount, the prolonged delay before sentencing, loss of interest, and litigation expense, the imprisonment and monetary relief were regarded as adequate rather than excessive.

Conclusion: The sentence and compensation required no modification.

Final Conclusion: No perversity, jurisdictional error, or disproportionality was established in the concurrent determinations.

Ratio Decidendi: Admission of the signature and issuance of a cheque activates the statutory presumptions of consideration and legally enforceable liability; an unsupported blank-cheque defence does not rebut them, and concurrent findings are not revisable absent perversity or jurisdictional error.

Issues: Whether an adjudication order uploaded only under the 'Additional Notice and Orders' tab, without separate intimation and without an effective opportunity of hearing, could be sustained.

Analysis: Adjudication under Section 73 of the applicable GST enactments must conform to principles of natural justice. The order was uploaded only under the 'Additional Notice and Orders' tab without separate intimation, and the petitioner had made out a prima facie case regarding the absence of an effective hearing. A fresh determination therefore required consideration of the reply, an opportunity of hearing, and a reasoned adjudication.

Conclusion: The impugned adjudication order was unsustainable and required fresh adjudication after affording an opportunity of hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether a monetary refund of unutilised input tax credit can constitute tax erroneously refunded under Section 73 of the Chhattisgarh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether jurisdiction under Section 73 is barred unless the refund order in FORM GST RFD-06 is first reversed through departmental appeal or revision; (iii) Whether Sections 73 and 50 of the Chhattisgarh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 authorise interest on an erroneous refund; (iv) Whether the operation of Rule 89(5), subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court, or the later insertion of Rule 88B renders the interest demand impermissibly retrospective; and (v) Whether the rate, period and quantified interest demand require interference.

Issue (i): Whether a monetary refund of unutilised input tax credit can constitute tax erroneously refunded under Section 73 of the Chhattisgarh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 54(3) permits refund of unutilised input tax credit. Once accumulated credit is converted into a monetary payment, it is a statutory refund; if it exceeds the entitlement under Section 54(3) read with Rule 89(5), it falls within the erroneous-refund limb of Section 73. The separate expression concerning input tax credit wrongly availed or utilised addresses ledger-stage credit and does not exclude a cash refund originating from input tax credit. The strict construction of taxing statutes does not require an exclusion unsupported by the enacted text.

Conclusion: A monetary refund of unutilised input tax credit is capable of being treated as an erroneous refund under Section 73. Against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether jurisdiction under Section 73 is barred unless the refund order in FORM GST RFD-06 is first reversed through departmental appeal or revision.

Analysis: Sections 107(2) and 108 provide appellate and revisional routes to test the legality or propriety of a refund order, whereas Section 73 provides an independent demand-and-determination mechanism for an amount erroneously refunded. None of those provisions makes prior appeal or revision a jurisdictional precondition for Section 73. The Section 73 power is not a general authority to reopen concluded refund adjudications or to disregard a subsisting appellate determination; on the facts, however, no appellate order affirming the refund existed and the notice was founded on the governing Rule 89(5) computation.

Conclusion: Non-invocation of Section 107(2) or Section 108 did not oust Section 73 jurisdiction in the circumstances of the case. Against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether Sections 73 and 50 of the Chhattisgarh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 authorise interest on an erroneous refund.

Analysis: Section 73(1), (5), (8) and (9) repeatedly link an erroneous refund with interest payable under Section 50. This supplies substantive statutory authority rather than an interest charge based on implication. Interest is compensatory and is not conditional on fraud, fault, or the absence of departmental error in sanctioning the refund. Payment of only the principal amount does not result in statutory closure under Section 73(8), which requires payment of the tax together with applicable interest.

Conclusion: Sections 73 and 50 jointly authorise interest on an erroneous refund. Against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the operation of Rule 89(5), subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court, or the later insertion of Rule 88B renders the interest demand impermissibly retrospective.

Analysis: The substituted Rule 89(5) was operative from 01.07.2017, before both the refund application and the refund sanction. The subsequent Supreme Court decision upheld the existing rule and did not create a new liability. Rule 88B concerns computation of interest and neither creates nor extinguishes the statutory charge arising from Sections 73 and 50. A contrary High Court ruling operative for part of the period did not suspend the rule or create an interest-free interval.

Conclusion: The interest demand is not an impermissible retrospective levy. Against the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether the rate, period and quantified interest demand require interference.

Analysis: The refund was credited on 13.02.2019 and the principal amount was repaid on 08.11.2021. Interest at 18% per annum for 999 days was arithmetically consistent with the quantified demand, and no alternative rate, period, or computation was established.

