Issues: (i) Whether the project-level anti-profiteering methodology, using purchase value to quantify additional input tax credit and allocating savings per square foot, complied with the remand directions; (ii) Whether unavailed pre-GST CENVAT credit on input services could be notionally set off against post-GST input tax credit; and (iii) Whether GST on the additional realisation and interest were validly included in the recoverable amount.

Issue (i): Whether the project-level anti-profiteering methodology, using purchase value to quantify additional input tax credit and allocating savings per square foot, complied with the remand directions.

Analysis: The governing methodology for real-estate projects rejects a comparison of input tax credit with turnover because construction expenditure, credit accrual and buyer collections do not have a direct correlation throughout a project. It requires the total GST-related saving for the project to be determined and allocated over the total project area to derive a uniform per square foot benefit. The revised computation quantified the additional input tax credit against project purchase value, determined the project-level saving, divided it by total area, and applied the resulting per square foot figure to the sold area. Purchase value was used to measure credit against project expenditure, not as a substitute for turnover or for allocating benefit according to buyer collections. Judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 does not permit replacement of a fair and reasonable factual computation accepted by the specialised Tribunal absent jurisdictional error, manifest illegality or non-compliance with the binding remand directions.

Conclusion: The methodology was consistent with the remand directions and was validly sustained, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether unavailed pre-GST CENVAT credit on input services could be notionally set off against post-GST input tax credit.

Analysis: Section 171 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 concerns the benefit of input tax credit actually accruing to the supplier and its passing on to recipients. The pre-GST returns recorded nil CENVAT credit actually availed, while substantial GST input tax credit was availed after GST. A credit that was only legally available but remained unclaimed cannot be treated as having reduced the pre-GST tax incidence, since that would compare actual post-GST benefit with a hypothetical pre-GST benefit. The benefit was not restricted to credit on goods, as the post-GST credit on input services was also actually availed.

Conclusion: Unavailed pre-GST CENVAT credit could not be notionally set off against the post-GST input tax credit; the determination based on actual availment was upheld, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether GST on the additional realisation and interest were validly included in the recoverable amount.

Analysis: GST collected on the enhanced consideration resulting from non-passing of the tax benefit forms part of the profiteered amount because it represents tax collected on the additional realisation. The direction to pay interest at 18% was part of the statutory anti-profiteering consequence, and no independent jurisdictional infirmity was established.

Conclusion: Addition of GST at 12% to the profiteered amount and the direction for interest at 18% were valid, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The project-specific calculation founded on actually availed incremental input tax credit, allocated on a per square foot basis and inclusive of GST collected on the excess realisation, remains enforceable with interest payable to the affected recipients.

Ratio Decidendi: In real-estate anti-profiteering proceedings, incremental input tax credit actually availed after GST must be determined as project-level savings and allocated by area; unavailed pre-GST credit cannot be imputed as a notional offset.

Issues: Whether imposition of tax and penalty under Section 129 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was justified where the e-way bills had expired and their validity was not extended under Rule 138 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017.

Analysis: Section 129 permits demand of tax and penalty for contraventions during transportation, while Rule 138(10) prescribes the validity period of an e-way bill. Circular No. 64/38/2018-GST distinguishes serious and substantive contraventions from minor or procedural lapses. The consignment was accompanied by invoices, lorry receipt, e-way bills and a test certificate; the invoices charged integrated tax and physical verification disclosed no discrepancy in the goods. Expiry of the e-way bills was the sole defect, and no tax evasion or intention to evade tax was established. The explanation for the incorrect destination entry and consequential validity period was relevant while deciding whether Section 129 could be invoked.

Conclusion: Invocation of Section 129 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 for the expired e-way bills was invalid and unjustified; the levy of integrated tax and penalty was set aside.

Issues: Whether statutory interest consequential to confiscation and redemption of imported goods may be computed from the original assessment of the Bill of Entry when the liability arising from the confiscation proceedings was determined only by a subsequent adjudication order.

