Referable question of law cannot be refused merely because an earlier ruling took the same view.

A prior decision on a similar point does not, by itself, make a later identical issue non-referable under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The High Court must examine whether the question arising from the Tribunal's order is a real question of law on its own merits; it cannot refuse a reference merely because it has already taken the same view in an earlier case. On that basis, the refusal to direct a reference was unsustainable, and the orders were set aside with a direction to the Tribunal to state the case and refer the question of law.

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Issues: Whether the High Court was justified in refusing to direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to state the case and refer the question of law under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground that an earlier decision had taken the same view.

Analysis: The existence of an earlier decision on a similar point does not, by itself, make a later identical question cease to be a referable question of law. The High Court may follow its earlier ruling or reconsider it, but it cannot reject a reference merely because the issue has previously been answered one way. Since the question raised in the present matter did arise as a question of law, the High Court ought to have directed a reference.

Conclusion: The refusal to make a reference was unsustainable, and the High Court's orders were set aside with a direction to the Tribunal to state the case and refer the question of law.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded in obtaining a reference on the disputed legal question, and the appeals were disposed of by granting that relief.

Ratio Decidendi: A question of law does not become non-referable merely because a similar issue was decided earlier; if a legal question arises from the Tribunal's order, the High Court must consider a reference under section 256(2) on its own merits.

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