Conclusion: The interest demand of Rs.44,51,491/- was correctly sustained. Against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory interest liability arising from repayment of the erroneous inverted-duty refund remains enforceable.

Ratio Decidendi: A monetary refund of unutilised input tax credit exceeding statutory entitlement may be recovered as an erroneous refund under Section 73, and Section 73 read with Section 50 carries compensatory interest without requiring prior reversal of the original refund order through appeal or revision.

Issues: (i) Whether the Benami proceedings conclusively established ownership of the seized cash; (ii) Whether a person claiming cash seized from another person's premises may seek its release under the first proviso to section 132B(1)(i); (iii) Whether established ownership entitled the claimant to immediate release without explaining the cash's nature and source.

Issue (i): Whether the Benami proceedings conclusively established ownership of the seized cash.

Analysis: The order under the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 expressly found the ownership of the cash to be established, held that it was not benami property, declined attachment, and dropped the proceedings. That determination conclusively established ownership for purposes of the Benami proceedings. It did not, however, determine the nature and source of the cash for income-tax assessment.

Conclusion: Ownership of the seized cash stood established in favour of the claimant under the Benami proceedings.

Issue (ii): Whether a person claiming cash seized from another person's premises may seek its release under the first proviso to section 132B(1)(i).

Analysis: The expression "person concerned" in the first proviso to section 132B(1)(i) includes a person whose assets are seized in a search conducted against another person. A claimant is therefore not disentitled from applying for release merely because the cash was seized from another person's custody, although Revenue interests may be protected by an appropriate indemnity where competing claims arise.

Conclusion: A third-party claimant may apply for release of seized assets under section 132B(1)(i), in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether established ownership entitled the claimant to immediate release without explaining the cash's nature and source.

Analysis: The first proviso to section 132B(1)(i) requires an application within the stipulated period and an explanation of the nature and source of acquisition to the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer. Ownership established in proceedings under another statute does not substitute for this statutory disclosure and satisfaction. The application was delayed and did not explain the nature or source of the cash, while assessment proceedings concerning the seized cash remained pending or contemplated. The stated questions concerning the effect of the 120-day period, non-decision on an application, and a deficient application were referred to a Larger Bench for determination.

Conclusion: Established ownership alone did not entitle the claimant to immediate release of the cash without the required disclosure and satisfaction; the claim for release was not accepted at this stage, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The claimant's ownership and standing to seek release were recognised, but the income-tax inquiry into the source of the cash was not displaced; the questions concerning the statutory time limit and consequences of a deficient release application await determination by a Larger Bench.

Ratio Decidendi: A person claiming assets seized from another may invoke section 132B(1)(i), but ownership established under the Benami law does not by itself warrant release without compliance with the statutory requirement to explain the nature and source of acquisition to the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer.

Issues: Whether thermic fluids imported for initial charging of a Continuous Polycondensation plant qualify as capital goods eligible for customs-duty exemption under the Status Holders Incentive Scheme.

Analysis: Paragraph 9.12 of the Foreign Trade Policy 2009-2014 and Notification No. 104/2009-Customs dated 14.09.2009 define capital goods broadly to cover plant, machinery, equipment or accessories required directly or indirectly for manufacture, including specified articles required for initial charge. The thermic fluids were initially charged into the plant and thereafter continuously circulated in a closed loop to supply the precise high-temperature heat essential to the polycondensation process while maintaining low pressure. Their functional integration with, and indispensability to, the plant's operation established their character as capital goods; their description as chemical inputs under the Standard Input Output Norms did not displace that character.

Conclusion: Thermic fluids used for the initial charging and essential operation of the Continuous Polycondensation plant are capital goods and qualify for the exemption under Notification No. 104/2009-Customs dated 14.09.2009.

Issues: Whether a fraud-classification show-cause notice founded on a forensic audit report already found inconclusive could be sustained merely because the borrower had replied to the notice.

Analysis: The company had entered corporate insolvency resolution and liquidation, with its management displaced and its records unavailable to the appellant, having been seized by the investigating authority. The forensic audit was based on limited lender-provided material and expressly contained qualifications that its conclusions were subject to further findings upon production of complete records. The same audit report had earlier been found unreliable for sustaining an equivalent notice issued by the lead bank. A reply to the notice did not cure the absence of a reliable evidentiary foundation, particularly when the bank had not sought the relevant documents from the liquidator or investigating authority. No reason justified a different treatment of a notice issued by another consortium bank on the same audit report.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice and consequential fraud-reporting measures were set aside; the bank may initiate fresh action upon obtaining conclusive evidentiary material.