Analysis: Under Section 125(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, the obligation to pay duty and charges consequent upon redemption arises in the context of exercise and acceptance of the redemption option. The resulting duty liability is required to be assessed and determined through the machinery of Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962, after which statutory interest may apply in accordance with law. The original assessment was based on the declared description of the goods, whereas the goods were seized and the description, classification, confiscation consequences, redemption fine, penalties and duty consequences were determined only through the adjudication order dated 28.02.2023. Delay in adjudication does not by itself extinguish statutory interest; however, a liability that had not yet been determined cannot be treated as an amount in delayed payment for the preceding period.

Conclusion: Interest could not be computed for the period from the original assessment in May 2015 until 28.02.2023. The interest liability must be recomputed from the date of determination under the adjudication order, after accounting for the subsequent reassessment and payments or appropriations already made; interest for the subsequent period remains payable if attracted under the applicable law.

Issues: Whether penalty upon a director under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 was sustainable where the imported goods were not available for confiscation or imposition of redemption fine, and the duty demand against the importer arising from the same order had already been set aside.

Analysis: Penalty under Section 112(a) requires an act or omission rendering goods liable to confiscation under Section 111. Although the adjudication order recorded that the goods were liable to confiscation under Section 111(m), no redemption fine under Section 125 was imposed because the goods were not physically available. The duty demand and penalties against the importer, founded on the same reclassification, had also been set aside in the importer's appeal. These circumstances left no legal basis for fastening penal liability upon the director.

Conclusion: The penalty imposed upon the appellant under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 was unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether AED (GSI) credit paid on unprocessed nylon tyre cord fabric could be availed and utilised towards basic excise duty where the intermediate TCWS was exempt from AED (GSI) and tyres were not chargeable to AED (GSI); (ii) Whether refund of AED (GSI) credit was available for inputs used in exported tyres.

Issue (i): Whether AED (GSI) credit paid on unprocessed nylon tyre cord fabric could be availed and utilised towards basic excise duty where the intermediate TCWS was exempt from AED (GSI) and tyres were not chargeable to AED (GSI).

Analysis: Rule 57C of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 denied credit on inputs used in manufacture of exempt or nil-rated final products. The second proviso to Notification No. 5/94-C.E. (N.T.) dated 01.03.1994 confined AED (GSI) credit to payment of excise duty leviable under the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957, on final products. TCWS was exempt from AED (GSI), while tyres were not chargeable to AED (GSI); consequently, no dutiable final product under that enactment existed against which the credit could be utilised. The subsequent CENVAT amendment and circular could not apply to the 1998-99 period. The retrospective amendment under Section 88 of the Finance Act, 2004 applied only to AED (GSI) paid on or after 1 April 2000.

Conclusion: The assessee was not eligible to avail or utilise AED (GSI) credit towards basic excise duty. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether refund of AED (GSI) credit was available for inputs used in exported tyres.

Analysis: Refund under Rule 57F(13) depended upon valid entitlement to the underlying AED (GSI) credit. Since the credit itself was unavailable under Rule 57C and Notification No. 5/94-C.E. (N.T.) dated 01.03.1994, export of the tyres did not create entitlement to refund of that credit.

Conclusion: The assessee was not entitled to refund of the disputed AED (GSI) credit. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: AED (GSI) credit under the MODVAT regime could be used only against liability under the same additional-excise-duty enactment; later CENVAT provisions did not alter the position for the earlier disputed period.

Ratio Decidendi: Credit of a specified additional excise duty is unavailable where no final product is liable to that duty, and cannot be diverted towards payment of a different excise duty unless the governing credit scheme expressly permits it.

Issues: Whether the order determining transfer-pricing matters was sustainable despite the absence of a personal hearing and adequate reasons.

Analysis: An order under Section 92CA(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 must reflect due consideration of the assessee's contentions and contain reasons supporting the determination. Although written replies had been considered, the impugned order did not record the contentions or reasons and did not show that a personal hearing had been afforded.

