Court Upholds Refusal of Appeal Condensation & Signature Requirement

Special Manager, Court of Wards, Naraindas Narsinghdas Versus Commissioner of Income-Tax, U.P.

Special Manager, Court of Wards, Naraindas Narsinghdas Versus Commissioner of Income-Tax, U.P. - [1950] 18 ITR 204 Issues:
1. Condonation of delay in filing appeal under Section 30 of the Income-tax Act.
2. Validity of the requirement for personal signature on the memorandum of appeal.
3. Classification of the order refusing to entertain the appeal under Section 31 of the Income-tax Act.

Analysis:
1. The case involved a reference under Section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act concerning the delay in filing an appeal by the Court of Wards, representing an estate. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner rejected the appeal due to a delay in proper verification and signature on the memorandum of appeal. The Special Manager's explanation for the delay was deemed false, leading to the refusal to condone the delay and admit the appeal. The Tribunal upheld this decision, emphasizing the lack of sufficient grounds for condonation of the delay.

2. A question arose regarding the validity of the requirement for the assessee to personally sign the memorandum of appeal, as opposed to through an agent. The argument against this rule was that it was ultra vires. However, the Court held that both the rule and the form were framed within the powers granted under Section 59 of the Income-tax Act. The Court found no substance in the argument that the requirement for personal signature in the foot-note attached to the form was ultra vires, concluding that the appeal was invalid due to non-compliance.

3. Another issue addressed was the classification of the order refusing to entertain the appeal as either under Section 31 or Section 30 of the Income-tax Act. The Tribunal relied on a previous ruling, determining that the order was not under Section 31 but under Section 30(2). The Court agreed with this interpretation, explaining the sequence of events leading to the conclusion that Section 31 comes into play only after the appeal has been admitted and any delay has been condoned under Section 30(2). The decision was influenced by the fact that both the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal found no sufficient grounds for condoning the delay, based on the false explanation provided.

In conclusion, the Court answered the questions raised in the reference, affirming the decisions made regarding the delay in filing the appeal, the validity of the signature requirement, and the classification of the order refusing to entertain the appeal. The assessee was directed to pay the costs of the proceedings, with the fee for the department's counsel set at Rs. 500.