Issues: (i) Whether the extended period of limitation for recovery of service tax could be invoked; (ii) Whether services rendered as a subcontractor for construction of public roads were exempt from service tax; (iii) Whether the demand for the financial year 2016-17 constituted an impermissible duplication of demand; (iv) Whether penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 was sustainable; (v) Whether penalty under Section 77(1)(a) of the Finance Act, 1994 was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the extended period of limitation for recovery of service tax could be invoked.

Analysis: Invocation of the proviso to Section 73(1) requires fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts with intent to evade tax. The receipts were disclosed in statutory income-tax records, and contractual documents supporting the claimed exemption were furnished during inquiry. Non-registration and non-filing of ST-3 returns, arising from a bona fide belief in exemption, did not establish wilful suppression or intent to evade tax.

Conclusion: The extended period was unavailable; the service-tax demand and consequential interest were barred by limitation, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether services rendered as a subcontractor for construction of public roads were exempt from service tax.

Analysis: The work orders, extensions and underlying public-works agreement established that the services related to construction of roads for use by the general public. Such road-construction services fell within Entry 13(a) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012, and the corresponding subcontractor services were covered by Entry 29(h).

Conclusion: The services were exempt from service tax; the demand was unsustainable on merits, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the demand for the financial year 2016-17 constituted an impermissible duplication of demand.

Analysis: The same receipts and tax period had already been subjected to separate departmental proceedings and a confirmed demand. Recovery of service tax twice on identical receipts merely because proceedings were pursued through different departmental channels was impermissible and amounted to duplication of demand.

Conclusion: The duplicated component of the demand for the financial year 2016-17 was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 was sustainable.

Analysis: Penalty under Section 78 requires the essential element of deliberate suppression or wilful contravention with intent to evade tax. The disclosed receipts, production of contractual records and bona fide exemption claim did not evidence such intent.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 78 was unsustainable and was set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether penalty under Section 77(1)(a) of the Finance Act, 1994 was sustainable.

Analysis: Registration and return-filing obligations under Sections 69 and 70 are strict-liability procedural requirements. The undisputed failure to obtain registration and file ST-3 returns remained an actionable procedural default notwithstanding the bona fide belief regarding exemption.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 77(1)(a) was rightly imposed and was upheld, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The service-tax demand, interest and Section 78 penalty were set aside on limitation, exemption and duplication grounds, while the procedural penalty for non-registration and non-filing of returns remained operative.

Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked against a municipal corporation for service-tax demands.

Analysis: The appellant, being a municipal corporation constituted under Article 243W of the Constitution of India and performing statutory functions, could not be attributed fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or intent to evade tax. As the notice invoked the extended period without these essential elements, its invocation was unsustainable.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable; the entire demand was time-barred and the penalties were unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether CENVAT credit attributable to common input services used for trading was required to be reversed for the period before 1 April 2011; (ii) Whether any further CENVAT demand was sustainable after proportionate credit attributable to trading activity had been calculated and reversed.

Issue (i): Whether CENVAT credit attributable to common input services used for trading was required to be reversed for the period before 1 April 2011.

Analysis: Trading was brought within the definition of exempted service by the explanation inserted in Rule 2(e) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 with effect from 1 April 2011. Consequently, trading could not be treated as an exempted service for application of the reversal mechanism under Rule 6 for the preceding period.

Conclusion: No reversal of CENVAT credit was required in respect of trading activity before 1 April 2011, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether any further CENVAT demand was sustainable after proportionate credit attributable to trading activity had been calculated and reversed.

Analysis: Under Rule 6(3) read with Rule 6(3A) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, the value of trading is the trade margin, namely the difference between sale price and cost of goods sold, or ten per cent of the cost of goods sold, whichever is higher; it is not the gross trading turnover. The calculations based on this prescribed value correctly determined the proportionate common-input-service credit attributable to trading, and the requisite amount had already been reversed. Non-intimation of the option under Rule 6(3A) did not justify a further demand where substantive reversal had been made.

Conclusion: The further CENVAT demand, interest and consequential penalties were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The confirmed CENVAT liabilities arising from the disputed trading activity could not be sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Trading is an exempted service under the CENVAT Credit Rules only from 1 April 2011, and where proportionate credit is reversed using the prescribed trading-margin value, a further demand under Rule 6 cannot be sustained merely on account of procedural non-compliance.

Issues: Whether the complaint allegations of theft and criminal misappropriation warranted a direction for registration of an FIR and investigation despite the availability of a civil remedy.