Conclusion: The impugned order could not be sustained and is required to be redetermined through a reasoned order after affording the assessee a personal hearing in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether employee recoveries for subsidised mandatory canteen facilities amount to a taxable supply. (ii) Whether input tax credit on canteen services is available and, if so, to what extent.

Issue (i): Whether employee recoveries for subsidised mandatory canteen facilities amount to a taxable supply.

Analysis: Section 7 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires a supply for consideration in the course or furtherance of business. The canteen facilities at the factory and research facility were obligatory under Section 46 of the Factories Act, 1948, while the corporate-office canteen was obligatory under Section 23 of the Gujarat Shops and Establishments (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 2019. The facilities were governed by the employer's canteen policy and the employee deductions represented subsidised meal charges. Circular No. 172/04/2022-GST treats employment perquisites provided under the employer-employee arrangement as outside GST.

Conclusion: The recoveries from employees towards canteen facilities are not a supply and do not attract GST. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether input tax credit on canteen services is available and, if so, to what extent.

Analysis: The proviso to Section 17(5)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, as clarified by Circular No. 172/04/2022-GST, applies to the whole of clause (b) and permits input tax credit where provision of the relevant facility is obligatory under law. Since the canteen facilities were statutorily mandatory, the blocked-credit restriction did not apply to the employer's cost. Credit attributable to the portion of canteen cost recovered from employees remains unavailable.

Conclusion: Input tax credit on canteen services is admissible only to the extent of the cost borne by the assessee; proportionate credit embedded in the amounts recovered from employees is disallowed. The issue is partly decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Statutorily mandated subsidised canteen facilities provided as part of the employment arrangement fall outside taxable supply, while the associated credit entitlement is confined to the employer-funded portion of the facility.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an employer provides a statutorily mandatory canteen under an employment arrangement, employee recoveries do not constitute taxable supply, and input tax credit is available only for the cost borne by the employer.

Issues: (i) Whether preferential-duty exemption could be denied by treating the certificates of origin as non-genuine without certificate-specific retroactive verification or supporting evidence; (ii) Whether confiscation and redemption fine could be sustained when the imported goods were unavailable for confiscation and had been cleared without a bond or undertaking.

Issue (i): Whether preferential-duty exemption could be denied by treating the certificates of origin as non-genuine without certificate-specific retroactive verification or supporting evidence.

Analysis: The Malaysian verification e-mail referred to a certificate number different from the appellant's certificate, and no enquiry or evidence was produced concerning the second Malaysian certificate. For the Thai imports, the retroactive-verification material did not concern the appellant's certificates. Verification findings concerning certificates of other importers could not be mechanically extended to the appellant's separately issued certificates. The material did not establish that the certificates furnished at import were invalid or non-genuine.

Conclusion: Denial of the exemption under Notification No. 46/2011-Cus. dated 01.06.2011, and the consequential differential duty, interest, and penalty under Section 114A of the Customs Act, 1962, were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether confiscation and redemption fine could be sustained when the imported goods were unavailable for confiscation and had been cleared without a bond or undertaking.

Analysis: The goods were admittedly unavailable for confiscation and were not released against a bond or undertaking. Redemption fine in lieu of confiscation is not imposable in those circumstances.

Conclusion: The confiscation and redemption fine were unsustainable and were set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The preferential tariff claims remained valid, and the consequential fiscal and confiscatory liabilities failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Preferential-duty exemption based on a certificate of origin cannot be denied without reliable, certificate-specific evidence establishing that the certificate is invalid or non-genuine.

Issues: (i) Eligibility of the imported electronic paver finishers for exemption under Notification No. 12/2012-Customs dated 17.03.2012; (ii) validity of invoking the extended period of limitation for recovery of duty; (iii) sustainability of personal penalty on the director under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issue (i): Eligibility of the imported electronic paver finishers for exemption under Notification No. 12/2012-Customs dated 17.03.2012.

