Personal signature requirement in appeal forms and refusal to admit delayed appeals under limitation rules upheld.

A prescribed appeal form may validly require the memorandum of appeal and verification to be signed personally by the appellant; placing that requirement in a foot-note to Form C(1) did not exceed the rule-making power, so an appeal filed without such compliance was invalidly presented. An order refusing to entertain a delayed appeal as time-barred falls under the limitation provision governing admission of appeals, not under the later appellate hearing provision, so no further appeal lay to the Tribunal. The refusal to condone delay was upheld because no sufficient cause was shown.

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Issues: (i) Whether the foot-note appended to Form C(1) prescribed by Rule 21 of the Income-tax Rules, requiring the memorandum of appeal and verification to be signed personally by the appellant, was ultra vires the rule-making power so as to invalidate the appeal filed on 19 February 1945; (ii) Whether the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner refusing to entertain the appeal as time-barred was an order under Section 31 of the Income-tax Act against which an appeal lay to the Tribunal.

Issue (i): Whether the foot-note appended to Form C(1) prescribed by Rule 21 of the Income-tax Rules, requiring the memorandum of appeal and verification to be signed personally by the appellant, was ultra vires the rule-making power so as to invalidate the appeal filed on 19 February 1945.

Analysis: The relevant provisions empowered the Central Board of Revenue to make rules and prescribe the form and manner of appeal. Since the requirement of personal signature and verification could validly be included in the rule itself, its placement in the foot-note to the prescribed form did not exceed the rule-making power. The placement of the requirement in the form was treated as a matter of convenience and drafting, not of illegality. The appeal filed without compliance with that requirement was therefore not validly presented.

Conclusion: The foot-note was not ultra vires, and the appeal filed on 19 February 1945 was invalid.

Issue (ii): Whether the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner refusing to entertain the appeal as time-barred was an order under Section 31 of the Income-tax Act against which an appeal lay to the Tribunal.

Analysis: On the scheme of Sections 30 and 31, the power to admit a delayed appeal and condone delay arises under Section 30(2), while Section 31 operates after an appeal has been admitted. Following the earlier binding view of the Court, an order refusing to admit a delayed appeal is an order under Section 30(2) and not under Section 31. On the facts, no sufficient cause was shown for condonation of delay.

Conclusion: The order was not one under Section 31, and no appeal lay to the Tribunal.

Final Conclusion: Both referred questions were answered against the assessee, and the refusal to condone delay as well as the Tribunal's view on non-maintainability were sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: A requirement as to personal signature and verification in a prescribed appeal form, if authorized by the enabling rule-making power, is valid even when set out in a foot-note to the form; and an order refusing to admit a delayed appeal under the limitation provision is an order under that limitation provision, not an appellate order under the succeeding hearing provision.

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