Analysis: Availability of a civil remedy for a contractual dispute does not exclude criminal-law recourse where the allegations disclose criminal conduct. The complaint contained specific allegations of unauthorised removal of scrap materials, non-accounting of substantial sale proceeds, and lack of cooperation in furnishing accounts. Verification of documents and interrogation of the accused were necessary to ascertain the truth of those allegations.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to a direction for registration of an FIR and investigation into the allegations.

Issues: Whether alleged outward supplies taxable at 18% were required to be included while determining the turnover of inverted rated supplies and adjusted total turnover for computing refund of accumulated input tax credit under the inverted duty structure.

Analysis: The refund formula under Rule 89(5) requires correct determination of the turnover of inverted rated supplies and adjusted total turnover. Although the Revenue asserted that three outward invoices attracted GST at 18%, it did not produce the relevant invoices or supporting documents, and the appellate order did not address those alleged supplies. The factual basis necessary to ascertain the admissible refund was therefore not available.

Outcome: Fresh verification and a reasoned determination of the eligible refund were directed after affording both parties an opportunity of hearing.

Issues: Whether service tax paid under the pre-GST regime on advances for flat bookings subsequently cancelled after commencement of GST can be availed as input tax credit under the GST law.

Analysis: Input tax and input tax credit under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 concern specified GST levies charged on supplies made to a registered person. Service tax paid under Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994 does not fall within that definition. Section 142(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 specifically governs a post-appointed-day claim for refund of tax paid under the existing law in respect of services not ultimately provided, requiring the claim to be dealt with under the existing law and the amount payable in cash. A taxpayer cannot unilaterally use the electronic credit ledger to adjust such a service-tax refund claim without statutory authority.

Conclusion: Refundable service tax paid under the Finance Act, 1994 on cancelled flat bookings cannot be claimed as input tax credit under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; the refund must be pursued under the mechanism in Section 142(5).

Issues: (i) Whether the first appellate orders, which did not address the material grounds, satisfied the requirement of a reasoned and speaking order; (ii) Whether the appeals should be sent for fresh adjudication where the first appellate authority failed to decide the grounds on merits and the original adjudications involved unresolved procedural objections.

Issue (i): Whether the first appellate orders, which did not address the material grounds, satisfied the requirement of a reasoned and speaking order.

Analysis: The principles of natural justice require a quasi-judicial appellate authority to record cogent reasons and deal with material grounds of challenge. The appellate orders merely stated that satisfactory evidence had not been produced and affirmed the original orders, without addressing the several substantive grounds or the authorities relied upon. Identical cryptic findings in all three matters disclosed a failure to exercise appellate jurisdiction and did not constitute reasoned or speaking orders.

Conclusion: The first question is answered in favour of the assessees; the first appellate orders violated the requirement of a reasoned and speaking decision.

Issue (ii): Whether the appeals should be sent for fresh adjudication where the first appellate authority failed to decide the grounds on merits and the original adjudications involved unresolved procedural objections.

Analysis: A decision on merits at the second appellate stage would deprive the aggrieved party of an effective appellate tier. The original adjudications were passed ex parte, while objections concerning the sufficiency of the show-cause notices, identification and availability of relied-upon documents, and effective opportunity of hearing under Section 75(4) remained unresolved. Fresh adjudication on the original record, after clearly identifying and making available the relied-upon material, permitting replies and reconciliation, and granting an effective personal hearing, was necessary.

Conclusion: The second question is decided in favour of the assessees; the appellate and original orders are set aside for fresh adjudication by the original adjudicating authorities in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The disputed tax liabilities must be determined afresh after compliance with procedural fairness, consideration of the assessees' objections, and reasoned findings on the evidence.

Ratio Decidendi: An appellate authority must adjudicate material grounds and give reasons for its conclusions; a cryptic affirmance that fails to do so warrants setting aside, with fresh adjudication where procedural objections at the original stage remain unresolved.

Issues: Whether reassessment under Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was valid where the claims forming the basis of reopening had been specifically examined during the original scrutiny assessment and the reassessment reasons relied upon the same assessment records.

Analysis: Reassessment is not a power of review. A valid reason to believe requires a live nexus with tangible material indicating escapement of income, and reopening cannot rest on a changed inference from material already considered in the original assessment. The original assessment record showed that specific queries concerning depreciation on the dam, additional depreciation, disallowance of expenditure, and pre-production income had been raised and answered. The recorded reasons relied only on those existing materials, without identifying fresh material or recording any failure by the assessee to make a full and true disclosure of material facts.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings were without jurisdiction as they were founded on a mere change of opinion; the reassessment order was invalid, in favour of the assessee.