Analysis: The notification extended exemption to an electronic paver finisher with sensor device for laying bituminous pavement of 7 metres and above. The proforma invoice did not disclose that accessories or bolt-on extensions were supplied with the machine. The imported machine, as verified, had a basic paving width capable of extension only up to 5 metres through its hydraulic system, while no additional bolt-on extension was connected. Exemption notifications require strict construction, and the claimant bears the burden of establishing compliance with the prescribed conditions. Optional external extensions could not be treated as enlarging the machine's capability for the exemption when the notification did not provide for such treatment.

Conclusion: The imported paver finishers were not eligible for the exemption. The finding is in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Validity of invoking the extended period of limitation for recovery of duty.

Analysis: The bill of entry did not specifically disclose the machine's paving capability or the need for external additions to attain a greater paving width. This omission amounted to misdeclaration of material particulars relevant to the exemption claim.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation was valid. The finding is in favour of Revenue.

Issue (iii): Sustainability of personal penalty on the director under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Neither the allegations nor the adjudication identified a specific act or omission of the director that caused the misdeclaration. Individual culpability necessary for personal penalty was therefore not established.

Conclusion: The personal penalty imposed on the director was unsustainable and was deleted. The finding is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The duty demand and allied consequences against the importing company remain enforceable, while the director incurs no personal penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: Eligibility under a strictly construed customs exemption depends on the capability and characteristics of the goods in their imported condition; optional external extensions cannot satisfy an unstated notification requirement.

Issues: (i) Whether dismissal of the oppression and mismanagement petition without specific findings on material allegations could be sustained; (ii) Whether the perjury/misrepresentation application could be allowed without precise findings and a meaningful opportunity to answer; (iii) Whether the appellants could be denied equitable relief for lack of clean hands on the existing record.

Issue (i): Whether dismissal of the oppression and mismanagement petition without specific findings on material allegations could be sustained.

Analysis: Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013 require an adjudicating authority to assess allegations concerning the affairs of a company on the material placed before it. The impugned order did not return adequate findings on the proposed transfer of intellectual property and business assets, dilution of the company's interest in the new entity, conversion of disputed debt into equity, valuation, allotment, and the alleged continuing oppressive conduct. A commercial explanation for the restructuring could not substitute for an evaluation of the contrary material and the cumulative effect of the challenged transactions. The record disclosed a prima facie case requiring reasoned, issue-specific determination, without deciding the merits of oppression and mismanagement.

Conclusion: The dismissal could not be sustained; the issue was decided in favour of the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether the perjury/misrepresentation application could be allowed without precise findings and a meaningful opportunity to answer.

Analysis: An adverse determination carrying civil or penal consequences requires identification of the precise allegedly false statement, the supporting material, the basis for finding intentional falsity, and compliance with the applicable requirements for further action. The impugned order allowed the application omnibusly without such reasoned determination. The material also did not establish that the affected parties had been afforded a meaningful opportunity to answer the specific allegations. The principles of natural justice, including audi alteram partem, therefore were not adequately satisfied.

Conclusion: The allowance of the perjury/misrepresentation application could not be sustained; the issue was decided in favour of the parties against whom the adverse findings had been made.

Issue (iii): Whether the appellants could be denied equitable relief for lack of clean hands on the existing record.

Analysis: The alleged understanding to defer the general meeting and the dissent concerning the meeting proceedings depended on contemporaneous correspondence, minutes, transcripts, and dissent notes capable of more than one interpretation. The discrepancies in those materials did not, without complete analysis and clear findings of deliberate falsehood, establish that the appellants had intentionally misrepresented facts. Application of the clean hands doctrine to deny equitable relief required clear and cogent findings supported by the record.

Conclusion: The appellants could not be denied equitable relief on the existing record; the issue was decided in favour of the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The challenged adverse determinations on oppression, perjury, and lack of candour no longer bind the parties, while preservation of the disputed corporate position safeguards the subject matter until the merits are determined.

Ratio Decidendi: A reasoned determination on material allegations and a meaningful opportunity to meet precise adverse allegations are indispensable before an oppression petition may be dismissed or perjury-related consequences imposed.

Issues: Whether interim status quo and stay protection should be granted pending disposal of the appeal.

Analysis: The subsisting restraint order of the Civil Court was noted, as were the competing interests asserted in the property and the pending applications for intervention and impleadment. No sufficient ground was found at this stage for further interim directions or a stay.

Outcome: Interim directions and stay were declined; objections and rejoinder were directed, and the application was listed with the appeal.

Issues: Whether a delayed restoration application seeking recall of dismissal for non-prosecution could be entertained where the default resulted from counsel's deliberate non-appearance and the party could not obtain consent to engage replacement counsel.

Analysis: Rule 48(2) of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 prescribes a 30-day period for restoration but does not expressly bar consideration beyond that period. Section 238A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 permits application of the Limitation Act, 1963 to proceedings, including interlocutory restoration proceedings, and thereby attracts Section 5 where sufficient cause is established. The continuing authority under the existing vakalatnama, read with Rule 39 of the Bar Council of India Rules and Order III Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, created a genuine impediment to engaging replacement counsel without consent or leave. A litigant who had entrusted the matter to counsel could not be penalised for counsel's deliberate non-appearance and refusal to facilitate substitution.

Conclusion: The delay in seeking restoration was capable of condonation on the facts shown, and the restoration request could not be rejected solely for being filed beyond 30 days; the dismissed claim is to be considered on merits.

Issues: Whether the uninvoked bank guarantees and the FDRs securing them formed part of the liquidation estate after the customs creditor failed to intimate non-relinquishment of security within the prescribed period.

Analysis: Regulation 21A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 presumes that security forms part of the liquidation estate where the secured creditor does not communicate its decision to realise the security within thirty days of the liquidation commencement date. The creditor did not exercise the option of non-relinquishment within that period. The EPCG obligations had expired before commencement of the insolvency process, and the bank guarantees were neither renewed nor invoked. The automatic-renewal terms did not displace the statutory consequence of deemed relinquishment. Authorities concerning subsisting guarantees and margin money held under trust were inapplicable on these facts.

Conclusion: The amounts underlying the bank guarantees were part of the liquidation estate, and the directions for return of the original bonds and remittance of the FDR amounts to the liquidation account were sustained.

Outcome: The Special Leave Petition was dismissed with liberty to seek regular bail after surrender.

Outcome: The earlier orders were modified and clarified: the PMLA proceedings shall continue, but judgment therein shall be pronounced simultaneously with the judgment in the predicate-offence case.

Issues: (i) Whether licence fees and additional licence fees paid for the State-granted exclusive privilege to deal in liquor constituted consideration for a taxable service; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for recovery of service tax.

Issue (i): Whether licence fees and additional licence fees paid for the State-granted exclusive privilege to deal in liquor constituted consideration for a taxable service.

Analysis: Section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994 requires an activity carried out by one person for another for consideration. The liquor privilege flowed from the State's constitutional and statutory regulatory power, including its authority to grant the exclusive privilege and levy statutory fees. The payments were statutory imposts for the State parting with or regulating that privilege, without reciprocity, quid pro quo, or a corresponding obligation to provide a service. For the period before 1 April 2016, grant of the privilege did not amount to "support services" under Section 65B(49) and remained within the Negative List. The subsequent expansion of taxable Government services did not dispense with the foundational requirement of a service for consideration. Further, Section 117 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019 retrospectively neutralised service tax on liquor-licence and application fees for the relevant post-1 April 2016 period.

Conclusion: The licence fees and additional licence fees were not consideration for a taxable service, and no service-tax liability arose thereon for the relevant period. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for recovery of service tax.

Analysis: The entity was a State undertaking carrying out regulated liquor-distribution activities in the public domain. No suppression of facts with intent to evade tax was established.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory payments made for the liquor privilege were outside the service-tax charge, and the related fiscal liability, interest, and penalties did not subsist.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory levy paid for the State's grant of its exclusive liquor privilege, without a reciprocal activity undertaken for the payer, is not consideration for a taxable service under the Finance Act, 1994.

Issues: Whether, following in-house conversion from twin-pack to single-pack configuration, the subject machine's maximum packing speed for duty determination was 301-750 or 751 pouches per minute and above.

Analysis: The capacity-based levy under Section 3A is governed by the maximum packing speed at which a packing machine can be operated, rather than its actual production speed. Rules 4 and 5 make maximum packing speed determinative of deemed production and duty, while Rule 6 requires approval of the declared speed after necessary inquiry and permits fresh declarations upon changes in parameters. The original manufacturer's speed related to the earlier twin-pack configuration and could not determine capacity after removal of additional side sealers and alteration of the feeding system. The prior speed category and actual operating data did not establish the maximum capacity of the modified machine. As the conversion enabled manufacture of only one product and no reliable technical material established that the modified machine could not exceed 750 pouches per minute, the lower speed category was not substantiated.

Conclusion: The subject machine's maximum packing speed is 751 pouches per minute and above, and duty is payable on that basis.

Issues: (i) Whether the 2014 and 2017 Amendments are unconstitutional for want of prior Presidential assent; (ii) Whether the 2014 definition of sale conflicts with the Sale of Goods Act, 1930; (iii) Whether rice bran oil, rice oil and de-oiled rice bran are agricultural produce under the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972 and can be included in its Schedule for market-fee levy; (iv) Whether market fees under the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972 require actual services by the market committee; and (v) Whether the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972 conflicts with the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951.

Issue (i): Whether the 2014 and 2017 Amendments are unconstitutional for want of prior Presidential assent.

Analysis: Article 301 of the Constitution protects against direct and immediate impediments to the movement of trade and commerce, not against a fiscal levy which merely affects profitability. The amendments expanding agricultural produce and adding vegetable oils neither impeded physical movement of goods nor imposed a restriction attracting Article 304(b). The legislation fell within Entry 26 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, while Entry 33 of List III did not displace the State's competence in this field.

Conclusion: The 2014 and 2017 Amendments are intra vires and did not require prior Presidential assent; this issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the 2014 definition of sale conflicts with the Sale of Goods Act, 1930.

Analysis: Sections 4 and 5 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 regulate general contractual sales and preserve the operation of other laws. The statutory definition of sale, including transfer of agricultural produce between market areas, serves the distinct purpose of preventing market-fee evasion. It is within the State's legislative competence under Entries 26 and 66 of List II of the Seventh Schedule.

Conclusion: The statutory definition of sale does not conflict with the Sale of Goods Act, 1930; this issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether rice bran oil, rice oil and de-oiled rice bran are agricultural produce under the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972 and can be included in its Schedule for market-fee levy.

Analysis: The original definition of agricultural produce did not permit the executive to enlarge that definition merely by amending the Schedule. Under the amended definition, processing covers the specified agricultural treatments and similar treatments, but excludes industrial manufacture resulting in a new commercially distinct commodity. Rice bran oil and de-oiled rice bran result from solvent extraction and refining processes, lose the character of paddy and are recognised in the market as distinct manufactured products. Their inclusion through executive notifications constituted excessive delegation beyond the parent statute.

Conclusion: Rice bran oil, rice oil and de-oiled rice bran are not agricultural produce; their scheduled inclusion, the notifications adding them, and all market-fee levies and demands founded on that inclusion are invalid. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether market fees under the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972 require actual services by the market committee.

Analysis: The distinction between a tax and a fee does not require an exact quid pro quo or receipt of an individual service. Section 17 authorises levy on agricultural produce brought into or deemed to have been sold in the market area. The market committee performs regulatory functions for the market as a whole, and the statutory deeming fiction prevents avoidance of the levy through removal or storage outside an actual sale.

Conclusion: Actual receipt of services by the payer is not a condition for levy of market fees on agricultural produce covered by the statute; this issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972 conflicts with the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951.

Analysis: The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 regulates scheduled industries and their manufacturing process, whereas the State enactment regulates marketing of agricultural produce within market areas and imposes market fees. The enactments operate in distinct regulatory fields, leaving no repugnancy or conflict.

Conclusion: The West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972 does not conflict with the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951; this issue is decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The constitutional validity of the amendments and the statutory definition of sale remain unaffected, but the impugned market-fee regime has no application to the manufactured products in question.

Ratio Decidendi: Executive power to amend a marketing statute's Schedule cannot encompass an industrially manufactured commodity falling outside the parent Act's definition of agricultural produce; processing does not include manufacture resulting in a new commercially distinct product.

Issues: Whether the arrest of a person who appeared before the GST authorities pursuant to a pending court order prima facie violated personal liberty and overreached the judicial process.

Analysis: The person appeared with records at the stipulated time in compliance with the earlier direction. The arrest authorisation did not disclose that the appearance was pursuant to the pending proceedings, and the stated grounds for arrest were prima facie inconsistent with the person's presence and willingness to cooperate. The subsequent summons and recorded timing of arrest also indicated a prima facie irregularity requiring examination of the officers' conduct.

Outcome: Interim release was directed, with notice issued to the concerned officers to explain their conduct; the matter was listed for further hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether extraordinary writ jurisdiction could be invoked despite an unavailed statutory appeal and unexplained delay; (ii) Whether Section 6(2)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 barred proceedings under Section 73 because of earlier proceedings initiated by the DGGI under Section 74; (iii) Whether conclusion of the DGGI proceedings and Section 75(13) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 precluded the separate demand.

Issue (i): Whether extraordinary writ jurisdiction could be invoked despite an unavailed statutory appeal and unexplained delay.

Analysis: The statutory scheme provided an efficacious appellate remedy against the adjudication order. The challenge raised jurisdictional and factual matters capable of consideration in appellate proceedings. The petitioner allowed the period for appeal to lapse and invoked writ jurisdiction after substantial delay; pendency of a rectification application did not extend the period for challenging the original order or sufficiently explain the delay.

Conclusion: Exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction was not warranted in view of the unavailed alternative remedy and unexplained delay and laches (against the assessee).

Issue (ii): Whether Section 6(2)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 barred proceedings under Section 73 because of earlier proceedings initiated by the DGGI under Section 74.

Analysis: Section 6(2)(b) prevents parallel proceedings by different GST authorities only where they concern the same subject matter. The Section 73 proceedings concerned correct tax liability and admissibility of input tax credit under Section 16(2)(c), whereas the DGGI proceedings under Section 74 concerned fraudulent availment of input tax credit without actual supply and involved multiple noticees. An overlap in transactions or period, or a common factual background, did not establish identity of subject matter.

Conclusion: The proceedings were not on the same subject matter, and the bar under Section 6(2)(b) was not attracted (against the assessee).

Issue (iii): Whether conclusion of the DGGI proceedings and Section 75(13) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 precluded the separate demand.

Analysis: The DGGI proceedings against co-noticees were deemed concluded following payment by the principal noticee; no tax, interest, or penalty was imposed upon the petitioner in those proceedings. Section 75(13) requires a prior penalty upon the person for the same act or omission, which was not established. Closure of proceedings on a distinct statutory basis did not extinguish the independently determined liability.

Conclusion: Neither the conclusion of the DGGI proceedings nor Section 75(13) precluded the separate liability (against the assessee).

Final Conclusion: The jurisdictional and statutory objections did not invalidate the separate adjudication, while remedies available against any decision on the pending rectification application remained governed by law.

Ratio Decidendi: The prohibition on parallel GST proceedings under Section 6(2)(b) applies only where the proceedings concern an identical subject matter; common transactions, overlapping periods, or a common assessee are insufficient where the statutory basis and allegations materially differ.